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Introduction
Marxism and the Critique of Value is the first broadly representative 
book-length collection in English translation of  work from the 
contemporary German-language school of Marxian critical theory 
known as Wertkritik, or, as we have opted to translate the term, 
value-critique or the critique of value.1 The critique of value itself 
is understood in these pages as having begun with Marx, who 
initiated a theoretical project that was as philosophically radical 
as its implications were revolutionary; an incomplete project 
that has been taken up only fitfully by Marxism after Marx.2 In 
Marx’s critique of political economy, value and other categories 
attendant on it are shown to be concepts both fundamental to the 
functioning of capitalism and fundamentally incoherent, riddled 
with contradictions as pure concepts and productive of crisis as 
actually existing concepts operative in the day-to-day reproduction 
of social life under capital. While this “esoteric” Marxian critique 
has been rediscovered from time to time by post-Marxists who know 
they’ve found something interesting but don’t quite know which end 
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is the handle, Anglophone Marxism, for reasons that will become clear 
in the course of this book, has tended to bury this esoteric critique 
beneath a more redistributionist understanding of Marx, imagining 
that there could be a positive Marxist science of the economy, a science 
that would be oriented toward devolving surplus value to the labor 
that creates it.3 But what if the value relation does not constitute itself 
in contradiction to labor, but rather encompasses labor as precisely 
another of its forms of appearance — if labor is, to paraphrase and 
echo what is perhaps Norbert Trenkle’s most direct challenge to 
“traditional Marxism,” itself always already a “real abstraction” no 
less than the commodity form? What then are, for a critical thought 
still faithful to Marx, the implied forms of revolutionary practice and 
agency? 
The introductory remarks that follow are intended principally 
for readers with little to no previous knowledge of Wertkritik. The 
nearly universal absence of English translations that has prevailed up 
until now — over a period of nearly three decades, in effect an entire 
generation — has resulted in a virtually total absence of Wertkritik 
from Anglophone critical theory — even as one of  those spaces 
marked “terra incognita” on the maps drawn up by the conquerors 
and colonizers of the first phases of the capitalist world-system. Given 
this absence, the need for a minimum of historical and bibliographical 
information can hardly be more urgent — even as the context would 
itself demand to be contextualized, ad infinitum. The bulk of this 
introduction will consist of a series of interpretive summaries of the 
thirteen texts selected for translation and conforming to a loosely 
thematic sequence.4 These summaries, making up the most practical 
segment of the introduction, are intended only to orient the reader 
toward the esays themselves. The best introduction to Wertkritik as a 
theoretical orientation is the essay that begins this collection, Norbert 
Trenkle’s “Value and Crisis: Basic Questions.” There the reader will 
find a concise presentation of the “what and why” of value-critique 
(originally presented as a lecture for this purpose in 1998) that would 
render an elaborate summary of fundamental tenets here superfluous. 
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Although its precise origins in the West Germany of the 1970s and 
1980s remain a matter of some dispute, Wertkritik’s emergence as a well 
defined and systematic direction within German-speaking Marxian 
critical theory is made clear by the sheer mass, range, and depth of the 
Wertkritik archive, which consists of thousands of pages distributed 
across publications ranging from short newspaper columns to 
lengthy journal articles to monographs. Yet it may come as surprise 
to Anglophone readers to learn that Wertkritik in this systematic sense 
designates in practice the accumulated work of probably no more than 
thirty or forty individuals making up two presently non-cooperating 
theory-oriented collectives, the central core of whose members have 
for years lived and worked in and around the northern Bavarian city of 
Nuremberg and whose main activity has been to produce two roughly 
annual journals — Krisis and Exit! — with Streifzüge, a Vienna-based, 
loosely Krisis-allied, more pamphletary publication, making up a third 
venue.5 
A smaller number of individuals closely involved in the production 
of one or the other of these periodical organs have published book-
length works as well, most notably and prolifically in the case of 
Wertkritik’s most prominent author and foundational thinker, the 
late Robert Kurz. Until his untimely death in July 2012, Kurz wrote 
voluminously, publishing theoretical essays regularly in Krisis and 
then, after 2004, in Exit!; contributed regular, short newspaper 
columns in the left-wing German press (and a monthly column for the 
Folha de São Paulo, the major Brazilian daily); and authored a number 
of  book-length works as remarkable for their uncompromising 
but innovative theoretical tenor as they are for their relentlessly 
polemical militancy. Probably the best known of these is Schwarzbuch 
Kapitalismus, Kurz’s Black Book of Capitalism, a massive and truly 
paradigm-shattering reconstruction, from its beginnings to its 
present-day crisis, of the history of the capitalist mode of production.6 
Meanwhile, other, somewhat younger value-critical theorists, most 
notably Exit!’s Roswitha Scholz and Krisis editors and stalwarts Norbert 
Trenkle and Ernst Lohoff, have published a stream of profoundly 
xii Marxism and the Critique of Value
original book-length works.7
Those who imagine themselves at the vanguard of  critical 
theory, Marxist and otherwise, within the privileged zone of today’s 
unquestioned, convertible currency of a lingua franca, often share 
an unspoken article of faith according to which one can trust that 
someone, somewhere will see to it that translations of anything of 
vital significance will sooner or later find their way into theoretical 
circulation. When one considers that few of the value-critical theorists 
publishing in Krisis, Exit!, or Streifzüge are employed as academics, it 
might appear understandable that the still predominantly university-
based audience for contemporary shifts and discoveries in Marxist 
critical theory would take little notice even of an undertaking as 
enormous and electrifying as Kurz’s Black Book of Capitalism — despite 
the rumors that German investment bankers and chief executives are 
worried enough to have been among the more loyal, if clandestine, 
readers of Kurz’s journalistic columns. Is the absence of Wertkritik from 
Anglophone discourse an exceptional, even scandalous state of affairs? 
Or is such absence rather inevitably the case whenever something 
genuinely new or simply chronically excluded from the awareness of 
any cosmopolitan stratum of intellectuals is “discovered”? The editors 
of this volume do not pretend to any superiority of judgment. We 
have, nevertheless, undertaken the work of preparing this volume 
in the conviction that the contribution of Wertkritik to Marxist and 
critical theory generally is of such importance that its absence from 
contemporary Anglophone debates is remarkable and possibly 
symptomatic: a perhaps inadvertently enforced exclusion from a 
theoretical-critical field of vision, and the removal of what it excludes 
to a location at which what has for unknown reasons failed to become 
present for theoretical and critical awareness is presupposed as, by 
virtue of its contingent absence, necessarily absent, even excluded 
a priori from such theoretical and critical awareness. There are, of 
course, important exceptions.8 But English-speaking Marxists have 
tended to acknowledge the existence of the esoteric Marx as it were 
only on Sundays, quite as if the inner dynamic of the value form and an 
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understanding of the historical unfolding of events down to the present 
moment had nothing to do with one another. And perhaps that fact, 
as much as the hitherto extremely sketchy dissemination of the crisis 
theories linked to German-language critiques of political economy, 
from Henryk Grossman, Paul Mattick, and Alfred Sohn-Rethel, via the 
origins of the neue Marx-Lektüre in Adorno’s classroom in the 1960s, 
up to and including both the contemporary manifestations of the new 
reading of Marx and present-day value-critique, explains why the 
latter has remained mostly unknown ground for Anglophones.9
The difficulty of finding value-critical material in English serves 
as an exacerbated model for the rest of the non-German-speaking 
world.10 English-language translations of  the occasional short 
article by Robert Kurz or Anselm Jappe (as often as not thanks to the 
opportune discovery of Portuguese, Spanish or French translations 
from the original German) have cropped up now and then on the 
blogosphere or, if one knew enough to look, in citation indices. And 
(thanks to the tireless efforts of Joe Keady) a more consistent stream 
of English renderings of, for the most part, excerpts from the works 
of Trenkle and Lohoff now appear on the new, online-formatted Krisis. 
But true to a longstanding intellectual import pattern in the English-
speaking world, French remains the quasi-official foreign language of 
new radical theory — with Italian now sharing the domestic market 
for exotic wares. Interestingly, the single most important exception 
to this linguistically imposed localism has been, since the mid-1990s, 
the still comparatively small but energetic and sustained study of 
Wertkritik that can be found in and radiating out from the University of 
São Paulo, thanks ultimately to the efforts of Roberto Schwarz, one of 
Brazil’s foremost Marxist literary, cultural, and social theorists, whose 
influential review of the Portuguese translation of Kurz’s Der Kollaps 
der Modernisierung (The Collapse of Modernization) sparked the intense 
Brazilian interest in value-critique.11 There followed the inauguration 
of Kurz’s column for the Folha de São Paulo. With this, shorter writings 
by Kurz and other well-known value-critical theorists and authors 
began to appear in Portuguese translation as well. This then made 
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possible the at first spontaneous, now organized publication of 
translations of the periodical literature of value-critique on websites 
(including Portugal’s obeco, on which virtually everything published 
in issues of Exit! appears practically overnight in highly competent 
Portuguese translation) that are the work of independent radical 
theory circles, one of which formed in the city of Recife, a relatively 
peripheral city in the far Northeast but one with an august radical 
tradition.12 So much for the notion that theoretical vanguards travel 
first from metropolis to metropolis!
The phenomenon of  so-called “anti-German” communism 
requires some careful mention here. With its origins in the critical 
Marxist currents that rejected the Leninism and Mao-Stalinism 
of the fragmented cadre-organizations and groupuscules known 
as the K-Gruppen (so called because the first initial of most of their 
organizational abbreviations was K for kommunistisch) in the late 
1970s and 1980s, the “anti-German” German trajectory can be credited 
with having played an important role in the rediscovery of a range of 
non-orthodox Marxist traditions, including the first generation of 
the Frankfurt School (Adorno in particular), the council communists, 
Alfred Sohn-Rethel, and Hans-Jürgen Krahl. Influenced by their 
rediscovery of the anti-nationalism of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl 
Liebknecht (and later that of  the left-communists), anti-German 
communists controversially turned away from the reflexive support 
for movements of  national liberation that was near-compulsory 
among the West-German radical left of the 1970s.13
This anti-national orientation entailed a complex relationship 
to the nationalist anti-Zionism that since at least 1967 had been the 
default position on the Left in both East and West. This stemmed in 
part from critical reflection on the latent antisemitism that sometimes 
hides behind criticism of Israel, not the only state with a record of 
violent and criminal discrimination. But it also went hand in hand with 
a new understanding, strongly influenced by Moishe Postone’s “Anti-
Semitism and National Socialism,” of eliminationist anti-semitism.14 
The rethinking of the politics of antisemitism and anti-Zionism that 
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took place in the German-speaking radical Left during the course of 
the 1990s was closely related to the kinds of attempts, carried on and 
further developed by Wertkritik in ways visible in some of the essays 
collected in this volume, to understand, to analyze, and above all to 
criticize the capital relation. In particular the “anti-German” tendency 
led, among other things, to the rejection of two kinds of positions that 
are still popular among large parts of the self-styled radical left. The 
first is the criticism of the role played by finance capital with respect 
to the so-called real economy of industrial capital. This criticism, 
frequently heard in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007–8, both 
ignores the force of the Marxian insight that finance capital is itself 
dependent on the production of  surplus value, and can at times 
come disturbingly close to mirroring the National Socialist objection 
to “parasitic” (international, Jewish, exploitive) capital in favor of 
“productive” (national, German, autochthonous) capital. The second 
is the anti-Americanism masquerading as opposition to capitalism 
that would later characterize large sections of the anti-globalization 
movement, manifesting itself in a hostility to symbols such as Coca-
Cola and McDonalds. 
What is clear in the case of both of these phenomena — and what 
Wertkritik drew from its own complex origins in the political debates 
and divisions of the era, and despite later criticisms voiced against the 
“anti-German” tendency as it began itself to take on more and more 
openly reactionary and even pro-U.S. imperialist positions — is that 
they are not, appearances notwithstanding, critiques of capitalism at 
all. The first explicitly appeals to industrial capitalist production (and 
in doing so erases all class distinctions in the industrial production 
process), while the second is an argument in favor of local and often 
smaller-scale production, an argument which is frequently imbued 
with anti-American ressentiment, and which neglects the capitalist 
compulsion to valorize value on an ever larger scale. Along these same 
lines, objections to the actions of the players in the game of “casino 
capitalism” are misdirected insofar as they see these individuals 
as responsible for the system within which they act rather than 
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recognizing that the systemic consequences of the compulsion to 
the valorization of value constitute the sphere within which casino-
agency is produced. In doing so, such objections misconstrue financial 
speculation and public borrowing as causes of the crisis, when in fact 
they are merely responses to — and more specifically, processes of 
deferral of — the crisis of exchange value in which capital, which can 
no longer attain valorization in industrial production, seeks greater 
returns elsewhere, by means of the inflation of speculative bubbles.15
And as a final observation here: given Wertkritk’s key contributions 
to crisis theory, its relative absence within Anglophone economic and 
political discourse has become especially crippling since the outbreak 
of the current severe and historically unprecedented crisis of global 
capitalism in 2007-8. The considerable upsurge of interest in Marx 
that has been one result of  the current crisis — in particular in 
Marx’s theory of capitalism’s “tendency to self-destruct,” as favorably 
mentioned by Wall Street’s and the Financial Times’s most listened-to 
doom-mongering mainstream economist, Nouriel Roubini, in August, 
2011 — has in turn given rise to a plethora of theoretical and political 
debates in Left-leaning, Marxism-friendly alternative media in North 
America concerning the nature and outcome of the Great Recession, 
as the global economic downturn in the wake of the financial crisis 
of 2007–8 seems to have come to be called, at least within the U.S.16 
But what has been missing in this literature has been an analysis that 
reaches deep into the structure of Marx’s mature critique of political 
economy and at the same time beyond the limitations of what Kurz 
refers to as the exoteric Marx: the points and aspects within his work 
where Marx is concerned with and oriented toward the modernization 
and development of capitalism, from the historical perspective of his 
existence in the nineteenth century.
Not surprisingly, and despite the impressive exploratory range 
of Wertkritik across the at times seemingly endless matrix of social 
relations mediated through the value abstraction, especially as the 
latter sinks ever more rapidly and deeply into the array of symptoms 
that mark what is possibly the terminal crisis of the value form itself, 
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many problematics remain unexplored. Prominent among these, for 
reasons perhaps not difficult to discern when one considers that they 
tended to dominate the critical theory of the Frankfurt School from 
which Wertkritik has had, ironically, to distance itself  in order to 
make full use of its ties to precursors such as Adorno, are the spheres 
of culture and the aesthetic. But the question of the emancipatory 
in its immanent relation to the crisis of commodity society may be 
what finally eludes the critique of value even as it bores its way ever 
further into the depths of a future as though from front to back. If the 
associated producers no longer appear as capitalism’s gravediggers, 
who takes their place? At times Wertkritik refuses to consider that its 
take on this question requires, at the very least, evidence that the old 
notion of a political subject, whatever its composition, is worse than 
its lack — evidence that the current moment coyly witholds. But if one 
is to find such an immanent ground of emancipation, even if its traces 
are as yet absent from them, one must start by looking hard into the 
new and at times uncannily dark illuminations in the mirror held up 
to our own contemporaneity by the essays that follow.
Marxism and the Critique of Value
Norbert Trenkle’s “Value and Crisis: Basic Questions,” the first text 
in this collection, sets forth in condensed form the central tenets 
of the critique of value.17 The first, which makes clear Wertkritik’s 
origins in the Western Marxism stemming from Lukács’s History and 
Class Consciousness and its Frankfurt School offshoots, is the critique 
of  the naturalization of  social relations, according to which the 
fundamentally social categories of commodity-producing, capitalist 
society — value, commodity, money — appear, in Trenkle’s words, 
“reified and fetishized, as seemingly ‘natural’ facts of life and as 
‘objective necessities’” (1). It is the misrecognition of these categories 
as transhistorical, as ‘second nature,’ that masks the internal 
contradictions of capitalist society, contradictions from which stems 
the latter’s inexorable tendency toward crisis. Thus it is that, for 
Trenkle, the critique of value is “essentially a theory of crisis” (13).
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The point at which value-critique differs sharply from both 
what it refers to, following Postone, as “traditional” or workers’-
movement Marxism as well as from a more “traditional” critical theory 
becomes most apparent is the concept of labor, which is understood 
not as a universal precondition of human existence or as a point of 
departure for the analysis of commodity society, still less as a basis 
for the construction of a new, liberated society, but as an “oppressive, 
inhumane, and antisocial activity that both is determined by and 
produces private property” (2). Labor, which only comes to exist as 
such as the result of a violent process of appropriation that separates 
workers from the means of production and existence, is a “specific 
form of activity in commodity society,” whose highest end is the 
valorization of value (4). 
In the critique of value, labor is made the object of theoretical 
critique, falling, along with the more familiar, “traditional” 
manifestations of the value-form under the aegis of what Alfred Sohn-
Rethel termed a real or “actually existing abstraction,” a “process of 
abstraction that is not completed in human consciousness as an act 
of thought, but which, as the a priori structure of social synthesis, is 
the presupposition of and  determines human thought and action” (7). 
Trenkle takes issue, however, not only with the claim of Sohn-Rethel 
but also of Michael Heinrich, both of whom situate the real abstraction 
in the sphere of circulation and more specifically the act of exchange. 
For Trenkle and Wertkritik, in contrast, commodity production is not 
distinct from or opposed to circulation, but always mediated through 
it: the production of commodities for the sake of their exchange value 
itself  always presupposes the sphere of exchange: “every process 
of production is from the outset oriented toward the valorization 
of capital and organized accordingly” (9). This reconsideration of 
the fundamental categories of the economic sphere of commodity-
producing society has radical and profound consequences for the 
relationship between value-critique and classical economics. For if 
value is no longer seen as reducible to an empirical category that 
can be positively determined by calculating the number of hours 
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of socially useful labor that are embodied within any particular 
product, but a fetishistic result of the internalization of processes of 
dispossession, then the Marxist attempt to solve, for example, the so-
called transformation problem, to explain how a commodity’s price 
can result from its value and to account for any divergence between 
them, is revealed to be a category mistake. All attempts to formulate a 
critique of capitalism from the standpoint of labor or to found a society 
on the principle that the price workers should be paid for their labor 
should justly be determined by its (notionally calculable) value will 
necessarily reaffirm the fetish on which capitalism is based rather 
than moving beyond it.
Along with these more axiomatic arguments, Trenkle’s brilliantly 
concise outline of value-critique also sets forth the “basic finding 
of  crisis theory,” namely that “since the 1970s, as a result of  the 
worldwide, absolute displacement of living labor power from the 
process of valorization, capital has reached the historical limits of its 
power to expand, and thus also of its capacity to exist” (13). It is this, 
in turn, that makes up the central claim of the second essay of this 
dossier, Robert Kurz’s “The Crisis of Exchange Value” (“Die Krise des 
Tauschwerts”) which has perhaps the strongest claim to be regarded as 
the founding document of value-critique. The essay was first published 
in 1986 in Issue 1 of the journal Marxistische Kritik, of which seven 
issues were published between 1986 and 1989 before it was renamed 
Krisis for the publication of Issue 8/9 in December 1990 after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall.
Marxistische Kritik was itself described in the editorial of its first 
issue as in certain respects a successor of Neue Strömung [New Current], 
a journal of radical-Left theory that had been made up of people with 
a wide range of revolutionary Marxist political backgrounds, former 
members of groups ranging from the K-Gruppen (which at one point 
in the 1970s were estimated to have had about 15,000 members among 
them), to Trotskyist organizations that trace their heritage back to the 
opposition that formed in the KPD in 1928 under Heinrich Brandler 
and August Thalheimer, and the operaismo-influenced Autonome and 
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squatters’ movement that had its origins in the Extra-Parliamentary 
Opposition of the late 1960s. According to contemporary reports, this 
constellation necessitated considerable discussion over a period of two 
years before it was possible to overcome the conceptual differences 
that resulted from such relatively heterogeneous and contrasting 
traditions, clearing a path for Wertkritik both to begin publishing a 
theoretical organ of its own and, as part of the same process, to begin 
to develop along increasingly systematic and rigorous lines.
It is perhaps a legacy of  these discussions that Kurz’s essay 
advances a position that more than a decade later would be described 
in the editorial to Krisis 12 as “completely naïve, seen from our current 
perspective.” While it was clear at the time that Kurz’s reading of 
Marx’s account of relative surplus value implied “a fundamental 
turn against the primary current of all previous Marxist theory,” the 
essay was still predicated on a “traditional” Marxist affirmation of 
the working class as revolutionary subject that will no doubt come as 
a surprise to anyone whose first point of contact with value-critique 
was the 1999 “Manifesto against Labor.” In the concluding section of 
“The Crisis of Exchange Value” Kurz insists that he does not “in any 
way wish fundamentally to belittle the role of the subject: any true 
revolution must proceed by means of the subject of a social class and 
its political mediations” (73). At this point the critique of commodity 
society and of value and the doctrine of a revolutionary struggle for 
state power led by the working class were still living side by side in a 
state of peaceful co-existence. Three years later, this position would 
be fundamentally rethought in a process that finds what is perhaps its 
first explicit manifestation in the publication of Robert Kurz and Ernst 
Lohoff ’s essay “The Fetish of Class Struggle” in Marxistische Kritik 7.
“The Crisis of Exchange Value” nonetheless contained the core of 
what would develop into the collection of ideas that are represented 
by the texts translated in this dossier. The essay’s opening criticizes the 
belief of what he refers to as “the Marxist Left” that the “law of value” 
is merely a “formal law of the social allocation of resources that can 
be influenced politically,” and argues that as long as value is allowed 
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to hold sway as an element of second nature, such a Left will not be 
able adequately to understand the developments in the productive 
forces that characterized the twentieth century (18). Kurz takes issue 
with the “petrified historical interpretation of Marx” in which the 
concepts of “productive labor” and “productivity” fail to take into 
consideration the distinction between use value and exchange value 
(20). From the perspective of use value, productive labor is any form 
of useful activity; from that of exchange value, it “refers exclusively 
to the abstract process of the formation of value” (21). While it is the 
case that in simple commodity production the two are more or less 
identical, under the industrial capitalist mode of production they 
begin to diverge. 
Kurz analyzes this divergence with particular attention to the 
category of relative surplus value, the term Marx gave to the decrease 
in the ratio of necessary to surplus labor achieved by means not of the 
absolute extension of the working day but of increases in productivity 
such that the same magnitude of labor power can produce a greater 
mass of  commodities, or the same mass of  commodities can be 
produced by a lesser magnitude of labor power, lowering production 
costs, and making capitalist enterprises more competitive on the global 
market. Kurz claims that “[c]apital has no interest in and cannot be 
interested in the absolute creation of value,” but is concerned merely 
with the proportion of this new value that can be appropriated as 
surplus value (47). However, this increase in productivity results in a 
decrease in the mass of value in every individual commodity, since less 
labor time is required for the production of the same unit produced. 
“With the development of productivity, capital increases the extent 
of exploitation, but in doing so it undermines the foundation and 
the object of exploitation, the production of value as such” (47). The 
substance or content of value is eliminated, but capital must ensure 
that its forms of circulation persist. “This must lead to catastrophic 
social collisions” (54). Kurz thus identifies an absolute, immanent 
limit to capitalism, and claims not only that capital and its advocates 
are necessarily blind to the tendency toward the reduction of value-
xxii Marxism and the Critique of Value
production, but also that the Marxist Left has failed adequately to 
address much less to refine its understanding of this problematic. 
For Kurz writing in the mid 1980s, the crisis dynamic has already 
begun: each additional increase in productivity and each further 
rationalization driven by the need of individual capitals to maintain 
competitiveness on the world market only add nails to the coffin of 
the self-valorization of value. Capitalism has, in this sense, and if the 
theory holds true, entered upon its final crisis.
Despite the foreboding predictions of barbarism in this context, 
Kurz’s strongest attack is directed not against capital and its advocates, 
but against the failure of the Left to recognize the dynamic of the crisis. 
From Engels, Kautsky, and Luxemburg’s presentation of Marx’s theory 
of crisis as a theory purely of overproduction or underconsumption 
to Bernstein’s rejection of Marx’s theory of collapse altogether, Kurz 
accuses the historical Left of remaining fixated on the fetishistic, 
surface-level categories of capital and of thus failing to consider 
the divergence of contemporary capitalist production from simple 
commodity production, and the role within this divergence of relative 
surplus value. Even the ultra-left, Kurz argues — here with respect to 
Grossman and Mattick — confined themselves to a “value-immanent” 
critique that remained within the surface categories of  market 
circulation, a claim that will strike readers familiar with Mattick’s 
Marx and Keynes or his introduction to Fundamental Principles of 
Communist Production and Distribution as curious. “It thus becomes 
clear,” Kurz nonetheless insists, “that Marxist crisis theory, so far, has 
in fact not moved beyond a value-immanent mode of observation, and 
has not seized on the elements of a logical-historical explosion of the 
value relation as such are included in Marx’s work” (71). 
Claus Peter Ortlieb’s “A Contradiction between Matter and Form: 
On the Significance of  the Production of  Relative Surplus Value 
in the Dynamic of Terminal Crisis” begins from a distinction that, 
though misunderstood almost as often by Marxists as by non- and 
anti-Marxists, is fundamental to Marx’s analysis of  the dynamic 
of capitalism. As Ortlieb reminds us (following Moishe Postone), 
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no less a figure than Habermas has been led disastrously astray by 
confusing value and wealth. The former is the legible form that the 
latter assumes under capitalism; wealth does not for all that disappear 
in its conceptual nor indeed in its actual distinction from value. Two 
identical coats, for example, always represent precisely twice the 
material wealth of one; they will keep two people warm instead of 
one. But the two coats do not represent twice the value if they were 
made in a process more efficient than that used to manufacture the 
single coat.
Although under capitalism the increase in wealth is only 
accomplished by means of the production of value, there is nonetheless 
not only a distinction but also a discrepancy between the two. In spite 
of all the cycles of expansion and contraction that have characterized 
the history of capitalism, the productivity of labor has increased 
over time in a unidirectional movement within the development of 
modern capital. Ortlieb’s argument, like Kurz’s, hinges on Marx’s 
distinction between absolute and relative surplus value: once the mere 
intensification of the working day or suppression of wages has reached 
a natural or legislated limit, the development of capital can henceforth 
only be accomplished by means of increases in the productivity of 
labor — that is, by means of decreases in the use of labor relative 
to output — a decrease which at the same time reduces the value of 
the product of labor. As local gains in productivity diffuse across the 
economy, the value of particular goods tends to decrease even as the 
wealth produced in particular processes tends to increase. For this 
reason new markets and new products must constantly be found in 
order to absorb the labor thrown off by increased productivity in 
existing processes.
While Ortlieb demonstrates that we have reached a point where 
such continued expansion at the required rate is unlikely — and it 
is worth noting that economists as solidly establishment as Larry 
Summers, Secretary of the U.S. Treasury under Bill Clinton, have 
been led recently to speculate about “secular stagnation” — he does 
not rule it out: his analysis of the “terminal crisis” is a tendential 
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matter, not a punctual prediction. In any case, for Marxist analysis the 
“terminal crisis” is no way triumphal, since its issue, barring political 
intervention, would not be a liberated society but rather universal 
unemployment and destitution. Moreover, Ortlieb points out that 
the continuing “resolution” of this process by means of economic 
growth runs up against an environmental limit, the origin of which 
is none other than the same contradiction between wealth and value: 
while environmental factors like a more or less stable global range 
of temperatures clearly count as wealth, they cannot be accounted 
for as value, and “if  the destruction of material wealth serves the 
valorization of value, then material wealth will be destroyed” (112). 
How, Roswitha Scholz’s essay “Patriarchy and Commodity Society” 
asks, might we formulate a Marxist-feminist theoretical framework 
that is able to account for the current crisis and other developments 
since the end of actually existing socialism? The answer is what Scholz 
theorizes under the name “value dissociation theory.” The beginnings 
of such a critique are rooted in the fundamental assertions of value-
critique to which Scholz adds what she calls a “feminist twist,” but 
which amounts to a framework that does nothing less than foreground 
the centrality of gender relations in the development of capitalism 
(125). As is the case for value-critical approaches generally, Scholz 
begins with the assertion that the object of critique should not be 
surplus value itself (or its production via labor) but rather the “social 
character of the commodity-producing system and thus […] the form of 
activity particular to abstract labor” (125). Traditional Marxism tends 
to foreground only one facet of what should rather be understood 
as a complex system of relations, ultimately privileging analyses of 
the unequal distribution of wealth and exploitive appropriation of 
surplus value over the level at which a more fundamental critique 
should begin. It is precisely this narrow concentration and focus of 
traditional Marxism that Scholz breaks open. Indeed, she claims, today 
the Marxism of the workers’ movements has exhausted itself and has 
effectively absorbed all the basic principles of capitalist socialization, 
the categories of value and abstract labor in particular.
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Yet, Scholz argues, the critique of value, which argues against this 
absorption, is itself found wanting insofar as its hitherto inadequate 
attention to gender means that even an analysis that begins with 
a fundamental critique of the value form misses a key basis of the 
formation of  capitalism. The immense significance of  Scholz’s 
contribution for Wertkritik proper cannot, therefore, be understated 
in this regard, as the recent critical production of the Exit! group 
adopts Scholz’s emphasis on value dissociation and the importance 
of examining the gendered dimension of the value form. The analysis 
of value dissociation attempts to capture this previously missing 
basis and aims to foreground all those elements that can neither be 
subsumed by nor separated from value — all those characteristics, in 
other words, that value can neither contain within itself nor eliminate 
entirely. In a logical operation that builds upon Adorno’s notion of 
determinate negation, Scholz argues that “capitalism contains a core 
of female-determined reproductive activities” that are necessarily 
“dissociated from value and abstract labor” (127). The provocative claim 
that masculinity should be understood as “the gender of capitalism,” 
then, can be understood as Scholz’s attempt to foreground the 
instrumental function of capitalist gender relations in the development 
of capitalism itself (130). The gendering and subsequent dissociation 
of  an entire range of  broadly reproductive activities, therefore, 
ought not to be considered a side-effect of capitalism and its value 
form, but rather as a necessary precondition of value, which makes 
it necessary to speak of the emergence of a commodity-producing 
patriarchy that determines the historical development of modernity 
and postmodernity. Indeed, the universalization of gender relations 
under the principle of value dissociation as part of the development 
of the capitalist value form reveals itself to be an instrumental aspect 
of the rise of modernity. Gender without the body, then: gender whose 
being derives neither from biology nor from “culture,” but rather 
from the value form in its dissociated development. But gender that 
is still gender: it is no coincidence that the crash of 2008 is followed 
not only by an unemployment crisis but also by intensified anxieties 
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about gender norms, as evidenced in the U.S. by a brutal anti-feminist 
backlash and renewed assaults on reproductive rights. 
Such an understanding of the gender relations that structure the 
social dynamism of capitalism also highlights the shortcomings of the 
theoretical paradigms that predominate within contemporary gender 
studies. Deconstruction and the wide field of identity-political and 
even identity-critical paradigms share a problematic understanding 
of causality that obscures the necessary connection between gender 
and value, namely value dissociation as the principle that structures 
gender relations. The assumption, in other words, that cultural 
meaning attaches itself  to a previously existing gendered social 
division, misses the fundamental importance of value dissociation 
for the development of capitalism in the first place. It is thus neither 
to be considered a consequence of capitalism nor even to be likened 
to the non-identical as analyzed by Adorno. Rather, Scholz stresses, 
value dissociation is a precondition for the formation of capitalism. 
Ultimately, value-dissociation theory allows for important metacritical 
historicization that reveals, for instance, the ultimate complicity of 
the deconstructivist paradigm with postmodern forms of capitalism 
and its social logic. “Consequently, it is not only unnecessary but in 
fact highly suspect to suggest that we must deconstruct the modern 
dualism of gender” (135). While the U.S. technological sector will 
gladly recognize fifty-one genders, such a recognition does nothing 
to disturb the overwhelming dominance of men in that sector by 
every metric at every level, or to disrupt the prejudice the women who 
work in that sector face daily. An examination of the changes in the 
form of capitalism from the perspective of value-dissociation theory 
reveals that critics such as Judith Butler “ultimately merely affirm 
[…] postmodern (gender) reality”: postmodern capitalism’s “double 
socialization” of women in the context of diversity politics and of the 
structural and logical centrality of difference is a key aspect in what 
we must understand as “actually existing deconstruction” (135). 
Norbert Trenkle’s “The Rise and Fall of the Working Man” provides 
a provocative companion to Scholz’s essay. For Trenkle, as for Scholz, 
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any examination of  the ongoing economic crisis in general, and 
of the crisis of  labor in particular, must include an examination 
of its gender dimension. “The crisis of labor,” he argues, must also 
be seen as “a crisis of modern masculinity” (143). Like Scholz, who 
insists that the emergence and development of capitalism cannot be 
understood without accounting for its gendered social dimension, 
Trenkle foregrounds the dialectical connection of modern masculinity 
with the logic of modern real abstraction of labor (while the focus on 
both subjectivity and labor significantly differentiates Trenkle’s from 
Scholz’s approach). The attachment of masculine power to the logic 
of labor power places the working man in a perpetually precarious 
situation. Since power is bestowed upon him externally — and as this 
power is connected to the business cycle (and thus beyond the influence 
of individuals) and therefore carries within itself at any given point 
the potential for devaluing specific forms of power and labor — it must 
therefore be aggressively defended and renewed. In consequence, 
modern man is not characterized by the dominant cultural images 
of  muscular, physical power as such but instead by the ultimate 
privileging of the will, by the exercise of discipline and self-restraint 
over the body that puts the emerging masculine subject totally in the 
service of a system that rests upon the fundamental desensualization 
of life as the basic precondition for its labor processes. Indeed, Trenkle 
argues, an examination of the relation between the capitalist form 
of labor — its real abstraction — and its corresponding form of 
masculinity reveals that both the body and the material existence of 
the commodity are nothing more than a necessary evil in a system 
that is primarily aimed at the generation of money out of money, in 
the context of which materiality becomes nothing else than a mere 
representation, a “body” that in the end is nothing but an abstract 
content postulated by the form of the valorization of value.
But Trenkle’s essay also foregrounds an even more fundamental 
aspect of a value-critique of capitalism: the relation between capitalist 
form and its corresponding social dimension. After all, Trenkle argues, 
the establishment of “this historically unique form of social activity 
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and relation was not possible without the creation of a particular 
human type” (146). This particular human type reveals itself to be 
nothing else than the “male-inscribed modern subject of labor and 
commodities, whose central essential characteristic is that the entire 
world becomes to him a foreign object” (146). In a logical operation 
similar to Scholz’s assertion of the dialectical connection of the modern 
form of value and the feminine-inflected characteristics that are 
dissociated from value (and that precisely via this operation become 
its basic precondition), Trenkle stresses that the emergence of the 
modern working man should not be regarded as a mere consequence 
of  capitalism. Instead, he insists, modern subjectivity itself  is 
constructed according to the compulsory push toward this form of 
subjectivity without which capitalism (and its value and commodity 
form) would not have been able to develop in the first place. This form 
of subjectivity must be regarded not as a matter of passive subjugation 
but of active complicity in the development of capitalism. While the 
development of this form of masculinity must, of course, also be 
analyzed diachronically in its relation to a long history of paternalism 
that precedes capitalism, its role in capitalism is unique insofar as 
“the abstract and objectified relation to the world” with which it is 
associated “becomes the general mode of socialization” (148). The 
valence of feminine identity, then, differs in comparison with Scholz’s 
model. For Trenkle, the construction of modern feminine identity 
takes the form of the construction of a social other, a counter-identity 
that first and foremost serves to stabilize and ground the parameters 
of the male subject of labor — without, however, neglecting the role 
the division of genders plays with respect to the division of labor and 
capitalist enterprise in general. Ultimately, the purchase of Trenkle’s 
argument for the current moment is its ability to account for the rise of 
masculine-inflected aggression (including racist and sexist violence) 
that for Trenkle must be understood as directly related to the changes 
and crises of the current form of capitalism, which inevitably brings 
with them a crisis of masculinity.
In the first part of “Off Limits, Out of Control: Commodity Society 
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and Resistance in the Age of Deregulation and Denationalization,” 
Ernst Lohoff shows that what in the U.S. appear as “liberal” and 
“conservative” politics are in fact two sides of the same coin. The liberal 
side regards the remains of the welfare state as “off limits” and fights 
rearguard actions against its dismantling and commodification. The 
other, conservative side regards the welfare state as “out of control” 
and seeks to dismantle and commodify it. Both camps regard the 
gulf separating them as essentially political, rather than driven by 
an underlying economic crisis, and neither questions that the role of 
the state itself is to guarantee conditions for the the reproduction of 
capital that cannot be met by capitalism itself. Lohoff points out that 
the asocial sociality that characterizes capitalism — a social formation 
that is thoroughly integrated and integrating, but that functions, 
paradoxically, through atomization and competition — can only be 
brought under control by the state: “The asocial character of commodity 
society imposes on the latter, as still another of its essential aspects, 
the formation of a second, derivative form of wealth,” namely the state 
(157). But from the perspective of commodity society, this derivative 
form of wealth (infrastructure, social provision, public education — 
in sum, all material wealth that is not directly commodified) appears 
rather as consumption. The symbiotic character of this relation then 
depends on the state plausibly serving its integrative function, a state 
of appearances that wanes as the explosive increase of permanently 
“superfluous” human material begins to fall under the jurisdiction of 
the state. That is, at the moment that “labor society” as such enters 
a crisis. The crisis itself is offset by two mechanisms — speculation 
and finance on one hand, and privatization on the other — and it is 
this latter mechanism that prompts the debate: “off limits, or out 
of  control?” Lohoff argues that the answer is neither: instead of 
concentrating our political energies on the state as the flipside and 
guarantor of commodity society, we should think material wealth 
as such outside of the money nexus, which is to say outside both the 
state and the commodity relation. This is easy to say (if not so easy to 
think), at the level of philosophical critique. But can it translate into 
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a practical politics? The second half of the essay is devoted to thinking 
through what a counter-politics that aimed at a non-commodity 
society would look like from within commodity society, and the first 
maxim is that rearguard defenses of the state cannot be the answer. 
“The question of legitimacy ought rather to be addressed offensively 
from the outset” (172-3). If commodity society can no longer afford 
social security, this is an argument against commodity society, not 
against social security. The answer to commodity society’s principle 
of equivalence is then free access, a slogan that organizes Lohoff ’s 
vision of a counter-politics.
Kurz’s “World Power and World Money” is an attempt to think 
through the causes and consequences of a looming global economic 
crisis that was then only in its initial stages. Kurz traces the origins 
of the crisis to the Reaganite policy of “weaponized-Keynesianism” — 
massive, debt-financed military spending — that, on Kurz’s account, 
stabilized the world dollar economy and established the dominant 
global flows of debt and goods that would persist until the onset of the 
crisis (192). These phenomena are often recognized on the Left as well 
as on the Right, only in inverted form: greedy bankers and American 
imperialism, rather than a crisis-induced flight to finance and the 
arms dollar as the “overarching common condition of globalized 
capital” (198). Popular slogans such as a more democratic globalization 
or a return to Fordist employment patterns are therefore not likely to 
be effective. The closing pages, focusing on the ultimate issue of the 
current crisis, are necessarily exploratory; speculating on the fate of 
the oil regimes in the event of a world depression, Kurz does not rule 
out the danger of an irrational “flight forward” into globalized civil 
war (199).
Norbert Trenkle’s “Struggle without Classes” is perhaps the most 
striking contemporary manifestation of value-critique’s rejection of 
class struggle that began with the publication of Kurz’s and Lohoff ’s 
“The Fetish of Class Struggle” in 1989.18 In the earlier article they had 
argued that the claim that the working class represents an “ontological 
opposition to the abstract logic of the valorization of capital,” that the 
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workers’ movement is the gravedigger of capital, should properly be 
considered as a form of thought that is immanent to a society based 
on value, an ideology of modern capitalism. A subject capable of 
overcoming modern capitalism, they argue, “cannot arise from the 
affirmation of the category of the worker, but only from the crisis, 
the crisis of value.” They accuse traditional Marxism of mistaking 
the classes, a “secondary, derived category,” for what are the genuine 
foundations of society, and of reducing the analysis of the value form 
to a “merely definitional and uncritical trailer to the ‘true’ theory of 
capital,” and thus of replacing Marx’s critique of political economy 
with an affirmative vulgar socialism.
Trenkle insists that the notion that the antagonistic character of 
class struggle can point to a future beyond capitalist social relations 
is an illusion, but nonetheless affirms its historically important 
role in the constitution of the working class as a subject conscious 
of  its ability to act in pursuit of  a social mission. In this essay, 
however, he addresses the consequences of what might be thought 
of as the converse process, which following Franz Schandl he terms 
“declassing,” in which four principal trends are identified.19 First, 
direct production is increasingly replaced in the labor process 
with functions of surveillance and control, functions which have 
been internalized by the individual worker, both in the “horizontal 
hierarchies” of large companies and the precarious conditions of 
freelance and self-employed labor (204). Second, responding to the 
demand for flexibility, workers cease to identify with a single function 
of the labor process. Third, there develop more, and more distinct, 
hierarchies among workers, particularly with regard to distinctions 
and divisions between permanent employees and temporary, part-
time, and agency workers. Fourth, there emerges as a consequence of 
long-term unemployment a new underclass that is primarily defined 
by the fact that its members are not required by the valorization 
process.
Trenkle rejects the trend, particularly in the anti-globalization 
movement and its aftermath, to see this underclass as a “precariat,” 
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the contemporary embodiment of  working-class, revolutionary 
subjectivity. That is, while the early value-critical texts on this 
thematic rejected class struggle on the basis of the co-determination 
of labor and capital as mutually dependent aspects of commodity 
society, Trenkle questions whether the category of a class subject is 
valid under the conditions of contemporary capitalism, suggesting 
that appeals to the working class now involve the extension of the 
concept to refer not merely to those workers whose surplus labor 
turns the wheels of valorization, but to all who are dependent on 
wage labor, or even all those whose labor power, following Marcel 
van der Linden, “is sold or hired to another person under economic 
or non-economic compulsion,” a more or less universal and to that 
extent meaningless category (qtd. 209). Indeed, this also allows all 
conflicts to be reinscribed as class struggle and permits the inclusion 
of reactionary movements such as ethnic nationalisms within the 
category of anti-capitalist struggles.
Trenkle not only offers an analysis of  the fragmentation of 
capitalism as nothing more than “the intensification of the logic 
of capital in the stage of its decomposition,” but also discusses the 
possibility of forms of resistance to this fragmentation and to the 
tyranny of the commodity-form (219). This is best seen as a growing 
tendency of the Krisis group and the Göttingen-based group 180° to 
investigate forms of value-critical political (or, since it rejects the 
foundation of politics that is the value form, anti-political) praxis. He 
insists that struggles such as those of “the Zapatistas, the autonomous 
currents of the Piqueteros, and other grass-roots movements” must 
not be romanticized or idealized, but identifies them as sites where we 
might find “approaches and moments which point to the perspective of 
a liberation from the totality of commodity society” (221). This tentative 
discussion of praxis is perhaps a point at which value-critique could 
constructively be brought into contact with Marxist currents outside 
the German-speaking world. Value-critique has up until now neither 
engaged particularly thoroughly nor been received by elements of the 
contemporary ultra-Left that insist both on the importance of struggle 
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and on the abolition rather than the affirmation of the proletariat. This 
essay may provide the starting point for such confrontations.
In “Violence as the Order of Things,” Ernst Lohoff takes up a series 
of fundamental questions about violence in the present moment. 
Given that, with the supposedly final and complete triumph of free-
market capitalism and its associated secular-Enlightenment catechism 
of “Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality” over its erstwhile Cold War rival 
all the underlying sources of violent conflict and war ought to have 
been extirpated as well, how is one to explain the violence with which 
we are confronted almost daily? How can such epidemic violence be 
understood as anything other than a paradoxical aberration in the 
face of an otherwise irreversible march toward world peace? What 
can be the sources of the violence we see emerging today on all sides? 
Must it not be categorically different from the more familiar forms of 
violence that marked previous moments in history?
Counter to the dominant narrative that traces the gradual 
disappearance of violence in tandem with the subsumption of the 
state under market forces, Lohoff ’s essay illustrates the ways in 
which capitalism and the rise of Western liberalism are inextricably 
and indeed constitutively bound up with violence. This relation is, 
according to Lohoff, particularly marked in the post-1989 era in 
which we are supposedly witnessing a transition into a peaceful 
world of globalization but which is instead defined by growing forms 
of violence that are the result not of momentary aberrations but of 
the violent core of capitalist modernity, itself pushed to a moment 
of crisis. Lohoff ’s essay traces the history of this violent core that, 
he argues, lies at the very heart not only of capitalism but also of 
Enlightenment thought. Thus, any genuinely genealogical tracing of 
the forms of violence that define our present moment must begin 
from a clear understanding of the historical changes — in a word, the 
crisis — affecting that same commodity form.
Lohoff returns to the writings of Hobbes, Hegel, and Freud to show 
that the Western ideals of Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality are not 
pathways toward peace but instead directly linked to merely temporary 
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suspensions of violence that mask the more fundamental relation: the 
violent core of the commodity subject and of commodity society. Such 
a change in perspective, Lohoff argues, allows us to highlight the ways 
in which war and violence have not been so much eradicated as instead 
sublimated, controlled, and instrumentalized, that is, brought under 
the rule of the modern state, the formal genesis of which parallels the 
rise of commodity society. This brings about the need to reconsider 
the work not only of Hobbes but also of Hegel. Indeed, from this 
perspective, according to Lohoff, Hegel emerges, surprisingly, as 
an apologist and propagandist for rising commodity society to the 
extent that his theoretical model of consciousness rests upon a logic of 
violence: the famous need to wager one’s life that is central to Hegel’s 
account of self-consciousness. Lohoff ’s essay concludes with a forceful 
critique of a contemporary capitalist and free-market ideology that 
does not, by means of its gradual dissolution of the state and thus of 
the state monopoly on violence, herald an age of peace, but instead 
brings once more to the forefront capitalism’s paradoxical but no less 
essential defining social relation, “asocial sociality.” Only this time 
Enlightenment’s gradual ideological sublimation of the commodity 
form’s “violent core” from Hobbes, say, to Rosseau, Kant, and Hegel, 
from the Leviathan’s deterrent threat of a pre-atomic mutually assured 
destruction, to the more compassionate faith entrusted to the “volonté 
generale” (equipped with a guillotine) of the Social Contract, to Kant’s 
purely rationalized “categorical imperative” (always back-stopped by 
the sovereign state of exception commanding obedience to enlightened 
despotism) begins to play out in reverse. 
Like Lohoff, Kurz traces the linkage between the dark underbelly 
of Enlightenment thought and the rise of capitalism. In his essay 
“The Nightmare of  Freedom,” he turns more specifically toward 
the ways in which concepts such as freedom and equality have not 
only shaped liberalism (a well-known story) but also Marxism and 
anarchism, traditions in which these concepts and their attachment 
to the development of Enlightenment thought occupy a much more 
uncomfortable position, and indeed have often been explicitly 
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disavowed. Kurz finds in Marx a persuasive account of how freedom 
and equality emerged not simply as lofty ideals, but rather under 
precise material conditions that assigned to these concepts a specific 
material and historical function. Indeed, as Kurz shows, the dominant 
form of equality (a far from homogenous concept) in modern Western 
thought is the equality of the market. The freedom to buy or sell on 
equal ground and by equal means becomes the dominant form of 
fulfilling and retroactively defining equality and equality’s aims. 
Under capitalism, all customers are equally welcome, the marketplace 
is the realm of mutual respect, and the exchange of commodities is 
an interaction free from violence. Yet, Kurz argues, it is important 
in this context to return to Marx’s forceful critique of this line of 
argumentation, which reminds us that the market sphere constitutes 
only one small facet of modern social life, and that a more profound 
understanding of these relations begins with the insight that exchange 
and circulation are secondary to the more fundamental relations of 
capitalist production. And once we regard capitalist society from the 
perspective afforded by this more primary relation, the well-worn 
theory that, like “bourgeois democracy,” principles such as equality, 
freedom, and non-violence must inevitably suffer betrayal at the 
hands of the capitalist social relations (that are nevertheless their 
historical conditions of possibility) is disclosed, more precisely, as 
itself a thoroughly bourgeois ideology. As Kurz illustrates, it is just this 
seemingly paradoxical opposition that is constitutive of capitalism: 
the unfreedom within capitalist production is systemically bound up 
with the narrative of freedom and equality that underlies the ideology 
of the market — a tension that, as Kurz argues, becomes even more 
acutely pronounced under neoliberalism.
What becomes visible here is neither simply an illustration of the 
limits of discussions that focus on trade and circulation (over and 
against production or the constitution and reproduction of capitalism’s 
value form), nor an analysis that foregrounds the violent dialectic of 
freedom and unfreedom that lies at the heart of capitalism. Instead, 
the account of the paradoxical ways in which Enlightenment ideals 
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are integrated into the logic of capital demonstrates that freedom as 
it is understood even by discourses that understand themselves as 
emancipatory is nothing more than a necessary element of capitalism’s 
valorization machine. Specifically, this means that we should regard 
the sphere of circulation and the market not only as a “hypocritical 
sphere of freedom and equality” (which it of course is), but more 
importantly as “a naked function of the end-in-itself of capitalist 
valorization” (288). In this sphere, where abstract value “realizes” 
itself as money, the freedom that constitutes the logic of free trade 
is indispensable. Utopias based on a liberated exchange relation, like 
the LETS (Local Exchange Trading Systems) championed by Kojin 
Karatani, realize the logic of capital rather than oppose it.
In “Curtains for Universalism,” Karl-Heinz Lewed brings a startling 
perspective to the characterization of political Islam. The initial and 
obvious object of critique, the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis, is 
hardly taken seriously by anyone on the Left, but Lewed begins with 
it in order to lay bare the deeper dimensions of his analysis. So, for 
example, Lewed reminds us that, far from representing the resurgence 
of an archaic form, Islamic fundamentalism takes shape at the local 
level as precisely the brutal repression of archaisms, here in the form 
of longstanding local Islamic traditions that must be suppressed in the 
name of a standardized system of law and jurisprudence. Furthermore, 
Lewed not only debunks the widespread (and often murderously 
aggressive) belief that “Islamism” is the atavistic expression of a 
hostile and “foreign” culture or civilization. On the contrary, Lewed 
argues that Islamism is in fact nothing other than a form of appearance 
of our own “civilization,” rendered superficially “exotic” by ideologies 
of culturalism. That is, more accurately put, Islamism is disclosed 
as simply one possible variation on a form of civilization required 
by the saturation of social relations by the market, that is, by the 
value relation. To be specific, this saturation necessitates a dialectic 
of  universal and particular such that the generalized pursuit of 
particular interests cannot dispense with a universal framework 
to preserve the appearance of a universal redress of interests. But 
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this system of social mediation is itself administered by individuals 
with particular interests. Such a dialectic proves to be irresolvable in 
the long run but not uncontainable: the ideological force that keeps 
the whole dialectic in check is the promise of national progress. The 
classical anticolonial movements develop on this basis: the colonial 
sovereign power operates in its own interest rather than that of the 
colonized territory, which is to say that the local economy, although 
universal in form is dominated by the particular interest of a foreign 
power. The strategies of recuperative modernization (nachholdende 
Modernisierung) pursued by the newly independent postcolonial 
states, once they fail to deliver on the promise of national progress, 
are assailed on precisely the same basis: governing elites, charged 
with guaranteeing universal progress, proceed instead to channel the 
wealth of the new nation back into the service of their own particular 
needs. 
Islamism represents a “solution” to this ideological dilemma, a 
solution which, since it patently has neither grounds from which to 
think through, nor any interest in thinking through, the problem of 
a neo-colonial formation in relation to a critique of the value form, 
can propose no way out of it, presenting instead a hypertrophied, 
transcendentally guaranteed version of political universalism. In 
a reading of a key text by Osama bin Laden, Lewed shows that it is 
shot through with the rhetoric and logic of Enlightenment politics. 
Universality, since it can no longer be guaranteed by the sovereign, can 
only be guaranteed transcendentally, through a religiously-inflected 
universal law. With this we return, ironically, to Kant, who perceived 
that the guarantee of universality could only be transcendentally 
postulated and not empirically established through contract: “The 
metaphysics of the divine law of the Islamists should, therefore, be 
seen within the horizon of modern bourgeois relations, as formulated 
by Kant in The Metaphysics of Morals” (318-9). It should be emphasized, 
then, that the political crisis represented by Islamism is the form of 
appearance of a much more general phenomenon. In understanding 
Islamism as a cultural matter rather than as the local expression of 
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bourgeois politics as such, the “Enlightened perspective of today…
hides the problem of its own foundations” (319). 
In Kurz’s examination of  the ongoing global economic crisis, 
assembled from interviews conducted for the Internet magazine 
Telepolis and the Portuguese internet organ Shift, published by Zion 
Edições, he not only engages in detail with the economic crisis itself 
but takes this examination as an opportunity to illustrate the general 
stakes of a critique of the value form at this moment in history. The 
result is a programmatic and methodological essay that at every 
moment parallels the illumination of  the object of  inquiry with 
an analysis of  the theoretical model with which the operation is 
carried out. The current global economic crisis constitutes for Kurz 
the moment at which a range of fundamental contradictions that 
underlie the valorization of value under finance capital come to a 
head. Far from being an isolated incident, the current crisis should 
be more accurately understood as the consequence of the gradual, 
disproportionate growth of the cost of the necessary mobilization 
of real capital (material capital) in relation to labor power as a by-
product of the increasing integration of science as a productive force 
with capitalist production in the aftermath of the third industrial 
revolution, the restructuring of  production in the wake of  the 
development of microelectronics. Financing this structure required 
the massive mobilization of anticipated future profit in the form of 
credit, whose direct consequence was a series of financial bubbles that, 
once burst, triggered the recent crisis. Yet, Kurz argues, the problem is 
to be located at a more fundamental level than that imagined by those 
who merely point toward the seeming irrationality of finance bubbles, 
since such bubbles are not aberrations confined to the discrete sphere 
of finance but rather constitute a symptom of the underlying global 
economic system that developed into a “deficit economy” (332). The 
growing gap between the future profit necessary to justify present 
credits and the profit actually generated ultimately led to a situation 
in which the “valorization of capital was virtualized in the form 
of fictional capital that could no longer be matched by the actual 
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substance of value” (335). Even the neoliberal revolution could only 
strategically defer but not resolve the fundamental contradictions 
of a deficit economy. Examining the problem from this perspective 
also illustrates the contradictions underlying current attempts to 
address the crisis in the form of state-sponsored bailout and stimulus 
programs that merely displace the problem from one sphere of credit 
to another while also actively counteracting the logic of the stimulus 
interventions by the simultaneous implementation of  austerity 
measures. In fact, Kurz predicts, the irrationality of the contradictory 
state-sponsored measures underlying all current attempts to resolve 
the crisis — the simultaneity of stimulus and saving programs — 
does little to change the more fundamental contradictions (the global 
economy and its logic of value and credit will remain confined to the 
circulation of deficits), and will likely lead to a further amplification of 
contradictions that will result in a second wave of the global economic 
crisis. 
Solutions to the current problem, therefore, do no lie in illusory 
attempts at recreating “good” (most frequently state-controlled) 
forms of capitalism — as proposed, for example, by calls for a return 
to Keynesianism. Instead it is necessary to forward a radical critique 
of the value and commodity forms themselves that is not limited by 
the desire to leave intact the fundamental principles of capitalism, 
a limitation that will reduce all attempts at resolving the crisis to 
mere crisis management and will result in a further intensification 
of contradictions. Such a critique must centrally include the transition 
from workers’-movement Marxism to what Kurz calls, in reference to 
Lukács’s early work, “categorical critique” — a critique that does not 
seek social emancipation based upon the persistent ontologization of 
the concept of labor but instead seeks to address capitalism’s “basic 
forms” (349). Indeed, categorical critique and the corresponding 
new global social movements for which Kurz calls (calls which are 
accompanied by a radically revised concept of revolution) aim at 
the contestation of what he calls, using the concept and term first 
introduced by Alfred Sohn-Rethel, the dominant “social synthesis”: 
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the negative totality of the specific form of socialization determining 
the present historical moment, which can only be surpassed by 
means of a total social revolution that begins in theory as in practice 
with a categorical critique of the internal barriers of contemporary 
capitalism, namely the reliance upon abstract labor, its form of the 
valorization of value, and its corresponding gender relations.
We turn finally to Kurz’s essay “The Ontological Break” in which he 
explores what is widely understood to be one of the defining problems 
of theoretical thought and political discussion today. The debate over 
globalization appears to have reached a moment of exhaustion — 
why? The reasons for this exhaustion are not linked to what some 
may understand as the end of globalization. On the contrary, Kurz 
suggests, the social process underlying globalization is still in its 
incipient stage. Rather, it is critique that has run out of steam. The 
dominant approach to globalization is to examine it against the 
backdrop of national economies. Yet, Kurz suggests, even as critique 
points toward the end of national economies and the nation state, the 
reaction to such proclamations is regressively contradictory: the end 
of the nation state appears merely to reaffirm the commitment to the 
nation state, to previous modes of economic and social regulation, and 
to modes of analysis that remain rooted in the logic of nation states 
and politics. This problem emerges, Kurz suggests, because within 
such a hermetically sealed form of thought there exist “no immanent 
alternatives to these concepts because, just like concepts such as labor, 
money, and market, they represent the petrified determinations of 
modern capitalist ontology” (357-8). The main task of critique today, 
therefore, is to explode the entire epistemological construct by 
radically historicizing its underpinnings — that is, to return the focus 
of critique to the precise historical fields within which our concepts of 
sociality emerge and within which they acquire meaning, force, and 
necessary historical limits. The endpoint we have reached, therefore, 
is that of a form of thought, of a range of linked historical concepts. 
Whenever such a moment of exhaustion is reached, it also carries 
with it a distinct crisis of theory and critique, for the replacement 
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of the fundamental categories of thought or their revision appears 
unimaginable, and the endpoint appears untranscendable. Yet, Kurz 
shows, such a moment of exhaustion must be rigorously historicized 
with the aim to reveal it not as an endpoint proper, but rather as the 
endpoint merely of a historically specific form of thought. In order 
for us to develop forceful accounts and critiques of globalization, Kurz 
therefore argues, we must bring about nothing less than a profound 
and complete ontological (and consequently epistemological) break 
— a break, that is, with those forms of thought that, once dominant, 
have now run out of steam.
Such a break might begin with Kurz’s suggestion that the perceived 
crisis of critique we are experiencing contains a misrecognition: 
“contemporary analysis asserts more than it knows. With its insight 
into the loss of the regulatory capacity of the nation state and of 
politics, it involuntarily comes up against the limits of modern ontology 
itself ” (359). Yet the aim radically to re-evaluate the very categories 
within which critique has played itself out, categories that emerged 
under historically determinate conditions between the sixteenth and 
the eighteenth century, is blocked by what Kurz calls an “ideological 
apparatus, which is as constitutive of modernity as the categorical 
totality of its social reproduction” (360). This ideological apparatus is, 
Kurz’s essay shows, nothing other than Enlightenment thought itself. 
Additionally, he argues, it is important to foreground the fact that 
modernity was determined by large-scale conflicts between liberalism, 
Marxism, and conservatism, conflicts that “always addressed specific 
social, political, juridical, or ideological matters.” Yet these conflicts 
“never addressed the categorical forms and ontological modes of 
sociality,” the precise terrain on which the categorical break that can 
reinvigorate contemporary critique must take place (365). Kurz’s essay 
outlines the forms such a break and its subsequent modes of critique 
may take, modes of critique that are aimed at nothing less than the 
constitution of a new society of critique, a “common […] planetary 
society” (372).
It is the possibility of such a common planetary society — of 
xlii Marxism and the Critique of Value
life free from mediation through the categories of value and labor 
— toward which the critique of value is oriented. We present these 
thirteen texts not merely because we are of the opinion that value-
critical voices and arguments — along other recent and contemporary 
work from the neue Marx-Lektüre not represented in this volume — can 
make a significant theoretical contribution to the interpretation and 
analysis of the ongoing crisis. For the critique of value has profound 
consequences for both theory and practice, and urgently raises the 
question of the form(s) that an emancipatory response to the crisis 
might take. As the renewal of the remorseless critique of everything 
that exists — the remorseless critique of the mediation of everything 
that exists through the categories of labor and value — the critique 
of value both demands and makes possible the instantiation of a 
means of struggle, of action, of practice that not only goes beyond 
the constraints of the capital-labor relation, but also aims at the 
emancipation from value of all aspects of life.
Work on the publication of this book has from the outset confirmed 
and re-confirmed the impossibility of such a project without the 
support of an informal collectivity that has, over the years ultimately 
needed to reach this goal, grown both outwards and inwards, and that 
has sometimes seemed to shrink and weaken only to prove itself to 
be just as firmly in place. Offers of help in all aspects of the work 
have frequently appeared before those of us who had necessarily to 
stay with the preparation of the book without let-up were even quite 
aware that we needed it. To the translation work undertaken by the 
co-editors themselves, many, many others contributed, including 
especially: Jon Dettman, Ariane Fischer, Elmar Flatschart, Joe Keady, 
Matt McLellan, Sina Rahmani, Emilio Sauri, Imre Szeman, Geoffrey 
Wildanger, and Robert Zwarg. Our gratitude to the authors of the 
texts themselves could hardly be overstated, but for their ex cathedra 
help we are especially indebted to Elmar Flatschart, Anselm Jappe, 
Wolfgang Kukulies, Karl-Heinz Lewed, Moni Schmid and Roswitha 
Scholz, and above all to Claus Peter Ortlieb of  Exit! and Norbert 
Trenkle of Krisis with whom we have been in regular communication 
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throughout this long editorial process, and without whose co-
operation — not to mention that of  the many other German and 
Austrian friends and comrades who answered more and less trivial 
questions on our behalf at their request — this project would scarcely 
have been possible. And finally we wish to express special thanks for 
the many kinds and many hours of dedicated assistance provided to 
us by Joe Atkins, Aaron Benanav, Brett Benjamin, Mark Bennett, Jasper 
Bernes, David Brazil (together with the California, East Bay chapter 
of the Public School), Nora Brown, Pat Cabell, Maria Elisa Cevasco, 
Joshua Clover (together with the many students and other readers 
of Capital and crisis theories — including early draft translations of 
this volume — who sepnt many rewarding hours together in multiple 
indepedent group study formations under the auspices of the Program 
in Critical Theory at the University of California, Davis), Kfir Cohen, 
Sean Delaney, Tanzeen Dohan, Eef, Anna Björk Einarsdottir, Maya 
González, Christian Höner, Laura Hudson, Fred Jameson, Tim Kreiner, 
Felix Kurz, Alexander Locascio, Duy Lap Nguyen, Erin Paszko, Jen 
Phillis, Michel Prigent, Ricardo Pagliuso Regattieri, Pedro Rocha de 
Oliveira, Gwen Sims, Magnús SnaebjÖrnsson, Chris Wright, and 
Michelle Yates. Unnamed here, for the simple fact that they are so 
many, are the ‘enemies of utopia for the sake of its realization’ — 
those students, colleagues, activists, and hard-thinking individuals 
and groups of all kinds who helped with or simply took an interest in 
this project out of a common desire to understand the crisis-driven, 
moribund, and lethal capitalism of our present day — to understand 
it precisely so as to hasten its destruction.
This project could not have been completed without support from 
the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung; the LAS Award for Faculty 
Research at the University of Illinois at Chicago; the Killam Research 
Fund at the University of Alberta; St. Francis Xavier University and the 
University Council for Research at St. Francis Xavier University; the 
Arts and Humanities Research Council; the Deutscher Akademischer 
Austauschdienst; the President and Fellows of  Queens’ College, 
Cambridge; the Peter Szondi-Institut at the Freie Universität Berlin; 
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the School of  English, Communication, and Philosophy, Cardiff 
University.
For all our gratitude to the great many who have helped us, 
responsibility for all errors remains of course with the translators 
and editors. And we are confident that despite our best efforts there 
will still be a great many errors to be found. Anyone who has paid 
critical attention to translations of theoretical work will be aware 
that they are all in some way flawed — and yet the vast majority 
are nonetheless good enough. However, the possibilities enabled by 
online publication will allow us to correct with relative ease many of 
the errors that we find and that are drawn to our attention. We invite 
readers to participate in a process of open peer review, and to send 
notice of any errors and inconsistencies of translation, or other errors 
or inaccuracies, to corrections@mcmprime.com before June 30, 2014; 
the gamma or definitive edition will be published in summer 2014.
- The Editors
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Notes
1. We use “Wertkritik,” “value-critique” (and variations, e.g., “critique of 
value,” “value critical,” and so on) to refer specifically to the theories 
represented in the output of the journals Exit!, Krisis, and Streifzüge. 
(Since its founding in 2004, Exit! has tended, following the work of 
Roswitha Scholz, to refer exclusively to Wertabspaltungskritik, or the 
“critique of value-dissociation” — a term that effectively labels the 
same systematic theoretical and critical standpoint, although Exit! would 
argue that their theoretical understanding of it differs from that of the 
post-2004 Krisis.) This is to an extent a label of convenience that goes 
back to before 2004, up until which time most of the figures associated 
with Wertkritik in Germany were to a greater or lesser extent affiliated 
with and in many cases involved in the production of the “first” Krisis, 
of which, between 1986 and the end of 2003, twenty-seven issues had 
been published, the first seven under the title of Marxistische Kritik. The 
publication of Krisis 28 in 2004 marked the beginning of a resolution, 
however unsatisfactory, to a conflict-ridden and at times highly polemical 
public split in the pre-2004 Krisis that saw two of its central figures, 
Robert Kurz and Roswitha Scholz, along with others including Hanns 
von Bosse, Petra Haarmann, Brigitte Hausinger and Claus Peter Ortlieb, 
found the journal Exit! as an alternative project, which began publication 
later in that same year. 
We are of course aware that this term, as well as references in English 
to “value-critique” or “critique of the value form,” can and often are taken 
to refer much more broadly to works of Marxian critical theory and of 
advanced Marx scholarship written mainly in German and as well as 
in some fewer cases to works and authors writing in English, French, 
Portuguese and a scattering of other languages. Principal among these 
works are those of Hans-Georg Backhaus, Helmut Reichelt, and some 
others who, influenced by such seminal works as Roman Rosdolsky’s 
landmark study, The Making of Marx’s Capital (first published in English 
in 1977), began the task of a serious re-examination of Marx’s theory of 
value (and his critique of value) in Capital and the until then little-known 
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or -studied Grundrisse. This early work, acknowledged as a crucial source 
for, if also subject to critique by, the self-designating representatives of 
what we here designate as value-critique or Wertkritik, can also be traced 
through to the work on Marxian theory and critique of the value form 
associated with the neue Marx-Lektüre or “new reading of Marx.” The 
latter began to emerge in the 1960s (drawing inspiration from Evgeny 
Pashukanis and Isaak Rubin, as well as from the German-language 
critical Marxist traditions) and is now probably most prominently 
represented by the important Marx scholarship as well as critical and 
polemical writings of Michael Heinrich. As can be seen from several of 
the texts in this collection, an intense polemic has sprung up between 
leading theorists associated with both current value-critical journals 
Krisis and Exit! and Heinrich himself, who has also become probably the 
most prominent of contemporary Germanophone critics of crisis theory 
à la Wertkritik. Our decision to employ the term “Wertkritik” in this more 
restricted sense is not to deny that their are interconnections between 
Wertkritik more narrowly defined and the neue Marx-Lektüre, but rather 
to recognize that within this context there exist a range of tendencies, 
of which Wertkritik, the subject of this volume, is one.
2. Kurz distinguishes between the exoteric and the esoteric Marx. The 
former develops from the perspective of modernization, and is the 
Marx that has been dominant in the political reception of his work, 
most particularly by Lenin and his followers, and by social democracy, 
and remains dominant in what value critics tend to refer to as labor-
movement or workers-movement Marxism. The esoteric Marx, which 
involves the development of  a categorical critique of  capitalism, a 
critique that is never brought to completion within Marx’s work, remains 
much less accessible. For Kurz this esoteric Marx has been written out of 
history by Marxism’s elevation of the exoteric Marx to a dogma.
3. It is interesting to note the willingness of theory-influenced scholars 
in the humanities to see the force of the critique of the logic of the 
(“positivist”) social sciences, but only very rarely to acknowledge the 
force of its continuation and development in Marx’s critique of political 
economy, and the implications of this continuation for practice in the 
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humanities. In this of course the reduction of the first generation of the 
Frankfurt School’s radical and potentially world-changing critique to 
a cultural or merely academic project mirrors long after the event the 
neglect of the force of Marx’s critique of political economy, which was 
transformed into a left-wing political economy that survives today, and 
not only in the representatives of the transfigured image of actually-
existing socialism. 
4. This “thematic” sequence runs as follows: I. “value – crisis,” comprising 
the first three selections; II. ”value – gender,” comprising the following 
two; III. “crisis and the heteronomy of politics,” comprising selections six, 
seven, and eight; IV. “value and the critique of enlightenment,” made up 
of nine, ten, and eleven; and V. “capitalism (and theory) at their historical 
limit-points,” referring to the final two works, twelve and thirteen.
5. This volume, perhaps the first project since 2004 to have involved the 
mutually sanctioned publication of works by writers on both sides of 
the split, is not the place to rehearse the details of a conflict that mixed 
(and often conflated) political and personal disagreements. Many of 
the relevant documents are publicly available, and it is a story that is 
ultimately much less interesting than the necessarily only partial account 
of the theoretical resources offered by the critique of value that is told by 
the translations collected in this volume. Since 2004 Exit! — http://www.
exit-online.org/ — has published eleven issues, most recently in July 
2013. Krisis 33, the journal’s last paper issue, was published in 2010; the 
journal recently switched to an online-only format whereby theoretical 
articles of often substantial length are published on the organization’s 
website — http://www.krisis.org/ — as Beiträge or contributions (in line 
with the journal’s subtitle of ”Contributions to the Critique of Commodity 
Society”) alongside more journalistic and blog-style pieces. Both 
organizations also organize a weekend-long public seminar involving 
presentations by regular contributors and occasionally invited guests, 
and lengthy discussion. Streifzüge — http://www.streifzuege.org/ — 
has been published in Vienna since 1997. Regular contributors to Exit! 
include Robert Kurz (until his death in 2012, although there remains 
a flow of posthumously published material), Roswitha Scholz, Claus-
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Peter Ortlieb, Udo Winkel and, more recently, Elmar Flatschart, while 
frequent contributors to and editors of Krisis include Norbert Trenkle, 
Ernst Lohoff, Karl-Heinz Lewed, Peter Samol, Stefan Meretz and Julian 
Bierwirth. Figures associated with Streifzüge include Franz Schandl and 
Petra Ziegler.
6. Robert Kurz, Schwarzbuch Kapitalismus: ein Abgesang auf  die 
Marktwirtschaft, was first published in 1999 (Frankfurt a.M.: Eichborn) 
and after several re-editions an expanded, second edition was released 
in 2009. A PDF of a reset version of the 2002 impression is downloadable 
from the Exit! website at http://www.exit-online.org/pdf/schwarzbuch.
pdf. Work is ongoing on an English translation. During his life Kurz 
wrote more than a dozen monographs, a writing career that began with 
the publication of Der Kollaps der Modernisierung: Vom Zusammenbruch 
des Kasernensozialismus zur Krise der Weltökonomie [The Collapse of 
Modernization: From the Collapse of Barracks Socialism to the Crisis of the 
World Economy] (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn, 1991).
7. Roswitha Scholz’s Das Geschlecht des Kapitalismus: Feministische Theorie und 
die postmoderne Metamorphose des Patriarchats [The Gender of Capitalism: 
Feminist Theory and the Postmodern Metamorphosis of Patriarchy] (Bad 
Honnef: Horlemann, 2000) represents a decisive turn of the critique of 
value toward its implications for our understanding of the relationship 
between gender relations and capitalism. Scholz further develops this 
inquiry in “Patriarchy and Commodity Society: Gender without the 
Body” (123-42 in this volume). Perhaps the most significant (and certainly 
the most timely) collaboration between Ernst Lohoff and Norbert Trenkle 
is their 2012 analysis of the ongoing crisis, Die Große Entwertung: Warum 
Spekulation und Staatsverschuldung nicht die Ursache der Krise sind [The 
Great Devaluation: Why Speculation and Public Borrowing are not the Causes 
of the Crisis] (Münster: Unrast, 2012). See also Josh Robinson’s review 
“Riches Beyond Value,” Mediations 27.1-2 (Winter 2014) 365-68.
8. Among them, of course, Moishe Postone ranks as the most outstanding. 
The fact that Postone’s great work, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, 
continues, despite important critiques undertaken of the latter by both 
Kurz in Exit! and, more recently, by Lohoff in Krisis, to be perhaps the one 
xlixIntroduction
monograph-length work most carefully studied and scrupulously cited 
by Wertkritik — after Marx’s Capital — deserves more careful assessment 
than has been possible in this brief introduction. Postone’s work itself, 
although increasingly known among Anglophone readers, continues to 
circulate far more widely in German translation and in Germany itself 
than in English.
9. Both Helmut Reichelt and Hans-Georg Backhaus studied under Adorno 
in Frankfurt. The appendix to the latter’s account of the dialectic of the 
value form consists of extracts from a transcript of Adorno’s seminar 
of summer 1962 on Marx and the fundamental concepts of sociological 
theory (Dialektik der Wertform: Untersuchung zur Marxschen Ökonomiekritik 
[Freiburg: Ça ira, 1997] 501–13). A translation of this transcript by Verena 
Erlenbusch and Chris O’Kane is forthcoming in Historical Materialism.
10. See, however, internet-published translations that include a series 
of shorter items by Kurz that have appeared on libcom.org (at http://
libcom.org/tags/robert-kurz) and a range of  translations at http://
principiadialectica.co.uk. It is worth noting that the former are mostly 
translated into English from Spanish translations (possibly themselves 
translated from the Portuguese) while many but by no means all of the 
latter come via the French of Wolfgang Kukulies and Anselm Jappe. A 
particularly significant contributor to this culture of freely available 
and widely read translations is Alexander Locascio, who has translated 
and published on his blog a wide range of texts from the neue Marx-
Lektüre, Wertkritk, and from the German speaking critical Marxist left 
and ultra-Left more widely. His translation of Michael Heinrich’s Kritik 
der politischen Ökonomie: Eine Einführung (Stuttgart, Schmetterling: 2004) 
was published as An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx’s Capital 
(New York: Monthly Review, 2012). 
11. For a sense of  Roberto Schwarz’s investment in Wertkritik, see “An 
Audacious Book,” Mediations 27.1-2 (Winter 2014) 357-61. Schwarz has 
always been centrally interested in the question of combined and uneven 
development, which is to say in the way capitalism as a total process is 
experienced and indeed functions differently in diverse local contexts. 
See Robert Kurz, O Colapso da Modernização: da derrocada do socialismo de 
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caserna à crise da economia mundial, translated by Karen Elsabe Barbosa 
(Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1991).
12. http://obeco.planetaclix.pt
13. Kurz’s concept of recuperative nationalism finds its most extensive 
exposition in Schwarzbuch Kapitalismus, 206–17, in which he analyses the 
appeals made to German nationalism by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Johann 
Gottfried Herder, and above all Friedrich List, and the persistence of these 
appeals both under actually existing socialism and in twentieth-century 
development economics. In this volume the concept is rethought and 
deployed in essays including Lohoff, “Violence as the Order of Things”; 
Lewed, “Curtains for Universalism”; and Kurz, “On the Current Global 
Economic Crisis” and “The Ontological Break.”
14. Moishe Postone, “Anti-Semitism and National Socialism: Notes on the 
German Reaction to ‘Holocaust,’” New German Critique 19 (Winter 1980) 
97–115. A translation of this essay by Renate Schumacher had previously 
appeared in the Frankfurt am Main student journal Diskus 3-4 (1979) 
425–37.
15. See Die Große Entwertung, and Trenkle’s 2008 response to the earliest 
unfolding of this crisis in “Tremors on the Global Market,” translated 
by Josh Robinson, online at http://www.krisis.org/2009/tremors-on-
the-global-market.
16. “I mean, Karl Marx had it right, at some point capitalism can destroy 
itself because you cannot keep on shifting income from labor to capital 
without not having excess capacity and a lack of aggregate demand, 
and that’s what’s happening. We thought that markets work, they’re not 
working, and what’s individually rational: every firm wants to survive 
and thrive and thus slashing labor costs even more — my labor costs 
are somebody else’s labor income and consumption. That’s why it’s a 
self-destructive process. [...] I think that there is a risk that this is the 
second leg of what happened in the Great Depression. We had a severe 
economic and financial crisis and then we kicked the can down the road 
with too much private debt, households, banks, governments, and you 
cannot resolve this problem with liquidity. At some point when there’s 
too much debt either you grow yourself out of it, but there is not going to 
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be enough economic growth, it’s anemic, either you save yourself out of 
it, but if everybody spends less and saves more in the private and public 
sector you have the Keynesian paradox of thrift: everybody saves more, 
there is less demand, you go back to recession and that ratio becomes 
higher. Or you can inflate yourself out of the debt problem, but that 
has a lot of collateral damage. So if you cannot grow yourself or save 
yourself or inflate yourself out of an excessive debt problem, you need 
debt restructure and debt reduction for households, for governments, 
for financial institutions, for highly leveraged institutions, and we’re 
not doing it. We’re creating zombie households, zombie banks, and 
zombie governments and you could have a depression.” Nouriel Roubini, 
interview with Simon Constable, WSJ Live, online at http://live.wsj.com/
video/nouriel-roubini-karl-marx-was-right/68EE8F89-EC24-42F8-
9B9D-47B510E473B0.html. Meanwhile Catherine Rampell, writing in 
March 2009, charts the rise of the phrase “Great Recession,” dating the 
rapid expansion in its use to December 2008. At the same time, she also 
observes how “[e]very recession of the last several decades has, at some 
point or another, received this special designation.” “‘Great Recession’: 
A Brief Etymology” NYT Economix blog, March 3, 2013, online at http://
economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-recession-a-brief-
etymology/.
17. Readers can find full publication information immediately following 
the introduction.
18. Robert Kurz and Ernst Lohoff, “Der Klassenkampf-Fetisch” www.krisis.
org (31 December 1989).
19. For more on Schandl’s term, see 208-9n4.
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Value and Crisis: Basic Questions 
Norbert Trenkle (1998)
The ground that I want to cover today is expansive. It stretches 
from the most fundamental level of the theory of value (or more 
precisely, from the critique of value) — that is to say, from the level 
of the fundamental categories of commodity-producing society: labor, 
value, commodity, money — to the level where these fundamental 
categories appear reified and fetishized, as seemingly “natural” facts 
of life and as “objective necessities.” At this level — that of price, profit, 
wage, circulation, and so on — the internal contradictions of modern 
commodity society emerge: here such a society’s ultimate historical 
untenability makes itself evident — in the form of the crisis. It is clear 
that in the limited time available today I can only sketch things out, 
but I hope that I can succeed in providing a clear view of the essential 
framework.
As a point of departure, I would like to begin with a category 
commonly viewed as a fully self-evident condition of human existence: 
“labor.” Even in Marx’s Capital, this remains largely unproblematized, 
and is taken to be a universally valid anthropological trait that can 
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be found in every society in the world: “Labor, then, as the creator 
of use-values, as useful labor, is a condition of human existence 
which is independent of all forms of society; it is an eternal natural 
necessity which mediates the metabolism between man and nature, 
and therefore human life itself.”1
It is true that for Marx, the category of “labor” is not as completely 
unproblematic as this quote seems to suggest. At other points, 
especially in the so-called early writings, he adopts far more critical 
tones. In a critique of German economist Friedrich List first published 
in the 1970s, he even goes so far as to speak of the abolition of labor 
as a precondition of emancipation. “‘Labor’ is in its very being an 
oppressive, inhumane, and antisocial activity that both is determined 
by and produces private property. The abolition of private property 
thus only becomes reality when it is understood as an abolition of 
‘labor.’”2 Even in Capital, we find passages which recall this early 
approach. But my task here is not to trace the ambivalences around 
the concept of “labor” (for more on this, see Kurz); rather I would like 
to proceed directly to the question of the meaning of this category.3 
Is “labor” an anthropological constant? Can we use it as such to make 
it unproblematically into a point of  departure for an analysis of 
commodity society? My answer is an unambiguous “no.”
Marx distinguishes between abstract and concrete labor, and calls 
this the dual character of labor particular to commodity-producing 
society. He thus suggests — and also states explicitly — that it is 
not until the level of this doubling, or splitting, that a process of 
abstraction takes place. Abstract labor is abstract insofar as it moves 
away from the concrete material properties and particularities of the 
respective specific activities — for example, the work of a tailor, a 
carpenter, or a butcher — and is reduced to a common equivalent. But 
Marx overlooks here (and in any case, Marxism has yet to develop an 
awareness of the problem at this level) that labor as such is already 
such an abstraction. And not simply an abstraction in thought like a 
tree, animal, or plant; rather, it is a historically established, socially 
powerful, actually existing abstraction that violently brings people 
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under its thumb.
Abstracting means withdrawing or withdrawing from something. 
In what way, then, is labor a withdrawal — that is, a withdrawal from 
something else? What is socially and historically specific about labor 
is not, of course, the fact that things are created in the first place 
and that social tasks are carried out. In fact, this must occur in all 
societies. What is specific is the form in which this takes place in 
capitalist society. What is essential to this form is in the first instance 
the fact that work is a separate sphere, cut off from the rest of its social 
setting. Whoever works is working and doing nothing else. Relaxing, 
amusing oneself, pursuing personal interests, loving, and so on — 
these things must take place outside labor or at least must not interfere 
with its thoroughly rationalized functional routines. Of course, this 
never fully succeeds, because despite centuries of training, it has not 
been possible to turn people completely into machines. But what I am 
talking about here is a structural principle which empirically never 
emerges in perfect purity — even though, at least in Central Europe, 
the empirical process of labor certainly seems to correspond to a great 
extent to this terrible model. For this reason — that is, as a result of the 
exclusion of all the moments of non-labor from the sphere of labor — 
the historical establishment of labor is accompanied by the formation 
of further separate spheres of society, into which all those dissociated 
(abgespaltenen) moments are banished, spheres which themselves take 
on an exclusive character: leisure, privacy, culture, politics, religion, 
and so on.
The essential structural condition for this division of social life is 
the modern relationship between the sexes with its dichotomous and 
hierarchical allocation of masculinity and femininity. The sphere of 
labor falls unambiguously into the realm of the “masculine,” which 
itself is already a demonstration of the subjective demands that this 
makes: abstract, instrumental rationality, objectivity, formal thinking, 
competitive orientation — requirements that women must of course 
also meet if they want to get anywhere in the world of work. However, 
this realm of the masculine is structurally able to exist only against 
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the background of that which has been dissociated, a sphere which 
is then posited as inferior — a sphere in which, ideally, the working 
man can regenerate, because in the ideal case the dedicated housewife 
takes care of his physical and emotional well being. This structural 
relationship, which bourgeois society has idealized and romanticized 
from time immemorial in countless bombastic eulogies in praise of 
the loving and self-sacrificial wife and mother, has over the last thirty 
years been analyzed more than adequately in feminist scholarship. To 
this extent it is possible to advance without further comment the thesis 
that labor and the modern system of hierarchical gender relations are 
inseparably linked to one another. Both are fundamental structural 
principles of the bourgeois social order of the commodity form.
I am unable further to pursue this relationship here in its own 
right, as the topic of my lecture is in fact the specific mediations and 
the internal contradictions within the historically and structurally 
male spheres of labor, commodity, and value. I should thus like to 
return to this matter. I remarked earlier that labor, as a specific form 
of activity in commodity society, is per se already abstract because it 
constitutes a separated sphere, withdrawn from the rest of social life. 
And as such, it exists only where commodity production has already 
become the determining form of socialization — in capitalism, that 
is to say, where human activity in the form of labor serves no other 
purpose than the valorization of value.
Human beings do not enter into the sphere of labor willingly. 
They do it because they were separated from the most basic means 
of production and existence in a long and bloody historical process, 
and now can survive only by selling themselves temporarily — or, 
more precisely, by selling their vital energy, as labor power, for an 
external purpose, the content of which is irrelevant. For them, labor 
thus primarily means a fundamental extraction of vital energy, and 
in this respect is thus an extremely real, actually existing abstraction. 
Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that the identification of labor 
with suffering makes sense, as the original meaning of the word 
laborare suggests.
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In the end, however, abstraction in the realm of labor also reigns 
in the form of a highly specific rule of time that is both abstract-linear 
and homogeneous. What counts is objectively measurable time — in 
other words, the time that has been separated from the subjective 
sensations, feelings, and experiences of working individuals. Capital 
has rented them for a precisely defined time-period, in which they 
have to produce a maximal output of commodities or services. Each 
minute that they do not expend for this purpose is, from the standpoint 
of the purchaser of the commodity labor power, a waste. Each and 
every minute is valuable, insofar as it, in the literal sense, presents 
potential value.
Historically, the establishment of  the abstract-linear and 
homogeneous rule of time certainly represents one of the sharpest 
breaks with all precapitalist social orders. It is well known that several 
centuries of  evident compulsion and open use of  violence were 
required before the mass of humanity had internalized this form of 
relationship to time, and no longer thought anything of arriving at the 
factory or office door punctually at a given time, giving up their lives at 
the factory door, and subjecting themselves for a precisely measured 
length of time to the metronomic rhythm of the prescribed productive 
and functional procedures. This well-known fact alone shows how little 
the form of social activity known as “labor” can be taken for granted. 
If labor as such, then, is not an anthropological constant, but rather is 
itself already an abstraction (albeit one that exerts a huge social force), 
how does it relate to the dual character of the labor represented in the 
commodity that Marx analyzes and that forms the basis of his theory 
of value? It is well known that Marx established that commodity-
producing labor has two sides, one concrete and the other abstract. As 
concrete labor it creates use values — in other words, particular useful 
things. As abstract labor, on the other hand, it is the expenditure of 
labor as such, regardless of any qualitative determination. As such, it 
creates the value presented in commodities. But what remains beyond 
any qualitative determination? It is perfectly clear that the only thing 
that all these different sorts of labor have in common, abstracted 
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from their material-concrete elements, is that they are different 
types of expenditures of abstract labor time. Abstract labor is thus 
the reduction of all the different forms of commodity-producing labor 
to a common denominator. It makes them comparable and as a result 
capable of being exchanged for one another, by reducing them to the 
pure abstract, reified quantity of elapsed time. As such, it forms the 
substance of value.
Virtually all Marxist theorists have adopted this not-at-all self-
explanatory or obvious conception as the basic definition of  an 
anthropological fact and quasi-natural law, and regurgitated it as such 
without reflection. They have never understood why Marx went to 
such lengths when writing the first chapter of Capital (which, indeed, 
was rewritten numerous times) and why he supposedly unnecessarily 
obscured what is apparently such an obvious state of affairs with 
recourse to a Hegelian language. Just as labor was obvious to Marxism, 
so too did it seem obvious to Marxism that labor quite literally creates 
value, in the same way that the baker bakes bread, and that in value, 
past labor time is preserved as dead labor time. Even in Marx it never 
becomes clear that abstract labor itself, both logically and historically, 
presupposes labor as a specific form of social activity — that it is 
thus the abstraction of an abstraction — or put differently, that the 
reduction of an activity to homogeneous units of time presupposes the 
existence of an abstract measure of time, which as such dominates the 
sphere of labor. It would never have occurred to a medieval peasant, for 
example, to measure the time spent harvesting his fields in hours and 
minutes. This is not because he did not have a watch; rather, because 
this activity merged with his life, and its temporal abstraction would 
have made no sense.
But although Marx does not adequately clarify the relationship 
between labor as such and abstract labor, he nonetheless leaves 
no doubt as to the complete insanity of a society in which human 
activity (that is to say, a living process) coagulates into a reified form 
and as such establishes itself as the dominant social power. Marx 
ironically questions the common belief that this was a natural fact 
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when he remarks in response to the positivist theory of value of 
classical political economy, “So far, no chemist has ever discovered 
exchange value either in a pearl or a diamond.”4 So when Marx shows 
that abstract labor constitutes the substance of value, and thus also 
determines the mass of value by means of the labor time expended 
on average, he is in no way lapsing into the physiological or naturalist 
views of classical economics, as Michael Heinrich claims in his book 
The Science of Value. Like the better share of bourgeois thinkers since the 
Enlightenment, classical economics grasps bourgeois social relations 
to a certain degree, but only in order to declare them unceremoniously 
a part of the natural order. Marx criticizes this ideologization of 
dominant social relations by deciphering them as the fetishistic reflex 
of a fetishized reality. He shows that value and abstract labor are not 
mere figments of the imagination that people need to jettison from 
their heads. Rather, under the conditions of a system of labor and 
modern commodity production that is always presupposed and that 
determines their thoughts and behavior, people actually encounter 
their products as expressions of reified, abstract labor time, as if these 
products were a force of nature. For the bourgeoisie, their own social 
relations have become “second nature,” as Marx puts it pointedly. This 
constitutes the fetish-character of value, commodity, and labor.
Alfred Sohn-Rethel coined the term “actually existing abstraction” 
for this irrational form of abstraction. By this he means a process of 
abstraction that is not completed in human consciousness as an act 
of thought, but which, as the a priori structure of social synthesis, 
is the presupposition of and determines human thought and action. 
However, for Sohn-Rethel, this actually existing abstraction is identical 
with the act of exchange — it governs wherever commodities confront 
one another in the context of the market. Only here, according to 
his argument, are different things made the same, are qualitatively 
different things reduced to a common equivalent: value, or exchange 
value. But in what does this common equivalent consist? If  value, 
or exchange value, is where the different commodities are reduced 
to a common denominator as expressions of abstract quantities of 
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different magnitude, one must also be able to name both the content of 
this ominous value and the scale by which it is measured. The answer 
to this is not found in Sohn-Rethel, something which we can attribute 
in part to his limited, almost mechanical conception of the context of 
commodity society.
For shortly afterwards, the sphere of labor appears as a presocial 
space in which private producers create their products, still untouched 
in any way by any determinate social form. Only afterwards do they 
throw these products as commodities into the sphere of circulation, 
where, in the act of exchange, they are abstracted from their material 
particularities (and thus indirectly from the concrete labor expended 
in their production) and thus morph into bearers of  value. This 
perception, however, which tears the sphere of production and the 
sphere of circulation apart from one another and places them in 
superficial opposition, completely misses the inner context of the 
modern commodity-producing system. Sohn-Rethel systematically 
confuses two levels of observation: first, the necessary temporal 
succession between the production and sale of a single commodity; and 
second, the logical and real social unity of the processes of valorization 
and exchange, a unity which these processes always presuppose.
I would now like to explore this point of view more extensively, 
because it is not something that can be attributed only to Sohn-Rethel, 
but rather is widespread and can be found in many variations. This 
includes Michael Heinrich’s aforementioned book, for example, 
where it appears at every turn. Heinrich asserts (to select just one 
quote of many) that commodity bodies obtain “their objectivity of 
value only inside the process of exchange” and then continues as 
follows: “In isolation, considered for itself, the commodity-body is not 
a commodity but merely a product.”5 It is true that Heinrich does not 
draw from this and many other similar statements the same theoretical 
conclusions as Sohn-Rethel, but they certainly lie within the logic of 
his own argumentation. It is only with the help of a not-particularly-
convincing set of theoretical aids (by tearing the value form and the 
substance of value apart from one another) that he can avoid them 
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(see Heinrich and Backhaus’s and Reichelt’s critique).6
It goes without saying that in the capitalist mode of production, 
it is not the case that products are innocently created and only arrive 
on the market a posteriori; rather, every process of production is from 
the outset oriented toward the valorization of capital and organized 
accordingly. That is to say, production occurs already in the context of 
a fetishized form of value, and products must fulfill a single purpose: 
to represent in the form of value the amount of labor time necessary 
for their production. It is thus the case that the sphere of circulation, 
the market, does not serve the exchange of commodities; it is rather 
the place where the value represented in the products is realized — or 
at least, where it is supposed to be realized. For this to succeed at all (a 
necessary but not sufficient condition), commodities must, as is well 
known, also be useful things, albeit only for the potential buyer. The 
concrete, material aspect of the commodity, its use value, is not the 
aim and purpose of production but only a more or less inevitable side 
effect. From the perspective of valorization, this could certainly (and 
gladly) be dispensed with (and in a certain respect this does in fact 
take place in the mass production of completely useless things or those 
that fall apart after a very short time), but value cannot go without a 
material bearer. For no one buys dead labor time as such, but rather 
only when it is represented in an object to which the buyer attributes 
a usefulness of some kind.
The concrete aspect of labor thus remains in no way untouched 
by the presupposed form of socialization. If  abstract labor is the 
abstraction of an abstraction, concrete labor only represents the 
paradox of the concrete aspect of an abstraction — namely of the 
form-abstraction “labor.” It is only “concrete” in the very narrow and 
restricted sense that the different commodities require materially 
different production processes: a car is made differently from, say, 
an aspirin tablet or a pencil sharpener. But even the behavior of 
these processes of production is in no way indifferent, technically or 
organizationally, to the presupposed goal of valorization. I hardly need 
elaborate at great length on how the capitalist process of production is 
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configured in this respect: it is organized solely according to the maxim 
of producing the greatest possible number of products in the shortest 
possible time. This is then called the economic efficiency of a business. 
The concrete, material side of labor is thus nothing other than the 
tangible form in which abstract labor’s diktat of time confronts the 
workers and forces them under its rhythm.
To this extent it is also totally correct to assert that commodities 
produced in the system of abstract labor also already embody value, 
even if they have not entered into the sphere of circulation. That the 
realization of value can fail — commodities can be unsellable or can 
only be disposed of for well below their value — is in line with the logic 
of the matter, but pertains to a totally different level of the problem. 
For in order to gain entry into the sphere of circulation, a product 
must already be in the fetishized form of an object of value — and 
since this object is as such nothing other than the representation of 
past abstract labor (and this always also means the representation of 
past abstract labor time), it necessarily always already also possesses a 
certain magnitude of value. For as pure form without substance (that 
is, without abstract labor), value cannot exist without going into a 
state of crisis in which it will eventually crumble.
But, as is well known, the magnitude of a commodity’s value 
is determined not by the labor time immediately expended in its 
production, but rather by the average socially necessary labor 
time. This average, in turn, is not a fixed magnitude, but changes in 
accordance with the current level of productivity (that is to say, there 
is a secular trend for necessary labor time per commodity, and thus the 
quantity of value that it represents, to fall). But as the measure of value, 
this average is always already presupposed by every individual process 
of production, and it assumes power in this process as a merciless 
sovereign. A product thus represents a particular quantity of abstract 
labor time only insofar as it can stand before the judgment of the social 
mass of productivity. If the labor of a business is unproductive, its 
products do not of course represent more value than those that were 
made under socially average conditions. The business must therefore 
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improve its productivity in the long term or disappear from the market 
altogether.
In this context it is somewhat confusing that the objectivity and 
magnitude of value do not appear in the individual commodity but 
only in the exchange of commodities — that is to say, only when they 
step into direct relation with other products of abstract labor. The 
value of one commodity then becomes visible in the other commodity. 
Thus, for example, the value of a dozen eggs may be expressed in four 
pounds of flour. In developed commodity production (and this is what 
is always at stake in this discussion), the place of this other commodity 
is assumed by a general equivalent: money, in which the value of all 
commodities is expressed, and which functions as a social measure of 
value. To claim, then, that value, in the form of exchange value, only 
appears at the level of circulation, already presupposes the insight 
that it does not come into being in the way that Sohn-Rethel and other 
theorists of exchange (not to mention all those representatives of the 
subjective theory of value) claim — the insight, in other words, that 
there is a difference between the essence of value and its forms of 
appearance.
The subjective theory of value, which in its flat empiricism is taken 
in by the appearance of circulation, has always lampooned the labor 
theory of value as metaphysics — an accusation which is once again 
booming, this time in postmodernist garb. Unintentionally, though, 
it divulges something about the fetishistic nature of commodity-
producing society. If  reified social relations elevate themselves 
to blind power over human beings, what is this if not metaphysics 
incarnate? The point at which both the subjective theory of value 
and Marxist positivism stumble is that value can in no way be nailed 
down empirically. For it is neither possible to filter out the substance 
of labor from commodities, nor consistently to derive the values of 
commodities from the level of empirical appearance (that is, from the 
level of price). “So where is this ominous value?” ask our positivist 
friends, only to dismiss this entire line of questioning straight away. 
For what is not empirically tangible and measurable does not exist in 
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their worldview.
But this critique applies only to a crude and itself positivist variant 
of the labor theory of value — which is, however, typical of the greater 
part of Marxism. For Marxism always related positively to the category 
of value in two senses. Firstly, as already mentioned, value was actually 
understood as natural or anthropological fact. It appeared, that is, as 
completely self-evident that past labor or labor time could literally 
be preserved in the products as an object. At the very least, however, 
it was necessary to provide a mathematical proof of how the price 
of a commodity results from its value, from which it deviates. And 
secondly, it was then only logical to attempt to steer social production 
with the help of this positively construed category. A key accusation 
leveled against capitalism was thus that in the market, the “real values” 
of products are veiled and thus do not come to fruition. In socialism, 
by contrast, so the argument goes in Engels’s famous formulation, 
it is easy to calculate how many labor hours are “hiding” in a ton of 
wheat or iron. 
This was the central program of the entire project — doomed to 
failure — of actually existing socialism, and in diluted form also of 
social democracy, a program which was planned and seen through 
more or less critically and constructively by legions of  so-called 
political economists. Doomed to failure because value is a non-
empirical category that by its nature cannot be nailed down, but rather 
gains acceptance among people as a fetishistic category behind their 
backs, and imposes its blind laws on them. But the desire consciously 
to steer an unconscious relation is a contradiction. The historical 
punishment for such an attempt was thus inevitable.
But if  I have said that value is a non-empirical category, does 
that also mean that it has no relevance at all for actual economic 
development? Of course not. It means only that value cannot be 
nailed down as such and must go through different levels of mediation 
before it appears at the economic surface in a mutated form. Marx’s 
contribution in Capital is to demonstrate the logical and structural 
interrelation of these levels of mediation. He shows how economic 
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surface categories such as price, profit, wage, and interest can be 
derived from the category of value and its internal dynamics, hence 
allowing them to be analyzed as such. In no way was he taken in by 
the illusion that these mediations could in any way be empirically 
calculated individually, as both economic theory and disarmed, 
positivist Marxism demand (without, however, being able to solve 
this dilemma themselves). But this is not in any way a defect of the 
theory of value, but merely highlights the unconscious nature of these 
mediations. Marx, however, never attempted to propose a positive 
theory that could be in any way used as an instrument of economic 
policy. His concern, rather, was to demonstrate the irrationality, the 
inner contradictions, and hence the ultimate untenability of a society 
based on value. At its core, his theory of value is a critique of value 
— it is no accident then that his magnum opus is subtitled Critique of 
Political Economy — and, at the same time, essentially a theory of crisis.
The empirical foundation of the critique of value in general and 
the theory of crisis in particular cannot in any way, therefore, be 
carried out in a quasi-scientific, mathematized form. Wherever this 
methodological criterion is applied a priori — as in the well-known (or 
infamous) value-price transformation debate of academic Marxism — 
the concept of value and the entire framework constructed around it is 
already fundamentally flawed. While it is true that the critique of value 
and the theory of crisis can certainly be underpinned with empirical 
support, the method must only comprehend the internal mediations 
and contradictions. What this means in concrete terms, I can at this 
point only suggest. Let us take, for example, the basic finding of crisis 
theory that since the 1970s, as a result of the worldwide, absolute 
displacement of living labor power from the process of valorization, 
capital has reached the historical limits of its power to expand, and 
thus also of its capacity to exist. In other words, modern commodity 
production has entered a fundamental process of crisis, which can 
only result in its downfall.
This finding is of course not based on purely logical-conceptual 
derivation, but is rather a result of the theoretical and empirical 
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comprehension of the structural breakdowns in the global commodity-
producing system since the end of Fordism. These include, for example, 
as a basic fact, the melting away of the substance of labor (that is, the 
diminution of the expended abstract labor time at the peak of the 
predominant level of production) in the productive central sectors of 
production for the global market as well as the continued retreat of 
capital from huge regions of the world that are largely cut off from the 
flow of commodities and investment and left to fend for themselves. 
Ultimately, however, the violent inflation and unleashing of the system 
of credit and speculation also belong to this context. That fictitious 
capital is being amassed to a historically unprecedented extent on one 
hand explains why the onset of the crisis has up until now appeared 
relatively mild in core regions of the world market, but on the other 
hints at the intense violence of the imminent wave of devaluation.
Clearly, a theory of crisis founded on the critique of value can 
misdiagnose individual elements, and can also fail to anticipate every 
way in which the crisis unfolds, even though it proves itself entirely 
capable in the analysis of details. But it can provide theoretical and 
empirical proof that there will be no more new waves of secular 
accumulation, and capitalism has irrevocably entered a barbaric stage 
of decline and disintegration. This proof necessarily coincides with 
the unrelenting critique of labor, commodity, value, and money, and 
pursues no other goal than the abolition of these fetishistic actually 
existing abstractions; and thus, also, its own sphere of relevance 
having been abolished, of the self-abolition of the theory of value.
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Preliminary Remark: The Left and the Law of Value
There is really no longer a shortage of publications with more or less 
left-wing or Marxist — or at least emancipatory — aspirations on the 
concept of crisis in itself, the crisis of labor, of Marxism, of the Left, 
new technologies, or post-Fordist or even postindustrial society. It 
would not be particularly helpful to add one more text to this flood 
without attempting to introduce a fundamentally new or different 
aspect. Since it proceeds on the basis of this presupposition, the 
article that follows is bound to appear to have an immodest, apodictic 
demeanor. It is for this reason that I wish to emphasize right from 
the start that my aim is in no way to allude suggestively to the 
sophistication of my own theoretical elaboration, but rather to the 
fact that the left-wing media are far removed from what would be even 
a tolerable level of theoretical assurance and reflection on their own 
elementary categories. The Left’s helplessness when it comes to new 
phenomena, and also its own political impotence, appear if nothing 
else to be grounded in this lack of fundamentally theoretical desire. 
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This thesis requires further refining.
Nothing less shall be asserted than that today’s Left, in all its deep-
seated factions, disposes over an understanding of the “Marxist” 
categories that is in no way authentic, but rather bound up with a 
disappearing historical stage of capital. It is ironic that the ripening 
objective crisis of the capital relation thus simultaneously appears as 
the crisis of Marxist theory itself as it is understood both by the Left 
and by its opponents.
While the left-wing media become more and more untheoretical, 
cloak themselves in the grey mantle of the shrinking modesty of the 
seemingly innocuous investigation of partial and superficial themes, 
and ultimately at least partially throw the categories of Marxian theory 
overboard — and sometimes, ascetically in comparison even with the 
positivists, completely dispense with theoretical synthesis of social 
totality in favor of sociological shorthand — they can only blindly 
walk past the central problem of their weakness. But in opposition to 
the general trend, becoming theoretical means, conversely, becoming 
fundamental again; however, as far as bourgeois society is concerned, 
becoming fundamental means deriving one’s own essential categories 
from the critique of the objectivity of value — that is to say, from a 
concrete historical critique of the commodity fetish — in a renewed 
historical transition. But if it is correct — and my point is none other 
than this — that the conventional epigones’ “Marxist” theory up until 
today, including that of the New Left, slips up completely as early as in 
the first chapter of Capital, then it will necessarily slip up all the more 
when faced with a social-economical reality that only today really 
begins to correspond fully to the fundamental categories of Capital.
As long as the law of value is understood only as the formal law 
of the social allocation of resources that can be influenced politically, 
but not as the historical determination of the essential content, the 
transience of which must establish itself both violently and objectively 
(that is to say, independently of all the political declarations of intent 
that refer to it), the understanding of value necessarily degenerates 
to the status of a category of second nature and can no longer be 
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conceived as a fundamental contradiction. However, the determination 
of  this contradiction at the highest level of  abstraction is the 
determination of the relationship between matter and form, and this 
must be developed conceptually in order to understand the celebrated 
empirical or surface reality. This contradiction between the matter and 
the form of social reproduction, which in the logic of capitalism enters 
into irreconcilable opposition, can only adequately be decoded as the 
contradiction between productive forces and relations of production 
when the definition of the latter does not remain external to the 
commodity or value relation. The task, that is to say, would be to carve 
out the concepts of material production on one hand, and the value or 
commodity character of production on the other hand, as the essential 
core of the history of capital.
This is the object of this text — and its task, more narrowly defined, 
is to derive, by means of a categorical redefinition of the capitalist 
relations of value, the absolute logical and historical limit of capital 
in its approximate features, as a consequence of the most recent and 
qualitatively new stage of capitalist socialization. From the beginning 
we must therefore also emphasize the fact that this text will illustrate 
the shortcomings not only of a deeply flawed theoretical model but 
also of the practical politics of the Left, which, in spite of its sense 
of urgency, is only able to imagine social transcendence illusorily (if 
at all) solely in relation to what is already established and by way of 
value and monetary relations, which also means that it cannot but 
misconstrue the newly socialized productive forces as frightening 
intensifications of capital’s might. 
Use Value and Exchange Value; Productive Labor
In current “Marxist” conceptions, the contradiction between use 
value and exchange value appears as a static, merely terminological 
contradiction, which at all stages of the development of capital only 
ever reproduces itself inflexibly. The liberation of use value from the 
dictatorship of the abstraction of value, to the extent that it appears 
in this thinking at all, remains an external, subjective endeavor which 
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can no longer rely on the unfolding of an objective contradiction in a 
concrete historical process. However, it is precisely this contradiction 
between use value and exchange value as it is laid out as a contradiction 
in the process of commodity production that makes capital into a 
contradiction in process, because it transforms itself under the capital 
relation from an apparently static relationship into a real historical 
process that drives toward resolution.
In order to grasp the process character of the relationship between 
use value and exchange value, it is, however, necessary to rediscover 
this contradiction within the concept of productivity or of productive 
labor. The Marxists’ astounding and relatively prevalent dilemma 
consists in their inability to take this step: the contradiction between 
use value and exchange value remains inflexible precisely because it is 
no longer retained as a contradiction within the concept of productive 
labor. In this contradiction, rather, the material aspects (“of the nature 
of use value”)  and those that are determined by value (“of the nature 
of exchange value”) appear to be mixed beyond differentiation, and 
no longer analytically distinct.
However, read against the grain of  the petrified historical 
interpretation of Marx, it is precisely this analytical distinction in 
the concept of productive labor that proves itself to be essential to his 
work. From this point of view, productive labor must be understood as 
a dual concept: firstly, in relation to use value, on the material side of 
the process of labor as the process of the metabolism between humans 
and nature; but secondly, in relation to exchange value, to the process 
of the formation of value, as the social metabolism of humans with 
one another, in which labor appears to be dematerialized, as abstract 
human labor.
According to the first analytic definition, the concept of 
productivity refers exclusively to the relationship between (natural) 
material activity and material useful effect, a relationship which itself 
depends on the form and quality of the means of labor and the objects 
of labor, which could be termed the social extent of the domination of 
nature, further removed from the individual, qualitatively determined 
21The Crisis of Exchange Value
skill of the worker in handling these socially prescribed means of 
production. To this extent, all labor is productive labor, the content of 
which enters into a material relationship between activity and useful 
effect. But in this definition, the purely material aspect of the labor 
process that pertains to use value is never abandoned.
According to the second analytic definition, the concept of 
productivity refers exclusively to the abstract process of the formation 
of value, to the expenditure of abstract human labor as the fictitious 
substance of value, which on the surface appears reified as exchange 
value. From this point of view, the only productive labor is labor that 
is presented immediately as a social real abstraction or value-forming 
substance, as the expenditure of human labor per se, objectified in 
each and every product.
On the level of  simple commodity production, this analytic 
distinction poses no problems. Indeed, it could even appear pointless, 
because productive labor, as material labor pertaining to use value, is 
here always immediately identical with productive labor as the social-
fictional substance of the process of the formation of value. For into 
the product goes only the labor of the individual (artisanal) producer, 
seen both on the material level and on that of value. In the personal 
identity of the producer, the logical separation of the material labor 
process and the abstract process of the formation of value is suspended 
and as such cannot appear at all. Concrete, qualitative labor and value 
creation appear as one and the same, which they indeed are, because 
the abstract expenditure of the nerves, muscles, or brain as human 
labor, as such, proceeds from one and the same personal corporeality 
as the particular concrete, material labor process of the blacksmith, 
the cobbler, or the tailor.
It could appear that Marx’s analytical separation of concrete, 
qualitatively particular labor from abstract labor were nothing other 
than an ingenious feat of  thought that finally comes up with an 
appropriate term for a logic that has in fact existed for thousands of 
years (namely the logic of value or of commodity production). Such 
a conception would in any case correspond to the current Marxist 
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understanding according to which the contradiction between use value 
and exchange value, and behind it the opposition between concrete 
and abstract labor, appears only as an inflexible definitional figure of 
thought, but to this extent not as a real category, as if this contradiction 
can no longer be retained within the concept of productive labor 
or productivity. However, if this contradiction is followed through 
logically, it is revealed that Marx’s feat of thought only became possible 
in the first place at the point in the development of society when 
material and value-related production actually began to separate 
from one another. The capitalist mode of production set in motion a 
process according to which the material labor process and the process 
of value creation began to diverge on a progressively larger scale, and 
increasingly grew out of proportion with one another. The motor of 
this development becomes cooperation in labor as it is practiced by 
capital, an increased social division of labor which reaches beyond 
the narrow limits of the individual branches of production that until 
that point had been inflexible and hermetic, and thus dissolves these 
limits along with the immediate identity of materially productive labor 
and value-producing labor within the personal corporeality of the 
individual producer.
Total Productive Labor
The transformation of the concrete material labor process into a 
cooperative process, initially in the form of manufacture, and later 
on the basis of the factory system, appears at first simply to reproduce 
the identity of the concrete labor process and the process of the 
formation of value in an altered form: this identity is now projected 
onto a total productive worker, the totality of the persons active in 
the cooperative labor process, instead of being, as previously, united 
within the individual producers.
But on closer observation this identity quickly becomes untenable. 
In the first instance, and this aspect can only be discussed briefly, the 
cooperation of labor with monetary capital causes the dissociation of 
a variety of unproductive functions (with regard to both materiality 
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and value). These dissociated functions — special labor processes — 
have neither immediate nor mediated influence on the product, yet 
they are contained in the nature of production as the production of 
commodities  (commercial functions, buying and selling as such). 
These functions, in every respect unproductive, also already exist for 
the individual artisanal producers (or they are carried out by members 
of their families, who also perform household and subsistence labor), 
but they are not isolated as individual activities, and remain extremely 
marginal to the process of commodity production as a whole and 
closely related to the cultural forms of social life which cannot be 
reduced to the dry categories of economic analysis (market day as a 
feast day). Capitalist cooperation brings about the formalization of 
these commercial functions, their economization, and at the same 
time their expansion: they are no longer restricted to acts of buying 
and selling, but are developed into marketing, market analysis, and 
advertising.
Secondly, however, enigmatic functions that can no longer 
unambiguously be identified with either productive or unproductive 
labor also begin to arise within the immediate labor process: the 
functions of direction and control. As a cooperative process, the 
material labor process is not identical with the simple sum of the 
individual parts of the labor process, but contains the very moment 
of  combination as a particular activity necessary for the whole 
process, just as the activity of the conductor belongs to the total labor 
of an orchestra (Marx uses this analogy on many occasions). On the 
other hand, in the capitalist form of cooperation this function of 
“conducting” is never simply a moment of the material labor process, 
but is always at the same time stained with the character of the labor 
process as a process of exploitation — that is to say, it is bound up 
with functions of control and oppression. The conducting function is 
divorced from the people involved in the directly cooperative process 
of labor by its exclusivity and its external character, and therefore is 
fundamentally loathsome to them — more so than can be said of the 
personifications of monetary capital itself, at whose command they 
24 Marxism and the Critique of Value
toil, but which never confronts them as immediately as the “officers 
and NCOs” of the production process.
These functions are just as inflexible as the capitalist process of 
production itself, and they are revolutionized with every revolution 
in the material structure of the labor process. The relentless rhythm 
of the factory system takes on to a certain extent the task of primitive 
surveillance and renders human control unnecessary; but these 
functions, as befits the nature of production as an exploitative process, 
never become wholly superfluous, but also reproduce themselves on 
the level of the most modern technological changes brought about 
by microelectronics and so on and merely take on new forms. To the 
ambiguous content of these functions corresponds their ambiguous 
connection to the concept of productive labor: to the extent that 
they emerge as a cooperative function (the function of a conductor) 
from the purely material character of the labor process, they are 
part of the labor of immediate production and are thus productive 
both materially and with respect to value; but to the extent that they 
emerge from the hostile opposition between capital and labor as the 
bailiff of the command of monetary capital, they are, just like the 
purely commercial functions, productive neither materially nor with 
respect to value. The split between productive and unproductive labor 
similarly splits every person in half.
The problem at the heart of the divergence of matter and value 
under capitalism consists neither in the isolation of the commercial 
functions nor in the way in which the cooperative tasks of direction 
take on an importance in their own right, in opposition to the 
immediate producers. Rather, this essential core appears only when 
we examine a third category that is usually not perceived as a category 
at all, but which alone makes the contradiction between exchange 
value and use value, between the material labor processes and the 
value-forming labor process, truly manifest. At stake here are those 
functions which, while they apply to the material labor process 
within the total worker, do not do so immediately, but indirectly, in 
a mediated way. These functions do not arise from the commercial 
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character of the mode of production, nor do they emerge from the 
formal opposition between capital and labor, but it is also the case 
that they do not constitute a link in the immediate cooperative labor 
process which is directly objectified in a product. What is at stake 
here are rather activities beside and beyond the immediate process 
of production, which without doubt become part of the material 
content of production, but do not straightforwardly become part of 
any particular product — for example, tasks of technical (rather than 
social) monitoring, technical project management, design, and so on.
These activities, which in the technological sense involve planning, 
monitoring, designing, and so on — that is to say intellectual labor 
in the broadest sense — were originally all united within the head 
of the individual producer, to the extent that they were part of his 
personal corporeality and not separated from the immediate manual 
labor. Capitalist cooperative labor involves the historical tendency to 
dissolve these functions from the immediate process of production, 
and to recompose them alongside this process.
With regard to the way in which these labors objectify value, the 
question arises as to whether they, as isolated functions that have been 
dissolved from the immediate process of production, are, nonetheless, 
as components of the total productive worker, still suspended in the 
identity of the material labor process and the abstract process of 
the formation of value. This is certainly the case to the extent that 
they, even indirectly and in a mediated form, still become part of the 
process of objectifying a particular total labor in a particular product; 
to this extent even such functions would in the end amount to no more 
than the collective reproduction, if  in more complex forms, of the 
earlier individual process of production in its hermetic identity of the 
concrete labor process and the abstract process of value formation.
The matter no longer seems quite so unambiguous when such 
technological, intellectual labors that are dissociated from the 
immediate production process no longer flow into a particular product 
in any recognizable manner, but rather into a wide range of products, 
and thus reach well beyond the limits of cooperation or of total labor in 
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the respective individual businesses. Even then, such labors doubtless 
enter, indirectly and mediatedly, the material labor process; to this 
extent they can unambiguously be identified as productive labor. 
However, as far as the process of the formation of value is concerned, 
a grey zone opens up: when the same activity that indirectly becomes 
part of the material labor process — let us take as an example the 
design of a control module — is not only spread across completely 
different products, but even (e.g., through licensing) across products 
of completely different participants in the market, then doubt arises 
as to how this labor, productive in the material sense, can objectively 
take on a value form.
We must not forget that value, which must appear as exchange 
value, does not by its nature express an in some way mythical substance 
inherent to things as such, as the fetish structure of exchange value 
suggests, but rather a social relationship between partial or private 
producers who are isolated from one another, whose social division of 
labor can only be realized by means of the sphere of circulation that 
has been separated from it. However, the construction of a control 
module that could be universally implemented is an immediately 
socialized task according not only to its form, but also to its content and 
its nature; to this extent it goes beyond the mere transformation of the 
process of simple production from individual to collective, cooperative 
production, but also begins to suspend these branches of production 
themselves on an ever-larger scale, by smudging the boundaries 
between them by means of technology. There do of course continue 
to exist operations specific to the production of specific products, but 
these become less and less characteristic of the central content of the 
production process, becoming rather merely an appendage to and a 
partial aspect of a highly socialized and networked total aggregate of 
immediately social labor. To the extent that a bulging, immediately 
social aggregate of universal, nonspecific technology pushes its way 
between the actual specific manufacture of a particular end product 
and its ideal conception, many specific branches of production also 
no longer relate to one another externally. Instead an integrated, 
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technological, and social total aggregate develops arbitrarily 
combinable output systems of specific products as its subordinate 
aspects and functions. This, however, tends materially to suspend the 
social division of labor according to separate branches of production 
that have existed up until this point, and as a result commodity 
production itself becomes obsolete.
As long as the technological-material suspension of the isolated 
branches of production had not progressed particularly far, that is to 
say perhaps up until the end of the age of steam-powered machinery, 
it might have seemed to a certain extent a good idea simply to replace 
individual commodity producers with a collective, cooperative 
commodity producer, that is to say to suspend the opposition of 
capital and labor within the confines of commodity production itself. 
It is for this reason that the concept of socialism in the old workers’ 
movement necessarily remained to a great extent confined not only 
within the commodity fetish, but also in the money and wage fetish, 
as the idea of a community of cooperative commodity producers in 
collectives and the like. If such thoughts are being revived today, they 
are certainly only reactionary, for these ideas must sink, along with 
the old workers’ movement, not least because the process of material-
technical socialization has long been left behind by capitalism. This 
all parenthetically.
Once it was possible to define the particular activities that were 
dissociated from the individual producer of the past initially either as 
productive or unproductive, both in the material sense and in respect 
to value (as an emulsion of productive and unproductive processes 
carried out by the officers and NCOs of the process of production). Now, 
however, we are confronted with an entirely new category within total 
labor that entails functions which may be categorized as productive 
labor in a material sense (insofar as they directly contribute to a labor 
process that is socialized on an increasingly higher technological 
level) but which are simultaneously unproductive with respect to 
the creation of value (and thus in respect to capitalist processes of 
valorization). At the very least, the latter category disappears into 
28 Marxism and the Critique of Value
a grey zone that (as immediately social labor) is not included in the 
categories of the socialization of surplus value. It is thus this area of 
the process of reproduction, in which materially productive labor 
and labor that is productive with respect to value begin to diverge, 
that historically dissolves the former identity of the concrete and the 
abstract labor process.
As long as the functions of immediately social labor that emerge 
objectively from the context of exchange value remain on the whole 
marginal — that is to say, as long as they appear both quantitatively 
and qualitatively to be shrinking in comparison with the mass of 
living labor which is employed in the cooperative immediate process 
of production and which is still unambiguously objectified within a 
particular project that can appear on the market as the product of a 
social-partial producer (internally divided into commanding monetary 
capital and wage labor) — the logical contradiction of value does not 
yet reveal itself in its true and pure form. This does not happen until 
this relationship between immediate (only indirectly social) labor and 
mediated (directly social) labor in the material process of production 
is altered and ultimately overturned by the capitalist development of 
social productive force. Living labor is removed from the immediate 
production process that directly objectifies itself within a particular 
product. The proportion of human labor alongside and beyond this 
immediate process of production, which only indirectly enters the 
process as directly social labor, grows at the same rate.
It is true that the explosive force of this development does not 
become completely clear until we examine this historical divergence 
on the level of society as a whole, beyond the interface or grey zone 
in which materially productive labor and labor that is productive 
with respect to value begin to diverge. I have for this reason until 
now only cautiously spoken of a grey zone, since all determinations 
of the productive total worker up to this point solely developed out 
of capitalist cooperation on the plane of the factory or the individual 
business where these determinations transform into a total 
aggregate only at the fraying boundaries of the separate branches of 
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production that determine immediately social labor. But if we now 
no longer examine the process of the material socialization of the 
whole apparatus of social reproduction from the bottom up (from 
the perspective of an individual capitalist business), but rather from 
the top down (from the perspective of total social reproduction), then 
the concept of the total productive worker must also be expanded to 
include this total social dimension. At this point we must deal with 
two levels of total labor (which both permeate each other), that of 
the individual business and that of society as a whole, which present 
themselves as reciprocally networked. On this second, expanded 
level of total labor the divergence of material production and value 
production now begins to become properly clear, and the derivation 
of the concept that has up until this point only been hinted at can now 
be fully developed.
In all precapitalist modes of production, the social network that 
reaches beyond the individual units of  production (peasant and 
artisanal families) is only developed to an extremely limited extent; 
even the state only exists in a crude form, primarily as the armed self-
organization of the ruling classes. Capitalism transforms not only the 
individual or familial productive units into cooperative large-scale 
producers that within themselves function according to the division 
of labor and that on a larger scale are integrated into a mechanical 
system, but in doing so also establishes an institutionalized social 
framework of conditions without which such cooperative large-
scale production for the newly developing global markets would 
be unthinkable. The most important of these conditions consists in 
advanced social infrastructure (e.g., extensive and ramified transport 
and communication systems, energy provision, regulated and 
institutionalized standardization of measures, weights, and formats, 
and not least a comprehensive and integrated system of education 
and training). This framework of increasingly necessary conditions 
of social infrastructure must quickly be taken over and run by state-
controlled or semi-state-controlled organizations — an indication 
that their essential character pertains to society as a whole, to the 
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way in which they fundamentally reach beyond every concern of 
individual businesses. As a general framework of conditions, this 
infrastructure becomes part of total social production just like the 
natural foundations and requirements of production; it becomes a sort 
of material second nature (just as on the other hand value becomes 
an economic second nature). The general average human capacity for 
labor is thus for example no longer the original natural capacity, but 
is always already, before all productive activity, a socially produced 
capacity of which cultural techniques such as reading, writing, and 
arithmetic at the very least form a part.
All these basic conditions of social infrastructure require labor and 
absorb a historically increasing proportion of socially available labor 
power. With respect to the productivity of this labor, what was already 
suggested at the margins of cooperation between individual businesses 
in activities such as design now becomes palpable: they are productive 
only in terms of society as a whole as immediately social or socialized 
tasks. They are no longer the expression of a separation of whatever 
nature between partial, individual, or private social producers, but 
rather their exact opposite: by their nature these tasks become from 
the outset part of all moments of partial social production to the same 
extent but by different routes, and are therefore always and indeed 
exclusively a matter of the whole process of reproduction of society as 
a totality, and never of a process pertaining to an individual business. 
Social productive forces are here being set in motion, and all the labors 
that are encapsulated within them are indirectly productive at the 
material level. But at the same time, it is in the nature of these labors 
that they stand a priori outside the law of value, and cannot take on the 
form of objectified abstract labor in the fetish shape of value, because 
it is precisely as immediately social labor that they become part of 
all products to the same extent and at all times, and thus cannot at 
all appear as a moment in a process of exchange of separate units. 
With respect to the process of value creation they must therefore 
always remain unproductive, because value is nothing other than the 
essential core of social exchange between separated partial producers, 
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a core which necessarily fetishizes itself, and which congeals in an 
apparently urgent substance.
Here we now have the new prototype of labor that is in many ways 
first engendered by capitalism, and with which capitalism, however, 
suspends the law of value and with it its own foundations according to 
real logic: immediately social, indirectly materially productive labor, 
that by its nature is unproductive with respect to value. However, with 
the large-scale expansion of the mechanical system of production, the 
social importance of this new, immediately social form of labor for 
the process of social reproduction grows in a historically inexorable 
manner, seen both in absolute and in relative terms. Logically, this also 
causes the law of value to become increasingly obsolete, and value-
based production historically to approach an objective collapse. Marx’s 
comments on this matter, particularly in the Grundrisse, are to be 
taken completely literally and as a concrete prognosis of the objective 
historical logic of the development of capital, and in no way as the 
subjective program of communism that is not to be realized until some 
distant future or other long beyond capitalism. The various tendencies 
of the Marxist Left might have pored over the relevant passages in 
Marx hundreds or even thousands of times and cited them in the most 
contradictory of contexts, but they have never conceptually unfolded 
their true logic as the logic of capital itself with reference to its actual 
historical unfolding; evidently not because of a fundamental lack of 
the capacity for abstraction, but because of a historically conditioned 
failure to escape the categories of exchange value, a failure that has 
up until the present day not been overcome.
Science as Productive Force
However, the essential determination of the content of  the new, 
immediately social labor is that of science. That capitalism is the 
scientification of production is absolutely obvious and therefore 
beyond dispute. However, in Marxist theory this concept of  the 
scientification of  production is also used in a far-too-inflexible, 
ahistorical, and abstract-definitional manner — and where the actual 
32 Marxism and the Critique of Value
historical development of this process of scientification is discussed 
at all, it is without any logical or systematic reference to the value 
structure of production.
There is a fundamental distinction to be made between two forms 
of the process of scientification, which reciprocally permeate each 
another and ultimately fuse into a social technology of production 
which by itself necessarily and wholly objectively explodes the law 
of value and therefore commodity production.
The first is the technological application of the natural sciences, 
which makes science itself  into an “immediate productive force”; 
but the second is the science of labor or of organization, which only 
emerges on the basis of cooperation in the form of the capitalist 
division of labor. Both forms of scientification are to be discussed at 
first for themselves, and then in terms of the reciprocal relationship 
between them.
Natural science as such has existed for millennia, and arose in 
ancient slave-owning society. But in accordance with the economic 
nature of  this society, natural science, as a part of  philosophy, 
remained strictly separate from the material activity of production. It 
was a luxury of the ruling, slave-owning class, a decisive step forward 
in the history of humanity, but in the first instance did not exercise 
any influence on production. The idea that natural science was a 
product of the “inventive spirit” of the immediate producer and so 
forth, as can be found in some “Marxist” treatises, emerges in contrast 
from naïve proletkult ideas and from a vulgar materialism that always 
wishes directly to derive all social phenomena from production. It is 
true that, in a historically mediated form, and going all the way back 
to the original society of the hunter-gatherers, intellectual activities 
and the forms of their higher development are indeed in the first 
instance a direct result of material production. But the further we 
advance through history toward the threshold of class society as the 
result of the development of the productive forces, the more material 
production and intellectual-scientific activity (or their primitive 
forms) are isolated from one another and take on their own existence 
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independently of one another. The general truth of the materialist 
thesis as it pertains to the process of human development as a whole, 
that the forms of intellectual activity have their roots in material 
activities of production, is no hindrance to recognizing the fact that 
natural science has evolved as a particular moment of this process of 
development in strict separation from production.
For this reason, natural science, understood as the socially 
abstract “love of wisdom” of luxuriant slave-owners, had in the first 
instance  and for a long time nothing to do with the development of 
the social productive capacity of labor; it was an indirect result of 
the development of productive capacity, but conversely did not itself 
become a cause or motor of its further development. To the extent 
that the productive forces were further developed by means of 
improvements in the instruments and methods of production, this in 
fact came about as a result of the meticulous and contemplative nature 
of some of the immediate producers (farmers, craftsmen, fishermen), 
but absolutely not in a scientific manner, but purely empirically, 
accidentally, nonconceptually, without systematic abstraction or a 
sequence of logical steps that sequentially build upon one another. 
For this reason the process was tremendously slow and took place over 
very long periods of time, such that it was hardly possible to observe 
changes in technologies of production over many generations, and 
new procedures established themselves only very slowly, to the extent 
that they were not bound to particular natural conditions (e.g. as in 
the case of watermills).
In the ancient world, emerging science, with natural science as 
an integral component of it that had not yet developed to the status 
of a discipline in its own right, had already been a moment of human 
emancipation from religion, at least from religion in its original, naïve, 
unreflected, mythological form. But at the same time these beginnings 
of intellectual emancipation arose — and could only arise — as a 
luxury good produced by an idle class of slave holders who despised 
material production, with whose historical demise this emancipation, 
while it did not simply disappear, was however subordinated once 
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more, and in a very inflexible, mechanical form, to institutionalized 
religion in the form of the Roman church.
The history of the new rise of science and its transformation once 
again into an emancipatory ideology on a higher scale is, however, 
since the Renaissance, nothing other than the history of bourgeois 
emancipation from the chains of  feudalism. The renewed, more 
extensive separation of science from religion, the detachment of 
knowledge of nature from the belief in God had in the first place — 
and indeed for centuries — a purely ideological function: it was an 
ideal weapon to begin to unite the urban bourgeoisie against the feudal 
powers. As the founding sciences of a new secularized world picture, 
astronomy and cosmology (Galileo, Bruno, Kepler) were hardly suited 
to function as immediate productive forces. But the class that was 
to become the socioeconomic bearer of the modern emancipation 
of  science from religion differed fundamentally in its economic 
position (and therefore also in its ways of thinking) from the ancient 
slave-holders who “discovered” science. The bourgeoisie understood 
itself in its rise and in its struggle with feudalism as a productive 
class, although this concept certainly remained ideologically blurred 
and took sustenance from its opposition to the manifestly socially 
parasitic classes of the feudal aristocracy and to the feudal clergy. In 
the bourgeoisie’s understanding of itself as a productive class lay the 
historical ideological precondition for the productive application of 
the new sciences; but for this application actually to come to life, one 
further path must be travelled.
In the first half of the nineteenth century — that is, relatively late 
in the overall development of the bourgeoisie since the Renaissance 
— when capitalism first really began to develop by means of 
steam-powered machinery, this historical leap in the development 
of productivity was not yet in any way the result of a systematic 
relationship between science and production. The decisive innovations 
were initially still made by empirical practitioners (such as the 
engineer-industrialist and inventor of the spinning frame Arkwright) 
and not by scientists, and these innovations were made not on the 
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basis of the socialized organization of science and technology, but 
individually. The development of  the natural sciences since the 
sixteenth century was certainly a general precondition of the new 
technologies, and in particular of the tremendous potential of steam 
as a source of energy, but the technological and commercial application 
did not directly result from this. It essentially remained this way 
throughout the nineteenth century: the systematic social organization 
of the process of science and of its technological application and the 
substructure of qualifications that it requires (schools, specialist 
schools, the expansion of  the universities, the foundation of 
polytechnics, the amalgamation of science and large-scale capital) only 
got under way gradually. As late as the Gründerzeit at the end of the 
century, the threshold to the age of imperialism, it was still inventor-
capitalists such as Siemens, Daimler, or Edison in the United States who 
laid the decisive foundations for entire industrial branches.1 Industry 
itself was still in development, the largest proportion of the working 
population had not yet been transformed into wage laborers, and the 
industrial processes themselves remained in themselves very crude 
and labor-intensive — the scientification of production was still in its 
childhood. It is perhaps necessary to bring these facts to mind in order 
to grasp just how extremely young the historical development of the 
true logic of capitalism is, the logic that Marx had already anticipated 
in ideal form from its beginnings through the power of abstraction, 
admittedly spread across a huge life’s work that has remained a torso 
and still awaits the development that would emancipate it from the 
historical abbreviations of Marxism.
The scientification of production, which not only embraces the 
entire spectrum of the different branches of production but also 
reaches to the very depths of the individual labor processes, could 
only fully develop itself in the twentieth century — and as is the case 
throughout previous history, war was here, too, the father of all things. 
It was the two imperialist world wars that not only brought with them 
new inventions and technological innovations, but also the decisive 
breakthrough in the state and social organization of the process of 
36 Marxism and the Critique of Value
science and its direct connection to material production. And after 
World War II, electronics, as the direct descendant of militarized 
research, was the basis not only on which new industries were 
produced out of thin air, but also on which applied natural sciences 
for the first time ceased to be merely the technological foundation and 
general prerequisite of industrial labor processes, and became the 
driving force of the immediate labor process itself. The resonance of 
this change is felt by observers in all ideological camps when they are 
in agreement in speaking of a new technological revolution.
The second form of the scientification of production, the science of 
labor as the science of the organization of the processes of production, 
is of an even more recent vintage than the productive application of 
the natural sciences, and only came into existence in the first place in 
the twentieth century. It will forever remain associated with the name 
“Taylor.” It is true that the necessity of the planned organization of the 
process of production coincides with cooperation itself and therefore 
dates back to the beginnings of manufacture, but this organization 
remained immediate, spontaneous, and above all external to the 
concrete reality of the labor processes themselves, even throughout 
the entire nineteenth century.
The industrial system did not simply turn the worker into an 
appendage of the machinery straight away, but only parts of the 
working class (in the first instance primarily women and children), 
while at the same time, as a result of the machinery, new activities 
arose within the labor process that required certain qualifications, 
which looked very similar to those of the old artisanal class, and in part 
emerged from them. But others — technicians — must also be seen 
as creations of the system of machinery. These technicians possessed 
irreplaceable knowledge about the immediate process of production, 
abilities, and skills that they had acquired through practice, which left 
them a certain amount of room for maneuver with respect to capital. 
But even the unskilled workers had a certain, if smaller, latitude, by 
learning as it were to take advantage of the gaps in the mechanical 
system in order to create tiny spaces and breaks for themselves, to 
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keep the average working speed as low as possible. Capital’s attempts 
to bring these various instances of room for maneuver under control, 
along with what it saw as the squandering of valuable time, are as old 
as the capitalist mode of production itself, and are personified in those 
officers and NCOs of the process of production that with the onset of 
cooperation necessarily appear in particular guises. But as long as this 
control did not take on an objectified, operationalizable — in short, 
scientified — form, it had to remain external, arbitrary, and subjective.
It was not until the next stage of the development of capitalist 
concentration at the start of the twentieth century, which brought 
with it the large-scale material production that left even the most 
comprehensive forms of cooperation from the nineteenth century 
in its wake (not least in the highly organized and in part already 
state-directed wartime production of World War I), that the general 
precondition for labor science was created. Taylor himself, and it 
is telling that he advanced from the skilled working class (he was 
originally a lathe operator), combined in his own person a mixture of 
an almost glowing ideological defense of capitalism and the innovative 
fantasy of the fastidious contemplator with a bean-counting pedantry 
that enabled him to place the organization of the labor process itself 
on a scientific foundation.
The elementary principle of the science of labor over their respective 
immediate labor processes consists in the deindividualization and 
systematization of the control contained in the workers’ individual 
personality and corporeality, and to institutionalize it as an instance 
of control outside the individual worker. What Taylor created can to 
this extent be described as a second level of cooperation: if the first 
level of cooperation divided the total individual labor of a branch of 
production into partial individual labors under a command that lies 
outside the partial worker and with the representative of monetary 
capital, then now the partial labor is itself divided into individual, 
standardized operations, under a control which now just as then lies 
outside the individual partial worker.
In the industrial labor process as Taylor found it, this new level 
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of cooperation had, like the first before it, to turn against the worker. 
For the unskilled workers the consequences were devastating, for 
what little remained of  their room to maneuver was now taken 
from them. The assembly line, technologically speaking, in no way 
a specific innovation of applied natural science, but rather a simple 
matter of  mechanics, was, however, organizationally speaking, 
a decisive step in the industrial production process, and became a 
symbol of the new scientific torture of labor, of which the presentation 
in Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times remains unsurpassed. However, 
the assembly line, developed in prototypical form in the vanguard 
of the automobile industry, could in no way easily be applied to all 
branches of production at will. The principles of the new science of 
labor failed spectacularly when faced with the great proportion of 
technicians’ tasks, which involved an artisanal precision that could not 
be dissolved into standardized and externally controlled operations. 
The age of Taylorism or of Fordism (named after the original image of 
assembly line production) thus remained an epoch characterized by 
perpetual struggle between the science of labor and the working class, 
symbolized by the despised stopwatch of the time and motion expert, 
whose task it was to standardize optimally the content and duration 
of the operations, and by the absurd consequences it brought (such as 
the standardization of the sequence of motions in filing a document).
We shall now consider the scientification of production under the 
aspect of the confluence of applied natural science and the science of 
labor, a process which did not start until after World War II, and is only 
today entering a decisive stage before our very eyes. At the beginning 
of the twentieth century, technologically applied natural science and 
the science of labor were still relatively separate disciplines; it was 
not until the development of electronics and the automatic processes 
of production control that developed out of it that they fused into a 
unity. This development is characterized precisely by the minimization 
and the tendency toward the elimination of living human labor in 
the immediate process of production. The gaps between the scientific 
organization of labor and technology are closed precisely by means of 
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the removal of living labor itself, regardless of the place it previously 
occupied in immediate production.
However, this has wide-reaching consequences. From the 
standpoint of the money and wage fetishes, Taylor was a capitalist 
monster, because he wanted to redeploy the last elements of autonomy 
that remained in the industrial process of production outside the 
worker and to centralize them; from the standpoint of the money 
and wage fetishes, the fusion of natural-scientific technology and the 
science of labor must bring about another, far more hideous capitalist 
monstrosity, because such a fusion eliminates human labor altogether 
from the immediate process of  production. But it is precisely in 
this aspect that Taylor’s genius, within his capitalist constraints, 
becomes clear: his “science of labor” created the preconditions for 
automatization, as soon as applied natural sciences had become ripe for 
it, and with them the starting point for the suspension of commodity 
production itself. For the unification of  technologically applied 
natural science and the science of labor implies a tendency toward 
the suspension of the partial social labor that is objectified within a 
particular product, and a tendency to universalize immediately social 
labor.
The revolutionary working class that was attacking the wage 
system itself ought to dedicate a monument to Taylor, for he, albeit 
unconsciously, and in a restricted and even sordid manner directly 
in accordance with the base ends of the capitalist extraction of living 
labor, paved the way for the ultimate suspension of that immediately 
productive labor that, precisely because of this direct productivity 
that objectifies itself  within a particular product, cannot be 
immediately social labor and therefore remains apprehended within 
the socialization of exchange value. In capitalism this tendency, which 
is only today attaining objective maturity before our eyes, cannot be 
completed, because it relies on the valorization of value and therefore 
on the exploitation of that immediate living productive labor which 
it at the same time tends, according to its historical logic, to abolish.
If Marx occasionally talks of the abolition of labor but at the same 
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time describes labor as the eternal natural condition of the metabolism 
between humans and nature, this apparent contradiction can now 
easily be accounted for: what is abolished is immediate productive 
labor, and with it the tendency toward the torture of labor; what is 
not abolished and can never wholly be abolished is mediated, indirect, 
productive labor alongside the immediate process of production, 
before and beyond this process, labor which for the most part 
appears to be becoming more immediately social or socialized, and 
therefore objectively falls outside the framework of exchange value 
— a historical tendency, which in capitalism can only appear as a 
fundamental and catastrophic crisis.
The logic of this tendency that continually works its way further 
into the body politic contradicts the Marxist Left, for the reason that 
their understanding of the capital relation is restricted to inflexible 
definitional determinations with which all movements within capital, 
including technical progress, can apparently be explained. But it 
becomes clear that the inflexibility of these definitions was merely 
the expression of an epoch of the historical development of capital 
itself that is now coming to an end. As applied natural science and 
the science of labor converge to bring about the tendency toward the 
automation of immediate production, the contradiction of capital as 
a relation that becomes its own limit is only today coming to a head. 
Accordingly, we now find ourselves at the start of a new epoch, in 
which the core of the logic of capitalist development and crisis will at 
last truly begin to emerge.
Because of its advanced maturity, the elimination of living labor 
from the immediate process of production can today be recognized as 
such, and it is possible to draw from this insight more fundamental 
and deeper-reaching conclusions than those of Marxist theory up 
until today. This tendency will assert itself objectively on a global 
scale not as a single, isolated event, but as a longer historical period 
in which the accumulation of capital perishes and burns out as a result 
of itself. The technological process of the fusion of natural science and 
the science of labor is still in its infancy, even if microelectronics has 
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already provided the decisive prerequisites. The structures of material 
production in a great many sectors are still closing themselves off 
against a far-too-hasty and simple process of complete automation, 
even if there is a palpable tendency (as in the automobile industry, 
which because of its assembly-line structure is the most suited to 
it) for industrial robots to begin to close the gaps in the mechanical 
system that at the moment are still filled by people. The imperialist 
industrialized nations are still involved in global exchange with labor-
intensive production of the countries of the Third World, from which 
they take control of the abstract wealth of exchange value, that spectral 
objectification of human labor in itself in the immediate process of 
production. But there can be no doubt an epoch has begun that will 
be defined by the necessary objective downfall of money, because the 
material productivity of the process of labor itself relies on direct 
socialization, and in doing so destroys exchange value.
It is one of the ironies of history that the Marxist and indeed non-
Marxist Left has, today of all times at the beginning of this historical 
epoch, moved the furthest away from the concrete Marxian critique of 
value or of the objectivity of value, and is starting to lose what trace it 
had of the recollection of the objectivity of the capitalist contradiction, 
and is even beginning to conceive the new technological revolution as 
an overpowering increase of power and the potential final consolidation 
of capital, rather than as the beginning of its objective demolition. An 
essential theoretical foundation of this grotesque misunderstanding is 
the failure to retain in the concept of productive labor the distinction 
between material production and the production of value, between 
the immediate labor of production and directly social labor. If Marx’s 
reference to “science as immediate productive force” is misunderstood 
to mean that science itself produces value, a misunderstanding that 
can only be based on a failure to escape the value fetish, then every 
new stage in the scientification of production must certainly seem to 
be a moment of the immortalization and consolidation of the process 
of the abstraction of value.2
While traditional Marxism had hardly touched on the problem, 
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the New Left unfurled the question of scientification in precisely the 
opposite way. Michael Mauke, who was much read in the early stages 
of the 1968 movement, thus argued: “The shift from immediate to 
mediated activities has the effect that technical and scientific labor 
directly ‘produces surplus-value for the capitalist or serves the self-
valorization of capital,’ that is to say it becomes productive labor in 
the capitalist sense.”3
Habermas expresses this misunderstanding even more clearly 
when he writes: 
With the advent of large-scale industrial research, science, 
technology, and industrial utilisation were fused into a system. 
[...] Thus technology and science become a leading productive 
force, rendering inoperative the conditions for Marx’s labor 
theory of value[!]. It is no longer meaningful to calculate the 
amount of capital investment in research and development on 
the basis of unskilled (simple) labor power, when scientific-
technical progress has become an independent source of 
surplus-value, in relation to which the only source of surplus-
value considered by Marx, namely the labor power of the 
immediate producers, plays an ever smaller role.4
It is writ large in the face of such proclamations that for them value 
has congealed into a fetish concept — but this is precisely the matter 
on which the Left, and Habermas with it, has failed fundamentally to 
reflect. These circumstances prove only that the New Left as a whole 
shares Habermas’s fetishization of value, and that their theory and 
their political goals have never moved beyond this fetish, that is to 
say that their critique of the “traditional” workers’ movement has 
not begun to touch on the decisive question. This becomes clear at 
the very latest when it is seen that the only critique of the “science as 
a productive force” theorem came from the K-Gruppen, which relied 
on a set of concepts that had lapsed to the petrified proletkult of the 
Third International.5 In the very few pertinent comments from this 
source the problem is approached no less wrongly than by Mauke 
and Habermas, but merely the other way around: their insistence 
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that science as a productive force creates no value (which is certainly 
by no means a result of theoretical derivation, but remains a merely 
dogmatic assertion of  faith) thus appears immediately identical 
with the finding that science accordingly cannot be an immediate 
productive force even with respect to material production, but at most 
a concern that is external to the process of production.
This formulation (as well as that of Mauke, Habermas, and others 
that are apparently opposed to it) remains, absurdly, aconceptually 
and without any analytical differentiation, wedded to that historical 
identity of material production and the production of value which 
experiences a moment of real suspension precisely by capitalism’s 
secular movement. But their respective consequences are just as 
opposed as their evaluations. For Habermas, at least, and the whole 
intellectual sphere of the Frankfurt School and indeed of the left-
wing academic socialists, the result — sometimes sooner, sometimes 
later — was the path to obsolescence of the revolutionary subject of 
the working class, instead of the obsolescence of exchange value, and 
thus a shallow reformism on the basis of the valorization of value, 
presumably immortalized by means of science as a productive force. 
Conversely, for the K-Gruppen the result was once again clothed in the 
burlesque intellectual garb of Stalinist proletkult, hanging to the naïve 
pride in his labor of the immediate producer who boasts that he creates 
all value, instead of palpably abolishing value.
Relative Surplus Value and the Logic of the 
Development of Capital
It is now time to reveal how the divergence of material production 
and the production of value gradually appears in the process of the 
social reproduction of capital, and constitutes the historical logic of 
the development of the capitalist mode of production. The key concept 
in understanding this logic is well known to be that of relative surplus 
value. This concept is an analytical category found in Marx, but at the 
same time a real category of the total social reproduction of capital, 
not a surface category which would also appear in the consciousness 
44 Marxism and the Critique of Value
of the representatives of monetary capital.
Presupposing the existence of an absolute physical limit (with 
respect both to the duration of labor time and the intensity of labor) 
and a relative social limit to the working day (limitations enforced by 
the labor movement and/or by state interventions), the valorization 
of value transforms itself  from an absolute and extensive into a 
relative and intensive movement. The foundation of valorization is 
and remains surplus value as such — that is, the fact that the capitalist 
yield, apparently the output, measured in value, of the total aggregate 
of dead and living labor, is nothing other than the proportion of the 
new value that the living labor has created over and above the costs of 
its own reproduction. But if the capitalist share of this new value can 
no longer be enlarged extensively, by prolongation of the working day, 
its growth comes to depend on intensively and relatively increasing 
surplus labor, mediated through the development of the productive 
forces — that is, through the progressive scientification of the process 
of production. What presents itself with respect to a single capital 
as the difference between individual value and the level of social 
value, presents itself socially with respect to the generalization of 
the new productive force as a decrease in the reproduction costs of the 
commodity labor power. The production of relative surplus value thus 
necessarily becomes the prime means of capitalist accumulation. But 
in the movement of capital as a whole, mediated by competition, three 
logical historical consequences are established, the third of which is 
hardly discussed in either bourgeois or Marxist theory.
The first consequence consists in the fact that the increased 
capitalist share of the newly created value brings about an escalation 
of the material output of products, which in turn forces an expansion 
of markets and an acceleration of accumulation. Capital as it were 
hunts across the globe. This law of motion, as it compels an individual 
capital, is multiplied and politicized at the higher level of forms of 
state organization of national total capital, or of total capitalist blocs. 
Competition for higher productive capacity and over the markets takes 
place on all levels, on the level of the individual capital just as on the 
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level of capitalist states and blocs of allied countries.
This process concentrates and centralizes capital within the 
individual states. At the same time, the world market, as the economic 
theater of the war over markets for commodities and capital, the war 
over sources of raw materials, spheres of influence, and so on, is 
transformed into a global political arena. The capitalist world economy 
gives birth to world politics, political and military power becomes a 
condition of economic competitiveness, to the reciprocal detriment 
of the economic base. Hot war, naked violence, which tends toward 
and in this century has actually meant world wars with millions of 
casualties, becomes the ultima ratio of competition. It is completely 
evident that in this global capitalist system known as imperialism, war 
is in no way the direct effect of the economic crisis, neither the crisis 
of overproduction nor any other, but rests on the logic of competition 
between capitals on the world market, and of the internal dynamic of 
a world politics that is itself founded on this competition. The most 
fundamental revolutions of this century did not result from economic 
crises, and to this extent not from a burning out of capitalist logic as 
such either, but from political crises in combination with military 
conflicts and defeats of the ruling classes: beginning with the Paris 
Commune in 1871 then the October Revolution, the German Revolution 
of November 1918, the Chinese Revolution in the aftermath of World 
War II (the specific example of anticolonial revolutions such as those 
in Algeria or southeast Asia ought to be given separate treatment).
Even when the capitalist world economy turns into the world-
political phenomenon that takes on a dynamic of its own and engenders 
its own laws, the fundamental economic movement of the accumulation 
of relative surplus value ultimately remains the determining factor. 
Imperialist violence, the ultima ratio of military intervention, does not 
in the slightest eradicate the economic starting point of competition, 
nor can it solve the resulting conflicts. Competition must always 
reproduce itself on all levels, even if it does so in ever-new forms. 
The struggle over the development of  productivity and over the 
markets is never determined or indeed ultimately resolved by mere 
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violence, as is shown by the fulminant economic upturn in the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Japan during the phase of prosperity after 
World War II, despite their military defeats and prolonged periods of 
political and military weakness. The compulsion to the development of 
productivity is contained both in the self-determined logic of political-
military competition, as is shown by the Sputnik Shock of 1957 and the 
subsequent technological drive in the West, and in the continued effect 
of purely economic competition, as is indicated today in the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) and Western Europe by the technological 
race with Japan and the United States for the leading positions in 
microelectronics or gene technology.
The second consequence of  the accumulation brought about 
by the increase in relative surplus value consists in the increasing 
tendency of the individual product to lose value — that is, in this 
interminable process, mediated by competition, of the development 
of the productive forces, the products decline in value. This tendency 
toward the decline in value of products allows more and more of 
what were previously luxury items to become available for the 
consumption of the masses, and creates and develops new, higher 
needs, which Marx with good reason reckons to be an aspect of the 
civilizing mission of capital. Contrary to some theoretical assertions, 
this tendency also develops according to its nature under imperialism, 
monopoly capitalism, and late capitalism — that is to say, neither the 
monopoly nor the state monopoly is ultimately able to render the law 
of value fundamentally inoperative. Even into the twentieth century, 
a great many products that used to be luxuries have, by means of the 
development of productive forces and the resultant decline in value, 
become objects of mass consumption (e.g., motor vehicles, electric 
household appliances, and so on at the start of this century; computers 
only more recently).
For the fact that the motor vehicle first became available to the 
masses in the form of the automobile and chaotic individual transport, 
with all its devastating consequences, is primarily the fault of the 
fact that this process was determined according to capitalism, for the 
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public (that is to say communal) forms of transport were in no way 
developed to the same extent. But even then there is fundamentally a 
certain civilizing moment to the generalization of the motor vehicle: it 
creates a new mobility, a new mass need to travel, and thus contributes 
to the spasmodic broadening of the mind and to the creation of an 
internationalized society, even if this process in some cases engenders 
grotesque frictions at the same time. If the critique is directed against 
the universalization of the motor vehicle rather than against the fact 
that it is determined by its capitalist form, then the conservative and 
culturally pessimistic perspective of the gentleman rider can easily 
shine through it, a perspective that merely mourns for the privilege 
of the elect.
The third consequence, however — and this has hardly been 
brought to light in theory — consists in the fact that capital itself 
becomes the absolute logical and historical limit in the production 
of relative surplus value. Capital has no interest in and cannot be 
interested in the absolute creation of value; it is fixated only on 
surplus value in the forms in which it appears at the surface, that is 
to say on the relative proportion within the newly created value of 
the value of labor power (the costs of its reproduction) to the share 
of the new value that is appropriated by capital. As soon as capital 
can no longer increase the creation of value in absolute terms by 
extending the working day, but can only increase the relative size of 
its own share of the newly created value by means of the increase 
of productivity, there arises in the production of relative surplus 
value a countermovement, which must consume itself historically 
and work toward and bring about a standstill in the process of value 
creation. With the development of productivity, capital increases the 
extent of exploitation, but in doing so it undermines the foundation 
and the object of exploitation, the production of value as such. For 
the production of relative surplus value, inseparable as it is from the 
progressive fusion of modern science with the material process of 
production, includes the tendency toward the elimination of living, 
immediate, productive labor, as the only source of total social value 
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creation. The same movement which increases capital’s share of the 
new value decreases the absolute basis of value production by means 
of the elimination of direct living productive labor. Capital creates, 
necessarily and unconsciously, the immediately social labor that 
emerges from the value relation, the material productivity of which 
reduces total social labor time — but it does so only to its own end, in 
order to increase the rate at which it exploits the immediate producers. 
Capital develops social productivity for asocial ends and interests, and 
thus becomes entangled in a contradiction that cannot be resolved on 
its own foundations, the ultimate logic of which Marx sketches in the 
following terms:
A development in the productive forces that would reduce the 
absolute number of workers, and actually enable the whole 
nation to accomplish its entire production in a shorter period of 
time would produce a revolution, since it would put the majority 
of the population out of action. Here we have once again the 
characteristic barrier to capitalist production, and we see how 
this is in no way an absolute form of the development of the 
productive forces and the creation of wealth, but rather comes 
into conflict with this at a certain point in its development. One 
aspect of this conflict is presented by the periodic crises that 
arise when one or another section of the working population 
is made superfluous in its old employment. The barrier to 
capitalist production is the surplus time of the workers. The 
absolute spare time that the society gains is immaterial to 
capitalist production. The development of productivity is only 
important to it in so far as it increases the surplus-labor time 
of the working class and does not just reduce the labor-time 
needed for material production in general; in this way it moves 
in a contradiction.6
Three questions necessarily arise from this sketch of the capitalist 
logic of the development of accumulation through the production of 
relative surplus value:
First: why has capitalism survived until today, in spite of  its 
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absolute immanent limit?
Second: why is capital, along with its theoretical advocates, blind 
to this tendency toward the absolute reduction of total social value 
creation?
Third: why has Marxist theory itself abandoned this thematic and 
not developed it concretely and honed it beyond Marx?
The Historical Expansion of Capital
The production of relative surplus value refers to the relationship 
between the capitalist share of the new value and the reproduction 
costs of the labor power of each individual laborer, but not to the 
absolute number of wage laborers employed, and therefore not to the 
absolute amount of surplus value, which with the absolute decrease 
in the creation of value is itself also necessarily decreased. This results 
in the situation
that the same reasons that permit the level of exploitation of 
labor to increase make it impossible to exploit as much labor as 
before with the same total capital. These are the counter-acting 
tendencies which, while they act to bring about a rise in the 
rate of surplus-value, simultaneously lead to a fall in the mass 
of surplus-value produced by a given capital, hence a fall in 
the rate of profit.7
From this results the urgent necessity that capital grow as capital, that 
is to say that the decrease in the amount of surplus value through the 
increase in the rate of relative surplus value must be compensated for 
by the reproduction of capital not on the same scale, but on an enlarged 
scale, which for the first time brings about the necessity of limitless 
accumulation (growth). This development grows exponentially. 
While capital eliminates living immediate productive labor on one 
given level of production, it must at the same time absorb more new 
living immediate productive labor on a further level of production. 
But for this capital requires a social space, a terrain that it has not 
yet seized, into which it can in time grow. If this process encounters 
obstacles — if capital, even for a short amount of time, is unable to 
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absorb more new living productive labor than it has eliminated by 
means of technological development — then periodic crises also 
arise when one or another section of the working population is made 
superfluous in its old employment. For in this case the materially 
and technologically mediated rise in the rate of surplus value does 
in fact lead to a fall in the mass of surplus value, and hence to a fall 
in the rate of profit — that is to say, production is no longer viable as 
capitalist production, and tends toward standstill, as long as it finds 
itself in capitalist hands. The tendency of the rate of profit to fall 
ought therefore only to be understood as the determination of the 
form of the crisis, the final content of which is founded in the material 
development of productivity and its absolute opposition to the value 
form of production in general. The crisis is only partial, periodic, 
and therefore transitional when capital succeeds in overcoming the 
obstacles in the way of its expansion, and in absorbing once again more 
living productive labor than it previously eliminated. In that case, the 
fall in the rate of profit is once again suspended. The character of this 
fall as a tendency must therefore not be understood as a continual 
process but as a historical discontinuity; this fall is fundamentally 
embedded in the development of productivity in the material labor 
process, but can again and again be suspended, as long as capital 
is once again able to start a new cycle of accumulation through the 
renewed expansion of the absolute mass of living labor employed in 
production.
However, the concept of capital’s process of expansion remains 
hollow and unclear if  it is only examined with respect to its value 
form, but not related systematically to the material content of this 
expansion. The process of accumulation can be understood as infinite 
only in the absence of a systematic relation of accumulation to its 
material substrate. After all, abstract wealth in the form of money is 
by its nature limitless and interminable, and only its material content 
is subject to an absolute historical limit. However, there can be no 
accumulation without its material bearer, however much the latter’s 
absence would be the ideal of capital. The extended absorption of living 
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immediate productive labor must refer to such a material content and 
bearer, which can be traced both historically and concretely in several 
respects.
First, the terrain for the expansion of capital becomes manifest in its 
step-by-step conquest of all branches of production that exist before it 
and independently of it — that is, in the transformation of subsistence 
and simple commodity production into capitalist production. And, 
again, as is taken as read in the question of the scientification of the 
labor process, it is necessary to remember that this process is in fact 
still young, and to recall how long a trajectory it would need in order 
to eat its way through all branches of production, starting with the 
textile industry. Together, the scientification of production and the 
transformation of, in the first instance, noncapitalist branches of 
production (crafts, agriculture) into capitalist branches constitute 
a single total process: the capitalization of  noncapitalist small-
scale production brings scientification in its wake, and the more 
branches of production are seized by capital, the greater the scale 
on which the total social aggregate of scientification develops. If 
this process is understood in inflexible definitions, as a result of the 
misunderstanding that the force of the Marxian abstraction had not 
anticipated ideally the historical logic of capital, but merely reflected 
an inflexible structural real logic of capital (a misunderstanding that is 
only possible as a result of the failure to escape the value fetish), then 
the temporal horizon is displaced, the process is no longer conceived 
as having an objective beginning and a just-as-objective end, but only 
as the return of the same, with this or that modification.
Even in the most-developed capitalist industrialized countries, 
the process of the capitalization of branches of production continued 
until late in the twentieth century; in Germany it did not reach its 
culmination until after World War II. It is possible to take the level 
of wage dependency within the working population as a whole as 
an indicator for this process (even if the category of wage labor of 
course also includes unproductive areas into which capitalism expands 
or which it has just newly created), and according to this index, 
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capitalization does not reach saturation point in the core imperialist 
countries with 70 to 90 percent wage dependency until the 1960s.
Secondly, however, the elimination of  human labor in the 
immediate process of  production during the course of  capitalist 
development was always overcome anew by the counter-absorption 
of living labor in new branches of production to meet new needs. 
Even here it is necessary to distinguish between different phases 
in the progression of capitalist development: World War II and the 
subsequent decades brought forth another new accumulation drive of 
capital. Particular products that before World War II were made more 
or less exclusively for a narrow class only entered mass production 
and mass consumption by means of  the scientific-technological 
innovations of the war: cars, electric household appliances, and then 
electronic forms of entertainment. All these products only attained 
technological maturity and the phase of their true mass production 
in the 1950s and 1960s. At this point, a stage of scientification becomes 
visible in which, while the development of productivity does indeed 
eliminate living labor from countless older branches of production 
such that one or another section of the working population is made 
superfluous in its old employment, it nonetheless does so only in order 
to create new branches of production or to make those which are not 
yet fully developed ripe for the loss of value and for mass production; 
this absorbs once again great masses of living labor into capitalist 
production, and the labor population that has been made redundant 
is again incorporated into an extended level of the production of value 
and surplus value.
But both essential forms or moments of the process of capitalist 
expansion are today starting to come up against absolute material 
limits. The saturation point of  capitalization was reached in the 
1960s; this source of the absorption of living labor has come to a 
final standstill. At the same time, the confluence in microelectronics 
of  natural-scientific technology and the science of labor implies 
a fundamentally new stage in the revolution of the material labor 
process. The microelectronic revolution does not eliminate living 
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labor in immediate production only in this or that specific productive 
technology, but sets out on a wider front, throughout all branches of 
production, seizing even the unproductive areas. This process has only 
just started, and will not fully gain traction until the second half of the 
1980s; it seems likely that it will continue until the end of the century 
and beyond. To the extent that new branches of production are created 
by means of this process, such as in the production of microelectronics 
itself or in gene technology, they are by their nature from the outset 
not very labor-intensive with respect to immediate production. This 
brings about the collapse of the historical compensation that has 
existed up until this point for the absolute immanent limit, embedded 
within relative surplus value, to the capitalist mode of production. The 
elimination on a massive scale of living productive labor as a source 
of the creation of value can no longer be recuperated by newly mass-
produced cheap products, since this process of mass production is no 
longer mediated by a process of reintegrating a labor population that 
has been made superfluous elsewhere. This brings about a historically 
irreversible overturning of the relationship between the elimination 
of living productive labor through scientification on the one hand, 
and the absorption of living productive labor through processes of 
capitalization or through the creation of new branches of production 
on the other: from now on, it is inexorable that more labor is eliminated 
than can be absorbed. All technological innovations that are to be 
expected will also tend only in the direction of the further elimination 
of living labor, all new branches of production will from the outset 
come to life with less and less direct human productive labor.
Social production’s objective departure from the limits of the 
fictitious objectivity of value must sooner or later make its presence 
felt clearly and with full force. The idea that a commodity, as a material 
product that we can see before us, is an objectivity of value, has become 
so commonsensical as the dominant fetish concept for the abstract 
individuals of commodity production that Marxists occasionally forget 
what value really is — namely the socially real fiction of objectified 
human labor in context of the immediate production process. One need 
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only, like Habermas and company, omit the attribute “immediately” 
or even attribute a mystical creation of value to the directly social 
labor that goes into whole ranges of products only in an indirect and 
undifferentiated manner, in order to arrive at this fetishistic result 
and completely to fail to recognize the explosive force of the problem.
That the content of value is in the process of disappearing from 
society does not of course by a long way mean that the social forms 
of circulation that arise from it must themselves peter out. For the 
interests of the exploiters are also indissolubly dependent on them.
Capital, which has as its essential core the “miserable foundation” 
of wealth as the exploitation of living labor, and simultaneously 
dissolves this foundation through its own movement, will try — must 
try — with all force to maintain the value as value, that is to say, to 
allow the form to continue as the general form of circulation, even 
as it becomes empty, robbed of its social content. This must lead to 
catastrophic social collisions.
The new and final crisis of capitalism is fundamentally different 
from previous crises. All the crises that have happened up until now 
were crises of the growth of capital which could only temporarily 
interrupt the process of accumulation; the new crisis, however, reveals 
itself to be the end of the process of the accumulation of abstract 
wealth itself, because concrete material wealth can no longer be 
engendered within the limits of the value relation. The new crisis is 
thus no temporary crisis of overaccumulation or overproduction, but 
rather a crisis of the creation of value itself, from which there can no 
longer be a way out for capital.
That the crisis which in the 1970s finally ended the phase of 
accumulation and of general prosperity after World War II promises 
by its nature to become such a final crisis of capital, and differs in its 
fundamental characteristics from all previous crisis processes, can be 
confirmed today by two surface manifestations of a new kind.
First, the crisis begins to make itself visible not only as a market 
crisis of capital and of commodities, but as a crisis of money itself. 
Inflation, which even as a concept was almost unheard of before World 
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War I, but which erupted, above all in Germany, as a consequence 
of the capitalist war economy after the world wars, has meanwhile 
become a permanent feature both in the imperialist countries and in 
the Third World. The astounding process in which not only products 
are devalued in competition, but also money itself, across the whole 
society and worldwide, has a very simple cause: the fact that with 
the monstrous development of technological productivity, material 
wealth can no longer be expressed in the money commodity of gold. 
Until World War I there was still a universal gold standard, that is to 
say that the banknotes of all important industrialized countries could 
be directly converted into gold. Since then, material productivity has 
exceeded the money commodity, gold, to an ever-increasing extent. 
The umbilical cord of the gold standard was finally cut at the start of 
the 1970s with the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system — that 
is, even the dollar, the global currency, was irreversibly decoupled 
from the gold standard. But this means nothing other than the 
successive suspension of money as a commodity, for paper money, 
released in volumes with no gold backing, no longer contains any 
real substance of value, with the single exception of the negligible 
amount of labor involved in its manufacture. This has come to hold 
universally for paper money, and also for money that exists purely 
for the purposes of accounting, and all the more so for the fantastic 
and purely juridical creations out of nothing such as the artificial 
world money of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of the International 
Monetary Fund, which can only circulate between the central banks. 
But the disappearance of the substance value of money only reflects 
the overall tendency for value to disappear, the fact that material 
production goes beyond the limits of value.
This in no way means that the old view of the vulgar economists, 
castigated by Marx, of money’s purely technical function had become 
reality, but rather that the mode of production and circulation that 
relies on money loses to an ever greater extent its real content, that the 
socially real fiction of value becomes unreal, and its fictional character 
begins to appear as such on the surface. Value is transformed into an 
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empty shell that no longer measures up to the material content. Capital 
and the capitalist politicians and experts of course try to maintain 
value as value under all circumstances, and to save the abstraction of 
money as real abstraction whatever the cost: the currency-related and 
other monetary manipulations are becoming more and more intricate, 
complicated, and incredible. In the few years, seen from a historical 
perspective, since the Bretton Woods system was abandoned, the 
international monetary and credit systems have already been on the 
point of collapse on several occasions, and this collapse will emerge as 
a worldwide failure of the banks as the collapse of the international 
credit system and a wave of currency reforms leading to the effective 
expropriation of large swathes of the population, and will not allow 
itself to be postponed forever. The new dimension of a final historical 
crisis of capital must ultimately assert itself  in all force from the 
monetary side, as the insoluble crisis of money, even if through many 
attempts by currency and credit experts to decelerate the process.
But the second fundamentally new manifestation which suggests 
the end of capitalist logic is the appearance since the mid-1970s of 
mass unemployment that is independent of  the economic cycle, 
and has climbed relentlessly, more or less independently of  the 
cyclical development — and its visible trend is that it will continue 
to climb. In the previous development of capital, it has on several 
occasions seemed for short periods of time that such a process was 
imminent, but each time it was absorbed by a new accumulation 
drive. On the whole, the state of unemployment followed the cycle 
of the accumulation of capital, the absorption and emission of living 
labor power in the immediate process of capitalist production. These 
previously valid economic laws have been rendered inoperative in all 
the core imperialist countries for over a decade. Even some serious 
bourgeois economists are seeing a relentless trend that on the basis 
of the financial economy will necessarily bring about apocalyptic 
unemployment figures and a desperate collapse of the social safety net 
by the end of the century. All talk on the part of bourgeois politicians 
of a prayed-for boom and of consolidation in the world economy must 
57The Crisis of Exchange Value
be measured against this remorseless logic.
The boom in the mid-1980s that was confined to a few countries with 
the highest productivity left mass unemployment almost untouched 
even in these countries. That at present unemployment seems stagnant 
and is not already noticeably higher is to be attributed more to 
statistical tricks and manipulations of the capitalist administration of 
labor, the task of which is to lead the public to accept the most favorable 
picture of the situation, than to an actual interruption in the process of 
redundancy of living immediate productive labor. And furthermore, 
for many branches of production, and also most of the unproductive 
areas, the microelectronic revolution of production still lies ahead. 
Every imaginable future boom for remaining sectors of capital will not 
put a fundamental halt to the growth in mass unemployment.
One ought now to confront the probably inescapable objection 
that the theory of the devaluation of value outlined here is false and 
potentially utopian for the reason that it presupposes as the social 
average the absolute and complete automation of production as a 
whole, the ghost factory, devoid of humans and so on. Such an objection 
would be naïve for the reason that it does not take into account the logic 
of the accumulation of capital as it is conditioned by the production 
of relative surplus value, but instead remains caught in inflexible 
definitions. The collapse of the value relation does not wait until the 
elimination of the last worker from immediate production before 
starting, but rather begins at precisely that historical point when 
the general relation between the elimination and the reabsorption 
of living immediate productive labor begins to overturn — that is, 
as early as the moment (and to a growing extent afterwards) when 
(and how) more living immediate productive labor is eliminated 
then is reabsorbed. This point, to the extent that it can be called a 
point at all, has probably already been passed, approximately in the 
early- to mid-1970s: it is no coincidence that both the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods monetary system and the start of technological mass 
unemployment took place within this period. And one must not, of 
course, imagine the collapse of the value relation as a sudden and one-
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off event (even though sudden declines and collapses such as bank 
failures and mass bankruptcies will very much be part of this collapse), 
but rather as a historical process, a whole epoch lasting perhaps several 
decades, in which the capitalist world economy can no longer escape 
from the maelstrom of crisis and processes of devaluation, surging 
mass unemployment, and the class struggles that will sooner or later 
inevitably follow.
It is worth noting as an aside that this development also provides 
the adjudication of an old debate as to the capability of capitalism 
to continue developing its productive forces. It is astonishing that 
this question was most frequently applied to the matter of whether 
capitalism could further propel material productivity as such; 
whether it could, even in its monopolistic stage, drive the process 
of scientification beyond a particular level. Capitalism’s chances of 
survival were then evaluated according to the way in which this 
question was answered. It is not difficult to recognize by means of the 
conceptual definition developed above the extent of the fundamental 
falsity even of asking this question, how severely it misunderstands 
authentic Marxism and the objective logic of capital. What is in fact 
reached is not the limit of the development of productive forces, but 
the limit of the objectivity of value. It is not the case that capitalism 
can simply continue to develop the material forces of production: 
it must do so relentlessly in accordance with the logic of its own 
development. “The real limit of capitalist production is capital itself ”: 
that is, value. The objective failure of capital comes about as a result 
not of the development of material productivity itself, but of the 
compulsion magically to constrain the immense social potential of 
science and technology within the limits of value. This is the only way 
to understand the Marxist claim that capitalism must perish at the 
hand of the “development of the productive forces.”
Inversion through Competition
Why can capital not see that it is historically digging its own grave due 
to its reliance on the production of relative surplus value by way of 
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the development of productive forces? I have already drawn attention 
to the fact that the category of relative surplus value (and indeed that 
of surplus value itself ) is no surface category that could appear in 
the consciousness of the representatives of self-valorizing monetary 
capital. The reason for this can ultimately be found in the fact that 
capital can never truly appear as total capital, but only ever — in 
whatever form — as competing individual capital. The category of 
value presupposes that of exchange, and thus in some form or other 
private producers who are in formal economic terms independent of 
one another. Even in highly developed forms of state capitalism in 
which the state appears not only as the ideal, but increasingly also 
as the real total capitalist, these fundamental facts cannot really be 
suspended. As long as the value relation exists within society at all, and 
with it production oriented toward the production of value, which in 
turn is expressed in the money form as universal form of circulation, 
the standpoint of the whole is in reality a practical impossibility. The 
state and its authorities can take up the perspective of the totality of the 
process of social reproduction only in a formal and external manner, 
but not according to its content (since the state as such is already the 
expression of the economic separation of social partial producers 
and their asociality within production). Moments of competition 
must therefore always develop anew and regrow like the heads of the 
hydra, even at the level of circulation between different states. For 
individual capital, the process is in its entirety only recognizable from 
the standpoint of participants in the struggle over markets. For the 
capitalist state as ideal (and increasingly real in regards to external 
exchange value) total capitalist, the process is only recognizable from 
the standpoint of the representative of a nation’s total capital in the 
struggle over markets and spheres of influence. For an imperialist 
bloc, the process reveals itself from the standpoint of a coalition of 
different national capitals struggling for markets and political and 
military zones of influence against another competing bloc.
In these competitive struggles the process of the production of 
value in no way appears in a manner in accordance with the theoretical 
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concept of social total reproduction, the standpoint of which is taken 
up by practically nobody. While the oppositional, tendentially self-
cancelling movement in the production of relative surplus value 
is visible from the perspective of total reproduction, it is utterly 
invisible from the perspective of competing individual capital. In 
total reproduction, the production of relative surplus value appears 
as absurd, because it brings about an increase in the rate of surplus 
value at the same time as a decrease in the mass of surplus value. This 
holds — and not only in theory, but also in practice — exclusively 
for the process as a whole, but in no way for each particular capital, 
for which the individual increase in the rate of profit (extra profit) 
through an increase in productivity is not paid for in the slightest 
by a simultaneous decrease in the mass of profit. The logic of the 
development of productivity consists in the production, in the same 
time period, of more products with less human labor power. Considered 
in the abstract (that is, every individual capital taken for itself), the 
absurd countermovement of relative surplus value — that is, that more 
value is appropriated per worker, while at the same time the absolute 
mass of the newly created value decreases, because in total less living 
productive labor has been employed — would also reveal itself on this 
level of the individual capital. However, this consideration remains 
abstract for the reason that the individual capital does not of course 
only reproduce itself for itself, but within the competitive relationship 
of many capitals among themselves. The production of surplus value 
and its realization in circulation — that is, in processes of exchange on 
the market — diverge from one another. It thus becomes necessary to 
clarify what takes place by means of the competition relation between 
production and realization in circulation.
When an individual capital doubles the productivity of its total 
aggregate (dead labor in the form of machines and living labor are 
not distinct from the standpoint of capital, but both appear in the 
same way as input-cost factors) while at the same time reducing the 
amount of living labor involved in the process, this brings about in the 
first instance a reduction of the input costs (the amortization of the 
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improved machinery has already been taken into account), while at 
the same time the amount of material products produced is increased 
— in this instance, doubled. However, because of the reduction in 
living labor, a smaller mass of value falls on this increased quantity of 
individual products, and therefore also on each individual product. But 
the absolute reduction in the mass of value thus only appears within 
an individual capital with the increase in its individual productivity. 
Each individual product of the productive capital contains less value 
than the corresponding social-average product, but this social average 
alone is valid on the market. As far as the monetary expression of the 
value of the commodity is concerned, and this is the only matter of 
practical interest, it is thus also in itself twice as high for the more 
productive capital, since it appears on the market with twice as great 
a quantity of material products that have the average social value 
of this product, which is still valid on the market. It is true that this 
monetary expression is in the first instance only the price, and not yet 
the realization through sale, for the doubled quantity of commodities 
enters a limited market with limited purchasing power. But of course, 
the more productive capital now has, compared with all the other 
participants in the market, vast room for maneuver which it can 
use to lower its price and to find buyers for its doubled quantity of 
commodities. For even if this capital must, in order to conquer the 
market share necessary for the doubled quantity of material products, 
now sell its doubled quantity of products below the average social 
value that holds at the time, the relationship between the absolute 
input costs and absolute output as yield has in any case shifted hugely 
in its favor.
Here the inversion of the true situation of society as a whole 
through the movement of competition becomes clear. In the total social 
reproduction of capital as a whole, the reduction of living productive 
labor, wherever it takes place, naturally also leads to a reduction in the 
total mass of value. But the very capital that achieves this reduction 
in living labor appropriates for itself a higher profit in doing so. The 
true process that appears in such an inverted form for the individual 
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capital at the surface of the market is the fault of the liquidity of 
abstract exchange value, money, in comparison with the inflexibility 
and bulkiness of the mass of material products. The mass of value 
presented in material use values and the mass of the liquid money 
commodity stand in a perpetually oscillating compensatory relation 
to one another, a relation that is produced by disproportionalities, 
and that takes on incredibly complex forms at the level of the world 
market. If the German and Japanese automobile industries develop 
higher labor productivity than, for example, the English, this in 
itself means that every car produced in Germany and Japan contains 
a smaller amount of abstract human labor, a smaller mass of value, 
that is, if we take as our basis the real social fiction of the objectivity of 
value of things. Furthermore, it means that in absolute terms, a smaller 
mass of value is produced in the automobile industries of Germany and 
Japan than in the English industry, at any rate as long as no additional 
productive capacity is constructed. But on the surface of the market, 
this situation appears completely different: precisely because of their 
higher productivity, their employment of less living labor, the German 
and Japanese automobile capitalists produce more cost-efficiently 
than their English counterparts, which is the only criterion that is of 
interest to the vulgar, abstract bourgeois economic understanding, 
and can therefore offer their products on the market more affordably, 
and can kick the English suppliers out of the market and nonetheless 
record yet another extra profit at their bottom line.
In fact, what has happened is the following: in spite of  the 
fact that they in fact produce less value, the German and Japanese 
automobile capitalists can capture a greater mass of the liquid money 
commodity in the process of realization of surplus value than their 
English competitors —  that is, they have actually appropriated, by 
means of redistribution on the world market, a portion of the surplus 
value that is produced in England. On the surface of the market, the 
inversion of the true movement thus appears. The capital that reduces 
in absolute terms the total capitalist amount of value (which is as such 
the concern of no particular capital) through higher productivity and 
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the elimination of immediate living productive labor — that saws, 
that is, at the bough of capitalism itself — is rewarded by extra profit 
and a greater market share, while at the same time the capital that 
employs more living productive labor (per commodity) and therefore 
maintains the total mass of value, and value as value, is punished by 
the loss of market share and the nonrealization of the surplus value 
that it has produced.
In the totality of this process of redistribution, the inescapable 
law of value is accounted for by the fact that the English automobile 
industry sits on a portion of its products — that these products, that is, 
only represent material use value, but can no longer serve as exchange 
values. What happens to these devalued use values is obvious: they 
are obviously not given to the poor, but initially stored, and then, 
depending on their material properties, either completely destroyed or 
reprocessed into raw materials and component parts: pulped, melted 
down, burned, thrown into the sea, whatever, but in any case destroyed 
as use values because they found no grace at the court of the queen of 
the commodities, money. All over the world, every day, every hour, use 
values of all kinds are thus wantonly destroyed on an ever-growing 
scale. Humanity sacrifices hecatombs of objectified labor torture in 
more and more frenzied insanity to the dark, incomprehensible god of 
its own socialization, the law of exchange value. The ancient families 
of the gods ought to explode with envy. This insanity only becomes 
possible by means of the divergence of production and circulation, by 
means of the liquidity of money and the perpetual redistribution of 
surplus value, mediated by competition, on the world market.
It is this inversion through competition that averts capital’s gaze 
from the consequences of this process on the level of the reproduction 
of society as a whole, consequences that are fatal for capital’s own 
mode of production. What Marx writes about capital as the process of 
its own objective self-abolition thus becomes clear for the first time:
To the degree that labor time — the mere quantity of labor 
— is posited by capital as the sole determinant element, to 
that degree does direct labor and its quantity disappear as 
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the determinant principle of production — of the creation of 
use values — and is reduced both quantitatively, to a smaller 
proportion, and qualitatively, as an, of course, indispensable 
but subordinate moment, compared to general scientific labor, 
technological application of natural sciences, on one side, and 
to the general productive force arising from social combination 
in total production on the other side — a combination which 
appears as a natural fruit of social labor (although it is a historic 
product). Capital thus works toward its own dissolution as the 
form dominating production.8
For a short period, in the context of history, of almost a hundred 
years, the logic of  the self-abolition of capital remained hidden, 
while the process of the expansion of capital still found terrain for its 
further development in the capitalization of noncapitalist branches 
of production, and the creation of new labor-intensive industries. If 
this process of expansion is today starting to come up against absolute 
limits, the inversion through competition is of course not suspended 
— quite the opposite, competition is accentuated, and the process 
of scientification is accelerated, with all the consequences it has for 
society as a whole. There has already existed since the beginning 
of  the 1970s — that is, since the start of  the phase that remains 
uncomprehended even today of the overturning of the historical logic 
of capital — a foreseeable trend according to which the world market’s 
room for maneuver is beginning inexorably to shrink: a new (and, I 
assert on the basis of the above derivation, final) stage of the struggle 
over the markets has come to pass, which can be negotiated neither 
by economic nor by political and military means. At the periphery of 
the capitalist industrial societies, in countries such as Spain, Portugal, 
and Greece, and to an extent even in the core imperialist countries 
such as France, Italy, and Great Britain, the remorseless process 
of redistribution of surplus value, the mass of which is shrinking 
worldwide because of the new level of material socialization, is already 
leading to agony in whole branches of industry; even the FRG has not 
remained unaffected (viz. steel- and shipyard crisis).
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The frontrunners and crisis profiteers in this process of 
redistribution that is becoming ever narrower — primarily Japan, 
the FRG, and (to a somewhat lesser extent) the United States — are 
trying to invoke the upturn and to deny the job-killing consequences 
of the new socializing technologies. In fact, the inversion through 
competition makes it appear on the surface as if  the victors in the 
process, mediated through competition, of  the realization and 
redistribution of global surplus value not only assert their position 
but are even able temporarily to expand their capacity for production, 
thus creating new jobs, and once again raising by a small amount the 
absolute mass of surplus value created in their country. This expansion, 
absolutely real for the countries and individual capitals that bring it 
about, is, within the total process of reproduction of world capital, 
only the semblance of an expansion. It is not based on a process of 
expansion of capital as a whole, which has reached its historical limits, 
but exclusively on the destruction of other capitals. The extra jobs are 
not created by means of microelectronics, but by the destruction of 
jobs, capital, and commodities in other countries and by other capitals. 
The situation that a capital can no longer grow by means of expansion 
into a historically free terrain, but can do so only at the expense of 
other capitals, which in previous periods of capitalist development 
was confined to periodic crises, now becomes a permanent normality 
that can no longer be suspended. In the last ages of the capital relation, 
the inversion through competition thus necessary leads to a spiralling 
cycle of ever-worsening trade wars. The provisional victories of the 
FRG and of Japan in the theater of war that is the world market will 
sooner or later have to be seen as pyrrhic victories, and indeed, to the 
same extent that the world market will tend to fragment through the 
political “iron curtain” of protectionism (which despite all the purely 
ideological assertions to the contrary has spread constantly since those 
ominous years of the early 1970s), thus to throttle the export economy, 
the true motor of Japan’s and the FRG’s economic development.
But since the character masks of capital (including a value- and 
wage-fetishizing trade union movement as the character mask of 
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variable capital) are only oriented toward the surface of appearances 
and can thus only move within the inversions of the true process by 
competition on the world market, they all see only a single solution 
and all sound the same trumpet: Yet more rationalization! Yet more 
scientification! Just don’t get left behind in the technological race! 
And they are right — save that with every small advantage that is 
achieved on the world market, they dig the grave of the total system 
of the valorization of value, this world beyond which they are neither 
able nor willing to think. In the last decades of the twentieth century, 
and at the start of the twenty-first, the nations, as character masks of 
the self-valorization of value, will thus present the image of a lunatic 
pack of wolves that tear themselves apart over an ever-smaller scrap of 
value. All political and potentially military conflicts of this new epoch 
will (increasingly) no longer be mere epiphenomena of the process of 
capitalist accumulation, but the immediate expression of the historical 
end of this accumulation — that is, the burning out of capitalist logic 
itself. The relation between economics and politics thus takes on a 
new quality.
Crisis and Theories of Crisis
To conclude, I should like now briefly to address the question of why 
Marxist theory has not up until now developed the true dimension of 
capitalist logic and its crisis that is at least implicitly contained within 
Marx’s work. In this context, the historical rudiments of Marxist crisis 
theory are the first point of interest. It is well known that Marx, in 
accordance with the fragmentary character of  his gargantuan 
complete works, did not leave behind a unified theory of crisis. The 
third volume of Capital and Theories of Surplus Value, in which the 
fundamental statements on crisis theory can be found, consist wholly 
of such fragments that have not been conclusively developed. This 
editorial point of departure alone has historically led to a situation in 
which, in the Marxist debate, individual aspects of the crisis theory 
left behind by Marx that were not completely developed into a system 
have been given existences independent of one another.
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The oldest layer of  interpretation of  Marxist crisis theory 
in the Second International presents itself  purely as a theory 
of  overproduction or of  underconsumption (Engels, Kautsky, 
Luxemburg). For this theory of overproduction, the crisis as such 
is really very simply a result of  the contradiction between the 
development of productivity of labor on one hand, and the shortage 
of the purchasing power of the masses, restricted to the reproduction 
of the value of the commodity labor power, on the other. But the 
weakness of this apparently obvious interpretation is twofold. Firstly, 
it derives the crisis as a pure phenomenon of circulation, and not from 
the production of surplus value itself, the ancestor of the illusions 
of political intervention into the capitalist process of reproduction 
(strengthen mass purchasing power) that appear even today. But 
secondly, it assumes as its foundation the simple reproduction of 
total capital, and not the historical fact of the expansion of capital 
as a relation of production, mediated through the production of 
relative surplus value. In simple reproduction, the evidence of 
the contradiction between restricted mass consumption and the 
development of productivity would come to light immediately; even 
this manifest contradiction, however, would be a derived surface 
phenomenon that itself ought first to be attributed to the fundamental 
tendency of value to be suspended in immediate production. However, 
access to the true logic of the development of capital was first of all 
completely blocked by the actual expansion and continually extended 
reproduction of capital as a historical mechanism of compensation, 
and thus continued to remain hidden and inaccessible to theorists 
of crisis, whose crisis theory was obsessed by circulation. Only Rosa 
Luxemburg tried to incorporate a systematic historical moment into 
the theory of crisis, and to present it as the logic of the development of 
capital with absolute limits — unfortunately, however, in accordance 
with the starting point that was restricted to circulation, in a directly 
inverted form, as the supposed support of the capitalist realization 
of  surplus value through non- and precapitalist producers (or 
consumers), rather than as the compensatory expansion of the mass 
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of surplus value through the incorporation of living productive labor 
on an ever-larger scale.
There thus existed in the Second International a widespread idea 
as to the (potentially imminent) collapse of capitalism, but only as a 
vague idea that was not adequately conceptually derived, and not at 
all derived from the split in the concept of productive labor and the 
suspension of the objectivity of value itself — with the exception of 
Rosa Luxemburg’s inverted form, the idea of collapse hardly found 
explicit formulation as a theory at all. The idea thus became easy 
prey for Bernsteinian revisionism, which could flatly appeal to the 
surface development of the higher level of capital expansion that was 
appearing at the turn of the century. Kautskyanism’s insistence on 
orthodoxy, in contrast, remained wooden, dogmatic, and defensive, 
particularly concerning the question of  the collapse. Whereas 
Bernstein had reproached Marx for his theory of collapse, admittedly 
without being able to give it concrete expression in concepts, and drew 
attention to the opposing empirical reality of (expanding) capital, 
Kautsky responded with the tame assertion that such a theory of 
collapse did not exist. Both Bernstein and Kautsky, that is, ultimately 
saw the surmounting of capitalism as invested only in the social 
action of the proletariat, not in a fundamental objective collapse of 
the circumstances themselves. Their positions, therefore, only differ 
from one another in the nuances. In the growing imperialist expansion 
of capital, the idea of collapse appeared as a sort of naïve belief, 
something like the belief among the early Christians that the messiah 
would soon come again and bring about the end of the world and the 
last judgment — and its few theoretical and political proponents such 
as Rosa Luxemburg were pushed to the periphery. Since then, one 
could speak of a reformist subjectivism, that was later complemented 
by a revolutionary subjectivism of Western Marxism, to an extent in 
the wake of the Frankfurt School.
It is easy to explain why Russian Bolshevism was unable to bring 
about any reversal in this respect. While it is true that Lenin defended 
objectivity as such, philosophically and politically, against reformist 
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and ultra-Left insurrectionist subjectivism, he was nonetheless at 
least as far removed from an objective theory of crisis and collapse 
as the Western social democrats and revolutionaries. In his work on 
imperialism, crisis theory is touched on only briefly, and this is in no 
way a coincidence. For Russia, where capitalism was not developed 
in the slightest, was of course worlds removed from the burning out 
of the logic of capitalist accumulation, much further than Western 
capitalism (a fact that might well still be true today). Lenin thus found 
no social basis whatsoever for the conceptual derivation and further 
development of Marxist crisis theory. Neither in the East nor in the 
West, as I suggested above, did the revolutions or the revolutionary 
movements at the end of  World War II rely in any way on any 
fundamental economic crises, but on the shattering of circumstances 
in the first instance by the war itself, by the existence for themselves 
of the political collisions of capital at a time as a whole still in a period 
of historical growth.
For this reason, Lenin’s prime theoretical concern could only be 
the analysis of a particular, actually attained level — precisely that of 
imperialist, highly concentrated capital, punctuated with elements 
of state capitalism, which in its historical expansion as a whole had 
in no way come up against absolute material limits — and to present 
this level as the objective foundation not of a collapse of historical 
accumulation as such and as a whole, but of the political collision of 
national imperialist capital and of the resulting potential conscious 
political action of the working class, which the world over would be 
able to bring the process of capitalist development to a standstill. It was 
only to this extent that he could speak of imperialism as the “last and 
highest stage of capitalism.” And to this extent the Bolshevik revolution 
and that within it which was specifically socialist were in the first 
instance politically determined, both with immediate respect to the 
capitalist development of Russian society and on a larger scale with 
respect to the worldwide, international situation of the development 
of capitalist logic as a whole. It was not possible to develop an adequate 
crisis theory on this theoretical basis of Leninism. This lack took 
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revenge immediately in the fact that Lenin was perceptibly wrong 
in his assessment of the ripeness for revolution in the West. It would 
be downright mean to condemn him for this error (which was hardly 
avoidable given his starting position) with the benefit of hindsight; 
his rightful task as a revolutionary was to exploit all theoretical 
possibilities for the truly preexistent revolutionary situation.
In the Marxist debate and polemic the emphasis was on politics, 
the relative independence of which was exaggerated to an ever greater 
extent, resulting in the dogmatic reification of the political sphere and 
a complete conceptual divergence of economics and politics. The global 
economic crisis at the beginning of the 1930s thus found Marxist crisis 
theory in a weaker state than ever, armed only with rusted and worn-
out weapons. Henryk Grossman, who had reopened the debate over 
Rosa Luxemburg’s theory of collapse and sought critically to refound 
it, remained, like Paul Mattick who joined him, relatively lonely and 
without any real representation in the main theoretical currents. In 
their critique of Rosa Luxemburg, Grossman and Mattick correctly 
retreated from circulation to the production of surplus value itself, and 
determined the essence of the crisis as the overaccumulation of capital, 
which in the sphere of circulation can appear as overproduction, but 
is not essentially determined by this fact. This development in crisis 
theory came at the cost that it dispensed with the inverted theory 
of Rosa Luxemburg that remained fixated on circulation along with 
its fruitful account of an historically absolutely finite developmental 
logic of capital. The reason for this can be found in the fact that 
Grossman and Mattick went back to the process of production, but 
not to the contradiction between the development of productivity 
and production’s objectivity of value. To this extent they therefore 
remained, like all previous crisis theorists, restricted and value-
immanent, and thus unable to identify the contradiction in the concept 
of productive labor itself. Grossman’s attempt to adhere to theory of 
collapse all the same thus remained restricted to a highly dubious 
value-immanent mathematical example, which (like the earlier crisis 
debate) took as its starting point not the conceptual derivation of value 
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and of productive labor, but the “schemata of reproduction” of the 
second volume of Capital, and which thus remained from the start 
apprehended within the surface-level mediations of the market. Paul 
Mattick thus ultimately no more adhered to a concretely derivable 
theory of collapse than did Grossman.
It thus becomes clear that Marxist crisis theory, so far, has in fact 
not moved beyond a value-immanent mode of observation, and has 
not seized on the elements of a logical-historical explosion of the 
value relation as such are included in Marx’s work. Both in theories 
that pertain to the realization of surplus value and in those that refer 
to its production, the question of the crisis is only examined within 
the horizon of the quantitative value relation and its analysis; the 
disproportionality is examined only within the quantitative logic 
of value, and not as a qualitative disproportionality in the relation 
between matter and value. In other words, it is not the value relation 
itself that becomes obsolete through the crisis, but only the blind 
mechanism of regulation by means of the market; it is not the value 
relation itself  that collapses, but merely the relative balance of 
exchange value. At this point the abbreviated understanding of the 
law of value that was set out at the beginning of this essay reappears in 
the theory of the crisis debate. It would admittedly be a mistake to raise 
only an ahistorical and therefore abstract charge at this point. For this 
theoretical abbreviation is only the ideal expression (made on the basis 
of Marxism) of an epoch in which the capital relation is even tangibly 
going through crisis only within the limits of the value relation, and 
the threshold beyond which the value relation will begin to collapse has 
not yet been reached. This threshold is only being reached today with 
the new socializing technologies, in which applied natural science and 
labor science converge, and thus for the first time allow the industrial 
system to emerge from its crude embryonic forms. To this extent the 
unfortunate term “postindustrialism” completely misrecognizes the 
true development. Capitalism can today be historically deciphered as 
identical with the coarse, awkward, immature, and in every respect 
dirty predecessor form of the truly immediately social industry that 
72 Marxism and the Critique of Value
only today is growing out of the spore of capitalism, which it thus 
explodes irrevocably.
The socialist and communist Left, however, is even worse prepared 
for the coming and in parts already visible crisis than at the start of 
the 1930s. The new epoch of accumulation and prosperity after World 
War II has completely weakened its logical force, just as it also left the 
practical and political old labor movement mutilated and emasculated. 
The thought of a theory of collapse elicits knowing winks even from so-
called radicals, even though the problem has never been conceptually 
or theoretically explained, but has merely languished in the swamp 
of empirical surface reality. And questions as to the determinations 
in the work of Marx and Engels of a social reproduction that is not 
founded on value and thus functions without money still triggers at 
best a sheepish laugh from the Left. Marxist theorists oriented both 
to the Western and to the Eastern strand of the labor movement have 
long since repressed, forgotten, and buried the fundamental critique 
of the value relation — value as such is unconsciously accepted as 
second nature. All socialist aims, strategies, and praxes refer not to 
the suspension of the value relation (and thus of wage labor) but 
purely and simply to the form of the mechanism of social allocation 
through the law of value. The result is the absolutely vapid opposition 
between plan and market, where the concept of  social planning 
remains subject to the value fetish. The suspension of the abstract 
individual of commodity production, necessarily missing from this 
account, must, as is demonstrated particularly repugnantly by the 
actually existing police socialism of the East, unthinkingly be shifted 
back onto the subject. It is no coincidence, then, that the alienation 
debate of the New Left in part leads to neoreligiosity and spiritualism. 
But the radical spring of the subjective political Left since 1968 has 
also come to an end without even a whimper. In any case, all theories 
and suggestions of the Left in the broadest sense that refer to the 
new social manifestations, regardless of whether they are orthodox 
Marxist or Left-wing socialist or green-alternative (Gorz) have one 
thing in common, that they shirk from the question of objective and 
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subjective suspension of the value relation. But the new crisis of 
capital, the content of which is a development of productivity that 
suspends value, cannot be solved or even merely impeded either by 
external political state intervention (Keynesianism, state capitalism) 
or by naïve sociopolitical bricolages such as in the models of the dual 
economy (Gorz, Huber).
In saying this I do not in any way wish fundamentally to belittle 
the role of the subject: any true revolution must proceed by means 
of the subject of a social class and its political mediations. And it 
would be a particularly great misunderstanding to derive from the 
concrete delineation of an objective logic of the collapse of capital that 
is historically becoming a reality some sort of mechanical automatism 
of the transition to socialism. The opposite is rather the case. The 
Marxian alternative that includes the possibility of a transition to 
barbarism is only today becoming real, and therefore also for the 
first time understandable. For a collapse is precisely nothing other 
than a collapse: what actual circumstances develop out of it always 
depend and will continue to depend on the concrete actions and will of 
human beings. But these will not and cannot move beyond the objective 
circumstances that they must have understood in their objectivity in 
order to be able to become consciously effective.
However, no fundamental historical change has taken place that 
has its cause in the actual maturity of the capital relation. Even for 
the old labor movement, which had its point of historical culmination 
and its chance at the end of World War I, the objectivity of capital 
and of its development was the foundation and precondition of acts 
of political will, but in a more general sense than today. The logic of 
capital had not yet burned out, but could only be halted and overcome 
by means of social action that had been carried over this logic by 
highly developed consciousness. The potential for this certainly 
existed, but the Western labor movement, which alone could have 
come into consideration for this act, had not reached this height of 
consciousness. But history has not stood still because of this. Logic 
that has not been understood also remains objective and real, becomes 
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something that can be experienced, and ultimately causes suffering — 
until consciousness and will turn to objectivity because it is no longer 
possible to do otherwise. To the extent that capitalist logic is burning 
out and decaying, this compulsion begins to become manifest. 
It certainly matters whether proletarian action consciously brings 
about the end of capitalist accumulation when it is in itself not yet 
completely exhausted, or whether, conversely, consciousness and 
action on the part of the working class are driven into existence by 
the historical end of the possibility of accumulation that objectively 
becomes manifest, independent of  the will of  those it affects. In 
the first case, the organized class consciously takes advantage of 
temporary disproportionalities and political and military frictions 
of the existing order in order to topple this order. Historically, these 
possibilities have passed by unused, and no path leads back to this 
situation. In the second case — which is historically current and for the 
most part lies before us — this order overturns as a consequence of its 
own contradictions and collapses into itself without at the same time 
bringing about a new social formation — neither the role of the subject 
nor the relative independence of the political form of the contradiction 
is thereby suspended, but the point of departure has changed. The 
often cited “hic Rhodus, hic salta!” is irreversibly becoming reality for 
the Left, but not in the way it had imagined.
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A Contradiction between Matter and Form: 
On the Significance of the Production of 
Relative Surplus Value in the Dynamic of 
Terminal Crisis
Claus Peter Ortlieb (2008)
While mainstream economics is under the belief that it addresses 
only the material side of capitalist production, and is interested in 
variables such as the “real” growth of GDP or “real” income — figures 
that are in fact themselves mediated through monetary values — most 
work in economics subscribing to the labor theory of value regards 
itself as investigating the very same “material” process of production, 
only here with reference to the quantities of value and surplus value 
realized in its products. Both sides would appear to hold to the tacit 
assumption that it is a question here merely of different units of 
measurement of wealth as such.
Against this trend, the present work, following Marx, takes as its 
starting point a historically specific, dual concept of wealth within 
capitalism, as represented by the dual character of the commodity 
and of labor. As the dominant form (Form) of wealth in capitalism, the 
commodity stands opposite material wealth. And while the particular 
form or shape (Gestalt) assumed by such material wealth is irrelevant 
for capital, as the bearer of value it remains indispensable. However, 
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as productivity increases, these two forms of wealth necessarily 
begin to diverge, and do so in a way that allowed Marx to speak of 
capital as “moving contradiction.” It is this contradiction that is to be 
investigated in this essay.
In carrying out this investigation, my aim is to assess — against the 
background of the more serious counterarguments since formulated 
against it — the argument advanced by Robert Kurz in “The Crisis of 
Exchange Value” (see this volume), first published twenty-seven years 
ago (1986) and the foundation of crisis theory in the former, pre-2005 
Krisis.1 According to Kurz’s argument, capital is heading for a terminal 
crisis because increasing productivity means that in the long term the 
total social (or global) production of surplus value can only decrease, 
and that the valorization of capital must ultimately grind to a halt.
With respect to this diagnosis the present work does not 
fundamentally differ from Kurz, but it justifies it from a somewhat 
different angle, with reference here to the representation of the mass 
of surplus value at the level of society as a whole. On one hand, this 
mass can be determined, as with Kurz (“Crisis of Exchange Value” 
and “Die Himmelfahrt des Geldes”) by starting from the surplus value 
created by the individual worker which, when multiplied by the total 
number of such individuals, gives us the total surplus value created 
by all productive workers; but it can also be determined, as it is here, 
by starting from the surplus value realized in a single material unit 
of production which, when multiplied here by the total number of 
such units, results in the total surplus value realized in material 
production.2 These two modes of presentation do not contradict one 
another, yet they do allow different aspects of the same process to 
come into view.
In addition, the approach chosen here makes it possible to relate 
the dynamics of terminal crisis to capital’s tendency, analyzed by 
Moishe Postone, toward environmental destruction.3
This present work contains a small core section in which the 
analysis is represented in mathematical terms. Anyone who cannot 
stand formulae should skip over them. Of greatest importance for 
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understanding what follows are three tables and a single graph, the 
qualitative meaning of which can, however, also be grasped without 
recourse to formulae.
The Terminal Crisis of Capital? A Controversy
The crisis theory of the original (pre-2005) Krisis met with numerous 
objections and criticisms that need not be taken seriously here insofar 
as they merely follow their own, well-trodden paths and do not even 
begin to take any real cognizance of the reasoning contained in that 
theory. These include the dogmatic notion that since capitalism has on 
each occasion raised itself from its own crises like a phoenix from the 
ashes, it will therefore continue to do so. Not even modern positivism 
dares advance such a crude inductionism. Other conceptions deny 
the objective side of  the dynamic of  capitalism altogether, and 
emphasize that capitalism could only be overcome by a revolution or 
even a “voluntaristic act.” This is correct insofar as the transition to 
a liberated society of whatever kind presupposes conscious human 
action. But it does not follow from this that in the absence of such a 
transition capitalism can continue to function without a care: it could 
also end in horror.
The diagnosis that draws attention to this, first put forward by 
Kurz in “The Crisis of Exchange Value,” argues — to summarize it 
in broad strokes — that capital, through the compulsive increase in 
productivity induced by the market, digs its own grave, because it 
increasingly removes labor, and thus its own substance, from the 
surplus-value-creating process of  production. In this context an 
exceptional role is played by “science as productive force” in general, 
and the “microelectronic revolution” in particular. The text can be 
read as a development and actualization of a well-known Marxian 
observation from the fragment on machines found in the Grundrisse: 
“Capital itself is the moving contradiction, [in] that it presses to reduce 
labor time to a minimum, while it posits labor time, on the other side, 
as sole measure and source of wealth.”4 
In that same passage in the Grundrisse, Marx remarks that this 
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contradiction is adequate to blow the blinkered foundation of the 
capitalist mode of production sky-high.
Among the critics of the thesis of an inevitable, terminal crisis 
of capital, Michael Heinrich plays an exceptional role insofar as, at 
least in part, he directly engages this thesis on the level of its logical 
development. Since he will not hear of any tendency of capital toward 
collapse, he must argue against the Marx of the Grundrisse and does so 
by playing off the latter against the Marx of Capital.5 Thus Heinrich:
The value aspect of the process [of terminal capitalist crisis], 
which holds that less and less labor must be expended in 
the process of production of the individual commodities, is 
analyzed in Capital not as a tendency toward collapse, but as 
the foundation of the production of relative surplus value. The 
apparent contradiction that so astonished Marx, that capital 
“presses to reduce labor time to a minimum, while it posits labor 
time, on the other side, as sole measure and source of wealth,” 
even becomes for Kurz, Trenkle and other representatives 
of the Krisis group “capital’s logical self-contradiction,” of 
which capitalism must necessarily perish. In the first volume 
of Capital, in contrast, Marx decodes this contradiction in 
passing as an old riddle of political economy with which the 
French economist Quesnay had already tortured his opponents 
in the eighteenth century. This riddle, Marx argues, is easy 
to understand as long as one takes into consideration that 
what is important for the capitalist is not the absolute value 
of the commodity, but the surplus value (or profit) that this 
commodity brings him. The labor time necessary for the 
production of the individual commodity can by all means fall, 
the value of the commodity can decrease, as long as the surplus 
value or profit produced by his capital grows.6 
In the first instance it must be noted that Heinrich here evidently 
conflates two distinct levels between which a contradiction can arise: 
Marx does in fact decode a riddle that appeared to the economists 
as a logical contradiction and was indeed a defect in their theory. 
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But such a decoding does not of course do away with the “moving 
contradiction,” situated as it is on the real and not just the logical 
plane; at most it has the potential for explaining the contradiction 
even as it is left undisturbed. This contradiction consists, for the Marx 
of the Grundrisse, in the fact that capital, in its unconscious internal 
dynamic, seals up the well from which it draws its life. Against this, 
Heinrich points to Marx’s argument in Capital that the progressive 
increase in productivity is what grounds the possibility of generating 
relative surplus value, as if this progression were not itself compatible 
with a tendency toward collapse. Is this the case? Does there exist an 
incompatibility between the production of relative surplus value and 
capital’s tendency toward its own destruction?
Kurz, in contrast, declares that
capital itself becomes the absolute logical and historical limit 
in the production of relative surplus value. Capital has no 
interest in and cannot be interested in the absolute creation 
of value; it is fixated only on surplus value in the forms in 
which it appears at the surface, that is to say on the relative 
proportion within the newly created value of the value of labor 
power (the costs of its reproduction) to the share of the new 
value that is appropriated by capital. As soon as capital can 
no longer go on expanding the creation of value in absolute 
terms by extending the working day, but can only increase 
the relative size of its own share of the newly created value 
by means of the development of productivity, there arises in 
the production of relative surplus value a countermovement, 
which must consume itself historically and work towards and 
bring about a standstill in the process of value creation. With 
the development of productivity, capital increases the extent 
of exploitation, but in doing so it undermines the foundation 
and the object of exploitation, the production of value as such. 
For the production of relative surplus value, inseparable as 
it is from the progressive fusion of modern science with the 
material process of production, includes the tendency toward 
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the elimination of living, immediate, productive labor, as the 
only source of total social value creation.7
Here it is not only the case that the production of relative surplus value 
is in no way in contradiction with capital’s tendency toward collapse: 
it is also, conversely, in fact the very tool by means of which capital 
itself becomes its own “absolute logical and historical limit.” But in 
that case the Marx of Capital would not have corrected the Marx of 
the Grundrisse at all, as Heinrich claims, but only given a more precise 
justification for the “moving contradiction.”
Evidently (and not entirely surprisingly) what is at stake here 
is a controversy. It is possible to get to the bottom of it because the 
opposing parties have a common point of  departure, namely the 
category, introduced by Marx into the critique of political economy, 
of “relative surplus value” — from which, however, many completely 
different and even mutually contradictory conclusions can be drawn. 
The following attempt at a contribution to clarification must therefore 
return afresh to this shared point of departure. The debate, often 
mentioned in the context of  debates over crisis theory, between 
Norbert Trenkle and Heinrich is not suitable as a reference for this 
purpose, because Trenkle’s view that a final crisis is approaching does 
not entail an account of surplus value.8
Productivity, Value, and Material Wealth
We speak of an increase in productivity when in a given labor time a 
greater material output, or — and this is the same thing — when a given 
quantity of commodities can be produced with lower expenditure of 
labor, thus decreasing their value. Productivity is thus the proportional 
relationship of the material quantity of commodities to the labor time 
necessary for their production. In order to understand productivity 
and the change it undergoes, it is therefore urgently necessary to 
distinguish between magnitude of value and material wealth.
When Marx speaks of how capital (see above) “posits labor time 
[...] as sole measure and source of wealth,” what is at stake is wealth 
expressed in the value form. For the Marx of the Grundrisse, this 
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historically specific form of wealth, only valid in capitalist society 
and characterizing its “very heart,” increasingly comes into opposition 
with “real wealth.”9
But to the degree that large industry develops, the creation 
of real wealth comes to depend less on labor time and on the 
amount of labor employed than on the power of the agencies set 
in motion during labor time, whose “powerful effectiveness” is 
itself in turn out of all proportion to the direct labor time spent 
on their production, depending rather on the general state of 
science and on the progress of technology, or the application 
of this science to production.10
In Capital Marx speaks not of “real” but of “material wealth,” which is 
formed of use values. This term is more appropriate for the reason that 
even material wealth in developed capitalist society is not the same as 
in noncapitalist societies: rather, the configurations in which it appears 
are themselves shaped by wealth in the value form. At this point it is 
sufficient to register that in capitalist society these two different forms 
of wealth must be conceptually distinguished from one another. “The 
wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails 
appears as an ‘immense collection of commodities.’”11 And in the dual 
character of commodities, the fact that they are bearers both of value 
and use value, one can see reflected the two different forms of wealth 
in these societies.
Value is the predominant, nonmaterial form of  wealth in 
capitalism — in this regard the actual character of material wealth in 
the value form is irrelevant. Capitalist economic activity aims solely 
at increasing this form of wealth (valorization of value), which finds 
its expression in money. Economic activity that promises no surplus 
value cannot continue, no matter how much material wealth it could 
produce. Why, indeed,should someone cast his capital into the process 
of production, when at the end of the process he would receive at most 
just as much value as he had put in?
Material wealth — according to Postone, characteristic of 
noncapitalist societies as their dominant form of  wealth — is 
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measured, in contrast, in use values to which society has direct 
access and which can serve extremely varied and completely different 
purposes.12 500 tables, 4,000 pairs of trousers, 200 hectares of land, 
fourteen lectures on nanotechnology, or even thirty cluster bombs 
would in this respect all be material wealth. Firstly, material wealth 
is not necessarily generated by labor, nor is it (as in the case of the 
air we breathe) necessarily bound to the commodity form, even if it 
is (as in the case of land) frequently brought into this form. Secondly, 
material wealth does not necessarily consist just of material goods, 
but can also comprise knowledge, information, other immaterial 
goods, and their distribution. Thirdly, it is important to guard against 
seeing in material wealth what is “good” as such. Although material 
wealth is not bound to the commodity form, and although labor is not 
its only source, the commodity nonetheless comprises in capitalism, 
conversely, the “material bearer” of value, which for its part remains 
bound to material wealth.13 The aim of commodity production — that 
is, the accumulation of more and more surplus value — deforms as 
a matter of course the quality of material wealth, the producers of 
which are not simultaneously its consumers: the aim can never be that 
of maximal enjoyment in the use of material wealth, but only that of 
maximal microeconomic efficiency. It would not therefore be possible 
to overcome capitalist society if that were to consist merely in the 
liberation of material wealth from the compulsions of the valorization 
of capital; it would also, necessarily, involve the overcoming of those 
deformations of material wealth produced by value itself.
There is nonetheless a difference between the two forms of wealth 
when they are assessed in a qualitative sense. Under the material 
aspect, the only matter of importance is the use that can be made of 
things. From the perspective of wealth in the value form, in contrast, 
the only matter of importance as to the question of whether I, as 
entrepreneur, would rather produce 500 tables or thirty cluster bombs 
is that of the surplus value that I can obtain in each respective case.
In the concept of productivity, an abstraction takes place from the 
qualitative dimension of material wealth, for which reason I prefer to 
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speak in this context of numbers of material units rather than numbers 
of use values. This restriction of the field of consideration here to 
matters of quantity is, this terminological distinction notwithstanding, 
still fraught with problems, because it is impossible to say whether, 
for example, more material wealth consists in 500 tables or in 4,000 
pairs of pants — because they are qualitatively different, they are 
not comparable on the material level. A concept of productivity that 
brings both forms of wealth into relation with one another would 
therefore require differentiation according to the qualities which 
material wealth can take on: productivity in the production of tables 
is, or would be, different from productivity in the production of pants, 
and so on.
In what follows the focus is on the quantitative relationships 
between these two forms of wealth, both of which are created in 
commodity production. And while both forms are fixed in relation to 
each other at any give point in time, they are also, as Marx observes, 
in a perpetual state of flux:
In itself, an increase in the quantity of use-values constitutes 
an increase in material wealth. Two coats will clothe two 
men, one coat will only clothe one man, etc. Nevertheless, an 
increase in the amount of material wealth may correspond 
to a simultaneous fall in the magnitude of  its value. By 
“productivity” of course, we always mean the productivity 
of  concrete useful labour; in reality this determines only 
the degree of effectiveness of productive activity directed 
towards a given purpose within a given period of time. Useful 
labour becomes, therefore, a more or less abundant source 
of products in direct proportion as its productivity rises or 
falls. As against this, however, variations in productivity 
have no impact whatever on the labour itself represented in 
value. As productivity is an attribute of labour in its concrete 
useful form, it naturally ceases to have any bearing on that 
labour as soon as we abstract from its concrete useful form. 
The same labour, therefore, performed for the same length of 
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time, always yields the same amount of value, independently 
of any variations in productivity. But it provides different 
quantities of use-values during equal periods of time; more, 
if productivity rises; fewer, if it falls. For this reason, the same 
change in productivity which increases the fruitfulness of 
labour, and therefore the amount of use-values produced by 
it, also brings about a reduction in the value of this increased 
total amount, if it cuts down the total amount of labour-time 
necessary to produce the use-values. The converse also holds.14 
I here draw attention to this distinction between material wealth and 
wealth in the commodity form, the very basis upon which Capital is 
able to assume its unique propositional form and centrality to the 
Marxian critique of political economy, because for us, as subjects in 
thrall to the commodity fetish and who reproduce ourselves by means 
of this fetish, it cannot simply be taken as read. In our everyday life, 
shaped by the commodity form, each of the two forms of wealth 
appears as “natural” to the same extent as does the other, and indeed 
usually as identical. This is not only because value requires a material 
bearer, but also because the acquisition of use values is usually carried 
out by our buying them — that is, our giving out value in the money 
form in exchange for use values. In modern everyday life ignoring the 
distinction between wealth expressed in the value form and material 
wealth may well be unproblematic, and may well even make everyday 
actions easier. But any theory that papers over this distinction — 
or, indeed, that does not acknowledge it in the first place — will 
necessarily miss the historically specific core of the capitalist mode 
of production.
This holds — naturally, one could say — for mainstream neoclassical 
economic theory, for which the ahistorical aim of all economic activity 
consists in the maximization of individual utility, something that 
in turn consists in the optimal combination of “packages of goods.” 
Abstract wealth, meanwhile, serves only as the “veil of money” that 
conceals the allocation of material wealth, and which therefore needs 
to be pulled away for the sake of greater clarity, and removed from 
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economic theory.
The same holds for classical political economy. See David Ricardo, 
for example, when he writes in the preface to his major work:
The produce of the earth — all that is derived from its surface 
by the united application of labor, machinery, and capital, 
is divided among three classes of the community; namely, 
the proprietor of the land, the owner of the stock or capital 
necessary for its cultivation, and the laborers by whose 
industry it is cultivated.
But in different stages of society, the proportions of the 
whole produce of the earth which will be allotted to each of 
these classes, under the names of rent, profit, and wages, will 
be essentially different [...]
To determine the laws which regulate this distribution, is 
the principal problem in Political Economy[.]15 
What is under discussion here is merely the distribution of material 
wealth, while there is no mention of the particular form of wealth 
in capitalism, which probably does not even come into the author’s 
consciousness. Traditional Marxism also seems only rarely to have 
gone beyond this understanding. Labor, which “creates all wealth,” 
is for traditional Marxism just as much an ahistorical natural given 
as the wealth which it has created. The kind of critique specific to 
traditional Marxism, which remains within the sphere of circulation, 
is only directed against the distribution of wealth as such, but not 
against the historically specific form of wealth in capitalism. Following 
Postone, it can be observed that an essential dimension of the Marxian 
critique of value thus remains obscured:
[M]any arguments regarding Marx’s analysis of the uniqueness 
of  labor as the source of  value do not acknowledge his 
distinction between “real wealth” (or “material wealth”) and 
value. Marx’s “labor theory of value,” however, is not a theory 
of the unique properties of labor in general, but is an analysis 
of the historical specificity of value as a form of wealth, and 
of the labor that supposedly constitutes it. Consequently, it 
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is irrelevant to Marx’s endeavour to argue for or against this 
theory of value as if it were intended to be a labor theory of 
(transhistorical) wealth — that is, as if  Marx had written a 
political economy rather than a critique of political economy.16
Entire mountains of  theory have been built up on this 
misunderstanding, criticized here by Postone, of Marx’s intention. 
A particularly striking example is provided by Jürgen Habermas, 
who takes of all sources the often-cited extract from the fragment 
on machines from the Grundrisse to attribute to Marx a “revisionist 
notion”:
In the Grundrisse for the Critique of Political Economy a very 
interesting consideration is to be found, from which it appears 
that Marx himself once viewed the scientific development of 
the technical forces of production as a possible source of value. 
For here Marx limits the presupposition of the labor theory of 
value, that the “quantum of applied labor is the decisive factor 
in the production of wealth,” by the following: “But as heavy 
industry develops the creation of real wealth depends less on 
labor time and on the quantity of labor utilized than on the 
power of mechanized agents which are set in motion during 
the labor time. The powerful effectiveness of these agents, in 
its turn, bears no relation to the immediate labor time that 
their labor costs. It depends rather on the general state of 
science and on technological progress, or the application of this 
science to production.” [...] Marx, of course, finally dropped 
this “revisionist” notion: it was not incorporated in his final 
formulation of the labor theory of value.17
Completely missing Marx’s point, Habermas evidently equates “real” 
wealth with wealth in the value form. For this is the only way in 
which he can imply that Marx “viewed the scientific development 
of the technical forces of production as a possible source of value.” 
In doing so he deliberately overlooks the fact that in this context, a 
page later in the fragment on machines, Marx — as cited — speaks 
of capital as a “moving contradiction,” which is more or less the 
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opposite of Habermas’s claim of a “revisionist notion.” As Postone 
demonstrates, this implicit identification of  wealth and value, 
attributed to Marx but subject to no further reflection whatsoever 
— and thus the ontologization of value and of labor as though they 
belonged to history only on the unspecified level of the human species 
— is the fundamental presupposition and thus results in the complete 
falsification that is Habermas’s critique of Marx and all his attempts 
to go beyond Marx.18
Even as accomplished a value theorist as Michael Heinrich, who 
is thoroughly familiar with the distinction between wealth expressed 
in the value form and material wealth, is not always immune to the 
equation of these two forms of wealth. To the thesis developed by Kurz 
that “productive” (surplus-value-producing) labor is melting away and 
that the proportion of “unproductive” labor, financed by the surplus 
value produced by total social labor, is continually increasing, and that 
taken as a whole, the production of surplus value that is available to 
capital accumulation is sinking,19 Heinrich objects as follows:
increasing productivity ensures that the mass of  surplus 
value produced by “productive” labor power grows steadily, 
and therefore that “productive” labor power can sustain a 
continually growing mass of unproductive labor.20
On the level of  material wealth, to which alone the growing 
productivity of labor refers, this argument could of course, on the level 
of sheer possibility, turn out to be correct, but this fact has nothing 
to do with the “mass of surplus value produced by productive labor 
power,” for this mass is measured simply in terms of expended labor 
time, on account of which the mass of surplus value produced on a 
single working day by labor power, however productive it is, can never 
be greater than this one working day. 
The same mistake, perhaps borrowed from Heinrich and simply 
taken to extremes, can be found in the Initiative Sozialistisches Forum 
(ISF)’s collectively authored pamphlet “Der Theoretiker ist der Wert.”21 
Here, again directed against Kurz, the possibility of a “capitalist service 
society” is postulated:
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Let us assume that it is the case that all the “hardware” required 
by such a society could be produced, because of the immense 
productivity of labor, with minimal labor time — let us say 
100,000 hours of labor in a given year X. What would prevent 
here the production of a mass of surplus value which would 
make it possible in this year X productively to cover all the 
money that the perhaps 10 billion service providers can save 
and invest at interest? Money would then concentrate in fewer 
hands than these 10 billion — let us say 10 million — and can 
be employed partly as speculative capital, but partly also as 
capital in competition with the producers of surplus value who 
work for 100,000 hours — in order in this way to secure power 
of disposal over society. This power of disposal over society is 
also a matter of importance — for in the end we still live in 
a class society, if also in one in which the classes, as Adorno 
says, have evaporated into a “super-empirical concept.” The 
power relations in a society that is constructed in such a way 
still depend on — and in this society depend all the more on — 
the power of disposal over this “hardware”-producing labor.22
The question of whether or not such a society would be possible I will 
for the moment leave unadressed, but it is certain that there is one 
thing that such a society would not be, because of the impossibility of 
the valorization of capital, and that is capitalist. The ten million hands 
in which the capital would be concentrated would be allowed to exploit 
100,000 working hours per year: each one, that is, one-hundredth of 
an hour, that is to say thirty-six seconds — nothing in comparison 
with a working day of perhaps eight hours, multiplied by 200 working 
days per year and ten billion “hands” that are fit to work. Under these 
conditions, why should even one of the ten million owners of capital 
cast his good money into the process of production? Here too, the 
mistake lies in the equation of the two forms of wealth: it is indeed 
imaginable that one day 100,000 hours of labor time per year would be 
sufficient to meet the needs of a population of ten billion people. But 
for want of a sufficient mass of surplus value, it simply will no longer 
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pass through the eye of the needle of valorization.
It is in no way a coincidence that mistakes of this sort — made 
by people who should really know better — come to the surface at 
precisely the time when polemics are being directed at the possibility 
of a final crisis of capital. For the diagnosis of the necessary emergence 
of such a crisis essentially depends — as will presently be made clear 
— on the distinction between the two forms of wealth mentioned, and 
in the fact that they increasingly diverge from one another.
The Production of Relative Surplus Value
Marx defines as relative surplus value the surplus value that emerges 
as a result of the process in which, by means of the increase in the 
productivity of labor, and therefore the reduction in price of labor 
power, the necessary labor time can be shortened and the surplus labor 
time correspondingly increased, without lowering the real wage or 
lengthening the working day, as would be the case in the production 
of absolute surplus value.23 The production of relative surplus value 
is the form of production of surplus value appropriate to developed 
capitalism, and is bound up with the real subsumption of labor under 
capital.24
This tendency for the productivity of labor to increase is one of 
the immanent laws of the capitalist mode of production, since each 
individual business that succeeds in raising the productivity of its 
own labor powers beyond the current average by the introduction 
of a new technology can sell its commodities for a higher profit. The 
consequence of this is that the new technology is universalized under 
the compulsive law of competition, the higher profit disappears again, 
and the commodity in question becomes cheaper. If this commodity 
belongs for its part to the supplies necessary for the reproduction of 
labor power — that is to say, if it is a determinant aspect of the value 
of labor power — its reduction in price also leads to a reduction in the 
price of labor power.
With the further uniform development of  productivity now 
becoming general for all commodities (and leading to their reduction 
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in price, including the price of the labor-power commodity itself ), 
the necessary labor time always decreases. Yet this does not result 
in a reduction in the working day, but rather in a lengthening of the 
surplus labor time, and thus an increase in the surplus value produced 
on any given working day:
Now, since relative surplus-value increases in direct 
proportion to the productivity of labor, while the value of 
commodities stands in precisely the opposite relation to the 
growth of productivity; since the same process both cheapens 
commodities and augments the surplus-value contained in 
them, we have here the solution to the following riddle: Why 
does the capitalist, whose sole concern is to produce exchange-
value, continually strive to bring down the exchange-value 
of commodities? One of the founders of political economy, 
Quesnay, used to torment his opponents with this question, 
and they could find no answer to it.25 
This statement by Marx, to which Heinrich (see above) also appeals, 
requires clarification. It is immediately obvious that the rate of 
surplus value and thus the proportion of surplus value in the value 
of a commodity increases with the productivity of labor. But the 
statement can also be read (and is read) as if it says that the surplus 
value contained within a commodity grows, although its value falls. 
Is this possible? And if so, is it true in the long term? It sounds at the 
very least improbable.
Table 1 shows a numerical example of the production of relative 
surplus value. It refers to a single commodity, a fixed number of 
material units (500 tables, 4,000 pairs of pants, or one automobile), 
or to a “shopping basket,” an arbitrary combination of such units. The 
numbers represent labor time (expressed approximately in working 
days), by which is meant the labor time that goes into the product 
(including the production of the raw materials, machinery, and so on, 
that it requires). What is described here is the effect of a technological 
innovation that reduces the labor time required for production by 
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value of 
commodity 
(social 
average)
s+v
necessary 
(paid) 
labor 
v
surplus 
value 
(surplus 
labor) 
s
rate of 
surplus 
value
s'=s/v
1 old technology 1,000 800 200 0.25
2 new technology 
in the individual 
enterprise 
(including extra 
profit)
1,000 640 360 0.5625
3 new technology 
a c r o s s  t h e 
sector (without 
reduction in price 
of labor-power)
800 640 160 0.25
4 general increase 
in productivity 
(with reduction 
in price of  labor 
power)
800 512 288 0.5625
Table 1: Production of Relative Surplus Value at Low Rate
twenty percent, which is equivalent to an increase in productivity 
of twenty-five percent. In a working day, 125 percent of the previous 
quantity is produced.
With the old technology (row 1), 1,000 working days are necessary, 
divided into 800 working days that are necessary for the reproduction 
of labor power, and 200 working days that serve for the production 
of surplus value. A new technology is now developed in a single 
business (row 2), allowing the labor time required to be reduced by 
twenty percent, that is reduced to 640 working days. The company 
introduces this technology because it enables profit to be increased, 
and allows an advantage in innovation to be attained. As long as this 
technology has not been established across the entire sector, the value 
of the commodity remains unaffected by it, because socially average 
production still proceeds according to the old technology. Although the 
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individual business can now produce the commodity twenty percent 
more cheaply, it can sell it at the previous price. Although only 640 
days of paid labor are now employed in its production, it is still worth 
1,000 working days. The individual business thus realizes an extra 
profit, even when it sells its commodity somewhat more cheaply than 
its competition in order to increase its market share.26
Under the compulsive laws of capitalist competition, the new 
technology becomes established in the entire sector (row 3) of 
production for the commodity in question: businesses that continued 
to use the old technology would become unprofitable and be driven 
out of the market. At the end of such a process of displacement and 
readjustment, all production would involve the new technology, which 
now corresponds to the social average. But with this the value of the 
commodity sinks by twenty percent, and the extra profit disappears 
again: compared with the previous situation, the surplus value 
contained in the material unit has fallen by twenty percent.
Forceably brought about by competition between individual 
capitals and between regional and even national economies, this 
counterproductive effect on the valorization of  capital can be 
compensated for if the increase in productivity also obtains for the 
commodities necessary for the reproduction of labor power: if  we 
assume an across-the-board decrease of twenty percent in the labor 
time necessary for commodity production (row 4), the commodity 
labor power also becomes cheaper by the same proportion. If wages 
remain constant in real terms, only 512 instead of the previous 640 
working days are necessary for the reproduction of labor power, and 
there remain 288 working days for the production of surplus value.
The production of relative surplus value increases the rate of 
surplus value in every case, and in the numerical sample in Table 1 
it also increases the mass of surplus value contained in a material 
unit, although their total value (in rows 3 and 4) decreases. There 
thus remains a margin for increasing wages in real terms, both in 
the individual business of row 2 and after the general increase in 
productivity in row 4, as has certainly been the case in the history 
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value of 
commodity 
(social 
average)
s+v
necessary 
(paid) 
labor 
v
surplus 
value 
(surplus 
labor) 
s
rate of 
surplus 
value
s'=s/v
1 old technology 1,000 400 600 1.5
2 new technology 
in the individual 
enterprise 
(including extra 
profit)
1,000 320 680 2.125
3 new technology 
a c r o s s  t h e 
sector (without 
reduction in price 
of labor-power)
800 320 480 1.5
4 general increase 
in productivity 
(with reduction 
in price of  labor 
power)
800 256 544 2.125
Table 2: Production of Relative Surplus Value at Higher Rate 
of capital, which, in combination with the reduction in price of 
commodities, meant that both new innovations and what had 
previously been luxury goods became available for mass consumption 
for the first time. So, love, peace, and harmony?
Table 2 demonstrates that argumentation via numerical examples 
is risky, because it is impossible to generalize from such examples 
without doing further work. The same calculations were carried out 
here as in Table 1, but on the basis of a different division into necessary 
and surplus labor time and with a rate of surplus value of 1.5 already 
before the start of a process of innovation. Here too, as a result of the 
decrease in the labor time required for the production of the material 
unit, the rate of surplus value climbs starkly, but the bottom line is that 
the mass of surplus value contained in the commodities produced falls 
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from 600 to 544 working days. The reason for this consists in the fact 
that the compensatory effect on the general decrease in the magnitude 
of value brought about by the simultaneous reduction in the price 
of labor power is only slight, because the proportion of paid labor in 
the value of the commodity is already low in the first place. If wages 
remain constant in real terms, an increase in productivity always leads 
to an increase in the rate of surplus value and a decrease in the value 
of the commodity. Against this, the mass of surplus value realized in 
the material unit is subject to two opposing influences: on one hand,  
as a fraction of the total value of the commodity, it falls in proportion 
to the fall in this value; on the other hand, it grows to the extent that 
the amount of surplus value in proportion to the total value of the 
commodity grows, because of the reduction in the price of labor power. 
What ultimately results depends on the magnitude of the proportion 
of paid labor at the start of the process of innovation, for it is only 
at the expense of this labor that the mass of surplus value can rise. 
So, if the rate of surplus value is low, the proportion of necessary 
labor correspondingly high, the mass of surplus value in the material 
unit increases; in contrast, if the rate of surplus value is high, and 
the proportion of paid labor in the total value therefore low, the mass 
of surplus value decreases. Since, on the basis of only two numerical 
examples, this assertion is still left up in the air, a more general 
observation is necessary, independent of the particular numerical 
values. This is also an opportunity to clarify where the boundary 
between “low” and “high” rates of surplus value lies.
In Table 3, the same calculation was carried out in a more general 
form, where v1 and s1 are the starting values for the necessary and 
surplus labor, and p is the factor by which the productivity increases 
with the introduction of the new technology in comparison with the 
old (in Tables 1 and 2, p was defined as 1.25). The production of relative 
surplus value functions by means of the fact that with a general 
increase in productivity by factor p (final row), the total commodity 
value is divided by this same factor, but the value of the necessary 
labor is divided by the factor p2, because both the labor time 
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value of 
commodity 
(social 
average)
s+v
necessary 
(paid) 
labor 
v
surplus 
value 
(surplus 
labor) 
s
rate of 
surplus 
value
s'=s/v
1 old technology s1+v1 v1 s1 s1'=s1/v1
2 new technology 
in the individual 
enterprise 
(including extra 
profit)
s1+v1 v1/p s1+v1-v1/p s1' p+p-1
3 new technology 
a c r o s s  t h e 
sector (without 
r e d u c t i o n  i n 
price of  labor-
power)
(s1+v1)/p v1/p s1/p s1'
4 general increase 
in productivity 
(with reduction 
in price of labor 
power)
(s1+v1)/p v1/p2 (s1+v1)/
p-v1/p2
s1' p+p-1
Table 3: Production of Relative Surplus Value in General 
necessary for commodity production and the reproduction costs of 
the single working day have decreased by the factor 1/p. The formulae 
for s and s' in the last row are of interest for the effect of an increase 
in productivity on the surplus value contained in a given material 
quantity:
s = s₁ + v₁ v₁p p² , s' = p(s₁' + 1) - 1
Expressing p in terms of s' with the help of the second formula: 
s₁' + 1p = 
s' + 1
and if this expression is included in the formula for s, the result is
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s = (s₁ + v₁)(s₁' + 1) v₁(s₁' + 1)s₁' + 1 (s₁' + 1)
Because s1 = v1 s1', the numerators of both fractions agree, and one gets
1 s
s' + 1( 1(s' + 1)² )= r (s' + 1)²s = r
The constant
r = v₁(s₁'+1)² 
can be interpreted as the labor time which can be reproduced by means 
of the given quantity of material wealth. It is constant because wages 
are here assumed to be constant in real terms. For the total value
(s' + 1)²s = v + s = 
r
r results precisely in the (fictitious, precapitalist) situation in which 
the total amount produced must be used for the reproduction of labor 
power, in which it is therefore impossible to extract surplus value at 
all.
The relationship developed here between the rate of  surplus 
value and the amount of surplus value per unit of material wealth is 
presented graphically in Graph 1. The graph should not be interpreted 
any more than the formulae that underpin it as saying that the rate of 
surplus value is the independent variable, and consequently the mass 
of surplus value is the dependent variable. Rather, the magnitudes 
expressed in both variables depend on productivity: the rate of surplus 
value increases in direct proportion to productivity, and as long as the 
rate of surplus value remains below 1, the mass of surplus value also 
grows. It reaches its maximum when the rate of surplus value reaches 
1. But with further increases in productivity and in the rate of surplus 
value, the surplus value falls again, and, with unlimited growth in 
productivity, tends, like the total value, toward zero.
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Graph 1: Rate of surplus value and (surplus) value per 
material unit 
The relationships displayed here are not of an empirical nature: they 
reveal rather the logic of the production of relative surplus value in 
its pure form — under the assumption, that is, that the length of the 
working day remains constant, as do wages, in real terms, and that the 
change in productivity takes place uniformly in all sectors and for all 
products. In capitalism’s immediate reality, this is of course not the 
case. Wages and working hours are always changing as a consequence 
of social struggles, and upward surges in productivity take place in 
an entirely asynchronous manner and to an extent that differs across 
different sectors.27
Moreover, the products themselves are always changing, and new 
products are always emerging, while others disappear. It is beyond 
doubt, for example, that productivity in the automobile industry has 
increased drastically in the last fifty years, but in order to quantify 
this increase precisely it would be necessary to find a new car that 
is comparatively the same as the 1950s Volkswagen Beetle — and no 
such car now exists. And it would not be possible to compare the 
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production of CD players over thirty years, because thirty years 
ago there were no CD players, and so on.
To this extent, the calculation carried out here, along with its result 
as presented in Graph 1, describes nothing more than a developmental 
tendency, which could perhaps have been made clear without such 
calculation. But nevertheless, this developmental tendency really 
exists. It is grounded in what Marx describes as the compulsion, 
ceaselessly operating and induced by market competition, to reduce 
labor time — that is, to increase productivity. This is something that can 
be observed, even empirically, across all sectors and products. It is also 
necessarily the case that if there is unlimited growth in productivity 
and the value of an individual product slowly but surely disappears, 
the mass of surplus value realized within a unit of material wealth 
tends toward zero. Ultimately the mass of surplus value can never be 
greater than the mass of value. On the other hand it is clear that as long 
as productivity is no more than is sufficient for the reproduction of 
labor power (s = 0), no surplus value can be obtained (and, therefore, 
no capitalism is possible). It is therefore plausible even without the 
mathematically modeled calculation that the mass of surplus value 
contained in the individual product (and materialized exclusively 
within such products as use values or units of material wealth) has 
its maximum somewhere between these two values.
It is necessary to refer to this in two further ways. Firstly, the 
schema of Tables 1-3, with the result shown in Graph 1, is applicable not 
only to individual products, but also to arbitrary “shopping baskets” or 
even to entire national economies, such as in the case of the material 
wealth produced within a year — the developmental tendency derived 
from them is therefore of the most general kind. Secondly, the form 
of production of surplus value by means of perpetual growth in 
productivity, according to Marx the form appropriate to developed 
capitalism, cannot simply be switched off, even if it is the case that 
in the long term it works against its own “interests” insofar as it 
perpetually reduces the surplus value per unit of material wealth. 
The dynamic described here is set in motion (see transition to the 
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second step in Tables 1-2) by competition, whether between individual 
businesses or between states or indeed between any “local site” 
that can be forced into competition with any or all others. Here the 
participants act entirely in accordance with their own interests, and 
have to do so, simply for the sake of their continued existence within 
capitalism. The dynamic that this sets in motion is therefore indelibly 
inscribed in the fact that social wealth takes on the value form. It could 
only be slowed down or even switched off by the abolition of value.
The Developmental Tendency of Relative Surplus Value
Because of the permanently functioning compulsion to reduce labor 
time it is legitimate to assume that over the course of  capitalist 
development, productivity has always increased, even if not evenly, but 
in phases marked by bursts of productivity alternating with phases of 
only slow growth in productivity. But this means that the development, 
depicted in Graph 1, of the surplus value realized within a material 
unit as a result of growth in productivity, is also a development in the 
historical time of capitalism: although each increase in productivity 
initially led to an increase in the mass of surplus value realized in the 
individual commodity, in its later phases it leads to a reduction. In this 
sense, the history of capitalism can be divided into a phase of the rise 
of relative surplus value, and a phase of its fall.
Capitalism moves in a single unambiguous direction — 
namely, toward ever-higher productivity over the course of time. 
This observation is already enough to wrench the ground from 
underneath all conceptions that hold capitalism to be merely a 
process of alternation, itself unchanging, between crises and surges of 
accumulation — proof, as a result of its own internal dynamic, against 
the possibility that it could one day come to an end. Those very same 
investments in the streamlining and rationalization of production 
so widely publicized in recent years — investments intended, for 
example, to eliminate jobs while production output remains at the 
same level, to raise the productivity of the remaining job categories 
and increase the profitability of the individual business enterprise 
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— would, during the phase of increasing relative surplus value, have 
resulted in the growth of surplus value overall. But in the phase of 
declining relative surplus value production, higher productivity 
leads to the reduced production of surplus value overall, with life-
threatening consequences for sellers of labor power who have become 
redundant but also with exacerbating effects on crisis conditions 
themselves.
Situating in precise historical terms the phase marked by the 
rise of relative surplus value and the phase marked by its decline, 
much less the tipping point between the two (at which s' = 1) is, to be 
sure, impossible — not least because of the possibility of historical 
discrepancies between the two. However, even without more precise 
historical-empirical investigations, it can be inferred that in the 
initial phases of the production of relative surplus value by means of 
cooperation and by means of the division of labor and manufacture, 
productivity was so low that there remained, as it were, headroom 
for the growth in the surplus value of each individual commodity.28 
This is perhaps too speculative, but if so it is also of no significance 
with respect to the question of the final crisis, for which only the late 
phase of capitalism plays a role, and it is clear that today we have left 
the tipping point where s' = 1 far behind us: in 2004, the net share of 
national income accounted for by wages in Germany was about forty 
percent, which corresponds to a rate of surplus value of 1.5. Here it 
must also be taken into account that what is important are the net 
wages not only of the productive (surplus-value-producing) labor 
powers, but also of the unproductive ones (those paid from the mass 
of surplus value produced by society as a whole). At this point I do 
not wish to attempt to provide a more precise distinction between 
productive and unproductive labor.29 However, within the framework 
of the critique of political economy it is not disputed that all labors that 
involve the mere channelling of streams of money (trade, banking, 
insurance, but also many individual departments of business that 
otherwise produce surplus value) are unproductive, that is that they 
produce no surplus value.30 However, this means that the net share of 
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national income accounted for by wages must in fact be considerably 
lower than the forty percent mentioned, and the rate of surplus value 
must correspondingly be higher than 1.5.31
For a few decades it has already been possible to observe that 
capital is increasingly resorting to the production of absolute surplus 
value — that is, it is attempting to increase surplus value by means 
of the extension of the working day and by real-terms reductions 
in wages. This does not of course lead to the disappearance of the 
perpetual compulsion to increase productivity: it is impossible, 
therefore, to talk of relative surplus value being superseded once 
again by absolute surplus value — there is not sufficient opportunity 
to increase productivity in this way simply because of the natural 
limitations to the working day, the extension of which can in addition, 
under today’s conditions, only lead to a reduction in jobs and not to 
more labor. Similarly, real-terms reductions in wages have a natural 
limit — zero — and if they approach zero it means nothing other than 
that the reproduction of labor power must be financed by the state, and 
therefore by the mass of surplus value produced by society as a whole.
According to Marx, the production of absolute surplus value 
belongs to an earlier form of the capitalist mode of production, in 
which labor was only formally subsumed under capital — that is to 
say, labor power was working for a capitalist, but on the material level 
the concrete labor was not yet bound to capital. The production of 
relative surplus value, in contrast, presupposes the real subsumption 
of labor under capital, which itself now defines the technical process 
of concrete labor in which labor power is employed.32 If capital is 
today resorting once again to the production of absolute surplus value, 
this in no way means that the real subsumption of labor under capital 
has been suspended, but rather that what is happening is a reaction 
— in the long term unsuccessful — to the demise of the production 
of relative surplus value, a demise which, as has been shown, is 
final and irreversible. Against this background, it is inadequate to 
conclude, as Heinrich does, that capitalism is returning from the 
“already almost idyllic conditions” of Fordism to its “normal mode 
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of function,” by which he appears to mean the pre-Fordist phase.33 
This ignores the question of what had since happened to productivity, 
and in this respect simply equates qualitatively distinct phases of the 
development of capitalism. It is at best an argument based on forms 
of appearance, and it is indeed entirely possible to compare on this 
level the relationships of exploitation in present-day China with those 
of western European capitalism of the nineteenth century. However, 
the deep currents of the capitalist dynamic remain closed off to such 
a mode of observation.
It is not clear to me whether Marx took his own analysis of relative 
surplus value beyond the tipping point that has been identified here, as 
a result of which he would for the first time have been able to establish 
the link between the above analysis and his characterization of capital 
as a “moving contradiction” in the Grundrisse. In the corresponding 
chapter of Capital I, his argument proceeds exclusively by means of 
numerical examples of the sort contained in Table 1, that is to say with 
a low rate of surplus value (e.g., a twelve-hour working day with ten 
hours of necessary labor and two hours of surplus labor).34 Heinrich 
appears to see the developmental tendency of relative surplus value, 
but because of the numerical examples he has chosen, he cannot 
express the this tendency in terms of its results; or, where he does 
get as far as to be able to point to these results, he finds ways to fend 
them off:
The labor time necessary for the production of an individual 
commodity can certainly sink, the value of the commodity 
decrease, but only as long as the surplus value or profit 
produced by its capital increases. Whether the surplus value/
profit is distributed among a smaller number of high-value 
products or a greater number of low-value products is in this 
case irrelevant.35
The final sentence, which at this point serves to allow Heinrich to take 
up a position against the Marx of the Grundrisse and the crisis theory 
of the pre-2005 Krisis, is, however, at the very least extremely risky. 
Its consequence is that Volkswagen need not care whether, in order to 
105A Contradiction Between Matter and Form
realize the same surplus-value/profit, they must produce and sell four 
million or fifteen million cars per year. Here it is possible, particularly 
in markets already saturated, for a problem to arise with respect to 
turnover, resulting in destructive competition, as has in fact been 
taking place on the automobile market for years. Heinrich is certainly 
right in claiming that one can only speak of the surplus value produced 
by capital as a result of the multiplication of the surplus values of the 
individual commodity within the material scope of production. On 
one hand, this means that it is not possible to derive phases within 
the rise or fall of capital from those within the rise or fall of surplus 
value. However, on the other hand, it is precisely at this point that 
the contradiction — also fundamental to the argument advanced by 
Kurz — between material wealth and the form of value within which 
such wealth must be subsumed arises a “moving contradiction” that 
becomes greater with increased production of relative surplus value: 
the higher productivity, the lower the surplus value contained in the 
individual commodity, the greater the material output necessary 
for the constant production of surplus value, the more fierce the 
competition, the greater the compulsion to further increases in 
productivity, and so on.
There appears here without doubt an “absolute logical and historical 
limit” of capital, and the end of its capacity for accumulation thus 
comes into view.36 Even if the course to be taken by the dynamics of the 
foreseeable crisis cannot be determined on the level of abstraction that 
has been taken up here, I shall nonetheless conclude by considering — 
including with reference to the ecological question — the in no way 
unambiguous directions in which the contradiction identified here 
between matter and form can resolve, more or less violently.
The Inner Compulsion Toward Growth, the Historical 
Expansion of Capital, and the Material Limits Thereof
In a society oriented solely toward material wealth — a society that 
merely by virtue of that fact would not be capitalist — growth in 
productivity would only cause a few problems, which could easily 
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be solved technically and could unburden human life, leading to 
a reduction of labor but nonetheless to an increase in the number 
of useful goods. This is also precisely the way that the blessings of 
growing productivity become public knowledge, as the potential for 
the technical solutions to virtually all human problems. But of course 
such ideals, constrained within the unquestioned framework of a 
capitalist mode of production, would imply the belief in a capitalism 
that could somehow coexist with a constantly shrinking mass of 
surplus value.37 This, of course, capitalism cannot do.
“When value is the form of wealth, the goal of  production is 
necessarily surplus value. That is, the goal of capitalist production is 
not simply value but the constant expansion of surplus value.”38 The 
reason for this is the fact that in the capitalist process of production, 
self-valorizing capital must reproduce itself  “on a progressively 
increasing scale,” and therefore also “produce” a surplus value that is 
constantly growing, by incorporating and exploiting a correspondingly 
growing number of labor powers.39
As productivity increases, this compulsion to growth increases 
exponentially once again on the material level: if the production of 
more and more material wealth becomes necessary for the realization 
of the same surplus value, capital’s material output must accordingly 
grow even more rapidly than the mass of surplus value. As we have 
seen, this holds for the phase of the fall of the production of surplus 
value, a phase that was reached some time ago. Now, if this movement 
of  expansion comes up against limits, because the perpetually 
growing material wealth must not simply be produced, but also find 
a buyer, an irreversible crisis dynamic gets underway: a material 
output that remains constant, or even that increases, but less quickly 
than productivity, results in permanently shrinking production of 
surplus value, through which in turn the opportunities for the sale 
of the material output become fewer, which then has a greater effect 
on the fall in the mass of surplus value, and so on. It is by no means 
the case that such a downward movement afflicts all individual 
capitals uniformly: those affected are in the first instance the less 
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productive, which must disappear from the market, culminating in 
the collapse of entire national economies such as, for example, in the 
eastern European countries at the start of the 1990s. The remaining 
capital can burst into the resulting empty spaces, and for the time 
being can expand again, which at the surface gives the impression 
that everything is fine for capital. This may indeed be the case for the 
survivors in each case — and for the moment — but it changes nothing 
of the character of the movement as a whole.
The growth of  the mass of  surplus value and — as long as 
productivity is increasing — the related and even stronger growth 
of the material output is the unconscious raison d’etre of capital and 
the condition sine qua non of the continued existence of the capitalist 
mode of production. In the past, capital has followed its compulsion to 
growth — that is, the necessity of its unlimited accumulation — in a 
process of expansion that is without historical parallel. Kurz names as 
its essential moments: first, the step-by-step conquering of all branches 
of production already existing before and independently of capital, 
and the concomitant condemnation of its working population to wage 
dependency, which also involves the conquering of geographical space 
(admired, though with a shudder, in the “Manifesto of the Communist 
Party” as the compulsion for a “constantly expanding market for its 
products” that “chases the bourgeoisie across the entire surface of the 
globe”) and second, the creation of new branches of production for 
new needs (which themselves have first to be created), bound up, by 
means of mass consumption, with the additional conquering of the 
“dissociated,” feminine realm of the reproduction of labor power, and 
recently the gradual suspension of the division between labor time 
and leisure time.40
The spaces into which capital has expanded are of  material 
nature, and therefore necessarily finite and at some point, by equal 
necessity, bound to be full. As concerns the spatial expansionism that 
is capitalism’s first essential moment (see above), this exhaustion of 
the planet itself as one, global mass of material for the valorization of 
capital has without doubt become a fait accompli today: there is now 
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no spot on the earth and no branch of production that has not been 
delivered up to into the grip of capital. This is in no way altered even 
by the subsistence production that exists in some places, for this is 
not the remains of premodernity, but a makeshift means by which 
those who have fallen out of capitalist production can attempt, after 
a fashion, to secure their survival.
The question, in contrast, of whether the second moment of the 
capitalist process of expansion — the generation of new branches 
of  production — has finally reached its end, is unresolved. This 
moment essentially relied on an expansion of mass consumption — 
which, however, is only possible if  there is a sufficient real-terms 
rise in wages, which in turn affects the production of relative surplus 
value. In the high phase of Fordism after World War II — times of full 
employment — it was for a time even possible to implement trade 
union demands for wage increases of the magnitude of the growth 
in productivity. In the schema of wealth presented in Tables 1-3 this 
means in each case a transition from row 1 to row 3 (and not to row 4), 
with no change in the rate of surplus value, and a fall in the mass of 
surplus value per material unit by a factor of 1/p — which for a time 
could be compensated by the growth in mass consumption. But with 
perpetual further growth in productivity and the gradual saturation 
of the markets for the new branches of production (automobiles or 
household appliances, for example), this process could not be sustained 
in the long term. Kurz summarizes the situation as it appeared in the 
mid-1980s as follows:
But both essential forms or moments of  the process of 
capitalist expansion are today starting to come up against 
absolute material limits. The saturation point of capitalization 
was reached in the 1960s; this source of the absorption of 
living labor has come to a final standstill. At the same time, 
the confluence in microelectronics of  natural-scientific 
technology and the science of labor implies a fundamentally 
new stage in the revolution of the material labor process. The 
microelectronic revolution does not eliminate living labor in 
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immediate production only in this or that specific productive 
technology, but sets out on a wider front, throughout all 
branches of production, seizing even the unproductive areas. 
This process has only just started, and will not fully gain 
traction until the second half of the 1980s; it seems likely that 
it will continue until the end of the century and beyond. To the 
extent that new branches of production are created by means 
of this process, such as in the production of microelectronics 
itself  or in gene technology, they are by their nature from 
the outset not very labor intensive in respect to immediate 
production. This brings about the collapse of the historical 
compensation that has existed up until this point for the 
absolute immanent limit, embedded within relative surplus 
value, to the capitalist mode of production. The elimination 
on a massive scale of living productive labor as a source of 
the creation of value can no longer be recuperated by newly 
mass-produced cheap products, since this process of mass 
production is no longer mediated by a process of reintegrating 
a labor population that has been made superfluous elsewhere. 
This brings about a historically irreversible overturning of the 
relationship between the elimination of living productive labor 
through scientification on the one hand, and the absorption 
of living productive labor through processes of capitalization 
or through the creation of new branches of production on 
the other: from now on, it is inexorable that more labor is 
eliminated than can be absorbed. All technological innovations 
that are to be expected will also tend only in the direction of 
the further elimination of living labor, all new branches of 
production will from the outset come to life with less and less 
direct human productive labor.41 
Heinrich describes, somewhat derisively, the direct reference of 
“Kurz’s theory of  collapse” to the “microelectronic revolution” 
as “technological determinism,” which he claims is wonderfully 
appropriate “to the ‘workers-movement Marxism’ that is otherwise 
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criticized so very fiercely by Kurz.”42 However, what is at stake 
here, as Heinrich is certainly aware, is not a particular individual 
technology, but the fact that technology is making labor to a great 
extent superfluous — an argument against which Heinrich marshals 
no argument even in his “more extensive critique.”43 But this ought 
really to give a theorist of value pause for thought, for a crisis of capital 
could in that case only fail to result if value and surplus value were not 
measured in labor time, but natural-scientific technology had instead 
replaced the application of immediate labor as a source of value, as 
someone like Habermas believes. But Heinrich does not go this far.
It is correct, on the other hand — and if this had been what Heinrich 
had said, he would have been right — that a prognosis, based on the 
here and now, according to which “it is inexorable that more labor is 
eliminated than can be absorbed,” cannot be derived solely from the 
category, established on a more abstract level, of relative surplus value. 
Empirical observations are also required. These exist in great numbers, 
and Kurz also alludes to them. But empirical semblance can of course 
deceive, and capital can pull itself together once more — the question 
is only what the consequences would be for capital and for humanity.
This uncertainty as to the future development of the crisis dynamic 
changes nothing of the fact that capital must perish as a result of its 
own dynamic, if it is not overcome by conscious human actions before 
then. This results simply from the limitless compulsion to growth 
on one hand, and on the other hand the finitude of the human and 
material resources on which it depends.
Knut Hüller has already drawn attention to the fact that the total 
social rate of profit (rate of accumulation) must fall for no other reason 
than the fact that the labor power available to capital on this earth is 
simply finite, whereas a constant rate of profit would presuppose an 
exponentially growing working population.44 And this conclusion was 
reached without once taking the production of relative surplus value 
into consideration. If one does so, it becomes clear that constant or 
even exponentially growing material production leads, if the rate of 
“real growth” is too low (under the rate of growth of productivity), to 
111A Contradiction Between Matter and Form
an exponential fall in the mass of surplus value (and accordingly to 
falls in the productively working population).
The observation that “it is inexorable that more labor is eliminated 
than can be absorbed” is essentially based on the presupposition that 
capital will no longer be able to compensate for the losses, induced by 
process innovations, in the production of value and surplus value, by 
means of product innovations. Much speaks in favor of this claim: even 
today, twenty-two years later, no innovations of this kind are anywhere 
to be found. As stated, here it is a matter not of new products and their 
associated needs as such, but of those whose production requires labor 
on such a mass scale that it would be possible at least to compensate 
for the streamlining potential of microelectronics. However, if this 
prognosis were to reveal itself to be false, the contradiction revealed 
here between matter and form would in no way be resolved, but would 
in that case result in a violent discharge in another direction.
The Inner Compulsion Toward Growth and 
Environmental Destruction
Moreover, all progress in capitalist agriculture is a progress 
in the art, not only of robbing the worker, but of robbing the 
soil; all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a 
given time is a progress towards ruining the more long-lasting 
sources of that fertility. The more a country proceeds from 
large-scale industry as the background of its development, [...] 
the more rapid is this process of destruction. [...] Capitalist 
production, therefore, only develops the techniques and the 
degree of combination of the social process of production by 
simultaneously undermining the original sources of all wealth 
— the soil and the worker.45
Capital requires material wealth as the bearer of value; as such the 
former is indispensable, and in quantitative terms (see above) it will 
become even more so. But capital is not concerned with the material 
wealth that is freely available and that therefore does not become part 
of the mass of value and surplus value that is produced. In comparison 
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with the necessity of capital accumulation, the preservation of this 
wealth is at best of lesser importance — or in other words, if  the 
destruction of material wealth serves the valorization of value, then 
material wealth will be destroyed. It’s that simple. Into this category 
fall all of its forms which have come into view or been mentioned over 
the last fifty years in the context of environmental destruction: the 
long-term fertility of the soil, to which Marx had already referred; air 
and water of a quality that they can be breathed and drunk without 
danger to life or limb; biodiversity and undamaged ecosystems, even 
merely with respect to their function as renewable sources of food; or 
a climate that is hospitable to human life.
The question is not, therefore, whether the environment is 
destroyed for the sake of the valorization of value, but at best of 
the extent of  this destruction. And in this matter the growth of 
productivity, to the extent that it, as the production of relative surplus 
value, remains bound to value as the predominant form of wealth, 
plays a thoroughly sinister role because the realization of the same 
mass of surplus value requires an ever-greater material output and 
even greater consumption of resources: for the transition from old to 
new technologies with the purpose of reducing the labor time required 
is usually achieved by replacing or accelerating human labor with 
machines. We may assume, for example, in an ideal-typical case, that 
in the schema of calculation of Tables 1-3 it is possible to make 10,000 
shirts in 1,000 working days by the old technology, and this production 
only requires cloth and labor. The new technology could consist in the 
reduction of the labor time necessary for the production of the same 
number of shirts to 500 working days, but to introduce and employ 
machines and additional energy which for their part could be produced 
in 300 working days. In the situation described in Table 2, however 
(s1' > 1), this would mean that in the case of the new, more profitable 
technique for the realization of the same surplus value as in the old, 
it would be necessary to produce not only more than 10,000 shirts in 
a capitalist manner, but also the additional machinery and energy 
which are used in the process of production. This means that ever-
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greater consumption of resources becomes necessary for the same 
surplus value, a consumption that is greater than, and grows even 
more quickly than, the required material output.
That is, if  Kurz was wrong, and the accumulation of  capital 
could continue without restriction, it would sooner or later have as 
its inevitable consequence the destruction not only of the material 
foundations of the valorization of capital, but also of human life as 
such.
Postone draws the following conclusion from his analysis of the 
contradiction between material wealth and wealth in the value form 
as it is brought forth by the production of relative surplus value:
Leaving aside considerations of possible limits or barriers 
to capital accumulation, one consequence implied by this 
particular dynamic — which yields increases in material wealth 
far greater than those in surplus value — is the accelerating 
destruction of the natural environment. According to Marx, 
as a result of the relationship among productivity, material 
wealth, and surplus value, the ongoing expansion of the latter 
increasingly has deleterious consequences for nature as well 
as for humans.46 
In explicit opposition to Horkheimer and Adorno, for whom the 
domination of nature is itself already the “Fall,” Postone emphasises 
that “the growing destruction of nature should not simply be seen 
[...] as a consequence of increasing human control and domination of 
nature.”47 Such a critique is inadequate because it does not distinguish 
between value and material wealth, although it is the case that in 
capitalism nature is exploited and destroyed not because of material 
wealth, but because of  surplus value. The increasing imbalance 
between the two forms of wealth leads him to come to this conclusion:
The pattern I have outlined suggests that, in the society in 
which the commodity is totalized, there is an underlying 
tension between ecological considerations and the imperatives 
of value as the form of wealth and social mediation. It implies 
further that any attempt to respond fundamentally, within 
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the framework of capitalist society, to growing environmental 
destruction by restraining this society’s mode of expansion 
would probably be ineffective on a long-term basis — not only 
because of the interests of the capitalists or state managers, 
but because failure to expand surplus value would indeed 
result in severe economic difficulties with great social costs. In 
Marx’s analysis, the necessary accumulation of capital and the 
creation of capitalist society’s wealth are intrinsically related. 
Moreover [...] because labor is determined as a necessary 
means of individual reproduction in capitalist society, wage 
laborers remain dependent on capital’s “growth,” even when 
the consequences of their labor, ecological and otherwise, 
are detrimental to themselves and to others. The tension 
between the exigencies of the commodity form and ecological 
requirements becomes more severe as productivity increases 
and, particularly during economic crises and periods of high 
unemployment, poses a severe dilemma. This dilemma and the 
tension in which it is rooted are immanent to capitalism: their 
ultimate resolution will be hindered so long as value remains 
the determining form of social wealth.48
The dilemma described here manifests itself in a many-faceted form. To 
give an example: while there is a consensus in environmental contexts 
that the global spread of the “American way of life” or even only of 
the western European lifestyle would bring with it environmental 
catastrophes to a degree that has not yet been seen, development 
organizations must nonetheless pursue precisely this goal, even if it 
has now become unrealistic. Or, in the terminology of this essay, the 
employment of labor power that would be necessary for the continued 
accumulation of capital, even of only half the globally available labor 
power, at the level of productivity that has been attained, with the 
corresponding material output and consumption of resources, would 
result in the immediate collapse of the earth’s ecosystem.
This dilemma also manifests itself in the weekly walk on eggshells 
as to what is “ecologically necessary” and what is “economically 
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feasible” — the two are now irreconcilable — in the political treatment 
of the expected climate catastrophe, which is indeed only one of many 
environmental problems. Politics cannot emancipate itself  from 
capital, since it depends on successful production of surplus value 
even for its tax revenue and therefore its own ability to act. It already 
has to go against its own nature in order to pass even resolutions that 
remain well below the objective requirements of the problem that is 
to be solved, and that even then nonetheless are softened within a 
week under pressure from some or other lobby on behalf of what is 
“economically feasible.” What remains is pure self-dramatization on 
the part of “doers” who claim still to have the objectively insoluble 
problems under control.
Conclusion
This present work presents a relatively meager analysis of a particular 
perspective that is nonetheless determinant of the capitalist dynamic 
— the production of relative surplus value and its consequences for 
the valorization of capital. The reduction of complexity necessary to 
carry out this analysis — and with it the occasional obscuring of all 
other aspects of a commodity-producing patriarchy that has entered 
a period of crisis — is the price to pay for a (hopefully successful) 
comprehensible presentation. For example, the ideological distortions 
that accompany the development of the crisis thus remain obscured, 
as does the increasing inequality with which different groups of the 
population bear the brunt of the crisis: women more strongly than 
men, and the middle class (for the moment) to a lesser extent than the 
majority that has already been precarized.49
The role of finance capital has also remained hidden — about which 
a few words should be said at this point, because some consider it to 
be the true cause of the crisis, while others believe that it could save 
capitalism from the ultimate collapse. Both views are false. What is 
true is that in late capitalism, the valorization of value would not be 
possible without finance capital, because the huge capitalist aggregates 
that are necessary at the level of productivity that has been attained 
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today could not by a long way any longer be financed by private capital. 
But this makes finance capital an indispensable “lubricant,” but not 
the “fuel” of the production of surplus value, which remains bound to 
the expenditure of labor. The valorization of value has not come to a 
standstill because capital has fled, maliciously, into the financial sector 
— rather, it is the other way round. Because it has already been the 
case for decades that the valorization of capital has come to a standstill, 
capital flees into the financial sector with its higher (if fictitious, seen 
from the perspective of the economy as a whole) yields. The effect of 
this flight is — in the fashion of global Keynesian deficit spending, 
against all neoliberal ideology — in the first instance to delay the crisis. 
But the longer this succeeds, the harder the impact with which the 
crisis must ultimately assert itself. In any case, the idea, which has its 
origins in the postmodern fantasy of virtuality, of a capitalism that 
could be “regulated” on a long-term basis by an escalating financial 
sector that is no longer counterbalanced by any real production of 
surplus value, is at least as adventitious as that of the production of 
surplus value without labor by means of science as productivity alone.
If, however, the production of surplus value presupposes the 
application of  immediate labor and the production of  material 
wealth that is bound up with it, the production of surplus value that 
according to Marx is appropriate to developed capitalism — that is, 
the production of relative surplus value — leads to the requirement 
of an ever-greater material output and a still greater consumption 
of resources for the realization of the same mass of surplus value. 
The capitalist process of accumulation and expansion thus comes 
up against absolute material limits, the observance of which must 
lead to the burning-out of the capitalist logic of valorization, and the 
disregard for which to the destruction of its material foundations and 
the possibility of human life as such.
The choice that this presents, between the devil of the gradual 
disappearance of  labor and the social consequences that are, in 
capitalism, bound up with it, and the deep blue sea of ecological 
collapse, is not even an either-or choice. It seems rather that both are 
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approaching together: falling production of surplus value at the same 
time as growing consumption of resources, overladen by the prospect 
of wars over increasingly scarce material resources, squandered in the 
valorization of capital, and for the chance to valorize the last remains.
Prognoses made on the basis of the investigations carried out here 
as to the course of such demise would therefore be pure speculation; 
but we ought, one way or another, to speak of the end of capitalism as 
a social formation — just not in the same sense as Heinrich does when 
he writes in relation to “Kurz’s theory of collapse”:
Historically, the theory of collapse always had an exonerating 
function for the left: however bad the contemporary defeats, 
the demise of its antagonist was ultimately certain.50
Here, too, he is wrong. It is a matter not of the end of an “antagonist,” 
but of our own end. Whether as a slow, lingering sickness or in a great 
explosion, the foreseeable demise of a social form the members of 
which, bound to it by means of a value form they regard as natural 
and thus lack any idea of what is happening to them, could at best 
leave its survivors to vegetate aimlessly as commodity subjects without 
commodities. It would merely be one more — albeit the last — defeat. 
And conversely, the only chance for some sort of liberated postcapitalist 
society presents itself to us as the overcoming of capitalism — and 
therefore of wealth in the value form, and of the subject form that it 
constitutes — brought about by conscious human action. This must 
come, however, before the compulsion to growth in the valorization of 
capital, in combination with the production of relative surplus value, 
leaves behind nothing other than scorched earth. Time is running out.
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Patriarchy and Commodity Society:  
Gender without the Body
Roswitha Scholz (2009)
In the 1980s, after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, culturalism and 
theories of difference became especially prominent in women’s studies 
courses, a discipline which has since largely developed into gender 
studies. Marxist feminism, which until the end of the 1980s had 
determined the debates in this field, retreated into the background. 
Recently, however, the increasing delegitimization of neoliberalism 
connected to the current economic crisis has produced a resurgence 
and increasing popularity of a diverse set of Marxisms. To date, 
however, these developments have barely had an impact on the fields 
of feminist theory or gender studies — aside from some critical 
globalization debates and area studies interrogating the themes of 
labor and money. Deconstruction is still the lead vocalist in the choir 
of  universal feminism, especially in gender theory. Meanwhile, 
assertions of the necessity of a new feminism (in particular a feminism 
that once again includes a materialist plane of analysis) have become 
commonplace. The popular argument of the 1980s and 1990s that claims 
that we are confronted with a “confusion of the sexes” is being rapidly 
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deflated. Instead, it is becoming clear that neither the much-professed 
equalization of genders nor the deconstructivist play with signifiers 
has yielded convincing results. 
The “rediscovery” of Marxist theory on one hand and the insight 
that feminism is in no way anachronistic or superfluous on the other, 
even if it can no longer be continued in those forms that have become 
characteristic of the past few decades, lead me to consider a new 
Marxist-feminist theoretical framework, one which is able to account 
for recent developments since the end of actually existing socialism and 
the onset of the current global economic crisis. It should, of course, be 
clear that one cannot seamlessly connect traditional Marxist concepts 
and analysis with twenty-first-century problematics. Without critical 
innovation, a direct application is similarly impossible for those 
theoretical frameworks from which I will draw in what follows, such 
as Adorno’s critical theory, even if his examinations provided us with 
an important basis for a patriarchy-critical theory of the present. 
Those feminist debates of the last twenty years that have been based 
on Adorno and critical theory can provide inspiration, but they must 
also be modified. I cannot elaborate on this here.1 Instead, I would like 
to advance a few facets of my theory of gender relations, or value-
dissociation theory, which I have developed via the engagement with 
some of the theories alluded to above. As I will show, asymmetrical 
gender relations today can no longer be understood in the same sense 
as “classical” modern gender relations; however, it is essential to base 
their origins in the history of modernization. Similarly, one has to 
account for postmodern processes of differentiation and the relevance 
of cultural-symbolic levels which have emerged since the 1980s. The 
cultural-symbolic order should here be understood as an autonomous 
dimension of theory. Yet, this autonomous dimension is to be thought 
simultaneously with value dissociation as a basic social principle 
without understanding Marxian theory as purely materialist. Such 
a theory is much better equipped to grasp the totality, insofar as the 
cultural-symbolic as well as the socio-psychological levels are included 
in the context of a social whole. Economy and culture are, therefore, 
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neither identical (as “identity logic” that violently aims to subjugate 
differences to the same common denominator would suggest), nor 
can they be separated from each other in a dualistic sense. Rather, 
their identity and non-identity must be conceived as the conflictual 
incompatibility that shapes the commodity-producing patriarchy as 
such: the self-contradictory basic principle of the social form of value 
dissociation.
Value as Basic Social Principle
Besides the above-mentioned critical theory of Adorno, the primary 
theoretical benchmarks are a new, fundamental critical theory 
of “value” and of “abstract labor” as enhancements of the Marxist 
critique of political economy, whose most prominent theorists in the 
last decade are Robert Kurz and Moishe Postone.2 I intend to give their 
texts a feminist twist.
According to this new value-critical approach, it is not surplus value 
itself — that is, it is not the solely externally determined exploitation 
of labor by capital qua legal property relations — which stands at the 
center of critique. Instead, critique begins at an earlier point, namely 
with the social character of the commodity-producing system and 
thus with the form of activity particular to abstract labor. Labor as 
abstraction develops for the first time under capitalism alongside the 
generalization of commodity production and must, therefore, not be 
ontologized. Generalized commodity production is characterized by 
a key contradiction: under the obligation of the valorization of value, 
the individuals of capitalist enterprise are highly integrated into a 
network while nevertheless paradoxically engaging in non-social 
production, as socialization proper is only established via the market 
and exchange. As commodities, products represent past abstract labor 
and, therefore, value. In other words, commodities represent a specific 
quantity of expenditure of human energy, recognized by the market 
as socially valid. This representation is, in turn, expressed by money, 
the universal mediator and simultaneous end in itself of the form 
of capital. In this way, people appear asocial and society appears to 
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be constituted through things, which are mediated by the abstract 
quantity of value. The result is the alienation of members of society, 
as their own sociability is only bestowed upon them by commodities, 
dead things, thus entirely emptying sociability in its social form of 
representation of its concrete, sensual content. This relation can, for 
the time being, be expressed via the concept of fetishism, keeping in 
mind that this concept itself is as yet incomplete. 
Opposed to this stand premodern societies, in which goods were 
produced under different relations of  domination (personal as 
opposed to reified by the commodity form). Goods were produced in 
the agrarian field and in trades primarily for their use, determined by 
specific laws of guilds that precluded the pursuit of abstract profit. 
The very limited premodern exchange of goods was not carried out 
in markets and relations of competition in the modern sense. It was, 
therefore, not possible at this point in history to speak of a social 
totality in which money and value have become abstract ends in 
themselves. Modernity is consequently characterized by the pursuit 
of  surplus value, by the attempt to generate more money out of 
money, yet not as a matter of subjective enrichment but instead as a 
tautological system determined by the relation of value to itself. It is 
in this context that Marx speaks of the “automatic subject.”3 Human 
needs become negligible and labor power itself is transformed into a 
commodity. This means that the human capacity for production has 
become externally determined — yet not in the sense of personal 
domination but in the sense of anonymous, blind mechanisms. And 
it is only for that reason that productive activities in modernity 
have become forced into the form of abstract labor. Ultimately, the 
development of capitalism marks life globally by means of money’s self-
motion and of abstract labor, which emerged only under capitalism 
and appears unhistorically as an ontological principle. Traditional 
Marxism only problematizes a part of this system of correlations, 
namely the legal appropriation of surplus value by the bourgeoisie, 
thus focusing on unequal distribution rather than commodity 
fetishism. Its critique of capitalism and imaginations of postcapitalist 
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societies are consequently limited to the goal of equal distribution 
within the commodity-producing system in its non-suspended forms. 
Such critiques fail to see that the suffering resulting from capitalism 
emerges from its very formal relations, of which private property is 
merely one of many results. Accordingly, the Marxisms of the workers’ 
movements were limited to an ideology of legitimization of system-
immanent developments and social improvements. Today, this form 
of thought is inappropriate for a renewed critique of capitalism, as it 
has absorbed (and made its own) all the basic principles of capitalist 
socialization, in particular the categories of value and abstract labor, 
misunderstanding these categories as transhistorical conditions of 
humanity. In this context, a radical value-critical position regards past 
examples of actually existing socialism as the value-producing system 
of state-bureaucratically determined processes of recuperative (or 
“catch-up”) modernization (nachholende Modernisierung) in the global 
East and South, which, mediated by global economic processes and the 
race for the development of productive forces against the West, had to 
collapse in the post-Fordist stage of capitalist development at the end 
of the 1980s. Since then the West has been engaged in the process of 
withdrawing social reforms in the context of crises and globalization. 
Value Dissociation as Basic Social Principle
The concepts of value and abstract labor, I argue, cannot sufficiently 
account for capitalism’s basic form as a fundamentally fetishistic 
relation. We have also to account for the fact that under capitalism 
reproductive activities emerge that are primarily carried out by 
women. Accordingly, value dissociation means that capitalism contains 
a core of female-determined reproductive activities and the affects, 
characteristics, and attitudes (emotionality, sensuality, and female or 
motherly caring) that are dissociated from value and abstract labor. 
Female relations of existence — that is, female reproductive activities 
under capitalism — are therefore of a different character from abstract 
labor, which is why they cannot straightforwardly be subsumed under 
the concept of labor. Such relations constitute a facet of capitalist 
128 Marxism and the Critique of Value
societies that cannot be captured by Marx’s conceptual apparatus. 
This facet is a necessary aspect of value, yet it also exists outside of it 
and is (for this very reason) its precondition. In this context I borrow 
from Frigga Haug the notion of a “logic of time-saving” that determines 
one side of modernity that is generally associated with the sphere 
of production, what Kurz calls the “logic of using-up (Vernutzung) 
of business administration,” and a “logic of time-expenditure” that 
corresponds to the field of reproduction. Value and dissociation 
therefore stand in a dialectical relation to each other. One cannot simply 
be derived from the other. Rather, both simultaneously emerge out of 
each other. In this sense, value dissociation can be understood as the 
macro-theoretical framework within which the categories of the value 
form function micro-theoretically, allowing us to examine fetishistic 
socialization in its entirety instead of value alone. One must stress 
here, however, that the sensitivity that is usually falsely perceived as an 
immediate a priori in the fields of reproduction, consumption, and its 
related activities, as well as needs that are to be satisfied in this context, 
emerged historically before the backdrop of value dissociation as total 
process. These categories must not be misunderstood as immediate 
or natural, despite the fact that eating, drinking, and loving are not 
solely connected to symbolization (as vulgar constructivisms might 
claim). The traditional categories available to us for the critique of 
political economy, however, are also lacking in another regard. Value 
dissociation implies a particular socio-psychological relation. Certain 
undervalued qualities (sensitivity, emotionality, deficiencies in thought 
and character, and so forth) are associated with femininity and are 
dissociated from the masculine-modern subject. These gender-specific 
attributes are a fundamental characteristic of the symbolic order of 
the commodity-producing patriarchy. Such asymmetrical gender 
relations should, I believe, as far as theory is concerned, be examined 
by focusing only on modernity and postmodernity. This is not to say 
that these relations do not have a premodern history, but rather to 
insist that their universalization endowed them with an entirely new 
quality. The universalization of such gender relations at the beginning 
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of modernity meant that women were now primarily responsible for 
the lesser-valorized (as opposed to the masculine, capital-producing) 
areas of reproduction, which cannot be represented in monetary terms. 
We must reject the understanding of gender relations under capitalism 
as a precapitalist residue. The small, nuclear family as we know it, for 
example, only emerged in the eighteenth century, just as the public 
and private spheres as we understand them today only emerged in 
modernity. What I claim here, therefore, is that the beginning of 
modernity not only marked the rise of capitalist commodity production, 
but that it also saw the emergence of a social dynamism that rests on 
the basis of the relations of value dissociation. 
Commodity-Producing Patriarchy as Civilizational Model
Following Frigga Haug, I assume that the notion of a commodity-
producing patriarchy is to be regarded as a civilizational model, yet 
I would like to modify her propositions by taking into account the 
theory of value dissociation.4 As is well known, the symbolic order of 
the commodity-producing patriarchy is characterized by the following 
assumptions: politics and economics are associated with masculinity; 
male sexuality, for example, is generally described as individualized, 
aggressive, or violent, while women often function as pure bodies. 
The man is therefore regarded as human, man of intellect, and body-
transcendent, while women are reduced to non-human status, to the 
body. War carries a masculine connotation, while women are seen as 
peaceful, passive, devoid of will and spirit. Men must strive for honor, 
bravery, and immortalizing actions. Men are thought of as heroes and 
capable of great deeds, which requires them to productively subjugate 
nature. Men stand at all times in competition with others. Women 
are responsible for the care for the individual as well as for humanity 
itself. Yet their actions remain socially undervalued and forgotten in 
the process of the development of theory, while their sexualization is 
the source of women’s subordination to men and underwrites their 
social marginalization. 
This notion also determines the idea of order underlying modern 
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societies as a whole. Moreover, the ability and willingness to produce 
and the rational, economical, and effective expenditure of  time 
also determine the civilizational model in its objective structures 
as a totality of relations — its mechanisms and history as much as 
the maxims of individual agency. A provocative formulation might 
suggest that the male gender should be understood as the gender 
of capitalism, keeping in mind that such a dualist understanding 
of gender is of  course the dominant understanding of gender in 
modernity. The commodity-producing civilizational model this 
requires has its foundation in the oppression and marginalization of 
women and the simultaneous neglect of nature and the social. Subject 
and object, domination and subjugation, man and woman are thus 
typical dichotomies, antagonistic counterparts within the commodity-
producing patriarchy.5
Yet it is important to prevent misunderstandings in this 
respect. Value dissociation is in this sense also to be understood as 
a metaconcept, since we are concerned with theoretical exegesis on 
a high level of abstraction. This means for the single empirical units 
or subjects that they are neither able to escape the socio-cultural 
patterns, nor able to become part of these patterns. Additionally, 
as we shall see, gender models are subject to historical change. It 
is therefore important to avoid simplified interpretations of value 
dissociation theory resembling, for instance, the idea of  a “new 
femininity” associated with the difference-feminism of the 1980s 
or even the “Eve principle” currently being propagated by German 
conservatives.6 What we must foreground in all of this is that abstract 
labor and domestic labor along with the known cultural patterns of 
masculinity and femininity determine each other simultaneously. 
The old “chicken or egg” question is nonsensical in this regard. Yet, 
such a non-dialectical approach is characteristic of deconstructivist 
critics who insist that masculinity and femininity initially must be 
produced culturally before a gendered distribution of actions can take 
place.7 Frigga Haug too proceeds from the ontologizing assumption 
that cultural meaning attaches itself over the course of history to a 
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previously gendered division of labor.8
Within the commodity-producing modern patriarchy develops, 
again, a public sphere, which itself comprises a number of spheres 
(economy, politics, science, and so on), and a private sphere. Women 
are primarily assigned to the private sphere. These different spheres 
are on one hand relatively autonomous, and on the other hand mutually 
determined — that is, they stand in dialectical relation to each other. 
It is important, then, that the private sphere not be misunderstood 
as an emanation of value but rather as a dissociated sphere. What 
is required is a sphere into which actions such as caring and loving 
can be deported and that stands opposed to the logic of value and 
time saving and its morality (competition, profit, performance). 
This relation between private sphere and the public sector also 
explains the existence of male alliances and institutions that found 
themselves, by means of an affective divide, against all that is female. 
As a consequence, the very basis of the modern state and politics, along 
with the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity, rests since the 
eighteenth century upon the foundation of male alliances. This is not 
to say, however, that patriarchy resides in the spheres created by this 
process of dissociation. For example, women have always to an extent 
been active in the sphere of accumulation. Nevertheless, dissociation 
becomes apparent here as well, since, despite the success of Angela 
Merkel and others, women’s existence in the public sphere is generally 
undervalued and women largely remain barred from upward mobility. 
All this indicates that value dissociation is a pervasive social formal 
principle that is located on a correspondingly high level of abstraction 
and that cannot be mechanistically separated into different spheres. 
This means that the effects of value dissociation pervade all spheres, 
including all levels of the public sphere.
Value Dissociation as Basic Social Principle and 
the Critique of Identity Logic
Value dissociation as critical practice disallows identity-critical 
approaches. That is, it does not allow for approaches that reduce 
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analyses to the level of structures and concepts that subsume all 
contradictions and non-identities with regard both to the attribution 
of mechanisms, structures, and characteristics of the commodity-
producing patriarchy to societies that do not produce commodities, 
and to the homogenization of different spheres and sectors within 
the commodity-producing patriarchy itself, disregarding qualitative 
differences. The necessary point of departure is not merely value, but 
the relation of value dissociation as a fundamental social structure 
that corresponds to androcentric universalist thought. After all, what 
is important here is not simply that it is average labor time or abstract 
labor that determines money as equivalent form. More important 
is the observation that value itself must define as less valuable and 
dissociate domestic labor, the non-conceptual, and everything related 
to non-identity, the sensuous, affective, and emotional. 
Dissociation, however, is not congruent with the non-identical 
in Adorno. More accurately, the dissociated represents the dark 
underbelly of value itself. Here, dissociation must be understood as a 
precondition which ensures that the contingent, the irregular, the non-
analytical, that which cannot be grasped by science, remains hidden 
and unilluminated, perpetuating classificatory thought that is unable 
to register and maintain particular qualities, inherent differences, 
ruptures, ambivalences, and asynchronies.
Inversely, this means for the “socialized society” of capitalism, 
to appropriate Adorno’s phrase, that these levels and sectors cannot 
be understood in relation to each other as irreducible elements of 
the real, but that they also have to be examined in their objective, 
internal relations corresponding to the notion of value dissociation as 
formal principle of the social totality that constitutes a given society 
on the level of ontology and appearance in the first place. Yet, at 
every moment, value dissociation is also aware of its own limitations 
as theory. The self-interrogation of value dissociation theory here 
must go far enough to prevent positioning it as an absolute, social-
form principle. That which corresponds to its concept can, after all, 
not be elevated to the status of main contradiction, and the theory 
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of value dissociation can, like the theory of value, not be understood 
as a theory of the logic of the one. In its critique of identity logic, 
therefore, value dissociation theory remains true to itself and can only 
persist insofar as it relativizes and at times even disclaims itself. This 
also means that value dissociation theory must leave equal space for 
other forms of social disparity (including economic disparity, racism, 
and antisemitism).9
Value Dissociation as Historical Process
According to the epistemological premises of the formation of value 
dissociation theory, we cannot resort to linear analytical models when 
examining developments in a variety of global regions. Developments 
generally determined by the commodity form and the associated form 
of patriarchy did not take place in the same fashion and under the 
same circumstances in all societies (especially in societies that were 
formerly characterized by symmetrical gender relations and which 
have to this day not entirely adopted modernity’s gender relations). 
Additionally, we must foreground alternative paternalistic structures 
and relations, which, while largely overwritten by modern, Western 
patriarchy in the context of global economic developments, have 
not entirely lost their idiosyncrasies. Further, we have to account 
for the fact that throughout the history of Western modernity itself 
ideas of masculinity and femininity have varied. Both the modern 
conception of labor and dualist understandings of gender are products 
of, and thus go hand in hand with, the specific developments that 
led to the dominance of capitalism. It was not until the eighteenth 
century that what Carol Hagemann-White calls the modern “system 
of dual genderedness” emerged, that led to what Karin Hausen calls a 
“polarization of gendered characteristics.” Prior to this, women were 
largely regarded as just another variant of being-man, which is one of 
the reasons that the social and historical sciences have throughout the 
last fifteen years stressed the pervasiveness of the single-gender model 
upon which pre-bourgeois societies were based. Even the vagina was 
in the context of this model frequently understood as a penis, inverted 
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and pushed into the lower body.10 Despite the fact that women were 
largely regarded as inferior, prior to the development of a large-scale 
modern public, there still existed for them a variety of possibilities 
for gaining social influence. In premodern and early modern societies, 
man occupied a largely symbolic position of hegemony. Women were 
not yet exclusively confined to domestic life and motherhood, as has 
been the case since the eighteenth century. Women’s contributions to 
material reproduction were in agrarian societies regarded as equally 
important as the contributions of  men.11 While modern gender 
relations and their characteristic polarization of gender roles were 
initially restricted to the bourgeoisie, they rapidly spread to all social 
spheres with the universalization of the nuclear family in the context 
of Fordism’s rise to dominance in the 1950s. 
Value dissociation is, therefore, not a static structure, as a 
series of sociological structuralist models claim, but should instead 
be understood as a process. In postmodernity, for example, value 
dissociation acquires a new valence. Women are now widely regarded 
as what Regina Becker-Schmidt calls “doubly socialized,” which means 
that they are similarly responsible for both family and profession. 
What is new about this, however, is not this fact itself. After all, 
women have always been active in a variety of professions and trades. 
The characteristic particular to postmodernity in this regard is that 
the double socialization of women throughout the last few years 
has highlighted the structural contradictions that accompany this 
development. As indicated above, an analysis of this development 
must begin with a dialectical understanding of  the relationship 
between individual and society. This means that the individual is at no 
point entirely subsumed within the objective structural and cultural 
patterns, nor can we assume that these structures stand in a purely 
external relation to the individual. This way, we are able to see clearly 
the contradictions of double socialization that are connected to the 
increasing differentiation of the role of women in postmodernity, 
which emerges alongside postmodernity’s characteristic tendencies 
toward individualization. Current analyses of film, advertising, and 
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literature, too, indicate that women are no longer primarily seen as 
mothers and housewives.
Consequently, it is not only unnecessary but in fact highly suspect 
to suggest that we must deconstruct the modern dualism of gender, 
as queer theory and its main voice, Judith Butler, claim. This strand 
of theory sees the internal subversion of bourgeois gender dualism 
via repeated parodying practice that can be found in gay and lesbian 
subcultures as an attempt to reveal the “radical incredulity” of modern 
gendered identity.12 The problem with such an approach, however, is 
that those elements that are supposed to be parodied and subverted 
have in the capitalist sense already become obsolete. For a while 
now, we have been witnessing actually existing deconstruction, 
which becomes legible in the double socialization of women, but 
also when examining fashion and the changed habitus of women and 
men. Yet, this has happened without fundamentally eradicating the 
hierarchy of genders. Instead of critiquing both classically modern 
and the modified, flexible postmodern gendered imaginary, Butler 
ultimately merely affirms postmodern (gender) reality. Butler’s purely 
culturalist approach cannot yield answers to current questions, and 
indeed presents to us the very problem of hierarchic gender relations 
in postmodernity in progressive disguise as a solution. 
The Dialectic of Essence and Appearance, and the 
Feralization of Commodity-Producing Patriarchy 
in the Era of Globalization
In the attempt to analyze postmodern gender relations, it is important 
to insist upon the dialectic of essence and appearance. This means 
that changes in gender relations must be understood in relation to the 
mechanisms and structures of value dissociation, which determine the 
formal principle of all social planes. Here, it becomes apparent that 
in particular the development of productive forces and the market 
dynamic, which each rely upon value dissociation, undermine their 
own precondition insofar as they encourage women’s development 
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away from their traditional role. Since the 1950s, an increasing number 
of women were integrated into abstract labor and the process of 
accumulation, accompanied by a range of processes rationalizing 
domestic life, increased options for birth control, and the gradual 
equalization of  access to education.13 Consequently, the double 
socialization of women also underwent a change, and now resides on 
a higher level in the social hierarchy and similarly generates higher 
levels of self-valorization for women. Even though a large percentage 
of women have now been integrated into official society, they remain 
responsible for domestic life and children, they must struggle harder 
than men to rise up in the professional hierarchy, and their salaries 
are on average significantly lower than those of men. The structure 
of value dissociation has therefore changed, but in principle still very 
much exists. In this context, it may not be surprising to suggest that we 
appear to experience a return to a single-gender model, however with 
the same, familiar content: women are men, only different. Yet, since 
this model also moved through the classic modern process of value 
dissociation, it manifests itself differently than in premodern times.14 
Traditional bourgeois gender relations are no longer appropriate 
for today’s “turbo-capitalism” and its rigorous demands for flexibility. 
A range of compulsory flexible identities emerges, but these are, 
however, still represented as differentiated by gender.15 The old image 
of woman has become obsolete and the doubly socialized woman has 
become the dominant role. Further, recent analyses of globalization 
and gender relations suggest that after a period in which it seemed as 
though women were finally able to enjoy greater, system-immanent 
freedoms, we also witnessed an increasing feralization of patriarchy. 
Of course, in this case, too, we have to consider a variety of social 
and cultural differences corresponding to a variety of global regions. 
Similarly, we have to note the differently situated position of women 
in a context in which a logic of victors and vanquished still dominates, 
even as the victors threaten to disappear into the abyss opened up 
by the current destruction of the middle class.16 Since well situated 
women are able to afford the services of underpaid female immigrant 
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laborers, we are witnessing a redistribution of, for example, personal 
care and nursing within the female plane of existence. 
For a large part of the population, the feralization of patriarchy 
means that we can expect conditions similar to black ghettoes in the 
United States or the slums of Third World countries: women will 
be similarly responsible for money and survival. Women will be 
increasingly integrated into the world market without being given 
an opportunity to secure their own existence. They raise children with 
the help of female relatives and neighbors (another example of the 
redistribution of personal care and related fields of labor), while men 
come and go, move from job to job and from woman to woman, who 
may periodically have to support them. The man no longer occupies 
the position of provider due to the increasing precarity of employment 
relations and the erosion of traditional family structures.17 Increasing 
individualization and atomization of social relations proceed before the 
backdrop of unsecured forms of existence, and continue even in times 
of great economic crisis without principally eradicating the traditional 
gender hierarchy along with the widespread eradication of the social 
welfare state and compulsory measures of crisis management. 
Value dissociation as social formal principle consequently merely 
removes itself from the static, institutional confines of modernity (in 
particular, the family and labor). The commodity-producing patriarchy, 
therefore, experiences increasing feralization without leaving behind 
the existing relations between value (or rather, abstract labor) and the 
dissociated elements of reproduction. We must note here, too, that we 
are currently experiencing a related escalation of masculine violence, 
ranging from domestic violence to suicide bombers. In regards to the 
latter, we must further note that it is not only fundamentalist Islam 
that attempts to reconstruct “authentic” religious patriarchal gender 
relations. Indeed, it is the Western patriarchal model of civilization 
that should constitute the focus of our critique. Simultaneously, we 
are also confronted with a transition on the psychological level. In 
postmodernity, a “gendered code of affect” emerges that corresponds 
to the traditional male code of affect.18 Nevertheless, old affective 
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structures necessarily continue to play an important role as well, 
since they ensure that, even in times of postmodern single-gender 
relations, women continue to assume dissociated responsibilities, 
making possible the pervasiveness of the mother with several children 
who still manages to be a doctor, scientist, politician, and much more. 
This may occur in the form of a return to traditional female roles and 
ideals, particularly in times of great crisis and instability.
While turbo-capitalism demands gender-specific flexible identities, 
we cannot assume that corresponding postmodern gender models, 
such as the model of the doubly socialized woman, are permanently 
able to stabilize reproduction in the context of today’s crisis capitalism. 
After all, the current stage of  capitalism is characterized by the 
“collapse of modernization” and an associated inversion of rationalism 
into irrationalism.19 The double socialization of the individualized 
woman should in this regard (seemingly paradoxically) be understood 
as serving an important, functional role for the commodity-producing 
patriarchy, even as the latter is slowly disintegrating. Organizations 
dedicated to crisis management in third world countries, for example, 
are frequently led by women (while one also has to recognize 
that reproductive activities in general are increasingly playing a 
subordinate role). Exemplary of the development within the West in 
this regard is Frank Schirrmacher (conservative journalist and coeditor 
of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung). In his 2006 book Minimum, he 
describes the “fall and re-birth of our society,” in the context of which 
Schirrmacher wants to assign women the role of crisis managers, 
believing that they fulfill an important function as Trümmerfrauen and 
as cleaning and decontamination personnel.20 In order to justify such 
claims, Schirrmacher mobilizes crude biological and anthropological 
lines of argumentation in order to account for the widespread collapse 
of social and gender relations and to offer so-called solutions carried 
out on the backs of women. In order to avoid such pseudo-solutions, it 
is necessary to analyze current social crises in relation to their social 
and historical contexts, as value dissociation theory emphasizes. From 
this basis, it is then also possible to ask which important theoretical 
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and practical conclusions need to be drawn from the dilemmas of the 
socialization of a value dissociation that today increasingly reduces 
man and nature to the most basic levels of existence and that can no 
longer be addressed with Old Left or Keynesian reform programs. 
Likewise, deconstructivist and postcolonial approaches, which for 
example interpret racism purely culturally, are unable to address 
the current crisis, as are post-workerist approaches that altogether 
refuse to address the general problem of the socialization of value 
dissociation and instead seek refuge in movement-religious notions 
of the multitude and act as though the latter concept includes answers 
to racism and sexism.21 What is required here, therefore, is a new turn 
toward a critique of political economy. Such a critique, however, can 
no longer be carried out in its traditional form that focuses on labor-
ontological and androcentric-universalist methodology, but must 
instead include a turn toward a radical value dissociation theory and 
its epistemological consequences.
Conclusion
What I have attempted to show schematically in this essay is the 
need to think economy and culture in their contradictory identity 
and non-identity from the (itself contradictory) perspective of value 
dissociation as a basic social principle. Value dissociation, then, must 
also be understood not as a static structure but instead as a historically 
dynamic process. This approach refuses the identity-critical 
temptation to forcefully subsume the particular within the general. 
Instead, it addresses the tension between concept and differentiation 
(without dissolving the concept into the non-distinct, the infinite) 
and is thus able to speak to current processes of homogenization and 
differentiation in ways that can also address connected conflicts, 
including male violence. It is important to note that the theory 
of value dissociation, as far as the latter constitutes a basic social 
principle (and therefore is not solely concerned with gender relations 
in a narrow sense), must at times deny itself, insofar as it must allot 
next to sexism equal space to analyses of racism, antisemitism, and 
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economic disparities, avoiding any claim toward universality. Only 
by relativizing its own position and function in this manner is value 
dissociation theory able to exist in the first place.
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The Rise and Fall of the Working Man: 
Toward a Critique of Modern Masculinity
Norbert Trenkle (2008)
The crisis of labor is also a crisis of modern masculinity. For in his 
identity, the modern bourgeois man is constituted and structured 
in a most fundamental way as a working man — as a someone who 
grapples and creates, who is target-oriented, rational, efficient, and 
practical, and who always wants to see a measurable result. This need 
not always happen “in the sweat of his brow.” In this respect, modern 
masculine identity is very flexible. The suited man in management, 
consultancy, or government understands himself as a maker just as 
much as — or even more than — a worker in the construction industry, 
on the assembly line, or at the wheel of a truck. The latter have, in 
any case, long been outdated as models of  masculine vocational 
orientation and are reserved to those who do not manage to jump 
through the social hoops on the way to the top-floor offices. However, 
they serve all the more as the representation of true masculinity on the 
symbolic level. Half-naked musclemen with heavy monkey wrenches 
or sledgehammers in hand, decoratively smeared with a little oil but 
otherwise almost aseptically stage-managed against the aestheticized 
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backdrop of an auto workshop or a furnace, are the icons of modern 
masculinity.
When these men are used in advertisements for designer suits and 
cologne, the aim is to awaken fantasies and identificational desires 
that are firmly anchored in the deep structures of the construction 
of masculine identity. Even the pale, weedy insurance employee or 
corpulent, puffing sales manager of a soda firm can identify with the 
musclemen. On the bodily level, these are unattainable dreams. But 
in the psyche something else is decisive. For the musclemen and the 
statuesquely chiseled and hardened bodies represent the entitlement 
to exercise power — power over others, over the world, and over 
themselves. But this may be a miserable power, such as the ability to 
command a few employees, prevail against a rival on the market with 
a new kind of soda, or to have attained a rise in profits compared to 
the previous year. This power is also extremely precarious because it 
is constantly threatened and subject to revocation. For it depends not 
only on self-assertion in competition, which can fail at any time, but 
also, at the same time, on business cycles, which cannot be influenced 
by individuals. But it is precisely because of this uncertainty that it 
requires constant and aggressive self-assurance.
Modern man is thus not characterized by muscle-bound physicality 
as such. Rather, this symbolizes a hardness that in the first instance 
pertains to an inner attitude and mental (self-)punishment. A “true 
man” has to be hard on himself and on others. Bulging biceps are the 
symbol for self-mastery, discipline, and self-restraint, of the power 
of the will over the body. The spirit is willing, the flesh is weak — and 
it must therefore first be tamed if a man wants to have everything 
under control. Therein lies the difference from the ancient notion 
that a healthy spirit dwells in a healthy body. Although this idea 
already announces the external separation into body and mind, 
the aim is their balanced relationship. In the modern conception, 
in contrast, the domination and subjugation of the body under the 
mind is foregrounded. The “free will” that falsely believes itself to be 
independent of all sensuousness, which it must permanently fight 
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precisely because it disowns it, and that lives in terrible fear of losing 
this fight, amounts to the socio-psychological core of bourgeois man.
The Labor of Desensualization
It is precisely in this respect that modern masculine identity 
corresponds exactly to the profile of the demands of labor in capitalist 
society based on universal commodity production. For labor in 
capitalism is by its nature a desensualized and desensualizing form 
of activity — in many senses. Firstly, its goal is not the manufacture 
of concrete, useful objects, but the production of commodities as a 
means of valorizing value or capital. The things that are produced thus 
do not count as such in their material-sensuous reality, but only so 
far as they are representations of value and in this form contribute to 
making more money out of money. From this perspective the material 
aspect of a commodity is a necessary evil from which one unfortunately 
cannot be liberated, because otherwise it would not be possible to find 
a buyer. This is accompanied, secondly, by a fundamental indifference 
toward the natural foundations of life which ultimately only count as 
material for valorization and even then are used up ruthlessly, despite 
the fact that it has for a long time been well known that this threatens 
the existence of millions upon millions of people. Thirdly, labor is also a 
desensualized activity to the extent that it takes place in a special sphere 
that has been detached from all other contexts of life, a sphere that is 
solely aimed at economic efficiency and profitability, and in which there 
is simply no place for other goals, needs, or feelings. 
Fourthly and finally, however, labor in this form does not only 
represent a specific historical mode of production, but also determines 
the entire social context in a fundamental way — and this not only 
quantitatively, by means of the direct transformation of more and more 
areas of life into divisions of commodity production and spheres of 
capital investment. Labor in capitalist society represents rather the 
central principle of the mediation of social relations, a mediation 
that by its nature has an objectified, alienated form. For people do not 
consciously create their context by agreement or direct communication, 
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but enter into relation with one another by the diversion of products 
of labor either by selling themselves as labor power or by producing 
commodities that are then thrown onto the market in order to realize 
their value. That is, in a certain way, products of labor instead of people 
communicate with one another, in a manner in accordance with 
the objectified code of the logic of valorization. Mediation through 
labor means subjugation of people under the presupposed laws of 
valorization that follow an automatized internal dynamic and that 
people encounter as inviolable natural laws — even though they are 
their own form of social relations.
The World, a Foreign Object
The almost all-encompassing establishment of this historically 
unique form of social activity and relation was not possible without 
the creation of a particular human type corresponding to it and 
guaranteeing that it can function adequately. For even an objectified 
form of relation does not produce itself independently of but through 
social individuals who  actively produce this relation again and again. 
But this human type is the male-inscribed modern subject of labor 
and commodities, whose central essential characteristic is that the 
entire world becomes to him a foreign object. His relation to his social 
and natural context, to other people and even to his own body and 
his own sensuousness, is that of a relation to things — things that 
are supposed be processed, organized, and also treated as things — 
as objects of his will. The modern subject even wants to manage his 
feelings and correspondingly to regulate functional demands. Despite 
an incredible mass of self-help literature, this regularly fails, but even 
then the intention is by no means abandoned.
This modern form of relation to the world and to the self becomes 
most obvious where one sells one’s labor power and thus relinquishes 
the power to dispose over oneself and immediately submits to the logic 
of valorization. But whoever works independently in no way escapes 
this logic but also stands under the compulsion to abstract himself 
from his sensuous needs and from the concrete-material characteristics 
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of products which to him are indifferent and exchangeable means of 
earning his living — things of value. What is decisive, however, is that 
what is at stake is not an act of passive subjugation under a merely 
external compulsion, but that modern subjectivity is structured 
according to this compulsion. Only in this way can the obligation 
to function without rest, the obligation  to objectification and self-
objectification for the duration of the entire labor process, be fulfilled 
without a slave driver brandishing the whip. To the external pressure 
corresponds an internal pressure. It is precisely for this reason that the 
objectifying pattern of action and behavior is in no way restricted only 
to the spheres of labor and economy, but shapes the entire network of 
social relationships. But because this is intolerable in the long term 
(because having to act that way requires constant strain and exertion 
and permanently threatens to fail), the modern subject of labor and the 
commodity has such a fundamental hatred of all those who flounder 
under these pressures or even refuse them altogether.
Man Makes Woman
The Protestant work ethic first elevates this human type, which 
abstracts from its sensuousness and makes itself into a means of 
attaining an objectified success, to an ideal. At a time when the capitalist 
mode of production was only beginning to establish itself on a few 
islands in the ocean of feudal society, it already anticipated in the 
history of ideas the profile of requirements pertinent to a social context 
mediated through labor and the commodity form, and thus made a 
decisive contribution to its general establishment. In actually existing 
history, it was centuries before the human type that corresponded 
to these requirements was formed and had become the normal case. 
The entire history of early capitalism and its establishment is one of 
violent training and self-training of people into subjects of labor and 
the commodity. A history that is also one of stubborn resistance to this 
formation, which ultimately, however, could not be prevented.
That in this process the modern subject form was at the same time 
inscribed in terms of gender with the result that it corresponds to 
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the time of modern masculine identity can be explained in the first 
instance historically, by means of the long prehistory of patriarchal 
domination on which capitalist society is based, and which it 
reinscribes and transforms in its own way. The identification of man 
with abstract reason and woman with sensuousness, which is at the 
same time devalued, desired, and fought against within her, follows in 
the wake of a long tradition that dates back at least to Greek antiquity, 
and which was adopted by Christianity and reinterpreted and further 
developed in accordance with its needs. However, in capitalist society 
this construction gains a new and central significance to the extent that 
the abstract and objectified relation to the world becomes the general 
mode of socialization. For this reason it combines with the basic social 
structure in a most fundamental way. The training of men into agents 
of objectification can draw on a variety of elements of the prior model 
of patriarchal masculinity; alongside identification with reason, this 
means in the first instance identification with the warrior, the violent 
subjugator. However, with the reification of all social relations, they 
are recomposed into a largely coherent and self-contained identity 
of “man.”
However, this could not succeed without the creation of a feminine 
counter-identity that unites all those features that the modern subject 
cannot endure because they do not fit in the system of coordinates of 
the construction of masculine identity, and which the subject must 
therefore split off projectively. This is the basis for the creation of a 
feminine “other,” the sensuous, emotional, and impulsive woman who 
cannot think logically or hammer a nail in the wall and is therefore 
charged with looking after the children, the household, and the well-
being of “her” man. The invention of this “other” not only brings about 
the stabilization of the masculine subject’s identity — at the same 
time, it also installs and legitimizes a gendered division of labor that 
is thoroughly functional for the capitalist enterprise, because it takes 
the load off the working man, enabling him fully to exert himself in the 
sphere of labor and commodity production that has been dissociated 
from the contexts of everyday life.
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Working Man in Crisis
Now while this construct of femininity has been called into question by 
the wide-ranging inclusion of women in the capitalist labor process on 
one hand, and by the women’s movement on the other, it nonetheless 
persists astonishingly stubbornly, and has in its core held its ground 
until the present day. To the extent that women have succeeded in 
gaining positions of social power, this has always happened at the 
cost of accommodating the requirements of the masculine norms of 
labor, competition, and abstract achievement. At the same time, seen 
in society as a whole, their primary responsibility for household and 
children remains preserved, and objectification of the female body for 
men’s sexualized fantasies is all-pervasive, as a glance at the display of 
any magazine kiosk or billboard demonstrates.
This tenaciousness of polarized capitalist gender identities may at 
first glance seem surprising. But as long as the social context continues 
to be produced in the reified forms of relation of commodity, money, 
and labor, the male-inscribed subject-form that is proper to it survives. 
Even the current crisis process that catapults people out of the labor 
process on a massive scale or forces them into increasingly precarious 
working conditions in no way removes the gender identities. While 
it is true that the crisis process unsettles one of the basic pillars of 
male identity, it nonetheless at the same time leads to an intensification 
of competition at all levels of everyday life. However, under these 
conditions the classical qualities of  modern masculinity such as 
hardness, assertiveness, and ruthlessness are more in demand than 
ever. It is thus no surprise that the cult of masculinity — including 
sexist and racist violence — is booming again today. For this reason, 
it is precisely under the conditions of the extensive crisis process that 
a fundamental critique of the modern, male-structured subject is 
necessary in order to open up a new perspective of social emancipation.

Off Limits, Out of Control:  
Commodity Society and Resistance in the  
Age of Deregulation and Denationalization
Ernst Lohoff (2009)
Part One: The Commodity’s Final and Fatal Victory 
The Heteronomy of Politics
From the end of World War I until well into the 1970s it was generally 
agreed that the future belonged to a market economy modified by state 
intervention and socially protectionist policies. This was, especially 
during the post-World War II boom, a perspective shared by all the 
dominant social and political powers within the centers of the world 
market. In the 1960s, this program operated in West Germany and 
Austria under the brand name of the “Social Market Economy” (Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft) and in the United States under that of the “Great 
Society.” In neither instance was there any question that the state had 
to act as a counterweight to the free play of market forces. The welfare 
state in particular was regarded as a virtual synonym for modernity 
itself, and on both sides of the Atlantic the politics of reform meant 
nothing if not the robust will to build such a state. 
But this scenario has, in more recent times, been radically 
overturned. As the leitmotif of the globalized capitalism developing 
since the 1980s now has it: whereever the state is, there the market shall 
be. The welfare state in particular, formerly the epitome of progress, 
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has now come to stand for backwardness and ossification. Everyone 
knows, even in the world market centers themselves, that the very 
idea of such a state has ceased to play any ideological role whatsoever 
in mobilizing contemporary mass movements. Since the turn of the 
millennium, both in continental Europe and in Great Britain and, prior 
to that, in the United States, decades’ worth of the welfare state’s social 
accomplishments have been cast overboard with breathtaking speed. 
The liquidators of  the welfare state and the proponents of 
privatization and deregulation justify their efforts as long-overdue 
corrections to politically motivated errors years in the making. 
Government “over-regulation,” which paralyzes private initiative, 
conspires with a welfare state that has “grown out of control” to block 
— so it is said — the path to growth and prosperity. On and on drone 
the ideological prayer wheels of market economics about the urgent 
need to eliminate such obstacles. 
Defenders of state regulation and of the welfare state’s erstwhile 
attempt at social redistribution see things differently. It is not the 
accomplishments of the welfare state but the decision to eliminate 
the state that produced them that amounts to the error in policy, a 
policy lacking any interest in the true common good of modern labor 
society.1 Each of the conflicting parties arrives at a diametrically 
opposed assessment when it comes to diagnosing ongoing antistatist 
developments, but the opposing diagnoses themselves nevertheless 
follow the very same explanatory model. One side is no different 
from the other when it comes to the fact that both stubbornly treat 
state regulation solely as a dependent variable governed by political 
dissension and decision making. The trials and tribulations of political 
struggle are what stand out here, in the final instance, as the real 
causative factors for whatever priority, be it low or high, the state is to 
be accorded in the production and distribution of wealth in commodity 
society.
The Left variant of this line of argument ought to be familiar 
enough: labor-protection laws, reduced working hours, standardized 
wages, and health, accident, unemployment, and retirement/pension 
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benefits (social security) had all been wrested from capitalism through 
hard-fought class struggles. Today, capital is exploiting the weakness 
of the organized working class to take back these concessions and 
reinstate the old-style capitalism of the “Manchester School.”
Such a view of things gets this much right: the struggles of the 
workers’ movement supplied the essential impetus for the process 
of building the welfare state. And, by the same token, its subsequent 
phasing out is also hardly thinkable without the fierce ideological 
determination of the neoliberal converts assigned the task of digging 
its grave. But this interpretation goes wrong by treating the decisions 
governing the political course of action as prima causa. As a result, 
what is essential falls by the wayside. In taking up the major political 
concepts at work here, we are already dealing with forms of reacting 
to and working through underlying structural developments that 
lie outside of the purview of political action itself. The architects of 
the welfare state were therefore only able to achieve lasting success 
because they added something indispensable to the implementation 
and universalization of the system of capitalist wealth production. 
And even in the case of today’s purely market-ideology-driven asset 
strippers, we are confronted with more than an aberration owing to 
a politically unfavorable balance of forces; upon closer examination, 
such enterprises reveal themselves as part of a thoroughly logical, 
intracapitalist response to a deep-seated structural crisis of labor 
and valorization. The political paradigm shift points to a fundamental 
contradiction internal to the production of wealth in commodity 
society: both the movement toward greater statification and that toward 
destatification are to be grasped as historical forms of development of 
this internal contradiction.
A Brief Political Economy of the Public Sector
Let us begin with a clarification of the above contradictory relationship 
at an initially very basic level, namely with the question of what is 
to be generally understood, according to the logic of capitalism, by 
wealth. Marx provides an answer right in the two opening sentences 
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of Capital: “The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of 
production prevails appears as an ‘immense collection of commodities’; 
the individual commodity appears as its elementary form.”2 This 
definition can also be read in the sense of a “historical mission,” i.e., 
an immanent historical tendency of the commodity form. Capitalist 
society is (in this latter sense) characterized by the drive to convert the 
largest possible portion of the wealth of society into commodities and 
to convert all producers of wealth into commodity producers. The more 
consistently a society achieves this, the purer the form of capitalism 
characterizing it. 
As far as the annihilation of traditional, non-monetary forms 
of social reproduction is concerned, the above-described historical 
development has remained faithful to the very letter of the commodity’s 
“historical mission.” In the metropolitan countries at least, such 
non-monetary societies had either been wiped out or completely 
marginalized by the twentieth century at the latest. Parallel to this, 
meanwhile, a new actor had been taking center stage in matters of 
wealth production: the state. The increase in activities carried out by 
the state was of course itself an integral part of the larger process of 
the monetarization and the transformation of all socially valid activity 
into paid labor. Yet the state itself played no direct part in the process of 
commodification. The social wealth generated by state activities did not, 
in point of fact, consist of an additional mass of commodities produced 
with optimal marketability in mind. Wherever the state provides goods 
directly or, in the case of their commercial exchange, has its finger in 
the pot, what it in fact does is to cancel out the exchange of equivalents 
as the form of social relations subsisting between commodity owners. 
So what, then, could have prompted commodity society to put in place 
alongside itself a form of the production and distribution of wealth 
(the state) so at odds with its own ideal form of wealth production?
The solution to this riddle lies in the particular character that 
wealth takes on through its transformation into commodities. This 
transformation binds together in itself two contradictory moments. The 
elementary unit of capitalist wealth, the individual commodity, thus 
155Off Limits, Out of Control
represents something fundamentally paradoxical, something that might 
be termed “asocial sociality” (ungesellschaftliche Gesellschaftlichkeit).3 
Looked at from one side, the commodity’s rise to dominance as a 
form of wealth leads to the formation of a highly socialized system 
with a correspondingly highly developed division of  labor. The 
historical advance of the commodity has as its logical horizon the world 
market and hence the fusion of production and consumption into one 
planetary, interconnected whole. Individual producers and commodity 
subjects act as the (mutually and fully interdependent) members of a 
gigantic social unit.
At the same time, the reduction of wealth as such to wealth in its 
commodity form signifies a systematic desocialization. This is so in two 
respects. On one hand, desocialization is entailed by the domination of 
the commodity form, under which social relations exist only as relations 
between things. From this it also follows that, since society simply 
cannot function without certain directly social relationships, there 
can only be a place for the latter in a specialized sphere dissociated from 
the primary one constituted by the actual thinglike social nexus. On 
the other hand, however, given the metamorphosis of all the manifold 
relationships to material goods into what now becomes exclusively a 
relationship to commodities, we are concerned here with a radically 
desocialized relational context that tolerates no other occupant besides 
itself within the seemingly limitless universe of commodities. From 
the standpoint of the producer, the sensory-material qualities of the 
product together with its social effect and social reality appear totally 
irrelevant. Only its marketability is of any concern. From the producer’s 
perspective there is, correspondingly, no difference whatsoever 
between poison gas and penny candy, or between violent video games 
and velvet curtains. The buyer can for her part never acquire anything 
more than isolated end products, the determinate origins and thus the 
social dimensions of which lie entirely outside her reach. In the end, the 
commodity subject, situated in an external relation to all commodities 
in general, remains utterly and completely unrelated to all commodities 
that she does not happen to encounter as a buyer or seller. It is only 
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with the merest fragment of the commodity cosmos, residing within 
a veritable nanosphere of the latter, that the commodity subject can, 
via payment, enter into any relationship at all. Anyone within the 
commodity universe who falls out of the cycle of buying and selling 
immediately finds herself in the uncomfortable position of a fish out 
of water, cut off, within a hypersocialized world, from everything that 
makes up human existence.
Yet the inner contradiction between total sociability and radical 
asociality, thought through to its end, leads to nothing short of 
self-destruction. A society that actually sought to drive absolutely 
every expression of life through the needle’s eye of the exchange of 
equivalents would become incapable of self-reproduction. To avoid 
breaking itself apart, commodity society is bound to desystematize 
certain components of the social production of wealth, but only so as 
to subsume them indirectly within the commodity form. This applies 
first of all to the broad palette of household activities. The indispensable 
processes that go into the preparation and subsequent adjustments 
required for personal commodity consumption, together with central 
aspects of basic social care giving, are relegated to a sphere dissociated 
from valorization proper. Commodity society relies implicitly on the 
fact that someone or something, as a rule feminine “invisible hands” 
ignored by the official bookkeepers, raise children, take care of family 
members, and run households.
But commodity society relies on more than just this compressed 
form of immediately social relations, here made up of activities that are 
carried out at low (or no) cost and require no large-scale or concentrated 
output. In order to be able to act as commodity subjects, people must 
find already in place certain general infrastructural preconditions 
without which their mode of existence is impossible. There can be no 
individual movement from one place to another without usable roads 
for these individuals’ private vehicles. No labor power can enter the 
labor market without first passing through educational institutions 
and being fitted to the universal cultural standards that are deemed 
necessary. In order that the very preconditions for existence as a 
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commodity subject should become universally accessible to all potential 
commodity subjects, these preconditions may not themselves assume 
commodity form. The further the development of productivity moves 
forward, the more profoundly, the more differentially scaled, and the 
more extensive this system of non-commodity infrastructural outlays 
becomes, to the extent that only the state as abstract universality is in 
any position to take its maintenance upon itself. The asocial character of 
commodity society imposes on the latter, as still another of its essential 
aspects, the formation of a second, derivative form of wealth. Were 
it not for the emergence of a wide-ranging sector of state-organized 
wealth production, the victorious onslaught of the primary commodity 
form of wealth could never have taken place.
In commodity society, wealth always finds social recognition in 
the same way, namely through its transformation into monetarized 
relationships. Whatever does not replace itself with the supreme 
commodity among commodities is an irrelevant moment of merely 
private satisfaction. Social significance goes wherever money flows.
The expansion of the state sector also finds its place in the larger 
historical process of monetarization. The state-linked, secondary, 
variant form of  wealth, however, differs decisively from the 
monetarization that is synonymous with the advance of the commodity. 
Observed from the perspective of society as a whole, the production 
of marketable commodities is transparently that which increases 
monetary wealth. When observed from this same perspective, state-
organized wealth production appears, by contrast, as consumption 
— that is, as consumption by the state. Commodity society’s secondary 
(state) form of wealth must be fed by commodity wealth in its primary 
(private) form.
What is, overall, the deficit-like quality of this secondary form of 
wealth is itself indebted to a fundamental difference in the form of 
social mediation. Exchange relationships function strictly according 
to the principle of equivalence. He who wants to be in possession of a 
commodity must cede its counter-value to the seller, thereby realizing 
it as a value. In the state sector, however, this principle of equivalence 
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is breached. Here value does not exchange itself for counter-value. 
Giving and receiving here diverge, at least in part. The first assumes the 
form of administratively and juridically established obligations to pay 
(taxes, levies, and so on) and the second the form of legally established 
claims to payment.
In the case of state activities financed exclusively by taxes and levies 
and available free of charge to all potential users, this decoupling of 
giving and receiving is complete. But even public infrastructure for 
which monetary payment is binding is in no way subject to the principle 
of equivalence. This applies not only to public utilities operating at a 
loss but also and just as much to those which operate at a profit. Their 
very infrastructural character, their focus on a comprehensive level 
of service, no matter the mandated area of responsibility, finds its 
juridical expression in a universal duty to provide such service. Public 
enterprises are obliged, independent of whatever the particular costs 
of its provision, to offer every citizen their service or product for an 
identical sum of payment. In lieu of price, what we have here is the 
charging of a fee.
Commodity society rests on the basis of one particular commodity, 
that of labor power. The valorization of value is a system dependent 
upon human material compatible with valorization. Among the general 
preconditions for commodity production which it is therefore the task 
of the state to guarantee is not only access to the commodity of labor-
power, but also the maintenance of this commodity at a level of quality 
that matches the highest attained level of productivity. 
This task coincides in part with the state’s ability to supply common 
infrastructural needs. Current, future, and former sellers of labor 
power also, as do all other categories of commodity owners, make use 
of the educational system, of the transportation network, of cultural 
facilities — not to mention such things as the public water supply. But 
to the same extent that the owner of labor power rises to the dominant 
position among all other categories of commodity owners, there falls 
to the state as regulatory agent yet another function resulting from the 
special character of the dominant, labor-power commodity. It is this 
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that obliges the state to become a social or welfare state in the narrower 
sense of the word.
Whoever is in possession of the commodity of labor power enjoys 
a twofold freedom. Like any other commodity subject she can dispose 
freely of her commodity and may even take her own hide to market. At 
the same time, the owner of this commodity is also freed of all possible 
modes of self-reproduction that could spare her that trip. This second 
freedom means nothing other than the structural compulsion to work. 
The structural compulsion to work, meanwhile, does not always 
guarantee the possibility that the owner of labor power will be able 
to live off the proceeds of its sale. Existence as a seller of labor power 
is, it so happens, bound up with certain routine risks in the individual 
lives of such salespersons. The ability to work can be lost intermittently 
(as in the case of illness), or on a continuing basis (as in the case of 
old age or occupational disability), or it may, temporarily, fail to find 
anyone able or willing to put it to use. Against the occurrence of 
such risks, the welfare state and its mandatory insurance programs 
organize alternative revenue sources and thereby provide the displaced 
owners of labor power with a secondary, substitute form of access to 
the wonderful world of commodities. But the welfare state’s socially 
redistributive policies have never, as a matter of principle, overridden 
the structural compulsion to work. On the contrary. For one thing, 
the duration and scope of welfare-state services are as a rule tied to 
wage income calculated in advance as a sum still to be generated; for 
another, in the case of all who are officially able to work, officially 
monitored readiness for work always takes the place of actual work 
itself. Where readiness for work begins and where it ends certainly 
leaves considerable room for interpretation. A certain easing of the 
strict compulsion to sell oneself always represents a kind of collective 
hedging against the dangers of existence as such for the sellers of labor 
power.
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The Market’s Pyrrhic Victory
Along with the triumphal march of commodity society in the twentieth 
century came the advance of the state. This was the only conceivable 
way that the glaring internal contradiction of “asocial sociality” could 
find even a provisional resolution. But this provisional resolution 
had a catch. It functions unproblematically only as long as the mass 
of value-producing labor — that is, labor in its self-objectifying, 
commodity form — continues to grow. But, no later than the revolution 
in microelectronics, a depletion of the labor substance (i.e., of the 
substance of value itself ) becomes evident in the core industrial 
sectors. The discrepancy between continuous increases in the cost of 
maintaining necessary infrastructural supports and the shrinkage 
of the value-productive core itself leads to a structural crisis in the 
financing of the activist, “social” state. Commodity society is now 
threatened with being crushed by its own faux frais.
The crisis of labor society does not only create problems as far as 
financing the state’s general array of public services is concerned. At the 
same time it undermines and renders more pliable what had until then 
been the statutes governing the practical services required of the state 
itself. The immediate and primary effect here is to raise the question of 
what, in any genuine sense, the welfare state now represents.
Commodity society in the age of Fordist mass labor can be described 
as a form of community based on repressive integration. As previously 
suggested in this context, the welfare state achieved its real prominence 
as an instrument both for making labor power fully accessible to the 
market and for enabling its flexibilization. Its construction was one of 
the indispensable preconditions for the individualizing or atomizing 
of universal social welfare provisions and for the suppression of 
precapitalist forms of reproduction resting on traditional family-
based self-sufficiency. Without this protection against the routine 
dangers that constitute the existence of those who must sell their own 
labor power, people would hardly have been disposed to enter quite so 
willingly into this mode of existence.
In light of  the crisis in Fordist labor society, more and more 
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superfluous human material — superfluous in the capitalist sense, 
that is — falls under the jurisdiction of the welfare state. Yet with the 
change in its clientele, the respective functions of the welfare state’s 
integrative and disciplinary mechanisms within the system of capitalist 
valorization begin to diverge. The welfare state’s social safeguards, 
until now considered to be part of future as well as the current costs 
of enabling the productive exploitation of labor power, threaten to 
become, from the standpoint of capitalism as a whole, yet another of 
those notorious “misallocated resources.” From the perspective of the 
local communities that begin to take the place of the national economy, 
the constant investment of scarce monetary resources in people from 
whom any corresponding return is scarcely to be expected is a “luxury.” 
The “generosity” with which those “let go” were carried over until 
being rehired — under the premise that their having been let go was 
simply the temporarily conferred status of being a potential labor and 
commodity subject honoris causa — loses its material basis. The welfare 
state mutates into an authority in charge of selection and exclusion, one 
that must make the cut between valorizable and unvalorizable human 
material. If the logic of commodity society is thought through to its 
bitter end, there remains for the latter of these two types of human 
material only existence as a monetary subject without money.
The creation of fictitious capital provided the dynamic mechanism 
necessary to manage and carry forward the underlying crisis of post-
Fordist labor society in the 1980s and 1990s. Anticipating the profitable 
utilization of future labor served as the substitute fuel for the flagging 
exploitation of actual, present-tense labor and kept the valorization 
machine running and, in appearance, moving forward. The hopes 
of casino capitalism found their material basis first and foremost in 
the new communications technologies. In this field, a new, additional 
gigantic infrastructure emerged which was supposed to generate 
provides for the private economic sphere.
The crash of the New Economy, however, delivered its verdict on 
the above, in double form. Firstly, that, over time, the trick of burning 
unmined coal comes to nothing. Secondly, that the attempt to turn 
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the investment of  substantial sums in the new communications 
infrastructure into the gold of saleable commodities has strict limits. 
But of course the disaster did not herald the end of efforts to privatize 
the infrastructure. Prompted by the precarious financial conditions 
of state-held assets, what changed was more a matter of shifting the 
focus of the enterprise. In place of the capitalizing of unsecured future 
expected earnings, attention turned increasingly to another means of 
reheating the economy, less ephemeral than “unmined coal.” What 
had been the state-owned and state-supplied general, material means 
required for all present and future social reproduction were now 
primed to be transformed into robustly profitable commodities. And 
it is the latter that now suddenly offer themselves up as combustible 
material ready to be thrown into the open maws of the profit engines, 
while whatever refuses to let go of its combustion value is ballast to be 
thrown overboard.
Our own present-day capitalism effaces the difference between the 
infrastructural preconditions of commodity production and commodity 
production tout court. This variant of capitalist accumulation models 
itself on a scene straight out of Jules Verne’s Around the World in Eighty 
Days. The steamer that is to take the hero Phileas Fogg across the 
Atlantic and back to England runs out of coal too early. Fogg thereupon 
convinces the captain and crew to burn the ship itself piece by piece so 
that the boiler can keep up a head of steam.
What consequences does the adoption of Fogg’s method have for 
commodity society?
The argument as it has been developed above already gives us the 
answer in its fullest and most fundamental sense: the commodity 
represents nothing other than the paradox of asocial sociality. In order 
that, despite this inner contradiction, the general social parameters 
that are the precondition of commodity society can be rendered secure, 
a secondary, state-organized form of wealth must take up its place 
alongside commodity production. But when the state’s contribution 
to wealth production is converted into commodities, they lose the 
safeguard provided by the state. Here the advance of the commodity 
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pushes society rapidly towards its own dissolution. The exclusion of 
those whose labor power can no longer be valorized, the dismantling 
of the social safety net so as gradually to turn over all responsibility 
for provision of care to the market — all this proves itself upon closer 
examination to consist of partial moments in a much more sweeping 
and generalized process of desocialization.
What the details of such desocialization turn out to be after a given 
time is dependent on the specific state-organized social programs and 
services, responsibility for which is currently being turned over to 
the market. But when it is a question of the most basic and universal 
infrastructural operations, such as transportation, electrical utilities, 
the water supply, the mail, and, above all, the further question of 
the infrastructural goods and services produced by such operations, 
a problem arises. Pure market relations are not universal but 
particular relations between the two separate parties to an exchange. 
The commodity seller never enters into relation with the entirety 
of all exchange partners, but rather only into as many profitable 
individual relationships as possible. But such relations collide with 
the comprehensive and generalized character of  infrastructure. 
Privatization leads unavoidably to cherry-picking and concentration 
of the supply of goods within core areas of profitability. Economic logic 
cannot resist neglecting or shutting down lines of production that 
either do not pay or do so only conditionally. Coupling the privatization 
of infrastructure with legally stipulated commitments to provide 
basic care leads, under the banner of cost optimization, to a constant 
tendency to bid down to nothing the very meaning of basic care and 
social welfare.
For a functioning infrastructure, reliability of supply is worth 
a great deal. Such reliability is tied to reserves. The mechanism of 
valorization as a whole is dependent on the fact that, in the case of 
electrical, water, and communications infrastructure, potential can 
be distinguished from actually existing capacity. Maintaining such a 
difference, however, is a direct slap in the face for economic logic. This 
logic knows and wants to know only the commandment of minimizing 
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the cost of each individual commodity. Profit maximization implies 
the minimization of the difference between the potential and actual 
efficiency of infrastructural systems. But that necessarily leads to a 
lack of flexibility during the fluctuations and disruptions affecting 
such systems. Where the market forces its logic onto infrastructure, 
periodic collapses are as good as preprogrammed. In this regard, 
the power outages in the United States during the summer of 2003, 
for example, demonstrated quite clearly the social price exacted by 
the private sector’s drive to minimize costs when this drive invades 
infrastructural enterprises.
Using the services provided by public infrastructure has also 
involved and in most cases continues to involve a cost. Anyone 
who has water and electricity provided at home or who uses public 
transportation still has to pay when a public company provides these 
products and services. The obligation to pay here takes the form of a fee. 
If the same infrastructure is turned over to the market, the monetary 
relationship changes, and a price takes the place of the fee. What 
changes as a result? In the eyes of a public company that is a contractual 
supplier, all whom it supplies are equal. In principle, the fee does not 
recognize any difference between bigger and smaller consumers and 
it is usually constant over a longer time period. Things look different 
when there is a price. The latter, in principle, prefers bigger customers 
and shows significant fluctuations.
Privatization was and is sold to the public as a way of getting rid 
of bureaucracy. Competition and a profit-seeking outlook ostensibly 
ensure that the most customer-friendly companies with the most 
attractive level of service will ultimately prevail in the marketplace. 
Instead, competition between privatized infrastructure providers after 
the elimination of state monopolies is the guarantee of a hopeless tangle 
and confusion concerning what is for sale and what it costs. Buying 
infrastructural goods and services becomes a full-time job for those 
really interested in finding the best price. The outsourcing of various 
subdivisions of problem solving and compliance to subcontractors 
creates confusion about administrative responsibility that in 
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retrospect makes the earlier pedantic state operation look like a refuge 
of transparency and efficiency — a transition that also occasionally 
involves life-threatening risks for its new clientele.
The commodification process also seizes hold of health insurance 
and old-age pensions. In answer to the financial plight inflicted upon 
such basic social security programs by the crisis of post-Fordist labor 
society the slogan of the day has become: “personal responsibility.” 
Translation: turn over responsibility for your fate to market forces. 
What are the consequences of this shifting of responsibility? Two are 
immediately obvious. First: if what was formerly financed out of the 
employer’s share of payroll deductions and other taxes is now to be 
paid out of an individual worker’s wages, the costs of reproducing labor 
power as a commodity will, on average, go up. Second: many people are 
in no actual position to undertake these additional expenditures. For 
the younger generation in particular, the level of public provision for 
basic needs and of accumulated pension benefits sinks dramatically. 
Not only unemployment but the other two routine dangers in the 
typical experience of all who must sell their own labor power, old age 
and illness, repeat the same story: poverty.
That the advance of the market into the sphere of welfare benefits 
makes it harder for more and more people to have any share in them is 
a fact due mainly to successive changes in the mode of access to such 
benefits. The establishment of the welfare state meant the partial 
decoupling of the individual beneficiary’s level of contribution from 
the general provision of benefits and, at the same time, the grouping 
together of insured individuals with different degrees of risk into 
what were, for monetary purposes, forms of association based on 
shared liability. Precisely these two aspects of the welfare state’s 
celebrated forms of communities of solidarity were done away with 
by the accelerating intervention of market forces. The latter led, in 
the first instance, to the inevitable practice of sorting good from bad 
levels of risk. It became obligatory for those with a higher individual 
probability of claiming an insurance benefit to pay for the latter with 
higher individual premiums. Add to this the fact that the principle 
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of equivalence itself disallows the practice of extending the same 
insurance benefit in exchange for differing premiums. Social security 
policies financed through worker and employer contributions were 
of the greatest benefit to those at lower income levels. The privileged 
treatment once accorded to the latter falls victim to the onslaught of 
the principle of equivalence.
This systemic change comes to light most noticeably in the 
health insurance service.In the competition between public, legally 
instituted and private health insurers, two opposed interpretations of 
equality confront each other. Public health insurance providers stand 
for the principle of equal access for all insured persons. “Personal 
responsibility,” as the new slogan for private insurers in the medical 
field, advances the sacred principle of equivalence in its quest to 
achieve legitimacy. Health mutates from a universally accessible good to 
a commodity that one must be able to afford. The trend towards cutting 
people off from health care may trigger some amount of outrage; but 
all the while the underlying logic of such a trend can even become 
a kind of advertising slogan in places like this. (Delusional systems 
are always consistent.) At any rate, not so long ago a major German 
insurance company advertised with the following slogan: “It’s all the 
same to a tooth-decay bacterium how much you earn. The same goes 
for a supplementary health insurance policy from Allianz.” 
Part Two: Fightback
What distinguishes present-day capitalism is the split between 
sensory-material and monetary forms of wealth. For commodity 
society, moreover, it is only insofar as wealth attains representational 
form as abstract labor that it has a right to existence. And yet this 
transformation itself becomes more and more problematic. Market 
radicalism is at the same time both an ideological reflex of and a form of 
processing this deep-seated, inescapable, and systemic contradiction. 
Yet with its widely implemented programs of commodification and 
deregulation, such market radicalism still cannot confront the fact 
that the general requirements of commodity production can now be 
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organized only at the cost of social disruptions even more severe than 
the harsh demands made by contemporary commodity production 
itself. Capitalism had, with good reason, always assigned the task of 
such organization to the state as total capitalist. The market-radical 
concept is, by comparison, sheer hallucination when it comes to 
perceiving the difference — thinking again here of Phileas Fogg — 
between the engine itself and the fuel that it burns: for it makes what is 
tantamount to the structural attempt to keep the ship that is commodity 
society under steam a while longer through successive acts of self-
combustion.
Market-Radical Ideology and Capital’s Systemic Imperative
Throughout the entire history of capitalism, the ideas that have won out 
and gained decisive influence in conflicts over ideological orientation 
have been those that, after their own fashion, best reflected the overall 
logic of the system and the historically most advanced level of internal 
contradictions achieved by capitalist society at any given moment of 
its development. As forms of fetishized awareness, however, such 
dominant ideas were never simply the translation of real-time systemic 
imperatives onto the level of functional immediacy. No given political 
tendency or world view is ever exhausted in a set of purely executive 
functions. The same applies to the presently dominant “free market” 
and “every-man-for-himself ” ideological frenzies. Those who proclaim 
the latter have, ironically, become today’s most enthusiastic imitators 
of paleo-Marxism’s erstwhile historical teleology: just as the Second 
International’s adherents believed they had the iron necessity of history 
to back them up, so today’s market radicals speak in swaggering tones of 
“unavoidable constraints” as they implement programs for dismantling 
the state. 
Such self-understanding, however, soon becomes a diversion from 
what actually supplies the electrical charge for market radicalism’s 
ideological circuitry. The “free market” and “every-man-for-himself ” 
mania reveals itself most unmistakably, as do all ideologies, in its 
moments of excess, of overshooting the mark. Yet, as the present epoch’s 
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salvational religion, market radicalism takes on, over and above this, 
and in the worst possible sense, a visionary and utopian character that 
accesses reality as a whole, as though making a package deal of itself in 
both an ideal and a no less real sense. (In its claim to being a program 
for world transformation, market radicalism has almost cast itself as 
the rightful heir to socialism itself.) The market radicals are not mere 
crisis administrators. The nature of their ideology, combining social 
Darwinism with a work ethic so severe as to be a kind of terrorism, 
drives its own adherents towards its overfulfillment and hence to a 
completely one-sided but thereby, ironically, also a highly coherent 
understanding of contemporary capitalism’s systemic imperatives. 
Herein consists both the strength and the weakness of  the 
market-radical project. On one hand, in its contempt for reality, 
market radicalism, more than almost any of the projects for world 
transformation that have preceded it, refuses to swerve from a path 
of completely foreseeable damage and destruction. Forcing its way 
through social reality, the steamroller of the market radicals’ drive for 
world betterment leaves behind it one heap of rubble after another. 
Market radicalism’s ideological overhaul of all that precedes it, however, 
thereby continuously brings into existence new flanks of attack and 
social battlefields. Not only does the project of social self-combustion 
as a whole show itself, even from capital’s own immanent standpoint, 
to be made up of (to put it mildly) dysfunctional traits; the same can 
be said of all its individual undertakings as well. 
On the other hand, the total and merciless identification with the 
pure logic of money positions the market radicals, as the only force still 
occupying the generalized ground of commodity society, as thereby 
also the only such force able both to provide a coherent interpretation 
of and perspective on the world — and the only force from which any 
claim to universality can be expected. (Racist ideologies, by contrast, 
relinquish such claims to universality.) In view of this capacity, the 
transitions toward outright sacrifice demanded by market radicalism’s 
new doctrine of salvation, having formerly entered into competition 
with neo-Keynesian concepts of crisis management, turn into what is 
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almost an argument in their own favor. For whatever does not at present 
cause any harm, can in the long run — so the market-radical logic will 
have it — be of no real help. With market radicalism an ideology comes 
into play in which, out of their own sheer, abject need, open machine-
gunnings and summary executions can be sold to the slain as collateral 
damage that they themselves have, perforce, already accepted out of 
what appears to be well-understood, long-term self-interest.
This peculiar dialectic does not show the way to its own, immanent 
breakup. To oppose it and to occupy, in an emancipatory spirit, the 
many separate fields of conflict that it opens up, demands a counter-
positioning that, for its part, also draws on a universal standpoint, and 
does so in a manner that sets forth a fundamental critique of the system.
There is no successful resistance without a vision with which to 
counter “free market” madness.
Commodity society makes all people into commodity and money 
subjects without distinction. Correspondingly, so as to wrestle over a 
larger share of social wealth while still resting on the ground of the 
existing order, all emancipatory currents had to transform themselves 
into or merge with existing mechanisms for asserting and enforcing 
banal, competitive self-interests. Striving to let go of their commodity 
only under the best possible conditions puts the vendors of the labor-
power commodity in league with all other categories of commodity 
owners. In the struggle over social distribution, a recipient of social 
security payments is, after all, no less enamored of his money than 
is any given capitalist. And yet, the history of capitalism has, strictly 
speaking, yet to see a single struggle for improved living conditions 
that could be reduced to nothing more than the mere putting into effect 
of vulgar, competitively driven self-interests. The accomplishment 
of even the most modest collective achievements always presupposes 
a partial suspension of  competition within capitalism’s “human 
resources.” All the social struggles arising from within the dominant 
competitive society have survived by forming an image of themselves 
in opposition to such a society, however vague it may have been. Yet 
with the fading of these counter-images they have also lost their 
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vehement edge, and, far and wide, what was once their oppositionality 
loses all force. 
In the age of the workers’ movement, the idea of the expropriation 
of the expropriators — that is, the vision of seizing the great machine 
of labor and submitting it to the solidarity-based rule of the proletariat 
— served as a source of power. Yet, with the passing of that age, 
its corresponding image of another, different society has become 
profoundly exhausted. The discontent that has greeted the general 
offensive of market radicalism cannot transform itself into a new 
emancipatory countermovement until a new, more far-reaching dream 
takes the place of the one that has faded. The process of forming new 
solidarities requires that the thought of the direct appropriation of 
social wealth and of its productive powers becomes, itself, socially 
contagious. The labor and valorization machine monopolizes all 
resources for itself while at the same time finding less and less use 
for the resources of human capital, with the result that even in the 
metropolitan centers the more or less tolerable conditions of servitude 
cannot be scraped together. The adequate emancipatory response to 
this situation can only be the desire to dismantle the labor machine 
that is suffocating on its own abundance of goods. Only the counter-
image arising from the radical critique of commodity society from 
the ground up will allow for an offensive redrawing of the social 
battle lines. If both the market and the mechanical demiurge of the 
state declare that the majority of people are superfluous, do they 
demonstrate anything other than their own superfluity? Society 
must free itself from the structural compulsion to reduce all wealth to 
commodity wealth and all social relations to juridical and commodity 
relations. For the production of goods this means the transition to a 
direct social reproduction oriented solely toward criteria of sensuous 
need, a reproduction that functions without the detours of money 
and state.
Needless to say, the counter-perspective cannot be translated into 
a mere program of ad hoc appropriation. It aims rather at profound 
and correspondingly long-term processes of radical upheaval. Without 
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such a far-reaching outlook and sense of direction, however, the 
opponents of market radicalism not only remain at a disadvantage, but 
are also condemned to being worn out in blindly defensive skirmishes.
A Priori Obedience and the Paradigm of Financial Feasibility
In this respect, the current situation actually speaks a completely 
unambiguous language. The initial phase of grandiose neoliberal 
euphoria and optimism dating back to the 1980s and early 1990s has 
subsided.4 However, despite — or rather, precisely because of — the 
crisis of casino capitalism, all the predominant social forces reveal 
themselves to be more committed than ever to the market-radical 
program. The world over, commodification and privatization are the 
absolute watchwords and demands of the hour. In order that growth 
and employment become possible again, the market and personal 
responsibility must finally replace the state’s duty to provide across-
the-board care, so it is claimed everywhere. The implementation of 
this program leaves in its wake a broad swathe of social devastation 
and provokes resistance and protests. Indeed, in a few countries, the 
waves of new atrocities are already bringing millions of people onto the 
streets. And yet the opponents of market-radical rampages remain at a 
disadvantage in the social array of conflicting forces, and, in the battle 
for public opinion, hopelessly positioned on the defensive — and this 
remains so the world over.
The fundamental premises of what now passes as social criticism 
also bear a decisive share of the responsibility for this intolerable 
situation. Drawing on what are essentially the nostalgic reminiscences 
of Fordist capitalism under the protection of the welfare state, the 
opponents of market radicalism assume as self-evident what also 
holds as self-evident for the market radicals: social reproduction can 
only ever be the waste product of successful valorization on all levels 
of society and of the accumulation of monetary wealth. And sharing 
just as much in the dominant market-radical consensus, market 
radicalism’s opponents also treat monetary wealth and material wealth 
as coextensive. But whoever operates with these axioms performs, 
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against his own intention, a premature act of obedience to the deadly 
logic of commodity society. Neo-Keynesian arguments stubbornly 
repeat this, as if only the proof that capitalist growth could be attained 
in some other manner, with many fewer victims, could legitimate 
opposition to market-radical rampages. By supposing that the problem 
of “but where are we going to find the money?” can in fact be solved by 
the application of its concepts, neo-Keynesianism has already allowed 
itself  to be knocked out of the ring by market radicalism, whose 
arguments it has already conceded as the criterion of all criteria, thus 
also acknowledging the overall primacy of the logic of money and 
profit. It is thus always already on the road to defeat. In the struggle 
between what are essentially competing hallucinatory systems, the 
market radicals, in keeping both feet planted on the ground of this 
logic, will always hold the winning cards.
Commodity society is faced with two tasks that are increasingly 
irreconcilable with one another. As a system, it is compelled to 
translate all wealth into its accumulable, monetary form. At the 
same time, it must face the necessity for preserving the capacity for 
social reproduction and must prevent any relapse into a situation 
of lawlessness and anomie. The opposition is ill-advised to deny the 
structural irreconcilability of the former with the latter simply in order 
to uphold some putatively alternative formula for valorizing the total 
social capital in opposition to that of the market radicals. Instead of 
wasting energy on trying to pass off dubious monetary concepts as 
plausible, whether to themselves or to its exalted public, the opposition 
would be better off concentrating on questions of sensuous-material 
(as opposed to abstract monetary) wealth, along with the very capacity 
for social reproduction, and making these questions, which have been 
stricken from the public record by the market radicals under the 
aegis of a new social Darwinism, the central locus of debate. Whoever 
consistently works out the direct and indirect costs of market-radical 
spending cuts and denounces merciless, unrelenting commodification 
as a program for social suicide is surely under no compulsion to turn 
around and argue for a form of resistance to such cuts that is obliged 
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to remain compatible with the system of self-valorizing value. The 
question of legitimacy ought rather to be addressed offensively from 
the outset. If the present-day capitalist order no longer intends to 
provide for social reproduction, what possible reason could there be 
for kowtowing before its logic?
Unlearning the four basic arithmetic operations out of respect 
for the sacred cow of money is not — what a surprise — the starting 
point of emancipatory thought, nor is fantasizing that one is the greater 
expert at manning the control panel of capitalism’s total business 
operations. When confronted with the paradigm of financial feasibility 
(“but where are we going to find the money?”) as the criterion of all 
criteria, emancipatory thinking begins by hitting the delete key. That 
social security and the general preservation of the preconditions of 
social reproduction itself should have ceased to be affordable can only 
become an argument against, say, medical care and public education 
in the lunatic world of market radicalism. What can be said of the 
notion that public infrastructure and the life prospects of millions of 
people must be sacrificed for the sake of a desperate attempt to balance 
state budgets? Only that it is madness, deserving only aggressive and 
purposeful incomprehension. Submitting such basic social needs to 
monetary calculation is tantamount to social suicide and speaks only 
to the need to uproot the social psychosis embedded in such grotesque 
procedures.
When the question of what (according to market radicalism) is and 
is not affordable is viewed in terms of its systematic function instead of 
being taken at its word, it becomes clear that it is designed to exclude all 
others, and has always already answered itself in the negative. The only 
thing that can stand up to such an over-the-top ideology is a relentless 
negativity ready to go double or nothing, staking everything by making 
the problem of wealth in its sensuous-material form — and of the social 
and cultural relationships that mediate sensuous-material wealth — 
into its single crucial and pivotal question. It must do this in such a 
way as, so to speak, to remain demonstratively ambivalent towards 
the imperatives of the existing system, going, ab initio, beyond the 
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significance they have been accorded by commodity society. It is only 
under the conditions of crisis capitalism that the fundamental struggle 
over the question of what is actually comprehended within the category 
of wealth opens up a direct passage to a fully emancipatory formulation 
of social conflict.
The Struggle Over the Assets of a Bankrupt State
In commodity society only a single criterion separates those activities 
and goods that are a part of social wealth from those that are not 
recognized as such — that of their saleability. If paying customers are 
found for poison gas, its production is counted as part of social wealth; 
unpaid childcare, in contrast, is not. As set forth in the first part of this 
essay, there is only one way that commodity society can circumvent 
this structural blindness and ensure that the general conditions of 
social reproduction — indispensable, at least, for its own successful 
xoperation — are subsequently met: through the intervention of 
state power. The market-radical project has now trained its gunsights 
on precisely this restricted form of taking sensuous-material needs 
into consideration. On one hand, the barriers previously erected by 
state authorities against the destructive consequences of unregulated 
competition (environmental legislation, working conditions, regulating 
the hours of commercial operation) are supposed to disappear. On the 
other hand, with its demand for restrictions on expenditure and for 
universal commodification, the business of deregulation targets the 
redistributive power of the state, insofar as the latter, in the guise 
of the welfare state, attempts retrospectively to temper the results 
of total competition. Any opposition that posits a material-sensuous 
redefinition of social wealth and its corresponding forms of social 
relations against the dictatorship of abstract monetary  wealth can only 
be formed in frontal opposition to this development. It cannot avoid 
intervening in the conflict over the power of the state to redistribute 
wealth, nor can it shy away from raising, in opposition to the market-
radical proposal for focusing all state spending on sectors immediately 
relevant to valorization, demands of its own that run counter to the 
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savaging of social needs imposed by the demands of the market. As long 
as the bulk of social wealth is forced through the needle’s eye of money, 
these demands must also, inevitably, take on monetary form as well.
This could at first glance appear as a departure from the basic 
orientation just set forth for a fundamental critique of money and the 
state. But a second glance already shows that this is no longer the case. 
While reformist policies want to take and restore the decomposing 
state role of the machine operator as an ineluctable social norm, an 
oppositional movement that struggles for the redefinition of social 
wealth takes the redistributive power of the state merely as a de facto 
starting point. The “no” to market radicalism does not imply a “yes” to 
the glory of the state — in the long term, the struggle is much more 
concerned with its assets. Will those aspects of public infrastructure 
that were built up over 150 years be burned down by the market 
economy in a very short time, or will it be possible to keep out of the 
oven of valorization the moments of state infrastructure that are worth 
saving so that a social movement of appropriation can successively 
occupy and renovate them and then organize them anew, divorced 
from the function of the machine operator?
What Does Sustainable Mean?
For the time being, public discussion is constrained by the terms 
of the well-known (or infamous) paradigm of financial feasibility. 
Emancipatory thought can only confront the poverty of the state 
finances with offensive ambivalence and insist on the primacy of other 
criteria.
The struggle over the question of financial feasibility can also be 
understood as a fight over the meaning of the concept of sustainability. 
In the 1970s it was once said that those currently alive were abusing the 
future of the generations to come. What was meant was the destruction 
of the ecological foundations. Today, the demand “don’t squander our 
children’s future” does nothing more than legitimate restrictive fiscal 
policy. The demand is that current social wealth, guaranteed by the 
state, be sacrificed on the altar of a fictitious monetary future. High 
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time to direct the focus of the concept of the future back on sensuous-
material questions, only this time conceived more broadly.
The refusal to recognize the question of financial feasibility as the 
question of all questions certainly ought not to be confused with the 
plea for an absolute increase in state spending, and has nothing to do 
with any sort of orientation toward demand. This difference is already 
important insofar as the state that has been calibrated on competition 
between locations is even in times of crisis by no means fundamentally 
sworn to a restrictive overall fiscal policy, at least not in the centers of 
the world market. This is significant not only for the distant future, 
but also for the struggles of the coming years. In practical terms, the 
transition to an excessive, market-Keynesian deficit policy, also on 
the foundation of market radicalism, is already looming (in Europe) 
or has even already been implemented (in the United States). This, 
however, implies a change, sooner or later, including with respect to the 
struggle for public opinion. It is possible that soon the debate in credit-
worthy states will be less concerned with whether large-scale public 
borrowing should be pursued, but rather to what end, and to what end 
the monetary means should be directed. Should the still-enormous 
redistributive state power in the metropolises be concentrated on 
areas of expenditure that are held to be relevant for the renewal of the 
illusions of capitalist growth? Are these societies willing to accept the 
huge advance costs of elite universities and futureless future industries 
at a time when the remaining social infrastructure is neglected?
The left-wing neo-Keynesian politics of demand does not have at 
its disposal any theoretically justifiable criterion for distinguishing 
between good and bad state expenditure. In the Keynesian framework it 
makes no difference, as far as growth promotion is concerned, whether 
the state supports demand by means of the senseless digging and filling-
in of holes, increased military expenditure, or social good deeds.5 In a 
situation in which the opposition also changes its opinion with respect 
to demand-policies under different auspices, left-wing Keynesianism 
necessarily begins to lose control with respect to its argumentation. 
At the same time, it falls into an ideal relationship of mutual liability 
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with its opponent with respect to the foreseeable consequences of such 
a turn (processes of devaluation, which effect the medium of money 
itself ). In contrast, emancipatory thought, which from the outset 
shifts material-sensuous questions to the center rather than treating 
material and immaterial goods as fundamentally exchangeable bearers 
of precarious growth effects, loses none of its capacity to formulate 
social conflict. Both the market-Keynesianism of tomorrow and the 
constellation of the day after tomorrow, which will probably also be 
essentially characterized by inflationary processes, are from the outset 
tailor-made for this form of critique.
Against the Standpoint State
State violence exerts a varying influence on the beautiful world of 
competition between commodity owners, and thus on total social 
reproduction, in three ways. First, as the state of command and 
proscription it prevents, to an extent, individualist capitalist agents 
from, in accordance with the logic of externalization of economic cost, 
summarily running workers and natural resources without regard 
to future cost. This it accomplishes through universal conditions and 
regulations such as environmental legislation and worker protection. 
At the same time it restricts the actors of particular commodity 
markets (drugs, weapons) via juridical means and prevents their 
free-market economic development. Secondly, the welfare state 
as redistribution guarantees revenue to replace and supplement 
earned income for groups of people defined according to particular 
biographical circumstances.6 Thirdly, and finally, state authorities or 
state-financed institutions appear as producers of infrastructural goods 
(transportation networks and educational institutions).
In its polemic against these three variants of state intervention, 
market radicalism advances an extremely monotonous logic. Nothing 
has ever occurred to the hardcore theory of neoliberalism but the 
abolition of bureaucratic barriers and relentlessly delivering both 
infrastructure and the guarantee of livelihood over to the market. 
Market-radical practice, however, proceeds in a more nuanced manner. 
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It accepts, as a rule, that the prevention of public blood and thunder 
requires certain restrictions to market freedom, even if the perceptions 
of what measures are necessary for this vary from country to country.7 
Wherever state intervention in regional competition leads directly to 
an advantage, it is in case of doubt not only permitted, but even eagerly 
desired.
Even the emancipatory camp can, however, make selective reference 
to the previous function of the state. But the criteria according to 
which it will prioritize infrastructure tasks may diametrically oppose 
the choices at which the apologists for the market economy arrive in 
their refrain that “we are strengthening our competitive position.” 
While the market radicals back massive support for elite universities, 
an emancipatory position will instead discover what is worthy of 
preservation in the idea of universal education. The market radicals 
forward the case for unconditional competition between all transport 
systems. Appropriate to this is the state-subsidized development of 
unmanned, energy- and land-monopolizing bullet trains, which would 
enter into competition with airplanes, and like them would be confined 
to links between large cities. From an emancipatory perspective it 
seems more desirable to guarantee a comparatively environmentally 
friendly and above all comprehensive rail system that could thus be 
used as an alternative to private transport.
Sensuous-Material Criteria and the Monotony of Money
Commodity society disposes over an absolute means of judging the 
justification for the two branches of the production of material wealth: 
their economic profitability. The market-radicals want to see this naïve 
yardstick deployed with respect to all infrastructural goods, even if 
this means that their comprehensive character and the assurance of 
supply is destroyed. The necessity of a facility can be derived from the 
magnitude of the yield.
A society oriented toward sensuous, material, and social needs 
would not recognize such an unambiguous, objectified standard. This 
is all the more the case for social movements which are formed in 
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the confrontation with the insanity of commodity society. A certain 
provisional hierarchy might even distill itself out since completely 
different successes in mobilization will emerge from the struggle over 
a way of securing the production of wealth, which is not subjugated 
to the diktat of profitability. Priorities are de facto established when 
people show themselves either willing to commit themselves and build 
up social pressure together, or to let things be.
Admittedly, an abstractly more universal measure must be 
lacking with respect to needs, so the forms of production for which 
an oppositional movement of appropriation is heading cannot be 
reduced to a simple common denominator. A liberated society does not 
subordinate the organization of the production of wealth to any binding 
counter-principle for the sake of minimizing economic costs. Rather, it 
sounds out how differing aims (minimal use of resources, stimulating 
and low-stress conditions for the immediate producers, long-lasting 
final product) can best be aligned in different sectors of (re)production. 
A transcontinental transport network cannot be organized by the same 
method as local vegetable production or a cultural organization. It is 
ultimately the specific insanity of our current society that establishes 
enforced conformity as it subordinates all areas under the logic of 
money.
Sensuous-material differences are inevitably also expressed 
in struggle over the configuration of the production of wealth. It 
will be difficult to transfer an extended, highly complex system of 
infrastructure (electricity provision, transport networks) from its 
current state into self-organization. A social movement that opposes 
the insanity of the market will tend, particularly when it comes to the 
infrastructural services that have traditionally been organized as an 
activity of the state, to be content initially to make demands, while in 
other areas (the production of knowledge) it is already showing what 
it is capable of.8 A form of state activity that, under compulsion from 
anti-political pressure, does not conform to competitive logic inevitably 
has a shimmering character. Dependent on the monetary power of 
the state, it remains reliant on the business of commodity society in 
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its mobilization of resources. At the same time, anti-political pressure 
wants to compel the state, as a producer of wealth, to guarantee the 
security of particular public-universal goods independently of its role 
as machine operator.
Principle of Equivalence versus Free Access
It would be absurd for a social movement oriented toward sensuous-
material criteria to aspire to a unified form of the production of wealth. 
However, with respect to the mode of access, things look somewhat 
different. Commodity society binds every share in social wealth to the 
principle of the exchange of equivalents. A horizontal movement of 
appropriation must thus raise in opposition the demand for free access.
Of course, the prospects of implementing this principle in the 
foreseeable future vary considerably from commodity to commodity. 
Defense is fundamentally easier than offense. Saving services which the 
state traditionally offers at no cost (free provision of textbooks, public 
streets) from commodification is one thing, the decommodification of 
things such as electricity, gas, or public transport quite another.
A social movement will, in resisting the market-radical ideal of 
the universal exchange of equivalents, have to content itself again 
and again with partial successes, and also for the time being to accept 
less-exclusionary forms of monetary access. Between the alternatives 
of “unaffordable for the majority” and “freely accessible” are many 
intermediate steps. A health-care system with income-dependent 
payments but comprehensive treatment provided to the same extent 
for everybody is certainly more desirable than the truncated insurance 
propagated by the neoliberals.
The advocates of free access certainly have on their side an argument 
that is particularly attractive because it borrows from neoliberal 
discourse: the rejection of bureaucracy. Nothing is as unbureaucratic 
and as good value to society as free access to social goods. No fences, 
no tollbooths. Nothing is as unclear and overcomplicated as highly 
individualized charges. Above all, the attempt to reintroduce a social 
element into an insurance system that has been restructured in the 
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direction of the idiocy of equivalence leads to situations which make 
the old actually existing socialism seem in comparison a stronghold 
of rationality.
The orientation toward free access by no means leads to an idea of 
self-service which would blindly accept capitalist wealth in its material 
structure. The question as to what sort of production can be considered 
desirable in the first place must be discussed in strict separation from 
the conditions of access. After the automobilization of society, there 
are good reasons to introduce an de-automobilization. However, an 
emancipatory perspective can have nothing to do with the drive to 
maintain private transport as the preserve of better earners while the 
socially weak are made to walk or to get on their bike. If countries such 
as China or India were to catch up with the degree of motorization in the 
United States, it would without doubt have catastrophic consequences 
for the environment. But this is only an argument against automobile 
society as a whole, and not for the exclusion from it of these parts of 
the world. The acutely justified critique of high-tech medicine in no 
way legitimates the curtailment of medical services. The content of 
social standards must be investigated and determined anew. But from 
an emancipatory perspective, standards must always be universally 
accessible.
Decommodification and Guaranteed Income
Our point of  departure was that contemporary capitalism is 
characterized by the divergence of sensuous-material and monetary 
wealth. In the face of this irreversible development, an emancipatory 
perspective on society as a whole can now only consist in the gradual 
decommodification and demonetarization of social relationships, and 
in the transition to a production of wealth that is directly socialized and 
that follows only sensuous-material criteria. The problem of scarcity 
disappears along with the needle’s eye of money and exchange.
As a perspective on society as a whole, demonetarization and 
decommodification promise the transition to a rich society and the 
end of misery and poverty. However, whoever is struck individually 
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by the fate of decommodification and demonetarization on the basis of 
existing society will have to deal not with a happy fate but rather with 
a palpable catastrophe. Anyone whose labor power is decommodified 
— that is, who sits on the couch unsaleably and does not find another 
source of money — is not rich, but markedly poor. A movement of 
emancipation cannot avoid taking this situation into account. As far as 
the production of wealth is concerned, an emancipatory perspective 
must protect social wealth from commodification and monetarization, 
and to decommodify and demonetarize commodified and monetarized 
wealth. However, as long as a large proportion of social wealth takes on 
the structure of the commodity, it must of course focus its attention of 
the matter of how one can attain the necessary universal equivalent, 
alias money, even if one is in a state of decommodification. The offensive 
project of the decommodification of the production of social wealth 
cannot be thought without a parallel defensive undertaking that secures 
the money supply of those who are superfluous in the capitalist sense, 
and enables them to have sufficient access even to commodity wealth. 
The question of making ends meet only decouples from income to the 
extent that social wealth actually becomes freely accessible, and on this 
basis all struggles over monetary distribution become unnecessary.
Slum Egalitarianism
This defensive undertaking draws of course on the welfare state, at 
least in the metropolises. Put more accurately, it can only take shape 
through the formation of social movements against the attacks that are 
currently operating at full blast on the traditional compulsory social 
security system.
The welfare state came into the world as an instrument to make 
the commodity labor power available. While it protected owners 
of the commodity labor power from the day-to-day risks that are 
bound up with their lives as sellers of labor power, it at the same time 
committed them to this mode of existence by rewarding them with 
earned entitlements. The so-called reforms of the welfare state are 
directed against the use of a carrot. Legal entitlements to pensions and 
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other social security benefits are reduced as far as possible. The gradual 
expropriation of the rights purchased by the sale of labor power is 
accompanied by forms of providing for the poor that are organized 
along slum-egalitarian lines. These are divorced from the previous 
position of the claimant in labor society.
This shift in emphasis took place in recent years, first and foremost, 
automatically and insidiously, since, with the removal of other forms 
of social security, more and more people slipped down into the lowest 
social safety net, which had always been structured in this way. 
Meanwhile, however, and not only in Germany, what remains of the 
welfare state is increasingly being converted onto such institutions that 
provide the poor with a bare minimum (basic state pension, merging 
of unemployment benefit with welfare).
In spite of all assertions to the contrary, the transition to these slum-
egalitarian fallback systems indicates that the prospect of integrating 
the unvalorizable into regular wage labor has evaporated. However, 
with the change in model, the compulsion to the availability to work 
that is bound up with the system of social safeguards in no way dissolves 
into goodwill. Quite the opposite: the weaker the prospects of actual 
inclusion in labor society, the more rigid the obligation to simulate labor 
drills. Administrative violence replaces the carrot.
Forced Labor and Time Appropriation
Given the structural weakness of struggles in pursuit of interests that 
operate on the basis of labor, it is conceivable that at least in Germany 
the struggle against the logic of exclusion will in the future have to be 
pursued primarily in the context of slum-egalitarian mini-incomes. 
This compelled change of terrain, far-removed from the defense of 
earned entitlements, after a certain fashion even approaches a radical 
labor-critical position. There are two fields of conflict in particular 
that could potentially be suitable for a wide-ranging debate and 
mobilization. The first is the pure and simple matter of the question 
of the size of the planned minimal payments for the unvalorizable. 
This much is clear: there is no lower limit for the level of provision that 
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results from the logic of political economy itself. Marx was right to 
draw attention to the fact that the value of the commodity labor power 
also contains a moral moment. What commodity society concedes to 
the unvalorizable — whether it concedes anything at all — depends, 
in contrast, solely on this moral moment.
Secondly, the linking of a share in this minimal provision to the 
performance of ritual actions that replace labor provides a rich supply 
of material for conflict. The delegitimation of this insanity is urgently 
required and leads us back to the consideration with which we started, 
of the redefinition of social wealth. If Marx is correct to say that the 
true wealth of a society consists in the time it has available, then what 
is at stake here is nothing but a gigantic pursuit of the annihilation of 
wealth, at the compulsion of the state. The content and the precondition 
of the appropriation of sensuous-material wealth is the appropriation 
of the time of life.
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Notes
1. “Labor society” translates literally “Arbeitsgesellschaft”; that, however, 
has, so far as we know, no precise equivalent in English. The German here 
refers to a society constituted not only through the synthesizing nexus 
of value in the form of commodities and money but also in the form of 
abstract labor. In a “labor society” one works not only so as to exchange 
one’s own labor power for commodities and money but, by virtue of this, 
to produce and reproduce oneself as a member of said society. [Eds.] 
2. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, trans. Ben 
Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 1976) 125.
3. The term here translated as asocial sociality, ungesellschaftliche 
Gesellschaftlichkeit, is in the original German mistakenly attributed to 
Marx. The origin of the term is Kant’s ungesellige Geselligkeit, the social 
antagonism that consists in the fact that the human tendency to enter 
into society is permeated with resistances and oppositions, which at all 
times threaten to break this society apart, of the fourth thesis of the “Idea 
for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim.” This concept resonates 
with and finds echoes in a great deal of both Hegelian and Marxian 
social theory. For example: “Division of labour and exchange are the 
two phenomena which lead the political economist to boast of the social 
character of his science, while in the same breath he gives unconscious 
expression to the contradiction of his science — the motivation of society 
by unsocial, particular interests” (Marx-Engels Collected Works, Volume 3 
[Moscow: International Publishers, 1973] 321). It seems likely that this 
compatibility led to the attribution of the Kantian expression to Marx, 
and that in this process Kant’s idiom was transposed into the less archaic-
sounding formulation that would be more consistent with a Marxian 
quotation. [Eds.] 
4. Lohoff is writing well before the outbreak of the crisis that began in 2008. 
[Eds.]
5. Incidentally, I have not made up this example. It stems from Keynes, 
who was entirely candid in this respect. He preferred to explain the 
consequence of his demand-oriented model with reference to the example 
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of obviously futile labors. In his writings he shows a particular foible for 
the state construction of pyramids.
6. An example of a supplementary revenue would be a child benefit; under 
the rubric of replacement revenue fall welfare and the diverse social 
security payments.
7. Here I am thinking of the difference between the liberal American 
laws with respect to private gun ownership and their more restrictive 
equivalents in Europe.
8. Commodity society knows alarmingly little about the actual, 
material circumstances that it creates. Because they are organized 
as an appendage of the monetary flows, knowledge of material 
circumstances is widely strewn and always haphazard at points. 
A central task of this reorienting movement consists in the first 
instance of bringing light into the darkness. Such an investigation 
is not only important in order to reveal the insanity of this 
mode of production. It also provides an orientation for a later 
reorganization and also makes visible points at which the highly 
complex capitalism is vulnerable.
World Power and World Money:  
The Economic Function of the U.S. Military 
Machine within Global Capitalism and the 
Background of the New Financial Crisis
Robert Kurz (2008) 
When one encounters the term “epochal break” after 1989, it usually 
refers to the decline of the German Democratic Republic and the 
end of state socialism in Russia and Eastern Europe; it also names 
the end of the Cold War between competing political blocs and the 
termination of the corresponding “hot” proxy wars in backyards of 
the world market. The supposed victory of capitalism, according 
to freedom-lovers everywhere, together with a general commitment 
to the “market economy” and the constitution of a singular global 
economic system on the Western model, was interpreted as heralding 
a new era of disarmament, peace, and global prosperity. 
This expectation has proven to be completely naïve. Over the past 
seventeen years, reality has developed into the virtual opposite of 
that which such optimists by profession have wantonly forecast. 
Globalization has produced new zones of  mass poverty, aimless 
civil wars, and a postmodern, neoreligious form of terrorism that 
one cannot describe as anything but barbaric. The West, led by the 
last world power, the United States, has responded with equally 
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directionless “wars of world order” and precarious, planetary crisis 
management.
As has become obvious, the interpretation of the events following 
1989 was merely superficial and therefore grasped far too little. 
Indeed, the break was not actually isolated only to the Eastern bloc 
as a “flawed system,” but a similar fate befell more than a few pro-
Western countries in the so-called Third World. Moreover, even in 
the Western core countries the postwar “economic miracle” had 
vanished and growth rates had long been sinking. Structural mass 
unemployment that has nothing to do with mere labor-market friction 
has subsequently developed, accompanied by underemployment and 
the increasing precarity of labor.1
Focusing instead on these tendencies, a whole other interpretation 
might come to the fore: namely, that it is a common crisis of the modern 
system of global commodity production, which includes the centers of 
capitalism themselves. From this perspective, the so-called “actually 
existing socialism” of the Eastern bloc was not a historical alternative, 
but a state-capitalistic system of recuperative modernization on the 
periphery of the world markets, and an integral component of them. 
After 1989, with the end of all kinds of older development regimes, 
this “weakest link” of the global system was broken, continuing the 
inexorable crisis process of direct globalization.
Many consider (not incorrectly) the third industrial revolution 
of microelectronics to be the deepest cause of the new world crisis. 
For the first time in the history of  capitalism, the potential of 
rationalization has overtaken the possibilities of an expansion of the 
market. Through crisis competition, capital has melted away its own 
“labor substance” (Marx). The ugly underbelly of structural mass 
unemployment and underemployment on a global scale is the flight 
of capital toward the famous “financial bubble” economy, because 
additional real investment has become unprofitable; an index of this 
is the global excess capacity of production (exemplified by the auto 
industry) and speculative “takeover battles.”2
This roughly sketched interpretation was in the late 1990s 
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considered plausible and perhaps even possible within a segment 
of Leftist social critique. In the meantime, however, one has become 
accustomed to the fact that capital is somehow able to survive even 
with a simulated form of financial accumulation (“jobless growth”). 
And doesn’t the recent export industrialization in Asia, particularly in 
China, point to a new era of real growth — just no longer in Europe? At 
the same time, the wars of world order seem to have become reduced to 
trivial oil interests, because capitalism’s combustion culture is running 
out of fuel. Might these circumstances not suggest a new competition 
between imperialist blocs — for example, between the United States, 
the European Union, and China? With such considerations, the Left 
returns (with a few modifications) largely to those old ways of thinking 
that characterized the times predating the epochal break. There are, 
however, good reasons to think that such a reinterpretation provides 
us with a distorted picture and that determinations appear quite 
different upon closer inspection. The key here is the political-economic 
status of the last world power, the United States, in the global crisis 
of capitalism.
The Crisis of Money and the World Monetary System
The world crisis of the third industrial revolution and globalization 
of the past two decades rests upon a much longer, simmering crisis of 
money that dates back to World War I. Up to that point, the nature of 
money as a “singled-out commodity,” general equivalent with its own 
particular value substance, was virtually undisputed. The currencies of 
the major capitalist countries therefore had to be stabilized by means 
of gold reserves in central banks. Gold was the real world money — the 
lingua franca of world markets — and the sterling pound of former 
world power Great Britain could function as a world currency only 
because of its gold standard. However, the industrial war economies of 
the two world wars and the productive forces of the second industrial 
revolution (Fordist mass production, assembly line, automobilization), 
even with accelerated circulation, could no longer be mediated by the 
gold standard — which therefore had to be abolished.
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In other words: the value substance of  money, based on the 
compressed “labor substance” of  rare metal gold, could not be 
maintained. On the level of money — the general equivalent as “king 
commodity” and appearance of capital — this desubstantivization 
was therefore perceptible already much earlier than on the 
level of  the ordinary “commodity rabble,” where it is becoming 
manifest only now in the third industrial revolution. The result 
was a “secular age of inflation” entirely unknown in the nineteenth 
century: the uninterrupted deflation of money, sometimes galloping 
(hyperinflation), sometimes creeping. 
In spite of this inflationary effect, some theorists made a virtue 
of necessity by declaring the gold standard unnecessary and money 
a mere sign that could only be guaranteed by state law.3 But the 
collapse of the world market in the Depression of the 1930s also had 
something to do with the lack of a recognized world money, after all 
attempts in Europe to return to the gold standard had failed. When 
the foundations of the economic and monetary order of the postwar 
period were established in Bretton Woods in 1944 under the guise of 
the “Pax Americana,” this was done in direct orientation toward the 
U.S. dollar as the new currency for international trade and reserve. 
The basis of this was not only the paramount industrial position of 
the United States (due mainly to the tremendous growth spurt of the 
war economy), but also the fact that the dollar was the only currency 
that was gold-convertible. The famous Fort Knox held three-quarters 
of the world’s gold reserves.4
Only on this basis — the world currency system of  Bretton 
Woods and then the severance of the dollar from a fixed exchange 
rate — could the “economic miracle” of postwar history unfold in the 
shadow of the Cold War. But the resurgence of Europe and Japan in the 
prosperous world market soon began to gnaw at economic dominance 
of the United States and the gold substance of the dollar. In the same 
measure, when the share of the commodity and capital exports shifted 
to the detriment of the United States, the dollar also lost strength 
and was increasingly converted into gold. The reserves in Fort Knox 
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melted away. In 1971, President Nixon was thus forced to cancel the 
gold-convertibility of the dollar. 
With this, the Bretton Woods system came to an end. Exchange 
rates were deregulated and have since “floated” on the market, 
which was the starting point for a completely new kind of currency 
speculation founded on the fluctuation of  exchange rates, with 
dangerous repercussions for the real economy.  However, since 
the global currency crisis of  the 1970s did not produce the great 
catastrophe, Left theorists, too, have considered the problem of money 
and currency to have been solved empirically: contrary to Marx, the 
character of money as singled-out commodity, with its particular and 
definite value substance, is said to have been disposed with.5 But the 
by no means safe practice of flexible currency conditions in the brief 
historical period of the last decades says nothing substantial about the 
essential durability of the new constellation, especially with respect 
to the currency crises on the peripheries throughout Asia in the 1990s 
and Argentina after the turn of the century, which both point to a 
long-smoldering issue.
From Gold Dollar to Arms Dollar
The global currency crisis of the 1970s can be considered to have been 
mild for the sole reason that, in spite of the loss of its convertibility into 
gold, the U.S. dollar was able to retain its function as world trade and 
reserve currency in the absence of a viable alternative. If this had not 
been the case, the result would have been a repetition of the disaster 
of the 1930s, but on a greater scale — without the dollar’s function 
as global currency, the world market could only implode. However, 
the reconstitution of the dollar as world currency was built on a 
completely new kind of foundation. World money’s substance of value, 
which had been founded on the gold standard, was now actually based 
on a kind of “political” guarantee — not a formal-legal but essentially 
a military one. The currency of the world power or “superpower” of 
the Western hemisphere now took on its world-money function now 
purely on the basis of this power.
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This gave rise to a peculiar reciprocal process: to the same degree 
that the economic position of the United States deteriorated within 
the “regular” world market of commodity and capital flows (a process 
that continues up to today), there was a continuous growth in what 
President Eisenhower described as the “military-industrial complex.” 
The exorbitant growth rates of the military industry during World 
War II continued in the form of the much-discussed “permanent war 
economy.” Against this background, the impact of the third industrial 
revolution of microelectronics was reflected in ever-new high-tech 
weapons systems, marking the path from industrialization to the 
computerization of war. With the development of one generation 
of weaponry after another, the United States moved into a position 
in arms that was increasingly unassailable by the rest of the world. 
President Reagan pushed this tendency even further. While the Soviet 
Union, the opposing world power of recuperative modernization, 
was in part undone by its own internal contradictions as a planned 
capitalist economy, it was also armed to death and could win the race 
neither economically nor militarily.
This extra-economic factor of the increasingly unrivaled U.S. 
military machine transformed it into a mighty economic power. The 
cautioners and warners in the United States who voiced opposition 
to the unstoppable trend towards the permanent war economy were 
correct insofar as it triggered an avalanche of public debt. Reagan’s 
tight neoliberal fiscal and monetary policy brutally cut the Keynesian 
social programs of his predecessors, but against his own doctrine 
he allowed the explosion in scale of weaponized-Keynesianism. As 
a result, the already bloated military-industrial complex became in 
many ways (also in derivative forms) the main guarantor of growth 
and a job machine. The U.S. economy showed nominal inner strength, 
although it was becoming weaker on the world market.
The United States’ astronomical debt arising from this process of 
economic militarization could already in the 1980s no longer be funded 
from its own savings. But the economic power of the military machine 
was also reflected in foreign affairs. It was the military power of the 
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United States as world police that offered global financial markets a safe 
haven — or so it seemed. This impression was reinforced significantly 
by the perceived victory over the opposing Eastern (European) system. 
The dollar maintained its function as world currency through the 
mutation from the gold dollar to the arms dollar. And the strategic 
nature of global wars in the 1990s and turn of the century in the Middle 
East (in the Balkans and in Afghanistan) was directed at preserving 
the myth of the safe haven via the demonstration of the ability to 
intervene militarily on a global scale, thereby also securing the dollar 
as world currency. On this ultimately irrational basis, excess (that 
is, not profitable and investable) capital from the third industrial 
revolution from around the world flowed increasingly into the United 
States, thus indirectly financing the defense and military machine. 
The Biggest Financial Bubble of All Time and 
the U.S. Consumer Miracle
Everywhere the internal barriers of  valorization of  capital in 
the third industrial revolution caused a flight toward the credit 
superstructure and finance-bubble economy. This crisis economy of 
financial capitalism inevitably had to be concentrated in the supposed 
safe haven of the dollar zone. The more excess money capital strayed 
around the global financial markets, the greater the suction power 
of the United States to attract these financial flows. In this manner 
there arose, in God’s own country, the mother of all financial bubbles. 
The sale of government bonds around the world not only financed the 
debt-driven arms boom; parallel to this, the U.S. stock market swelled 
in the 1990s, and so, in turn, the U.S. real estate market after the turn 
of the century, thus producing the basis for a new quality of debt.
In addition to the military-industrial complex thus arose the second 
pillar of the, as it were, irregular apparent growth of the internal 
U.S. economy. Due to the very wide dispersion of share and property 
ownership (in comparison to Europe), a paradoxical consumption 
miracle could take its course. Even though average real wages had 
stagnated or even declined since the 1970s, consumption increasingly 
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became the critical driver of growth.6 Though invoked again and 
again, the jobs miracle was in no way the real cause of this boom. 
Apart from jobs in the military-industrial complex, itself hanging on 
the drip of public debt employment, it was mainly low-income jobs in 
the service sector that were created — the famous “labouring poor.”7 
Due to weakness in global markets, employment in the export sector 
was also declining.
Today, the consumption boom is fueled not so much by regular 
wages but primarily by financial bubbles in the stock and property 
markets. It was possible to borrow against the difference gains from 
the fictitious increase in value of relevant property titles, and its 
millionfold, broad dissemination resulted in credit card and mortgage 
debt on an unprecedented scale. The only security for this was the 
very same increases in stock prizes and of real estate. The influx of 
excess money capital from around the world into the supposed safe 
haven of the dollar not only financed the indebted consumption of 
armaments, but was also diverted into the debt-ridden field of private 
consumption. It is this marvelous money machine that fed the U.S. 
consumption miracle.
Pacific Debt Cycle and the Global Economy
The real economic weakness of the United States on the world markets 
revealed itself in the form of a steadily growing trade deficit. Relatively 
speaking, the internal economy of the last world power, characterized 
by the arms industry and service sector, produced fewer and fewer 
industrial goods (in some areas the decline was even absolute). A 
significant portion of U.S. citizens, who could go into debt due to 
sustained increases in stocks and real estate prices, increasingly 
consumed goods that were manufactured elsewhere. As a result, a 
global deficit cycle gained momentum — one visible for the first time 
in the 1980s, which accelerated in the 1990s and that is beginning 
to run hot today. While initially it was mainly the balance of trade 
with Japan that slipped into the red, the trade deficit soon also rose 
with the smaller Asian countries and Europe, eventually escalating 
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in the context of the immense commodity flow between the United 
States and the colossi India and China. Today, there are hardly any 
industrial regions in the world that do not sell their surpluses to the 
United States.
The flip side of external monetary debt created by the sucking of 
global money flows is, conversely, that excess global commodity flows 
of goods are drawn back. In other words, U.S. consumers (government 
and private) borrow the money with which they pay for the flood of 
commodities from the very same suppliers. The United States has thus 
become the black hole of the world economy. However, this function 
includes a double reciprocal dependence. If  the miraculous U.S. 
consumers had not heroically eaten up global overproduction, the 
global economic crisis of the third industrial revolution would have 
become resoundingly manifest long ago. Moreover, these are by no 
means the flows of goods between separate national economies, but 
movements within a fully global economy. In addition to Japanese and 
European corporations, it is mainly U.S. corporations themselves who 
use China as a hub for transnational value chains because of its low 
wage structures, in order to supply markets in the United States and 
elsewhere. The corresponding investments are therefore limited to 
economic export zones and have nothing to do with the traditional 
ideas of a national economic development of China, India, and so on.
The one-way street across the Pacific of Asian exports to the United 
States has now turned the deficit cycle into a flywheel that powers 
the global economy. Just as in other regions of the world market, 
European industry not only supplies a portion of its surpluses to the 
United States itself, but simultaneously exports an ever-increasing 
extent of the production components for the massive Asian export 
systems (particularly in engineering). The widely celebrated upswing 
of the last few years is almost entirely a result of this voodoo economy. 
Periodically, the danger of the increasing global economic inequalities 
in the form of accumulating U.S. foreign deficits become a topic of 
discussion, but because everything has somehow gone so well for so 
long, the all-clear signal is usually not far away.
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The Coming Credit- and Dollar-Crisis Scenario
Over the course of 2007, however, menacing black clouds have gathered 
on the global horizon. It had to happen: the U.S. housing bubble, the 
consumption engine’s fuel in recent years, is imploding, and real estate 
prices are shrinking fast. As a result, subprime mortgage loans suffer 
en masse. What forms the financial crisis might take have already 
been shown over the past few months: suddenly, banks and savings 
institutions in many countries have come under massive pressure 
from asset depreciation, because U.S. debt circulates globally. However, 
that was just the beginning. Because cycles of credit and physical 
capital extend over several years, the true extent of the credit crisis 
will only become apparent in the years 2008-2010. If in this period 
U.S. consumption experiences a deep slump, there will not only be 
a setback in global stock markets, but also a decline in Pacific deficit 
circulation that will bring the world economy to a halt. No one can 
predict the exact magnitude, but it threatens to surpass all the crisis 
phenomena faced by the third industrial revolution over the past 
twenty years.
It’s mere whistling in the dark when economic commentators now 
pretend to expect that the domestic economy in the European Union 
or China could suddenly become self-supporting and might replace 
the U.S. consumer as the vacuum cleaner of the excess flow of goods. 
Where should we expect the purchasing power in these regions to 
come from, if  it was not already there during the booming export 
economy? At the same time, a dual interest rate dilemma opens up. 
The impact of the Asian crisis of the 1990s and the collapse of the 
virtual New Economy after 2000 could still be absorbed by the central 
banks in a rate-cut race that flooded markets with cheap money. 
The financial markets now expect the same from the U.S. Federal 
Reserve, hoping that central banks everywhere else will follow. But 
when dying American consumption is supposed to be reignited in this 
way, a renewed threat of a dollar glut can reignite the long-lurking 
inflationary potential of asset inflation and permit a secular age of 
inflation to escalate. Additionally, it is foreseeable that the flow of 
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surplus money capital into the United States will dry up, if in the face 
of rising inflation the European Central Bank does not follow suit and 
level the interest rate differential between the United States and the 
European Union. The simultaneity of depression and inflation moves 
into the realm of possibility.
The resulting global interest-rate dilemma generated by the U.S. 
credit crisis is also beginning to call into question the function of 
the dollar as global currency. Standing behind this is ultimately the 
towering external deficit, which requires a drastic devaluation of the 
dollar and a similar appreciation of the export-surplus currencies. 
Although the dollar had been devalued repeatedly and in controlled 
fashion in the past, forcing creditor countries to pay part of the U.S. 
debt, now there are signs of an uncontrolled crash and a rapid loss of 
value, one that has started against the euro, while Asian currencies are 
still kept artificially low. But if the credit crisis strikes through fully, 
even this barrier will be broken. Then, not only the financing capacity 
of the military-industrial complex but also the myth of the safe haven 
will come to an end.
It is, however, not possible to replace the dollar with a new global 
currency, even if the euro is widely celebrated as containing such 
potential. Since neither the euro nor gold is based on armament, they 
will not be able to replace the dollar. The crisis of the global currency 
and the connected potential for inflation indicate a growing crisis 
of money proper. This is indicated by the constant and unavoidable 
rise in the price of gold which accompanies the currency crisis — 
the commodity character of money with its own value substance is 
asserting itself in this crisis. Gold, no longer simply a resource, returns 
to its status of “real” global currency, but it is no longer possible to 
mediate the productive power of the Third World via movements of 
the global market on the basis of gold. It would be no more plausible 
to attempt to drain the ocean with a teaspoon. The situation of the 
interwar period threatens to return — this time, however, on a much 
higher level of development.
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World Crisis, World Ideology, and World Civil War
What is required of emancipatory social critique in this situation 
characterized by an internal limit of capitalism is the redefinition of 
socialism beyond the fetish forms of commodity, money, nation, and 
their associated gender relations. However, to the extent that the Left 
returns to its old patterns of interpretation and seeks possibilities of 
positively appropriating immanent power inherent in the new global 
constellation, it runs the risk of becoming reactionary. This critique 
of capitalism frequently turns into anti-Americanism and into overt 
or structural antisemitism. The “objective thought-forms” (Marx) of 
the capital fetish, which contain an inversion of reality, form (if they 
are not broken) the ideological basis for processing the crisis, which 
already led in the interwar period to devastating results. From within 
the globalization of capital arises a murderous world ideology. Cause 
and effect will be turned on their head: the credit crisis does not appear 
as the result of the internal degradation of real accumulation, but as 
the result of “finance capitalist greed” (one which for 200 years has 
been a stereotype associated with antisemitic ideas); the role of the 
United States and the arms dollar are understood not as an overarching 
common condition of globalized capital, but as imperial oppression 
of the rest of the world.
The motive for these ideological inversions today is the desperate 
desire to flee back to the times of Fordist prosperity and Keynesian 
regulation. It constitutes the radical Left’s option to replace the 
American, unilateral version of  the Empire with a “democratic” 
globalization led by the European Union and possibly with the 
euro as the new international trade and reserve currency.8 This 
option is not only fully crisis-blind, but it also fails to recognize the 
interdependence of world capital and the character of the European 
Union. The phantasmal illusion of a confederation of this virtual world 
reform is unearthly: imagine the Gazprom-and-intelligence regime of a 
Putin, or the larger part of a transnational capital-investment Chinese 
export bureaucracy, incorporated into an unholy alliance between 
the oil-caudillismo of a Chavez and the antisemitic Islamist regime 
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in Tehran…
Quite apart from the fact that an E.U.-centered globalization would 
be no better than a U.S.-centric one, it is not even possible. It is not 
just that the euro cannot take the place of the arms dollar, but that the 
European Union is not in a position to reverse the excess cash flows 
and absorb global overproduction. In even greater global economic 
dependence on this paradoxical role of the U.S. economy are Russia, 
Venezuela, and Iran, whose political claims against the Great Satan are 
nourished by the explosion in oil prices. If the flywheel of the Pacific 
deficit cycle comes to a halt and a world depression is triggered, the 
oil regimes together will be thrown to the wolves.
The ripening world crisis of the third industrial revolution, for 
which there is no new regulatory model in sight, will certainly not 
only run its economic course. Even more than in previous breaks in the 
history of modernization, there lurks in the looming, unmanageable 
global economic crisis the danger of an irrational flight forward into 
world war. However, based on the level of development of globalization, 
this will not be a national war between national-imperial power blocs 
for the redistribution of the world. One must rather speak of a new 
kind of world civil war, as suggested by the “denationalization” and 
wars of world order since the collapse of the Soviet Union; perhaps 
these were precursors to this (coming civil) war. Never before has 
the slogan “socialism or barbarism” been as relevant as today. But 
simultaneously, socialism must be reinvented at the end of the history 
of modernization.
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Struggle without Classes: Why There Is No 
Resurgence of the Proletariat in the 
Currently Unfolding Capitalist Crisis
Norbert Trenkle (2006)
From Class Struggle to Declassing
While living and working conditions continue to grow more 
precarious, affecting greater and greater segments of the population 
even in countries that have emerged victorious on the world market, 
widespread talk of a return of class society and of class struggle 
suggest the (re)birth of a new historical conjuncture. Given the rapid 
growth in social polarization, such talk can, at first glance, seem quite 
plausible. However, as is usually the case, resorting to the past modes 
of interpretation and explanation leads not to clarification, but only 
to greater confusion. Despite initial appearances, categories of class 
opposition cannot provide a basis for any adequate conception of 
the extreme growth in social inequality, nor are the oppositions and 
conflicts between social interest groups resulting from such inequality 
simply recurrences of what, measured by their real historical content, 
were once accurately conceived as instances of class struggle. 
The great social conflict that, in the form of  class struggle, 
decisively shaped capitalist society throughout the historical period 
of its formation and establishment was, as is well known, the conflict 
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between capital and labor. What is at stake in the structural logic of 
the commodity in its process of historical formation, when considered 
from its objectified side, are the opposed interests corresponding to 
two of capitalism’s functional categories: the opposition between the 
representatives of capital, who command and organize the process 
of production with the valorization of capital as their end, and the 
wage workers, who by their labor “create” the surplus value necessary 
for this process. Taken for itself, this is a purely immanent conflict 
arising from within the common system of relations presupposed by 
modern commodity production, a conflict that revolves around the 
manner of value production (working conditions, working hours, 
and the like) and the distribution of the mass of value (wages, profits, 
benefits, and the like). As such it is a conflict impossible to overcome 
as long as the capitalist mode of production, which is based on the 
valorization of value as a self-propelling end in itself, continues to 
exist. This, however, in no way means that such a conflict must always 
express itself as class opposition. The objectified opposition of capital 
and labor only developed into class opposition because a generalized 
social mega-subject was constituted on its foundation, and under very 
particular historical conditions: in the course of the struggle for their 
interests and for social recognition, the wage workforce developed a 
collective identity and a consciousness as a working class. It was the 
constitution of such a subject that first enabled those who sell their 
labor power as a commodity to shift themselves into a position from 
which they could endow their struggle with the necessary continuity 
and strength, even in the face of setbacks and defeats.1
Now, if over the course of the second half of the twentieth century 
the class struggle has increasingly lost the dynamic and force that 
had placed its stamp on the whole of society, this was not of course 
because capitalism had suddenly dispensed with the production of 
surplus value. The objective opposition between capital and labor, as, 
at the same time, categorical functions within capitalism itself, has 
remained and remains still, even if its concrete shape has changed over 
the course of the development of capitalism, as will be shown more 
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extensively below. The working class nonetheless loses its character 
as collective subject to the extent that wage workers now become 
citizens with equal rights and thus, precisely speaking, commodity 
subjects absorbed into the universe of bourgeois society, and the 
sale of labor power becomes a generalized mode of existence. With 
this, the revolutionary nimbus of the working class, which had been 
a significant part of the cement holding its identity together, dissolved, 
revealing its feet of clay. For even if the idea that class struggle has 
an antagonistic character and thus points beyond capitalist society 
can in retrospect be revealed to be an illusion, it nonetheless played 
a thoroughly important role in class constitution, and furnished the 
working class with the consciousness required for it to act with its eyes 
trained on the horizon of a far-reaching social mission.
Ultimately, however, the opposition of capital and labor in its 
subjective form also emerged from its cocoon, revealing itself to be, 
no less than in its objective manifestation, an immanent conflict 
between social and economic interests internal to capitalism.2 Despite 
occasional rhetorical reenactments of times past, the conduct of labor 
struggles today is no longer premised on the irreconcilability between 
the interests of the sellers of labor power and those of capital. Quite 
the opposite: the emphasis is always placed on their compatibility, 
whether in the name of productivity, of local competitiveness, or of 
the purchasing power of internal, domestic demand. Criticism is not 
leveled at capital but rather at excessively high profits, unnecessary 
plant closures (or relocations) or, in a more ideologically charged 
version, at greedy bankers pitting the parasitical needs of Wall Street 
against the “real” economy of Main Street.3 Those transformed into 
commodity subjects, workers no less than anyone else, have long 
since considered it only natural and self-evident that profits must be 
made, capital valorized, productivity increased, and growth ensured at 
whatever cost. They know that their (however precarious) well-being 
in this society — and they can scarcely imagine any other — depends 
on precisely this.
The development of  the struggle between labor and capital 
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into what more and more resembles their effective identity on the 
subjective level can be attributed to the systematic establishment 
of a fully generalized commodity society, one that has successfully 
invested the functional logic of capitalism with what appears to be the 
irrevocablility of a natural law. But there is more to it than just this. At 
its basis also lie quite specific changes in the relationship of capital to 
labor, changes that had already been introduced in the Fordist era and 
that were brought to completion at an accelerated rate after Fordism 
came to an end. These changes in no way led to the suspension of 
the functional opposition of labor and capital, but rather to a state 
of affairs in which this functional opposition itself could no longer 
serve as ground for the constitution of any renewed class subjectivity 
whatsoever. There is thus, despite — or even because of — the extreme 
exacerbation of social inequality, no reclassing of society taking place 
today; we are rather dealing with a general process of declassing, a 
process which is expressed in at least four trends.4
First, since as early as the final phase of Fordism, the labor directly 
applied to the product has been reduced in favor of more capital-
intensive technologies of automated oversight and control and of 
pre- and post-production functions. This has meant not only the 
melting away of the actual working class in the sense of the value-
producing industrial workforce and the massive upsurge of the most 
diverse and non-traditional categories of wage labor (in circulation, 
in the state apparatus, and in the various “service sectors,” and so on), 
categories that become impossible to ascribe in any meaningful way to 
a given class.5 To this has been added the integration of a substantial 
part of the command function of capital directly within the various 
activities of labor, thereby shifting the contradiction between labor 
and capital in its immediacy to a point within individuals themselves 
(a process euphemistically configured as “personal responsibility,” 
“job enrichment,” “horizontal hierarchies,” and so on). This tendency 
has been further exacerbated under the pressure of crisis-induced 
hypercompetition and in the course of a general precarization of 
working conditions. This is most apparent in the many small-scale 
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freelancers and “entreployees,” whose welfare as well as whose woe now 
becomes purely a matter of taking on, under their own direction and at 
their own risk, the outsourced job functions of this or that company. But 
even within the enterprises themselves there is an increasing tendency 
to turn employees into “managers,” both of themselves and of their 
respective working areas (as, for example, through the establishment 
of so-called “profit centers”). And, in the end, this tendency even 
generates the cynical ideology for administering the unemployed in 
which praise of “self-management” and “personal responsibility” are 
all the more obtrusively propagated, and thus the clearer it becomes 
that the labor market cannot even come close to reintegrating all those 
whom it has spat out like so many “self-managing” bits of refuse.
Second, and as an extension of the above, the practice of constantly 
changing jobs and the resulting alternation among a huge variety 
of activities has, increasingly since the end of Fordism, become the 
norm — a norm that has substantially contributed to the dissolution 
of any given individual’s identification with specific productive 
functions. Individuals’ relationships to their position in the process 
of production thus ceased to be in any way anchored in their biography 
or environment, and empirically became closer to what it, according 
to its concept, already was: an external relationship.6 In the process 
the categorical imperative of flexibility now demands obedience more 
and more adamantly. It is well known that today there is no worse sin 
against the law of capitalism than continuing to adhere to a single 
function or activity of labor. This is not only preached by the priests 
of the market, but also results from the objectified compulsions of the 
global race to the bottom. Whoever wants to survive must be prepared 
perpetually to switch between the categories of wage labor and self-
employment, and to identify with neither — although, of course, even 
this brings no guarantee.
Third, the new hierarchies and divisions cut across the categories of 
capitalist function rather than overlapping with them. Specifically, they 
are not determined by the opposition between wage labor and capital, 
for the social differential is just as steep within the category of wage 
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labor as it is in society as a whole. This applies in the first instance to the 
businesses themselves, in which (shrinking) core workforces with (at 
least for the moment) permanent jobs, even with collective bargaining 
agreements, carry out the same work alongside a growing number of 
part-time and agency workers under completely different conditions. 
However, the differences between sectors, branches of production, 
and regional locations are even greater, and ultimately there are huge 
discrepancies with respect to income, working conditions, and status 
depending on one’s position in the hierarchy of the global chains of 
valorization.
Fourth, declassing ultimately means that more and more people 
worldwide are falling through the grid of the functional categories, 
because there is no longer a place for them in the system of commodity 
production that can productively exploit less and less labor power. 
They are forced to find out that they cannot only be replaced at any 
time, but that they are also to a growing extent becoming superfluous 
in the capitalist sense. Being privileged means managing to cling to 
some function or other, or to switch between different functions, 
without coming crashing down. But since these functions are 
themselves becoming precarious or wholly obsolete, such a balancing 
act is becoming increasingly more difficult. Because the objectified 
functional structures are disintegrating, more and more people are 
also falling through their grid. How many this effect varies according 
to the position of a country or region in global competition, but the 
threat of falling into social nothingness looms over everyone. The 
trend is clear and unambiguous: across the world a growing segment 
of new underclasses has emerged, which have nothing to do with the 
old proletariat and which neither objectively (by their function or 
position within the process of production) nor subjectively (by virtue 
of their consciousness) constitute a new social collective (something 
like a “precariat”). Their relationship to the capitalist process of 
valorization is in the first instance a purely negative one: they are no 
longer required. But this forces us to formulate anew the question of 
the possible constitution of new emancipatory social movements.
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Attempts to Save the Dead Subject
The resurrected left-wing discourse of class struggle hardly makes 
a contribution to the clarification of this question. While it is true 
that it has in some respects learned from social upheavals and 
transformations, and undergone a few alterations in its argumentation, 
it has ultimately not succeeded in freeing itself of the fundamental 
metaphysical patterns of traditional class-struggle Marxism. These 
patterns are perennially reproduced, even if the subjects to which 
appeals are made (or rather, which desire attempts to summon up) 
have changed. In the last issue of Krisis I attempted to show this above 
all in the examination of Hardt and Negri and John Holloway.7 But here 
attention should in the first instance be directed toward approaches 
with a less obviously metaphysical leaning, since their arguments 
proceed more in the mode of sociology, and concentrate more strongly 
on the analysis of the objective aspect of social development. In course 
it will be shown that it is precisely the empirical results of these 
investigations that refute the paradigm of class that has been applied. 
In the attempt to save class analysis by means of all sorts of extensions 
they become entangled in contradictions and aporias which clearly 
indicate that this rescue attempt is condemned to failure and that only 
abandoning the traditional Marxist construct can open a glimpse of a 
renewed perspective of emancipatory action.
Let us first hear the Gramscian class theorist Frank Deppe. The 
“working class,” he argues in the journal Fantômas, 
has by no means disappeared, capitalism is still based on the 
exploitation of wage labor and the natural, social and political 
conditions of production and appropriation of surplus value. 
Between 1970 and 2000 the number of workers dependent 
on wage labor nearly doubled, and comprises about half of 
the entire global population. This can be explained in the first 
instance by development in China and other parts of Asia, 
where large parts of the rural population were “set free” as a 
result of industrialization.
In the developed capitalist countries the proportion of the 
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population engaged in wage labor has now reached 90% and 
more. 8 
What is immediately striking about this argument is that it operates 
with a concept of the working class that swings back and forth between 
at least two different meanings. At first Deppe seems to classify among 
the working class only those wage workers who produce surplus 
value in the strict sense, whose surplus labor is skimmed off directly 
for the valorization of capital. However, this concept of class slides 
seamlessly into a completely different one, one which comprises all 
the “workers dependent on wage labor” and thus “half of the entire 
global population” and in the capitalist urban centers even almost the 
entire population (namely over 90 percent).
In this argumentative vacillation, the class theorist’s entire dilemma 
is expressed. If the category of the working class is interpreted in 
the first sense (which corresponds to Marx’s theory, to which Deppe 
explicitly refers), then it must be conceded that what is at stake is 
a global minority which is losing its significance to an ever-greater 
extent the further the processes of  rationalization in the value-
producing sectors advance, and the more labor is made superfluous 
in immediate production. In the second meaning, however, that is to 
say the expansion of the category of the working class to all “workers 
dependent on wage-labor,” it becomes a non-concept, for it no longer 
has any power to discriminate at all. It is then just another word for 
the general mode of existence and life in capitalist society, which 
mediates its connectedness simply by means of labor and commodity 
production, which for the huge majority of people presents itself as 
the compulsion to sell their labor power in order to survive. While this 
universal compulsion is an essential characteristic of capitalist society, 
it is by no means suitable for the determination of the working class, 
because all people are in principle subject to it, regardless of their 
positions in the social hierarchy their social status and life situation.
The aporias of the newer theory of class also become clear in the 
writings of the historian Marcel van der Linden, whose concept of 
class is even broader than that of Deppe. For him, “every bearer of 
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labor power, whose labor power is sold or hired to another person 
under economic or non-economic compulsion, belongs to the working 
class. Whether the labor power is offered by the worker herself or 
himself, and whether she or he owns her or his own means of 
production, is irrelevant.”9 With this definition, van der Linden wants 
to account for the fact that in globalized commodity society there has 
emerged a gargantuan multitude of differentiated and hierarchized 
working conditions that do not (any longer) fit the classical schema 
of wage labor. Among these he counts different transitional forms 
between slavery, wage labor, self-employment, and subcontracting, 
but also the unpaid subsistence and reproductive labor of women. 
Van der Linden accordingly no longer speaks of the class of “free wage 
workers,” but chooses the broader concept of “subaltern workers.”10 
But this, however, does not solve the problem, but rather goes one step 
further than Deppe by inflating the concept of class so that it becomes 
a metacategory which fundamentally encompasses capitalist society 
in its entirety.
It lies within the very logic of  this metacategory that it is 
completely devoid of shape. It presents the paradox of a concept of 
capitalist totality, but precisely this totality slips through its hands. 
For on one hand it indirectly accounts for the fact that labor is the 
comprehensive principle — or more accurately, the principle of 
mediation — of bourgeois society. On the other hand, it is precisely 
this that is hidden by the fixation on the category of class. Traditional 
Marxism had always considered the mediation of the social context 
by labor as the transhistorical constant of all societies, and failed to 
recognize that what is at stake is the historically specific essential 
characteristic of the capitalist formation, which is inextricably linked 
to generalized commodity production and the valorization of value 
as if  an end in itself.11 What seemed to Marxism to be specific to 
capitalism was rather the particular way in which surplus labor is 
skimmed off in the form of surplus value, the mediation via the market 
and private ownership of the means of production — characteristics 
which can all be brought together in the concept of class domination 
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or of the class opposition between the capitalist class and the working 
class. This perspective was certainly ideologically compatible with the 
struggle of a particular segment of commodity owners for recognition 
within bourgeois society. But whoever wants to bring it up to date 
and to account for the gargantuan discrepancy in working conditions 
under the conditions of the globalization of the capital relation will 
necessary fall into irresolvable contradictions.
The idea, however, that class opposition characterizes the essence 
of capitalism rather than presenting a derived relationship is so 
deeply anchored in people’s heads that it obscures the view of the 
formal context of society even where it reveals itself to be analytically 
unsuitable at every turn.12 The very attempts to found this idea more 
precisely make this clear. An example of this is provided by van der 
Linden’s attempt at least to begin to delineate his concept of class, 
which evidently even he finds unsatisfactory, when he asks himself 
“what all these completely different subalterns actually have in 
common,” only to answer “that all subaltern workers live in the status 
of ‘institutionalized heteronomy.’”13 What is to be understood by this he 
explains with a reference to Cornelius Castoriadis: “Institutionalized 
heteronomy expresses an ‘antagonistic division of society and with it 
the domination of a particular social category over the whole [...] The 
capitalist economy thus alienates us to the extent that it coincides with 
the division into proletarians and capitalists.’”14
It is immediately striking that Castoriadis derives “institutionalized 
heteronomy” immediately from the class position of the workers. This 
definition, abbreviated as it is, logically corresponded to the traditional 
Marxist theory of class with its fixation on the good old proletariat. 
But what remains of this theory if, like van der Linden, one extends 
the concept of class to infinity and subsumes more or less the whole 
of humanity under it? Van der Linden implicitly says nothing other 
than that alienation is a universal feature of bourgeois society. But at 
the same time he cannot provide a plausible theoretical justification of 
this claim, because he does not set himself free from the paradigm of 
traditional Marxism. Even here the attempt to save this paradigm by 
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extending it uncovers its aporias and limitations, which the historical 
process had initially obscured. That alienation or fetishism cannot be 
directly attributed to class domination, but are essential characteristics 
of a society that is blindly mediated by commodity production and 
labor, had, as is well known, already been shown by Marx. It is quite 
possible that to the workers’ movement in its struggle for recognition 
within bourgeois society, this might have appeared as idle speculation. 
But today there stands in the way of this insight nothing more than an 
anachronistic refusal to let go of the paradigm of the theory of class 
that repeatedly disclaims itself.
The “Class” as Positive Totality
However, the protagonists of the more recent discourse of class do not 
acknowledge this self-disclaimer. It is true that they cannot help but 
implicitly recognize the emptying that results from the inflation of 
the concept of class, but that does not lead to a change of perspective 
in their critique of capitalism, but rather ensnares them in all kinds 
of evasive maneuvers and attempts to blur their own tracks. Above 
all, the shifting of  the focus of  investigation onto the empirical 
level enables the masterpiece at once to dispose of and to retain the 
fixation on the class opposition as essence of capitalism and center 
of gravity of all radical critique (“principal contradiction”): retain 
because the concept of class is elevated to the metalevel of the social 
relation, where it ekes out a living as an abstraction, devoid of content, 
which can be immunized against critique precisely because of this 
character; and dispose of because it no longer plays any real role in the 
empirical analyses, but only presents a diffuse, presupposed instance 
of invocation — which as such, however, shapes the perspective of 
investigation and colors the results in a particular way.
It sounds a little like unconscious self-irony when van der Linden 
ends his essay with the remark “But it remains to warn against 
every empirically empty grand theory.”15 For this is precisely what 
distinguishes his approach and that of all more recent protagonists 
of the discourse of class: their theory remains empirically empty and 
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their empiricism remains theoretically naked; they uphold the myth 
of class struggle, although no subject or a movement can any longer 
be found in social reality to which the class struggle could be affixed 
without great strain. When Deppe and van der Linden describe the 
social hierarchies and inequalities that are formed and sharpened in 
the context of global crisis capitalism, it is in some respects empirically 
illuminating, but by setting the headline “Fragmentation of  the 
Working Class” at the top, a highly unfortunate turn of phrase enters 
the room. What is assumed is always a fundamental unity which is 
presupposed by all those fragmentations, even if it is not possible 
adequately to explain in what this unity is supposed to consist. The 
bridging of the oppositions of interest and the positions of competition 
with respect to an anticapitalist formation nonetheless appears as 
fundamentally prearranged.
Deppe even expands this construct to the extent that he speaks, 
referring to Gramsci, of a “new bloc of subalterns,” which alongside 
the “working class” is supposed also to encompass all other social 
movements of the last years (“landless peasants’ protests in Brazil, 
the uprising in Chiapas, [...] global mass-demonstrations against 
war and the threat of war”). This bloc, he concedes, “has not yet, 
however, articulated itself as a bloc, because it lacks an alternative 
programme and the capacity to act against neoliberalism, through 
which the fractions of this bloc could be welded together.”16 The 
“bloc,” that is, already exists “in itself,” but has not yet “articulated 
itself politically” as such. It is no accident that this is reminiscent 
of  the violent construction of  “ascribed class-consciousness,” if 
admittedly in a sort of shrunken version which — in contrast with 
Lukács — does not do without a metaphysical foundation because 
Deppe is critically beyond such things, but because he carries it 
around with him unacknowledged.17 It is only because he implicitly 
carries the corresponding ascription through to its conclusion and 
thus presupposes something like a fundamental objective congruence 
(of interests) of all parties that he can reduce the problem to the 
superficial question of an “alternative programme” that he imagines 
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could weld together the different “factions” of that bloc.
The almost incidental manner in which the fragmentations 
produced by capitalism are downgraded to a sort of secondary or 
derivative problem with respect to the presupposed “class” indicates 
a further aporia, which results from the frantic adherence to the 
paradigm of traditional Marxism. For traditional Marxism, the working 
class represented by its nature the standpoint of social universality 
—  which was thought to be identical with the standpoint of labor. It 
was thus supposed to inherit the legacy of the bourgeoisie, which at 
the times of the bourgeois revolutions was supposed to have claimed 
this standpoint for itself, but then to have betrayed it for the sake of 
the selfish private interest of profit. The revolutionary aim accordingly 
consisted in the creation of a social totality — a totality, namely, that 
was mediated through labor in a conscious manner. As Moishe Postone 
has shown in extensive detail, this idea amounted, in two senses, to 
an ideologically distorted projection of the conditions of capitalism. 
On one hand, it is a contradiction in itself to desire consciously to 
shape mediation through labor (and thus through the commodity), 
because labor is by its nature self-referential and self-directed — that 
is, it follows its own reified laws, which it forces onto people as if it 
were a natural law. On the other hand, the constitution of the social 
context as totality is also an historically quite specific characteristic 
of  capitalist society, which in contrast with all other societies is 
mediated through a single principle, and for that reason naturally 
cannot be the vanishing point of emancipation: “The capitalist social 
formation, according to Marx, is unique inasmuch as it is constituted 
by a qualitatively homogeneous social ‘substance’; hence, it exists as 
a social totality. Other social formations are not so totalized: their 
fundamental social relations are not qualitatively homogeneous. They 
cannot be grasped by the concept of ‘substance,’ cannot be unfolded 
from a single structuring principle, and do not display an immanent, 
necessary historical logic.”18 It follows as a consequence of this insight 
“that the historical negation of capitalism would not involve the 
realization, but the abolition, of the totality.”19 Now it is true that the 
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more recent discourse of class claims to offer a critique of the false 
identifications of traditional Marxism, but it undoes this work itself 
by its continued fixation on class and its inflation to a metacategory, 
the tendency of which is to encompass society as a whole. The appeal 
to totality — and the unconscious affirmation of the form of capitalist 
mediation that is contained within it — of traditional Marxism is thus 
surpassed, and at the same time reduced to absurdity. For if almost 
all people are ascribed to “the class” (or to the “bloc of subalterns,” or 
whatever), the social universality that traditional Marxism depicted 
as still on the horizon would already be potentially realized. But with 
this the theoretically justified standpoint of critique is also lost. For 
the totality constituted on capitalist terms could not then be criticized, 
but would only have to acquire consciousness of itself. Only a few say 
this as explicitly as Hardt and Negri, who already see communism 
everywhere peeking through from under the thin cover of capitalism; 
but this is in no way just an isolated quirk, but rather the logical 
consequence of the theoretical approach that they fundamentally 
share with all the discourse of class in its entirety.
This discourse certainly believes that it goes beyond traditional 
Marxism, because it has freed itself from the idea of a unified subject 
and instead permanently evokes the heterogeneity of the putative 
working class. But in this it fundamentally only reflects the inner 
disjointedness of  commodity society, which as asocial sociality, 
by definition, disintegrates into countless particularities.20 If this 
fragmented totality is immediately identified with the working 
class and appealed to positively, then the criteria necessary in order 
adequately to address the destructive capacities that are increasingly 
set free in the process of disintegration of bourgeois subjectivity are 
ultimately missing. This holds for racist and sexist violence as much as 
for antisemitic delusion and the ethnic and religious fundamentalisms 
that are gaining currency. From the perspective of class they cannot 
be decoded as inherent forms of  expression of  subjectivity in 
commodity society that present independent moments of the dynamic 
of capitalist crisis, because the fixation on the “fragmented class-
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subject” would otherwise be called into question. It is basically for 
this reason that they are always treated as external appearances, as a 
sort of disturbing factor that might be able to split the class context, 
but are not of essential concern. It thus ultimately remains a matter 
of personal taste to decide whether or not reactionary movements, 
be they ethno-nationalistic currents (in Spain, for example) or the 
so-called Second Intifada, can be included in the great consensus of 
anticapitalist struggles. The partition between the elements of the 
more recent discourse of class and the regressive decayed forms of 
traditional Marxism is thus extremely thin for the reason that the 
theoretical foundation is at heart the same.
No More Making of the Working Class 
In contrast to the attempts to save the working class by overexpanding 
its objective determinations are those whose arguments proceed 
primarily from the subjective side. According to these approaches, 
class is not defined by position in the process of production and 
valorization, but always constitutes itself  anew and is subject to 
permanent changes which are an essential result of the dynamic of 
class struggles. Such a perspective has the initial advantage of drawing 
attention to the active moments in social conflict, their process 
character, and the possibilities for subjective development that are 
contained within it, because the category of class is kept open and not 
codified in a definition. But the appearance of openness is deceptive. 
It is fundamentally limited by an axiom that is always placed in front 
of all specific analyses in advance, and that restricts their perspective. 
For it can be seen how self-evidently class struggle is presupposed 
as a transhistorically valid principle, from which class can then in 
turn be derived: “Always already present in all social relations, class 
struggle precedes the historical classes,” so the editorial of the issue 
of the journal Fantômas that has already been cited many times in 
this chapter.21 But with this the argument becomes circular. Both 
the concept of class and that of class struggle are defined completely 
arbitrarily. All social conflicts can in principle be ennobled to class 
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struggles without differentiation, and all participants to class subjects. 
In this manner, the subjectivist concept of class attains in principle 
the same result as its objective counterpart. It is thus no wonder that 
these former theoretical rivals are increasingly becoming reconciled 
with one another and living together in peace (as, for example, is the 
case in that issue of Fantômas). For wherever all conceptual stringency 
is lost and the “class” can simply be anything and everything, the old 
differences no longer play any sort of decisive role.
What is problematic here is primarily that the concept of class 
struggle, once it is dissolved from the historically specific context of 
the workers’ movement, the only context in which it made any sense, 
can very easily be short-circuited with a completely nonspecific 
concept of struggle, which corresponds more to the “war of all against 
all” (Hobbes) than a struggle against the conditions and impositions 
of capitalism. Once again, this is particularly apparent in Hardt and 
Negri, who transfigure even the individualized daily struggle for 
existence to a form of expression of class struggle, and no longer 
have any sort of criteria to distance themselves from outbreaks of 
regressive violence or even fundamentalist movements. Class struggle 
thus becomes an abstract and ultimately affirmative empty formula 
which encompasses the permanent internal state of war of capitalist 
society and its disintegration in crisis no less than the endeavors 
to oppose precisely this. Now it is true that many proponents of 
the subjectivist standpoint of class for good reasons do not wish to 
pursue this consequence to its end, but in this they end up with a 
fairly considerable burden of  justification. For their levitating, 
decontextualized concept of class struggle has no conceptual set of 
tools available that could distinguish between the mere action of 
bourgeois subjectivity in its ugliest facets (whether individual or 
collective) and the attempts to overcome precisely this (e.g., in grass-
roots social movements). To save the concept of class struggle, all kinds 
of argumentative bolt-ons are necessary (the recourse to discourse 
theory, for example), which only show how little it can itself contribute 
to the analytical clarification of social development.
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One of the most important witnesses for the case of the subjectivist 
theorists of class is the English social historian E.P. Thompson, who 
always emphasized the active moment in the emergence of the working 
class. In the preface to his most important historical study, which has 
the programmatic title The Making of the English Working Class, he 
writes “Making, because it is a study in an active process, which owes 
as much to agency as to conditioning. The working class did not rise 
like the sun at an appointed time. It was present at its own making.”22 
However, Thompson’s analyses refer — as he himself always insists 
— to processes in a highly specific historical situation: the capitalist 
drive to assert itself during the last third of the eighteenth and the 
first third of the nineteenth century in England. But this situation is 
evidently different from today’s in a fundamental way. It was shaped 
by the repression and destruction of the comparatively heterogeneous 
pre- and proto-capitalist living and working conditions under the 
ever stronger pressure of standardization of the capitalist mode 
of production and of life; and this means not least by the massive 
creation of doubly free wage workers who were compelled to sell 
their labor power in order to survive. In Thompson’s investigations 
he concentrated on the revolts and the struggles of resistance that 
were provoked by this process, and showed how during the course of 
them (and also by the experience of defeats) something like a class 
consciousness first began to take shape.
But while it was important to emphasize the significance of these 
subjective processes that had been ignored by orthodox Marxism, 
it was just as important that the insights gained by this process not 
be deleted from their historical context if they were not to become 
abstract in the bad sense. While the formation of a class consciousness 
is in no way the automatic result of the process of establishment of 
the valorization of capital, this subjective unification in a working 
class nonetheless corresponds to the simultaneous objective process 
of subordination of all social relations under the principle of unity 
of  abstract labor and commodity production. The two moments 
devour one another in a dialectical relationship. Thompson himself 
218 Marxism and the Critique of Value
emphasizes: “the class experience is largely defined by the productive 
relations into which men are born — or enter involuntarily. Class-
consciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled 
in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and 
institutional forms. If the experience appears as determined, class-
consciousness does not.”23
If  we transpose this claim onto the current situation, it must 
be acknowledged straight away that the objectively predefined 
context within which social experiences are made and social 
struggles are pursued is fundamentally different from that epoch. 
We are not standing today at the beginning of  the process of 
establishment of capitalism; the main trend is not by a long way that 
of the extermination of noncapitalist modes of life by means of the 
steamroller of valorization (although this is still happening in some 
parts of the world). We are rather facing a situation in which the 
commodity-producing system has generalized itself the world over 
and at the same time entered a fundamental process of crisis, because 
it undermines its own foundations by the increasing displacement of 
living labor power. This development, however, which is expressed 
in the increasing precarization of living and working conditions and 
in the fact that worldwide more and more people are being made 
surplus to the requirements of and excluded from the valorization of 
capital, is directly opposed to that of the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. In the current direction of development of the basic logic 
of capitalism that has become an end in itself can be found not the 
formation of a (new) working class, but the increasing destruction of a 
society which is based on the universalized compulsion to sell oneself. 
People, that is to say, are not being forced into a unified social form; 
rather, the form of unity in which they live and by means of which 
they are constituted is disintegrating, and they are thus falling through 
its structures. However, it is possible to speak of a unification in this 
context to the extent that the process which I described above under 
the concept of declassing is a universal one. But in itself, this contains 
nothing of consequence. Quite the opposite: capitalist fragmentation 
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is only the intensification of the logic of capital in the stage of its 
decomposition. This is true not only objectively, as exemplified by the 
exacerbated competition between locations, a quandary that from 
the beginning imposes limits upon the struggle between particular 
interests (for example against factory closure or wage cuts), although 
this does not fundamentally mean that these struggles have lost their 
immanent justification. At the same time, the exacerbated pressure 
of the struggle for existence has also made an essential contribution 
to the atomization and decline in solidarity and the broad-reaching 
establishment of  the capitalist subjectivity of  competition and 
delimitation.
This development is also expressed in the subjective forms of 
operation and modes of action. The movements of social resistance at 
the start of the nineteenth century emerged against the background 
of a repression of non- and proto-capitalist living conditions that 
were incompatible with the industrial-capitalist mode of production. 
In the light of  this collective experience and of  the tremendous 
imposition that was daily factory labor and the selfishness of 
capitalist competition, cultural patterns of interpretation and forms 
of practical solidarity were developed in resistance, which ultimately 
led to the formation of the consciousness of belonging to a class with 
a common fate. However, because today such a process of constitution 
is no longer and cannot any longer take place, the beginnings of 
anticapitalist resistance are overlayed and pushed back by processes 
of collectivization that are determined by regressive forms from the 
core stock of commodity-society subjectivity.24 This is true for the 
formation of sects and gangs just as for the antisemitic delusion, for the 
racist and religious forms of identity politics of all shades no less than 
for outbreaks of violence for its own sake. There is no new working 
class emerging here; what is rather taking place is the action of people 
who have been formed into subjects of labor and the commodity but 
who can no longer ordinarily function as such.25
However, the fragmentation of crisis capitalism does not only set 
free the regressive moments of the subject form; the emancipatory 
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impulses, ideas, and aspirations which had attached themselves to the 
struggle of the working class for recognition within bourgeois society 
have also lost their context and have to a certain extent begun to float 
free. The historical class struggle draws its comparative coherence 
from its focus on the opposition of the interests of capital and labor, 
an opposition which developed an integrating dynamic in the phase 
of the rise of capitalism. The resistance against the current wave of 
precarization and impoverishment, in contrast, continually exposes 
itself to the danger of itself reproducing the centrifugal tendencies of 
the unfolding capitalist crisis. It is thus faced with the difficult task 
of formulating and pursuing social conflicts in such a way that they 
counteract the intensified logic of competition and exclusion and the 
identity-political tendencies that accompany it. This will ultimately 
only succeed if different struggles and conflicts can be linked together 
across all borders without false proclamations of unity or hierarchies. 
This linking, however, cannot be derived from presupposed objective 
or subjective determinations (class standpoint or class struggle). It can 
only emerge from the conscious cooperation of such social movements 
that aspire to the abolition of domination in all its facets, and not only 
as an abstract, distant goal, but also within their own structures and 
relationships.
Blueprints for such movements cannot be drafted at the drawing 
board. Theory is unable to do anything other than formulate 
fundamental considerations in this direction. If we have anything to 
learn from Thompson’s investigations, it is the significance of practical 
experiences for the constitution of social movements. For this reason 
it is important to turn our attention to those processes within which 
resistance to capitalist impositions turns away from hierarchical, 
populist, and authoritarian attempts to draw people together, and 
where struggles between interests are linked to the establishment 
of self-organized structures. While such movements (as for example 
the Zapatistas, the autonomous currents of the Piqueteros, and other 
grass-roots movements) are in many respects contradictory — and 
we must on no account attempt to transfigure them romantically — 
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they are also in a minority on a world scale, and always under the 
threat of marginalization and cooptation.26 However, here can be 
found approaches and moments which point to the perspective of a 
liberation from the totality of commodity society. The future belongs 
not to class struggle, but to an emancipatory struggle without classes.
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Violence as the Order of Things  
and the Logic of Extermination
Ernst Lohoff (2003)
“I have always dreamed,” he mouthed fiercely, “of 
a band of men absolute in their resolve to discard 
all scruples in the choice of means, strong enough 
to give themselves frankly the name of destroyers, 
and free from the taint of that resigned pessimism 
which rots the world. No pity for anything on earth, 
including themselves, and death enlisted for good 
and all in the service of humanity — that’s what I 
would have liked to see.”
- Joseph Conrad, The Secret Agent
The Great Disillusionment 
The epochal break of 1989 promised — of this a victorious West was 
thoroughly convinced — the beginning of an age of peace. In a world 
unified under the banners of Democracy, Human Rights, and Globalized 
Markets, war and violence would become as obsolete as yesterday’s 
newspapers. With the aim of becoming their unifying synthesis, this 
hope grabbed hold of two of the hoariest, bedrock assumptions of 
Enlightenment thought. On one hand, it repeated the widely held 
notion, in circulation ever since the eighteenth century, that under 
the sway of the founding principles of modernity — reason, freedom, 
and the rule of law — there could be no real place for bloodshed. Wars, 
if they did occur, were anomalies resulting from the actions of agents 
of states ungrounded in these principles of liberty, fraternity, and 
equality. With the final victory of the West, such forms of power 
supposedly vanished, transforming the world into a garden of peace. 
The ongoing process of globalization, on the other hand, was itself 
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understood as a guarantee of pacification, since, with the triumph 
of an unbounded market totality, the state as a potential war-making 
power would increasingly find itself left behind by the market as a 
supposed force for peace. Since politics and the state increasingly lose 
individual significance, and are, nolens volens, subordinated entirely to 
a logic governed by the market and by one’s relation to it, the argument 
runs, wars are becoming more and more unlikely. 
The assumption that the guns fall silent where the market and 
its laws are the order of the day and that the triumph of economic 
logic is in itself the road to nonviolence has deep historical roots. Ever 
since Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant, this notion has belonged to 
the standard repertoire of liberal economics and the philosophy of 
the Enlightenment: “The spirit of trade cannot coexist with war, and 
sooner or later this spirit dominates every people.”1 It fell to Thomas 
Paine to give liberalism’s warranty of universal peace its classical 
configuration. In The Rights of Man (1792) he not only praises the 
peacemaking ideals glittering in the new dawn of abstract bourgeois 
principle, but in the same breath also salutes the market as “a pacific 
system, operating to unite mankind by rendering nations, as well as 
individuals, useful to each other.”2 “The invention of commerce has 
arisen since those governments began, and is the greatest approach 
toward universal civilization that has yet been made by any means not 
immediately flowing from moral principles.”3 
But developments since 1989 have effectively frustrated the 
expectation that, as a result of  the final victory of the West, the 
world would become a less violent place. This frustration can of 
course not solely be understood as the result of an overly optimistic 
prognosis resting on otherwise valid premises. It is the basic premises 
themselves, rooted in the deepest stratum of Enlightenment thinking, 
that have in fact now become untenable. They stand the real relations 
on their head. For a start, Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality do not, 
after all, form a rhyming couplet with Peace and Reconciliation. The 
unpleasant, sickly-sweet smell rising from these principles turns out, 
if we really hold our noses up close, to be an effluvium of intermingled 
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death and murder, more overpowering and all-pervasive today than 
ever before. 
Moreover, to equate the free market with peace and nonviolence is 
itself already a false step. To be sure, the initial phase of commodity-
producing society was marked by an increasing tendency to turn 
violence and war exclusively into matters of state. But from this it 
scarcely follows that the processes of state disintegration currently 
under way are going to make war and violence disappear. In the age 
of capitalist crisis that is now bursting onto the scene, they merely 
undergo a change of form. Within the framework of globalization, 
what we see flourishing across wide swathes of the world is, more 
precisely, an outright marketization of violence itself, as the latter 
becomes a stage for dramatis personae of an entirely new type. With 
the turn to warlordism and mafia rule in vast areas of the Third World, 
war-spawned commercial enterprises reminiscent, in a European 
context, of the age of the Renaissance and of the Thirty Years’ War, 
are staging a comeback. But in the Western metropolis as well, the 
state as a form of regimented violence is undergoing a metamorphosis 
in which, rather than dissipating, the potential for violence is simply 
given a freer rein.
This essay starts in the manner of an exploratory excavation of 
intellectual history. Via critical interrogations of Hegel, Hobbes, 
and Freud, here proposed as exemplifying the more general trend, 
the following thesis is developed: that the canon of Western values 
popularly called to mind by the slogan of Liberty, Fraternity, Equality is 
ultimately predicated on a merely temporary suspension of expressly 
homicidal violence. The very form of the commodity subject is built 
around a nucleus of violence. The essay’s second part analyzes the 
process of bringing war and violence under the sway of the state and 
understands the rise of the state as sole legitimate agent of violence 
as a two-sided process of implanting and taming this violent nucleus. 
In part three the dissolution of a state-governed regimentation of 
violence is described. The homicidal logic underlying the modern, 
commodity-generated process of subject constitution that has given 
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us Western values, having once been displaced, is now thrusting itself 
back into plain sight. 
Part One
Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity and the Violence at the Core  
of the Subject Form of Commodity-Producing Society 
According to its own self-understanding, the canon of Western values 
is essentially a programmatic antidote to arbitrary rule, tyranny, 
and murder. Notions of contract, legality, and morality derive their 
legitimation from the fact that, under their rule, bloodshed and all 
lawless, unregulated relations are prevented. Examined more closely, 
of course, another picture emerges than the one painted by Western 
ideology. The disease that Western values are supposed to remedy is, 
as a rule, the product of the cure itself. Destruction, murder, and chaos 
are themselves constitutive of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. What 
these principles represent is in no way the opposite of destruction 
and violence, but rather the result of the latter’s partial suspension 
and sublimation — the result of processes that, with the decadence 
of  commodity-producing society, could prove themselves to be 
everywhere subject to reversal. Where lawless, unregulated conditions 
take over from the day-to-day norms of commodity-producing society, 
the decadence of the latter serves, if anything, only to lay bare the 
ugliness underlying such norms. 
To the degree that the core values of the West have become, so 
to speak, the flesh and blood of commodity rationality, to that same 
degree are such values exempted from all critical reflection. The same 
is true of the real inner connection between the universal principles 
of the Enlightenment and the logic of violence and extermination 
underlying them. But for those whose thinking first paved the way 
for the values of the Enlightenment, and who produced the ideological 
prerequisites for their implementation, things looked otherwise. If 
their theoretical constructions are read against the grain, they blurt 
out things that their heirs would now be incapable of expressing. Even 
just a brief test-drilling into the foundations of Liberty, Fraternity, 
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and Equality here dredges up such monstrosities that it becomes 
impossible to draw in any naively positive way on the ideas of 1789 
without feelings of nausea.   
Homicidal Equality 
It would in no way be an exaggerated claim to locate the originating 
ground of all modern state and contract theory and the legitimation 
of the state itself in the panic-driven fear of self-created specters 
of  violence. In the case of  the progenitor of  modern political 
thought, Thomas Hobbes, at any rate, such fear constitutes both the 
unmistakable point of departure and a leitmotif. Hobbes’s concern is 
to legitimate and propagate the rule of the sovereign. But the resulting 
picture he draws of that sovereign is far from sympathetic. As the 
biblical name “Leviathan” reveals, Hobbes explicitly calls for the rule 
of something gigantic and terrifying enough to keep all citizens in 
check through the threat of its capacity for violence. But if rule by 
such a generalized and superior power appears unavoidable, this 
is precisely because Hobbes imagines the human species itself as a 
motley collection of notoriously antisocial, violent subjects. Only a 
super monster, according to Leviathan’s ceaselessly repeated axiom, 
can prevent the little monsters from constantly slitting each other’s 
throats, and thereby put an end to the supposed state of  nature 
proclaimed to be a “war of all against all.” 
The point of departure for all theories of contract is the notion of 
human equality. Although this idea was already known to the European 
Middle Ages, human equality in its Western version then referred only 
to the afterlife, to the equality of all mortals before God. Hobbes gets 
the credit for bringing the ideal of equality down from the religious 
sphere of the divine to earth. But this process of secularization only 
really steps into the spotlight when one considers just how it is that the 
father of contract and state theory defines human equality. Mortality 
as conditio humana is replaced in Hobbes by what might be termed 
the universal capacity for homicide. Men are equal insofar as all are 
equally capable of killing each other.
230 Marxism and the Critique of Value
Hobbes’s unremittingly empiricist understanding of equality 
initially rests on an “equality of hope.” But this equality does not 
join men together in a mode of common action and conduct. On the 
contrary, it sets them against each other in the pursuit of “the same 
thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy.”4 It is precisely 
such “equality of hope” whereby men, finding themselves on, “the 
way to their End, which is principally their owne conservation, and 
sometimes their delectation only” are led to become “Enemies.” In 
their “Naturall Condition,” however, it is a matter of more than just 
distrust and the constant suspicion of one another. To the equality of 
hope there corresponds an “equality of ability,” and this is above all to 
be understood as the primal ability of men to dispatch one another to 
the other world. For Hobbes men are equal insofar as “the weakest has 
strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or 
by confederacy with others.”5 
Only the existence of  a state power armed with all means of 
coercion makes possible the transformation of this homicidal primal 
relation into a relation between equal, contractual, and juridical 
subjects. The very existence of a state positing such contractual and 
juridical subjects must spring from the prior consent of Hobbes’s 
natural-born killers to relinquish their naturally given right to kill 
each other and to confer it on a generalized super-killer. 
Of  course, it is not hard to discern the specific historical 
background from which the Hobbesian approach to Western values 
springs. The writing of Leviathan bears the imprint of the wars of 
state formation (Jacob Burkhardt’s so-called Staatsbildungkriege), the 
wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that were to decide 
to whom would fall the task of sovereign rule over which western and 
central European territories. In view of the unprecedented horrors 
that accompanied this process of elimination and selection, Hobbes’s 
wish to see the number of contenders for rule over England, France, 
and other countries reduced as quickly as possible to one per territory 
— no matter which one — has something to be said for it. But insofar 
as Hobbes simply projected the crimes of the early modern states in 
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spe onto human nature as such, they become more than the ideological 
inversions needed to legitimize the absolutist states of his day. There 
are two respects in which Hobbes’s thinking points beyond his own 
times. First, there is the fact that the results of his efforts at ideological 
projection were to be widely adopted. Just as he ascribes the brutality 
of early-modern military absolutism to human nature and expands the 
definition of an institutionalized Western reason in such a way as to 
make it the solution itself for all horrors connected with that process, 
just so has commodity rationality — the spontaneous or common-sense 
understanding native to commodity society — repeatedly managed to 
exploit the horrors, past and present, born out of its own historical 
genesis into means of self-legitimation. Whether it is witch hunts, 
National Socialism, or al-Qaeda, such commodity thought always 
misrecognizes as nameless, alien powers sprung out of the abysses of 
the human soul what are, in fact, its own products. Second, Hobbes’s 
construct renders visible the basic relation into which human beings 
enter as a result of capitalism’s “asocial sociality.”6 Contract and law are 
by no means precipitates of human cooperation but instead grow out 
of a sublimated praxis of violence, a violence prohibited according to 
the enforced norms of commodity society, but which is itself logically 
presupposed by it. 
Freedom, Liberty, and the Fight to the Death
Hegel repeatedly and decisively stresses the interconnection 
between freedom and violence. Concerning mind or spirit itself, a 
well-known passage in the introduction to the Phenomenology states 
programmatically: “But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks 
from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather 
the life that endures it and maintains itself in it.”7 What this means 
for the free commodity subject and his self-consciousness becomes 
particularly evident in the “lordship and bondage” section of the 
Phenomenology. Here Hegel’s point of departure on the path leading 
to self-consciousness and freedom is a struggle taking shape as a 
duel to the death between two configured abstractions, lord and 
232 Marxism and the Critique of Value
bondsman. This difference here between what are also, respectively, 
“independence” and “dependence” is referred back to differing degrees 
of defiance in the face of death on the part of the two contendants. The 
lord is the first to rise to the occasion of a still incomplete stage of self-
consciousness, given his willingness to go to extremes. The bondsman, 
on the other hand, fearful of risking his life at the crucial moment, 
is not able to tear away the bars which man must break through in 
order to attain the conditions both of being recognized by others and 
of self-consciousness. “The individual who has not risked his life […] 
has not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent self-
consciousness.”8 
But for the bondsman as well, the duel becomes the starting point 
on his path to self-consciousness. “For this consciousness has been 
fearful, not of this or that particular thing or just at odd moments, but 
its whole being has been seized with dread; for it has experienced the 
fear of death, the absolute Lord. In that experience it has been quite 
unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being, and everything 
solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations.”9 Precisely this 
quaking makes the bondsman ripe, through the detour of labor, for 
leaving behind the “natural existence” from which the master had 
freed himself in struggle. And yet he accomplishes this even more 
thoroughly than did the master when he directly scaled his way 
upwards into the stage of self-consciousness. The autotelic activity 
of labor takes on the function of the fight “to the death” and thereby 
becomes its heir. 
In the primal scene that is the achieving of freedom and self-
consciousness, the death against which the combatants must face off 
appears as something threefold. First, “each aims at the destruction 
and death of the other.” Achieving self-consciousness is thus bound 
to the will to make one’s opponent into a dead object. At the same time 
it includes putting one’s own life on the line, that is, the willingness 
to turn oneself into a dead object and to adopt an indifferent attitude 
toward one’s own fate. And finally it means the essential determination 
of  recognition-by-others and of  self-consciousness as products 
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of struggle, the devalorizing of all that is not at home and does not 
discover its own original image on the battlefield. Whatever is not born 
so as to wager its own life is judged to be inessential and therefore, 
paradoxically, already dead. For Hegel, freedom and, accordingly, 
real life are cries heard only on the battlefield — and its surrogates — 
where citizens indulge in manly virtues. Or as Hegel himself puts it: 
“But because it is only as a citizen that he is actual and substantial, the 
individual, so far as he is not a citizen but belongs to the Family, is only 
an unreal impotent shadow. This universality which the individual as 
such attains is pure being, death; it is a state which has been reached 
immediately, in the course of Nature, not the result of  an action 
consciously done.”10 
Hegel’s verdict here is aimed primarily against that whose 
existence he characteristically deems unworthy of  mention: 
dissociated femininity. A masculinized logos-cum-self-consciousness 
imagines itself  as the source of all true life, generating all that is 
substantive in reality out of itself.11 While the woman inevitably leads 
her existence completely inside the family and therefore in the realm 
of the “insubstantial shadows,” the man participates as citizen and 
warrior in the life born out of confrontation with death. The actual 
delivery room in which this peculiar birthing ability realizes itself, 
remains for Hegel on the battlefield. Death and extermination thus by 
no means end with what is imagined as the primal act of one-on-one 
combat between master and bondsman. To prevent the regression of 
the self-consciousness to a creature-like state, the original duel must 
be periodically renewed. This, then, is the true task of war, the “duel 
on a large scale” (Clausewitz): “War is the Spirit and the form in which 
the essential moment of the ethical substance, the absolute freedom 
of the ethical self from every existential form, is present in its actual 
and authentic existence.”12
Hegel is an apologist and propagandist for the emerging fabric of 
commodity society, not its critic; but he is no admirer of destruction 
as “an end in itself.” The life-and-death struggle is justified for him 
solely in regard to its successful suspension, in the universalization 
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of the self-conscious labor- and commodity subject. The possibility of 
“sudden death” in a duel does not shrink before its own aestheticization 
but rather matures into praise of the “slow death” (Baudrillard), into 
the self-justification of the commodity subject in its expenditure of 
abstract labor. 
Hegel’s apologetic reference to war, moreover, in no way 
contradicts this. If he treats war as something to be honored, what he 
pictures here is far from an orgy of total destruction that leaves nary 
a stone standing. War merely demonstrates the nullity of individual 
existence. While later authors celebrate looking death straight in 
the eye on the battlefield as an act of self-positing on the part of the 
individual, Hegel regards this act (and death in general) as the victory 
of the human species over the individual human organism. In death, 
freedom conceived as universality triumphs over the narrow-minded 
particular: “The sole work and deed of  universal freedom is therefore 
death, a death too which has no inner significance or filling, for what 
is negated is the empty point of the absolutely free self. It is thus the 
coldest and meanest of all deaths, with no more significance than 
cutting off a head of cabbage or swallowing mouthful of water.”13 
On the other hand, an unshackled destruction that not only causes 
the individual but even the universal to tremble makes Hegel cringe. 
This becomes obvious in the passages of the Philosophy of Right in which 
Hegel brings up the internal connection, in relation to the state and 
politics, between the normativity of commodity society and pure 
extermination. The content of the “free will” which realizes itself at 
the end of history in the Prussian state to which Hegel pays homage 
is positively determined in its content, making reality as a whole into 
material for the formation of the state and for the valorization of value. 
Before it can reach this final stage, however, it takes on the form of a 
negative will that flees “from all content as a barrier.” Freedom appears 
initially as a freedom 
of the void, which has taken actual shape, and is stirred to 
passion. […] [B]ecoming actual it assumes both in politics 
and religion the form of a fanaticism, which would destroy 
235Violence as the Order of Things
the established social order, remove all individuals suspected 
of desiring any kind of order, and demolish any organization 
which then sought to rise out of the ruins. Only in devastation 
does the negative will feel that it has reality. It intends, indeed, 
to bring to pass some positive social condition, such as universal 
equality or universal religious life. But in fact it does not will 
the positive reality of any such condition, since that would 
carry in its train a system, and introduce a separation by way 
of institutions and between individuals. But classification and 
objective system attain self consciousness only by destroying 
negative freedom. Negative freedom is actuated by a mere 
solitary idea, whose realization is nothing but the fury of 
desolation.14 
The movement of “absolute abstraction” that, otherwise contentless, 
finds its content in pure destruction, was historically identified by 
Hegel with the horrific events of the French Revolution. Although it 
deeply unnerves him, Hegel ascribes the “fury of destruction” without 
exception to an epoch that, however necessary, has drawn to a close and 
that reveals itself to have been a transitional stage since superseded. In 
the process, the “fury of destruction” is stood on its head and becomes 
the legitimation of commodity society and its corresponding state 
form. If  one cancels out Hegel’s historical optimism without also 
deleting the inner connection he establishes between the freedom 
of destruction and the normality of commodity society, another, 
more consistent but at the same time more angst-ridden picture 
appears: behind what purports to be an immature form of the realm 
of freedom now fully overcome, what the “fury of destruction” and 
the “freedom of the void” show us is, in fact, the inherent logic of a 
possibility that is continuously inherent in the “freedom of the will” 
and the principles of the West. Even worse, what Hegel treats as an 
alleged period of transition threatens to become the vanishing point 
of modernity. If  the normality of commodity society decays, that 
is, if  the state form begins to deteriorate and the movement of the 
exploitation of labor as an end in itself loses its bonding power, then 
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an alternative end in itself — destruction and extermination — can 
take its place. Reified, commodity-mediated “freedom,” which loses 
its content with the progressive cessation of nation state building and 
the accumulation of abstract labor, has won for itself, ultima instantia, 
in the sheer, naked destructiveness that remains, the possibility of 
another content. Hobbes’s horrific vision of a “war of all against all” 
threatens to assume reality as what Hans Magnus Enzensberger has 
called “molecular civil-war.”
Fraternity and Extended Suicide
Hobbes and Hegel have already divulged the fact that labor, as 
commodity society’s primary relation to nature, traces its origins even 
further back — to violence. In the fight to the death, furthermore, 
they had found the source both of self-consciousness and of the 
universality of the state. The principles of freedom and equality are 
thus derivatives of that foundational experience. Both as regards its 
relation to nature as well as its identity, the commodity subject rests 
on a bedrock of violence, and the primal encounter of this subject with 
its other, the originating social experience, is anything but peaceful. 
And yet, wide-ranging as it may already be, the matter does not end 
here. What remains is the question of the original social bond or, to 
put it in terms of the holy ideals of the bourgeois revolution: does the 
last part of the threefold promise — Liberty, Equality, Fraternity — 
conceal the same threat?
The answer given by our third involuntary principal witness, 
Sigmund Freud, turns out to be quite unequivocal. At the beginning of 
all civilization stands the collective murder that shapes our thoughts, 
feelings, and culture to this very day. Initially — thus Freud in allusive 
reliance on Darwin — the human species had been split into presocial 
patriarchal hordes that only had space for the chief tyrant and his 
wives but not for the pubescent sons. Sociality only emerges at the 
moment when the ostracized brothers gang up with one another so as 
to undertake the act of murdering the tyrannical father — whereupon, 
troubled by that original collective guilt, they created a common 
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regime: “Society was now based on complicity in the common crime; 
religion was based on the sense of guilt and the remorse attaching to 
it; while morality was based partly on the exigencies of this society 
and partly on the penance demanded by the sense of guilt.”15 
The inner affinity between Freud’s speculations regarding the 
emergence of culture from the original state of mankind and the world 
according to Hobbes is obvious enough, if only because both presume 
a state of radical asociality as the starting point for the development 
of mankind. While Hobbes’s natural-born killers are able to agree on 
a social contract that stipulates the transfer of their sovereignty to the 
state in order to bring to an end the universal threat of homicide, a 
direct “gentlemen’s agreement” takes on the same function in Freud: 
“In thus guaranteeing one another’s lives, the brothers were declaring 
that no one of them must be treated by another as their father was 
treated by all jointly.”16 As one follows Freud’s arguments in Totem 
and Taboo it becomes apparent that they increasingly approximate 
those of the father of state theory and indeed prove themselves to be 
the reproduction of Hobbes’s thinking, expanded so as to account for 
the question of the family and the emotional life of the murderer. The 
development of culture, according to Freud, does not come to a stop 
with the emergence of the brother-clan. Rather, society and culture 
represent entities grounded on a posthumous identification with 
paternal authority. On the level of psychology the murdered patriarch 
celebrates his resurrection as superego, on the level of religion as the 
father-god, and last but not least as the secular “father” state with a 
vengeance. With this last point, however, Freud touches down precisely 
at the juncture already reached by Hobbes several generations before. 
Totem and Taboo and his later writings on culture do not win Freud 
many friends among more recent generations of readers. The collective 
murder of the father is nowadays commonly held to rest on the same 
wild and unfounded speculation that lead Freud to formulate, as literal 
truth, the theory of a “death drive” in the aftermath of the World War 
I, which was purported to be the world-historical event in which the 
drive had itself first become manifest. To be sure, the construct of a 
238 Marxism and the Critique of Value
primal horde of vengeful brothers appears ridiculous in the face of all 
that is now known about prehistory. Similarly, the statement that “the 
aim of all life is death” because “inanimate things existed before living 
ones” at first glance appears more than a little dubious.17 But are such 
necrophiliac murmurings therefore nothing but superfluous noise 
that need only be silenced to rescue the analytical value of Freud’s 
approach? Or are the death drive and the fraternity of parricides in fact 
metapsychological constructs essential to the architecture of Freud’s 
theory? Indeed, are they not, in point of fact, indispensable if Freud is 
to be able to speak at all about the violence at the core of the commodity 
subject without revealing its historical specificity as a phenomenon 
of bourgeois society? 
As in Hobbes and Hegel before him, in Freud the constitutive but 
buried connection between violence and the commodity subject is 
brought into view. Like his predecessors, of course, he can only reveal 
this intimate relation by clouding its specific character and turning 
it into something transhistorical and naturally given, substituting 
projection for repression. The projective character of  Freud’s 
phylogenetic myth can, in truth, scarcely be ignored. But the killing 
of the primal father is only the tip of the iceberg in the formation of 
a generalized theory subject to continuous ontologization. Initially, 
this is true of  the ontogenetic model of  an ominously parricidal 
primal horde, but therefore just as true of the oedipally constituted 
male infant. This model, in a process resembling a form of repetition 
compulsion, reproduces the murderous original event. This, however, 
inverts the real relationship. The (self-)destructive tendencies 
developed, in statu nascendi, by the commodity subject do not stem 
from a “collective unconscious” and from dredging up old memories of 
even more archaic conditions liable to fall prey to primary repression. 
What must here be repressed are the achievements of a commodity-
governed civilization. Repression is, therefore, not a primary but a 
secondary act, for prior to any restraint on the violence at the core of 
the commodity subject stands, of course, that very subject’s (far from 
archaic) implantation.
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Yet such is still not the deepest layer of Freudian ontologizing. The 
Oedipal problem in no way stands alone. The prohibition the father 
imposes on the son is imposed as the “reality principle.” It is therefore 
only the continuation and bundling of a whole range of previously 
existing prohibitions. On Freud’s account, every human being 
experiences the world from the beginning as an inhospitable place 
and any satisfaction whatsoever is an unmistakably precarious and 
ephemeral affair. For the commodity subject this is, no doubt, entirely 
accurate. Every enjoyment turns into a surrogate satisfaction, and he 
or she never reaches a goal that would ultimately be worth reaching. 
This restlessness and emotional undernourishment, however, appears 
in Freud as the conditio humana, as a purely endogenous problem, 
ultimately posited by the biology of man as a being born into scarcity. 
Already the introduction of the concept of the drive consolidates this 
false ontologization. By defining the satisfaction of drives as a relief 
of tension and a form of protection against external stimuli, therefore 
as an approximation of an inorganic state, Freud must inevitably 
understand the relation of man to the exterior world as a relation of 
frustration. Every libidinal satisfaction remains not only provisional 
but also a detour. Actual satisfaction and the true goal can only lie in 
finally entering the realm of the inorganic that absolves man of the 
return of the drive and tension. Although Freud introduces the “death 
drive” (Thanatos) and its opponent, Eros, rather late, the reason for 
this introduction rests in the logic of the drive, the concept it rescues 
theory-immanently. The counterpart of the death drive, therefore, 
resembles more closely the concept of the drive predicated on the 
“nirvana principle,” and it is consequently logical that Freud ultimately 
opposed it drive-theoretically to Eros as the more fundamental and 
far-reaching emotion.
It would be inadequate to dismiss Freud’s idea of an external world, 
always hostile to man, and its counterpart, the insatiable drive, as 
simply false. Social critique, more accurately, must be critical of Freud 
insofar as he presents a product of “second nature” as one of man’s 
first nature, and it has to trace the theoretical inversions resulting 
240 Marxism and the Critique of Value
from this. If one reconsiders Freud’s approach from this perspective, 
the “archaic heritage,” the patricidal primal horde, appears in a 
radically changed light. It reveals itself to be a metaconcept clad in 
mystical garments that encompasses all social institutions involved 
in the process of implanting the death drive. The homicidal desire 
of the primal horde with regard to the father on which Freud insists 
reveals itself in this context as a code for a much more common urge to 
destroy, and simultaneously as the negation of the actual target. Above 
all else, the “brother horde” represents, in full accord with the paternal 
command, the self-sufficient masculine principle and the fear of the 
woman and, moreover, of the unregulated engagement with reality 
as such. In the ideal of “fraternity” the commodity subjects commit 
themselves and everyone else to the program of “emancipation” from 
the material-sensuous. In the dictatorship of value and logos the aim of 
transforming this planet into a place that is largely immune to pleasure 
and satisfaction shows its clear contours. Reality is only permitted as 
the sensuous form of representation of abstraction. But there remains 
a second, direct path to complete liberation from uncontrolled reality, 
pleasure, and satisfaction: the destruction of the world. The alleged 
starting point of the development of culture, the common killing of 
the father, represents the only possible endpoint of modernity: the 
extended collective suicide of patriarchal value society. 
The Violent Core of the Commodity Subject
Sexuality — or at least what modernity understands by sexuality — 
only emerges, as Foucault illustrates convincingly, with the prohibition 
of the sexual. Nothing already existing was brought under control; 
rather, the procedures of control constituted their very objects. A 
similar relationship can be reconstructed for the phenomenon of 
violence. Officially a peace-loving being, the commodity subject is 
fascinated, if not obsessed, with what it resolutely rejects in its public 
declarations. In its actual, masculine manifestation, one can, therefore, 
indeed accuse the commodity subject of maintaining an intimate 
relation to reality much like that characterizing the relation of the 
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Spanish Inquisition to lust, witchcraft, and heresy. To be sure, the 
propensity for violence was well known in traditional societies. As the 
right of force of all rulers that permeated all hierarchical structures, 
violence was as self-evidently present as it was a fundamental aspect 
of  gentile order (including paternalistic right of  castigation and 
vendetta). Purified from the medium of oppression to the medium of 
destruction and extermination, violence in the context of commodity 
society transformed itself into the foundation of all subject forms. Only 
the ability to degrade others to the status of object makes a subject into 
a subject, and this degradation, even if it assumes its sublimated form 
as competition, remains retroactively attached to its original image: 
the transmutation of the living other into a lifeless object. Against 
this background it appears profoundly questionable to celebrate 
with Norbert Elias the “process of civilization” as a process of drive 
control in general and the control of aggression in particular. Yet, this 
is not only questionable because it has failed to control the “natural 
beast” in man, as culture pessimists such as Freud found necessary 
to stress time and again. Rather, the mission itself contains a crucial 
contradiction. The constitution of the subject is simultaneously the 
implantation and formation of the violent core and its integration 
into content.
In the breast of the developed commodity-subject two souls emerge: 
that of the private market subject and that of the citizen. The violent 
core of the commodity subject did not simply emerge temporally 
alongside this bipolar structure. Rather, it has to be logically as well 
as historically understood as the same process. The superiority of 
military organization founded on “citizens in uniform” as compared to 
previous forms of the craft of extermination contributed significantly 
to the triumph of the citizen and the universalization of this figure. 
The impulse to include previously excluded social groups as equal 
subjects of law into the state community had a significant impact. 
From the French and American revolutionary wars to the world wars 
and the anticolonial movements, the willingness to risk one’s own life 
for the national cause was the measure of the accomplished degree 
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of citizen consciousness as a citizen. Not only this, but expanding 
the circle of  legally equal citizens and subjects of  law to include 
those groups of people formerly relegated to the margins was in each 
case a consequence of the necessity to expand the mobilization for 
warfare — a process, therefore, that was poignantly carried out largely 
independently of the political auspices under which those wars were 
carried out. 
At the same time — and even more importantly in our context 
— the profile required of the armed citizen matched precisely the 
tensions, constitutive for commodity subjectivity, emerging from a 
willingness to defend that was steadily and simultaneously increased 
in intensity and tamed. As a result of tailoring the citizen for the virtual 
or actual participation in wars between states, those inner regimes of 
violence formed, without which the modern monad of competition and 
labor could not have developed. The fraternity of the national “we,” 
the self-integration of the armed body of the people, paves the way for 
the commodity ego by simultaneously curbing both its self-destructive 
tendencies and its antisocial affinity toward autonomous, self-
orchestrated killing sprees.18 Training for the state of emergency and 
the identification with the national cause ennobled the participation 
in optimized exercises of violence and extermination, elevating them 
to the epitome of virtue and duty, hermetically separating “fields of 
honor” from the normal activities of commodity society. 
Part Two: The Age of Statified Violence 
Beyond Law and Contract — Camp and Front   
If one examines the victory of commodity society on a macro-level, it 
reveals itself as unifying two fundamental processes: the successive 
reduction of all social relations to market relations, and the statification 
of social existence. The history of violence clearly corresponds to the 
latter process. The entire epoch of the rise of commodity society, 
beginning with absolutism and extending into the age of Fordism, 
was marked by the transformation of violence and bloodshed into an 
exclusive right of the state. In its developed form, the state no longer 
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tolerates any extrastatist forms of violent practice, with the exception 
of rudimentary forms such as the right to self-defense. 
The primitive accumulation of all legitimate means of violence 
into the hands of the state is not just any moment within the overall 
process of statification. The implementation of the monopoly on 
violence rather constitutes the core around which the state forms itself 
as abstract universality. As long as it goes without saying that masters 
across the spectrum of power are able to enforce at times conflicting 
interests whenever necessary through the use of violence, social life 
inevitably remains confined to the realm of individual relations of 
loyalty and dependence. Only the implementation of the monopoly on 
violence allowed the state to break up the colorful mosaic of traditional 
customary rights and replace it with a homogenous, universal right, 
equally binding for all members of society. Without the monopoly 
on violence, the political domination adequate to commodity society, 
applied to an abstract geographical space, could never have been 
developed. 
The implementation of the state monopoly on violence — the 
reduction  of the once-broad range of legitimate actors of violence to 
one new type — and the formation of the violent core of the commodity 
subject describe one and the same process from two perspectives: first, 
from the standpoint of the objectified social structure as a whole; 
second, from the micro-logical standpoint of the singular commodity 
individual. Therefore, a counterpart to the above-described dialectic 
of breeding and taming a violent core, constitutive for commodity 
subjectivity, must be developed on the macro-level. Indeed, the 
statification of the exercise of violence can be characterized as a 
double process of potentiation and potentialization. In developed 
commodity society, manifest physical coercion plays a notably smaller 
role in daily life than in many other societies. Yet, this is not, as is 
frequently claimed, the result of reducing aggression and destruction 
to an insignificant marginal force in the context of the social context 
of mediation. The development of statified regimes of violence, rather, 
coincides with the focalization, purification, and intensification of the 
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potential for extermination in its entirety. Only in a state of exception 
does state power wade through pools of blood and transform the 
citizen into the human material of the killing machine. Precisely this 
state of exception, however, allows for the creation of social standards 
in the first place and indeed, as omnipresent possibility and ultima 
ratio, constitutes the logical precondition of all standards.
Commodity thought does not want to know the violent core of 
the subject of competition and instead celebrates it as the epitome of 
peace-loving humanity. Correspondingly, commodity thought also 
remains blind to the inner relationship between statification and the 
hypertrophy of violence. Although the term itself already signifies 
the opposite, the emergence of the state monopoly on violence is 
positively interpreted as gradual pacification. First, according to 
the narrative that has been circulating since the Enlightenment, the 
triumph of freedom, equality, and law clears the inner space of the 
state of violence. In a large second step, this judification, according 
to this credo, is also supposed to subsume inter-state spaces and to 
demilitarized international relations. The classical version of this 
argument goes back to Kant and has been warmed over for more than 
200 years now. Violence, it is argued, is an anachronism, which will 
not be able to resist the advance of market and law. 
Already the first part of this pacification process defies reality. 
In commodity society one can only speak of inner pacification if the 
word is taken in its Latin meaning as synonym for total subjugation. 
Such a society is peaceful only insofar as the individual member of 
society, insofar as he does not act as a functionary of state violence, is 
tendentially robbed of all means of violence in order to deliver him to 
a highly developed machine of state violence. The principle of a state 
of law in no way supplants this fundamental relation of omnipotence 
and impotence. Instead, the universality of law requires this very 
relation. As Giorgio Agamben has shown with reference to Benjamin 
and Foucault, the sovereign as instance that posits and guarantees 
law himself has the power to reduce human existence to “bare life.”19 
The normality of the constitutional state in which all those who break 
245Violence as the Order of Things
the law have the right to a trial based on the tenets of legality cannot 
be thought without recourse to the possibility of a state of exception. 
Only the ability to make reference to this possibility constitutes the 
sovereign. But this is, of course, not merely an abstract, theoretical 
threat. By creating an exterritorial space, the camp, it can be 
absolutely realized without calling the validity of legal and contractual 
regulations into question for the rest of society. In the twentieth 
century, it is precisely this localization of the state of exception in 
compliance with the form of  right that has become a gruesome 
reality on several occasions. The camp, consequently, represents the 
“nomos of modernity” (Agamben). Yet, one does not have to invoke 
the death camp of Nazi Germany or the Stalinist gulags to unveil this 
fundamental contradiction. Already the “normal” Western deportation 
prisons indicate the peaceful coexistence of law and its foundation, 
state power exercised over human beings reduced to prelegal biomass.
To confuse the emergence of the state monopoly on violence with 
pacification, however, does not only mean to ignore the incredible 
potential of violence on which the constitutional state is predicated 
and that can become manifest especially in times of crisis. In addition 
to the camp, the internal space that is excluded from the law, the 
implementation of the state monopoly on violence generates out of 
its own logic a second area beyond the validity of law, in which pure 
violence takes on, in the final instance, the function of a medium of 
regulation: international relations. The state monopoly on violence is 
always confined to its own territory. Only there, that is vis-à-vis its own 
population, can the sovereign enforce the relinquishing of violence 
and therefore posit law. For international relations the dominance of 
the sovereignty principle correlates ultimately with the ius ad bellum. 
Of course there have existed bilateral agreements ever since ancient 
times and international conventions since the nineteenth century 
— even martial law (ius in bello) was created. But these contractual 
agreements among sovereigns have a completely different character 
from law connected to the omnipotence of a single sovereign. These 
agreements leave untouched the possibility of international wars as 
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ultima ratio — what is more, they presuppose these wars and their 
validity. After World War II and especially after the breakdown of 
actually existing socialism, international tribunals gained a growing 
importance. But because they can only dispose of borrowed means of 
power, voluntarily surrendered by single states the basic structure 
does not change one bit.
In the case of military emergency the counterpart of the camp 
emerges, a second exterritorial space in which the social relations turn 
from normal, “peaceful” competition into optimized physical violence 
without thereby questioning the validity of law and contract in the 
actual territory of a sovereign. This space is the front. While in the 
camp human material is administered by the national sovereign, the 
front covers exactly that territory in which hostile sovereigns attempt 
to turn foreign citizens into dead biomass. As opposed to the camp, the 
geographical location of this exterritorial interstitial space changes 
constantly throughout the course of a war. At the same time, the size 
of this space expands as the reach of weapons systems increases. 
The bombing of Guernica, the beginning of modern warfare against 
civilian targets, marks the moment at which in principle every location 
in the territory of any given party involved in the conflict could be 
turned into a front. 
Combatant and Noncombatant
The process of the statification of violence and war creates the violent 
core of the commodity subject, while the corresponding violence 
and annihilation practices are sequestered from everyday life. This 
separation is connected to two key characteristics of statified warfare. 
The state wars between 1648 and 1989 were temporally limited. The 
line of demarcation between war and peace was explicitly defined. 
The state sovereign decided, universally and with binding validity, 
when exactly and for how long the duty to engage in highly efficient, 
collective murder replaced the obligation of the contract subject to 
refrain unconditionally from violence. Declaration of war, ceasefire 
agreements, and surrenders precisely designated the beginning 
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and end of all military action and categorically prevented precisely 
those abeyances that were characteristic of early modern markets 
of violence and their postnational epigones. But the clear distinction 
between war and peace in conflicts between nation-states was not just 
a matter of unequivocal regulations of international law; it also had 
an impact on practical life.
Everyday life of people in the Middle Ages was often not greatly 
affected by whether or not their masters were at war. Early modern 
wars, which were determined by the logic of markets of violence, 
were already accompanied by a sudden increase in losses, both 
material and human. But this pertained mainly to those people who 
were unfortunate enough to live in those areas that were afflicted by 
packs of lansquenets and who consequently lost their possessions 
or even their lives. Compared to the number of deaths suffered by 
uninvolved civilians, death in battle remained a rarity in the wars of 
the Renaissance and even throughout the Thirty Years’ War. Because 
they would run the risk of staking their capital, that is, their troops, the 
condottieri did not categorically seek military resolutions of disputes. 
In many cases the goal was to motivate hostile lansquenets to switch 
sides rather than to kill them. 
The wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries broke with 
this pattern. The statification of war was accompanied by the focusing 
of the craft of murder and extermination. As the sovereign assumed 
the direction of a war effort himself, the killing was widely relocated 
to the battlefield. While the intensity of the military actions increased 
and war began to be a seriously dangerous business for the troops, 
the category of the noncombatant emerged. Now it was no longer the 
civilian who paid for the war effort with his life and property, but the 
taxpaying civilian who paid for the war effort with a portion of his 
property but no longer directly with his life. 
That state warlords drilled their soldiers, at times with rather 
drastic measures, to massacre and maraud no longer for their own 
benefit was, of course, not a result of humanistic impulses. Facing 
armies that were increasingly supplied via a centralized system 
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utilizing state resources and training soldiers for warfare, troops 
for whom combat was a secondary profession were at a decided 
disadvantage, since they were forced to disperse at regular intervals 
to replenish their resources. Their ability to operate was detrimentally 
affected by this, and, moreover, autonomous looting and raping did 
not exactly boost military discipline.
It was not only for strategic reasons that the statification of war 
sought to assign to the unarmed foreign population the status of 
noncombatant, thereby allowing for social normality in wartime; 
above all it turned the maintenance and support of normal commodity 
society in the home country into a military necessity. When, beginning 
with the Italy campaign by Francis I in 1494, war mutated from a 
form of reproduction of war enterprises into a duel of war machines 
seeking a military decision, military expenses exploded. The monetary 
valuation of warfare and the recruiting of mercenary soldiers had 
already made national bankruptcy a constant companion of  the 
early modern superpowers. The introduction of standing armies in 
particular contributed to the exponential rise of mobilizing resources 
for destructive purposes. Access to the goods and chattels of  the 
unfortunate vanquished inhabitants of war-torn territories proved 
itself to be an insufficient foundation for war economies. Vis-à-vis 
the local self-supply of armies, taxation become more important than 
ever for states engaged in military conflict. But this required above 
all the implantation and maintenance of economic normality and the 
assurance of the abstract production of wealth in the home territory. 
For the hitherto main victims — the uninvolved inhabitants 
of the territories beleaguered by armies — the unleashing of the 
military potential for extermination meant the taming of destructive 
violence. This dialectic is also reflected in martial law. After the end 
of the wars of religion, the clear distinction between combatant and 
noncombatant emerged. But this differentiation corresponds precisely 
to the above-mentioned inner regime of violence implemented by 
statified warfare. The respective coexistence of  destruction and 
normality appears geographically as the antagonism of front and 
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hinterland, and, on the personal level, in the difference between 
combatant and noncombatant. 
The classic manifestation of the noncombatant emerges in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Industrialized war discovered, 
in addition to opposing armies, new targets of attack, the pursuit of 
which indirectly influences the will and military power of the opposing 
sovereign: infrastructure and the working civilian population. This 
change rendered the distinction of combatant and noncombatant 
problematic. However, it neither annulled nor contradicted the 
concentration of warfare into the foundations of state power. Because 
modern warfare mobilized not only monetary resources but also the 
majority of social resources, the producers of wealth became indirect 
combatants. The distinction between civil and military targets became 
a matter of discretion. At least in the protection of the civil population 
in occupied territories, limits to the practice of extermination and the 
difference between combatant and noncombatant continued to exist. 
In the twentieth century, limiting destruction by means of 
differentiating between combatant and noncombatant became 
problematic beyond the context of  industrialized wars between 
capitalist protopowers. Anticolonial conflicts, the wars of state creation 
at the periphery of  the world market, also changed their classic 
character. In the confrontation with superior military occupying 
powers, the only form of armed combat with which anti-imperialist 
movements were left was guerilla warfare, a form of asymmetrical 
warfare that consciously forces the enemy into a position in which 
he is no longer able to tell combatants from civilians. The military 
goals of both sides, of course, implicitly maintained the distinction, 
and in this way it continued to determine the progress of war and 
curbed destructive energy. The theoreticians and practitioners of 
anti-imperialist war emphasized that the guerilla would be only a 
transitional stage in the liberation battle whose final stage implied the 
metamorphosis into a regular army. The guerrillas’ need to win the 
support of the population precluded from the beginning the massive 
repression of a majority of the population. But the imperial power 
250 Marxism and the Critique of Value
and its local sub-agents also had to make room for the theoretical 
possibility of ultimately separating combatants and peaceful civilians 
in their effort to maintain control over land and people. Despite all 
cruelties, massacres, resettlements, and carpet bombings, the imperial 
powers never made full use of their entire potential of destruction. 
Despite millions of (preferably civilian) victims and despite free-fire 
zones, the threshold of systematic genocide was crossed neither in 
Algeria nor in Indochina. 
The Totalization of War
Both the development of the state regime of violence in general and the 
history of the statist wars in particular are to be understood as a double 
process of potentiation and potentialization. From the beginning of 
modernity to the end of the short twentieth century — that is, until 
1989 — the number of years at war continually decreased. In turn, the 
concentration of all destructive power on the supportive hand of the 
territorial state multiplied these powers to an unimaginable degree. 
Measured by the devastation of the wars of commodity societies, 
all armed conflicts of premodern societies seem like pub brawls. 
The logical vanishing point of this development was the precarious 
balance of the atomic horror between the superpowers. On one hand, 
the power of destruction accumulated by the arms race had reached a 
point that did not permit another qualitative increase. If the arsenals 
of the two superpowers sufficed for a hundredfold or a thousandfold 
omnicide, it ultimately remained a question of little importance. On 
the other hand, it was clear at the climax of the Cold War that the 
line between the threat of destruction and manifest war, into which 
the superpowers would throw all their military weight, could only be 
crossed once.
The statification of warfare led to an enormous increase in the 
efficiency of killing. It would of course be too shortsighted to see that 
only as progress in the technology of weapons. No society has ever 
transferred a similar portion of its social and material resources to 
the war industry; neither has any society rationalized the craft of 
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violence to maximized destruction to the same extent as commodity 
society. (The construction of the Chinese wall might be the most 
prominent exception. But this show of strength, paid for with famine 
and uprisings of farmers, was notably a defensive measure.)
The precapitalist wars were mainly “limited wars” in which the 
bloodshed fell far behind what was technologically conceivable. War 
remained the private entertainment of a small caste or, where a large 
part of the male population was under arms, temporally confined and 
ritualized to prevent too big of a disturbance of the reproduction. The 
conflicts between the Greek city-states are paradigmatic of this second 
form of limited war. In these conflicts all participants refrained from 
big strategic maneuvers and the military action was confined to the 
immediate decisive battle. (Only the Peloponnesian War diverted from 
that pattern. It therefore ended with the downfall of all participating 
powers, the whole of Greece, and the rise of Macedonia as superior 
power.) Those who could stand their ground already had victory in 
their hands. The statist war on the other hand tended towards “absolute 
war” (Clausewitz) and knew only one limit to the complete unleashing 
of destruction, namely the reconnection to political ends. But this 
limit, scrutinized more closely, is a precarious one. 
It is not just that the practice of warfare gained in statification a 
rational-instrumental character, gradually transforming all material 
and human resources into actual or potential means of warfare; while 
in the Middle Ages armed conflict created its significance as a specific 
way of life of a special caste, modernity rendered warfare a mere 
means of the statist calculation of interest. A politically defined will 
switches the war machinery on and turns it off: war is a “true political 
instrument”; it is to be understood as the “continuation of political 
intercourse, carried on with other means.”20
In the conventional understanding, the primacy of the political 
over the military guarantees reason and proportion within murderous 
lunacy. This connection only seems necessary against the background 
of an affirmative image of politics, in which politics is understood as 
something rational per se, and its primacy, therefore, as a reasonable, 
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even cynical end, over an irrational instrument. But politics does 
not reduce itself to the process of tarring competing interests, and 
neither does brutal statist policy confine itself to the conquering of 
countries, raw materials, and working populations in the service of 
its own capital. Where politics itself becomes an irrational means, the 
alleged extinguishing agent works as an accelerant and intensifier. 
The extreme example is of course National Socialism. It showed 
that the reduction of human life to bare, extinguishable, biological 
existence not only provides the foundation of political sovereignty 
but also that destruction became, as we still see, a political program 
throughout the history of the rise of commodity society; a program 
that ultimately suspended the reluctance to destroy and kill that is 
contained in military logic. First, a war of conquest that from the 
beginning was supposed to be boundless is incoherent. Second, the 
decision of the leadership of the Third Reich to continue war beyond 
the point of obvious complete hopelessness was politically motivated. 
And finally, the central point of the National Socialist murder program, 
the destruction of the European Jewry, fully contradicted military 
calculation.  
The Warfare of the Commodity Society as “Absolute War”
The idea of the primacy of politics goes back to Clausewitz. But it is 
not the only feature of statified war that he expressed with precision. 
Never before and never again would the essence of the statified war 
be comprehended more precisely and clearly than in his main work 
On War. Already in his initial definition “absolute war” seems to be 
the central point of reference: “War is an act of force, and there is no 
logical limit to the application of that force.”21 The unleashed “absolute 
war” is considered by Clausewitz as an ideal type that was far from 
being realized by the actual wars of all ages. Unlike the thinkers of 
the Enlightenment who wanted to see a containment of the impact of 
destruction by the implementation of Western civilization, Clausewitz 
saw destruction as a neutral factor. But the alleged transhistorical 
ideal type is actually, scrutinized more closely, the logical-historical 
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vanishing point of statified violence.22
War has developed towards “absolute war” in three great leaps, and 
Clausewitz’s theory has the first as historical background. Clausewitz’s 
formula of “absolute war” was developed in the wake of the Napoleonic 
wars, which represented a dramatic increase in murderous efficiency 
in comparison to the cabinet wars of the eighteenth century. This new 
quality sprung immediately from the achievements of the French 
Revolution and cannot be thought without the discovery of the nation. 
In the wars of the absolutistic sovereigns of the eighteenth century, 
the intensity of the slaughters was mainly limited by two factors. First, 
the mercenary soldiers pressed into the army were completely passive 
tools of destruction. The highest goal was drilling them to be obedient 
marionettes that executed their exercised battle program on command. 
In the life of the soldier-material, only one form of one’s own initiative 
existed that was not quite compatible with the murderous goal, 
but was practiced massively: namely, fleeing the scene on the first 
possible occasion. Consequently, the eighteenth century entered 
military history as the “age of deserters.” In the battles of the Seven 
Years’ War, on every side one-third of the troops disappeared into 
the woods at the first shot. Battle discipline was primarily a matter of 
preventing one’s own troops from running away and only secondarily 
of the effort to destroy the enemy army. Second, the recruitment of a 
sufficient number of soldiers always remained an expensive problem. 
Both conditions stood in the way of what Clausewitz defined as the 
essence of war: the concentration on the abolition of the enemy, the 
willingness to seek the decisive battle in the appropriate moment. 
Both difficulties disappeared with the emergence of the citizen 
soldier. In their level of training, the voluntary troops of the French 
Revolution were at first inferior to the regular troops of the coalition 
of British, Prussians, and Austrians. Furthermore, the guillotine and 
the escape over the French border had decimated the old aristocratic 
officer corps. But the tapping of hitherto unused resources made 
it possible to compensate for these unfavorable conditions. The 
identification with the national cause provided hitherto unknown 
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readiness that can less euphemistically be described as bloodlust 
and fanaticism. (The lyrics of  the “Marseillaise,” bristling with 
xenophobia and the glorification of violence, speaks of that spirit 
of the new bourgeois age.) At the same time the levée en masse and 
the transition to general compulsory military service allowed for the 
immediate (and for the state budget financially cost-effective) closure 
of emerging gaps. It only needed a commander that knew how to turn 
these new possibilities into strategy. In Napoleon, a man that boasted 
of sacrificing a million men without the blink of an eye and who for 
so much manhood was rightfully raised by Hegel to the level of the 
“world spirit astride a horse,” the epoch found its ideal embodiment. 
Ill-reputed among generals of the old stripe as a slaughterer, he defied 
all military doctrines of the eighteenth century, always looking for 
the immediate decision. The new French empire could only be beaten 
when the enemy had adopted the new methods. 
Fordism and Total War
“Absolute war” stands for the ruthless application of all military 
means available for the “aim of military operations,” the “enemy’s 
overthrow.”23 The logical continuation and overculmination of the 
focalization on the goal of destroying the enemy troops lies in the 
consequent mobilization of all productive potential for the war effort, 
the transformation of society in one gigantic machine of destruction in 
which all wheels turn only for victory. The industrialization of warfare 
in World War I marked this new quality: absolute war realizes itself 
in total war.24 
Up to this point, wars strained the monetary resources of 
the states involved. The state — the ideal general capitalist in the 
nineteenth century — confined itself essentially to channeling away 
the necessary resources for the maintenance of the standing army 
from the social production of wealth. The economy of war was not 
particularly different from the economy of peace. At this point, the 
relative brevity of military conflicts rendered the transformation of 
production obsolete. In the great conflicts of the twentieth century, 
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on the other hand, war had a much greater impact and affected social 
regulation more than ever.25    
Heraclitus is often quoted as having said that war is the father of all 
things. Although this translation distorts heavily what the philosopher 
meant, it hits the mark for modernity. In particular, the so-called 
German economic miracle of the 1950s is in every aspect a child of 
the world war era and total war. 26 
This can be seen for instance in macroeconomic regulations. The 
monetary and economic-political framework created by the warfare 
state, in order to maximize the production of destruction, only needed 
to be slightly modified to optimize the production of civil abstract 
wealth. The interventionist state, first born from the necessities 
of  “absolute war,” became a permanent arrangement and made 
the Fordist take-off and the short summer of full employment and 
historically unique growth possible at all. With regard to the methods 
of production and products, it is equally obvious that Fordism is an 
achievement of total industrialized war. Of course civil commodity 
production initially had to suffer under the frictions that accompanied 
the alignment of industry to the statist production of destruction. But 
in the long run, production aligned to military ends became the model 
for the civil application — a condition that points to the character of 
commodity wealth as the continuation of destruction by other means. 
Not only did the standardization of the labor process emerge from 
war production, but the key technical innovations of Fordism also all 
started their career in the military field. It was not only in Germany 
that the automobilization of society began with the motorization of 
warfare.27
At least as important, and in our context even more revealing, is the 
world war’s historical effort regarding mentality. If there is something 
like an ur-experience for the homo fordisticus, it is the experience of 
the World War I battlefronts.28 From the trenches of the “Great War” 
crawled men who differed as much in their thinking and feeling from 
the bourgeois class of the nineteenth century as from the masses of 
the lower classes in the past. 
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The horror of industrialized warfare could not be withstood by 
hero nonsense or by the identification with the “national whole” that 
essentially bore the euphoria of the outbreak of the war. The trauma 
of being exposed to overwhelming destructive mechanics broke down 
all social bonds and values. The evasive movement was internalized. 
Thereby the soldier-subject adopted the kind of relation to the world 
that was introduced as a theoretical and epistemological program by 
Descartes. Descartes and Hobbes had put the thought experiment of 
a universal “idea of destruction” that retains nothing but the thinking 
subject at the beginning of their philosophies. The material battles at 
Somme and Verdun turned this empty self back onto itself and into 
a mass experience. 
The psychoanalyst Sandor Ferenczi wrote about the basic 
mechanism of war neurosis: the “[l]ibido withdraws from the object 
into the ego, enhancing self-love and reducing object-love to the point 
of indifference.”29 But even self-love threatens to become abolished in 
the numbing process. To be able to function and survive in conditions 
of war, the soldier-subject approaches a solipsistic attitude in which 
connections with others dissolve as much as the subject impoverishes 
emotionally. 
Jacques Rivière expressed not only his own war experience when 
he wrote: “Just as he tried to delouse himself as regularly as possible, 
so the combatant took care to kill in himself, one by one, as soon as 
they appeared, before he was bitten, every one of his feelings. Now 
he clearly saw that feelings were vermin, and that there was nothing 
to do but treat them as such.”30 The horror could only be endured in 
some kind of psychological rigor mortis and state that Marc Boasson 
accurately described by as “automatisme anesthésiant.”31 
The state of  radical endogenous anesthesia is certainly an 
exceptional state but one with a model function. The soldier’s effort 
of abstraction, his ability to abstract his self from all feelings and 
desires, found civil successors. The unsensuous sensuousness of 
the commodity subject, however, is not to be comprehended as an 
awakening from soldierly anesthesia. The coolness of the postmodern 
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competition-idiot rather repeats the death-feigning reflex of the war 
neurotics of the World War I, while the manic bustle of the marketing 
professionals and coordinators is consistent with other means of going 
crazy in the barrage. In both versions endogenous anesthesia lives 
on as a constitutive moment and with good reason: only in the state 
of anesthesia can a reality constantly transformed by the ravages of 
value logic be endured. 
It would be misleading to interpret the merciless subsumption of 
the subject as a retraction or even an eradication of the subject form. 
The leading image of the Freudian theory, the autocentric individual 
strengthened by ego power, which is sometimes equated with the true 
single subject, never became a mass phenomenon; even in the classical 
bourgeois parts of society the ideal of the ego-sovereign, controlled 
from within, has probably never been realized to the degree that is 
often ascribed to it. Subject form and external guidance, contrary to 
the common understanding, are not contradictory. The developed 
subject form is rather a mediated form of external guidance. For 
the subject form to become universal it has to be somehow dictated 
from above as a kind of collective We-Ego. The aggrandized collective 
identity of soldiers plays a key role in that process. With the rapid 
transition to the unleashed competition and commodity subject, the 
slaughters of the world wars and the subsumption of the subject under 
the military megamachine gained the character of a mass initiation. 
Brought into and mediated through military formation, millions 
of troops were trained to adopt a type of relation to the world that 
the fully developed commodity subject later had to execute without 
the continuous reference to omnipotent intermediary powers. The 
holiest principles of competition society became flesh and blood for the 
soldiers at the front: the elimination of the other is the presupposition 
of self-assertion. Only he who can degrade his opponent to an object 
secures as a degrader his own status as subject. Only by consistently 
treating himself  as an instrument and a machine is man able to 
triumph as subject. 
Ernst Jünger celebrated the soldiers as those that “know how to 
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create in a martial way.”32 This is no perversion of modern subjectivity 
and by no means a break with it; the negative Prometheus who creates 
himself by the destruction of others is rather its ugly prototype.
The Age of the Scientification of Destruction
The history of modern warfare is one of gradual total mobilization 
of all social resources for destruction. With the Napoleonic Wars, the 
essential psychological, social, and military-tactical shackles that had 
hitherto prevented martial potentials that already existed implicitly 
from being fully realized had been cut. About 100 years later “total 
war” means industrialized warfare, systematic and widespread 
appropriation of civil-society labor power for the sake of destruction. 
But World War II also marks a third level, namely the immediate 
subjugation of science and research under the warfare business, the 
scientification of destruction. 
With regard to the application and improvement of technological 
innovations, the military, of course, always showed itself to be open-
minded; even novelties in a nonempirical science like mathematics 
— one could think here of mathematical functions — had military-
practical applications already in early modern times, for instance 
in ballistics.33 The old entente cordiale between freelance inventors 
and scientists on one hand and the military, interested in military 
application on the other, was now being replaced by something 
qualitatively new. Military needs now determined directly the 
alignment, focus, and development of research, and the military hired 
an enormous scientific apparatus to realize it. This new quality is of 
course in the first place represented by the Manhattan Project.34 But 
the key technology of the third industrial revolution is definitely also 
a child of World War II and the arms race. After the end of the Cold 
War too, especially in the United States, the majority of the national 
research budget goes through the hands of the military or institutions 
close to it like NASA. 
In the Cold War the process of the statification of war reached its 
culmination. First, the dialectic of potentialization and potentiation 
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of destruction arrived at its final state in the balance of the nuclear 
horror. Second, the scientification of killing increased the arms effort 
to such a degree that it became incompatible with the competition of 
many national states and the classical polycentric system. For forty 
years, scientific complexes sufficient to compete in the technological 
race could only be maintained by two superpowers. The transition 
into the age of globalization and digital communication that also 
transformed the technological basis of  destruction, however, 
exhausted even this situation. Without even one shot fired, the Soviet 
empire, armed to death, had to give up. The number of armies with a 
profound international presence had shrunk to one, an exceptional 
position that would not be conceivable without the privileged access 
of the United States to transnational capital.35 The absolute military 
superiority of one state is not just an absolute novelty in the history of 
modernity; with the abolition of the balance of power, a cornerstone 
of the international order of violence has been removed.
The scientification of warfare undermined the classical statist 
regime of violence. It profoundly affected the traditional agent of the 
core of violence of commodity society, the proud citizen in uniform. 
His halo began to disappear, in part due to the development of nuclear 
weapons which displayed a potential for destruction that made 
traditional Fordist armies look like military atavisms at best responsible 
for the preparatory phases of major military engagements. Finally, 
the advance of microelectronics and the associated emancipation of 
destruction from the need for immediate destructive labor struck the 
final blow to the armed citizen. Certainly, the realization of the vision 
of the automatic battlefield, the military counterpart to the empty 
factory, might be limited. But its appearance alone reveals that the 
military and ideological mass mobilization of destruction workers no 
longer fits into the historical picture and is finished. The old pacifist 
slogan “Suppose they gave a war and nobody came” gains a frightening 
new significance. To wage war in all its brutality it is no longer 
necessary for the masses to be there; they can consume the exploding 
cruise missiles from their chair in front of the TV. It suffices that the 
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destruction specialists and the military infrastructure workers do 
their job. Significantly, compulsory military service is conserved only 
in some militarily third-class countries, while the power of all powers 
has long since abolished this anachronism. 
Part Three: The Age of Post-Statist Violence
The Unleashing of the Violent Core
After a long process of depletion, the figure of the proud defender of the 
fatherland associated with compulsory military service lost, bit by bit, 
its significance for the identity constitution of the commodity subject. 
Its final hour came with the breakdown of actually existing socialism. 
But the violent core of the competition subject did not perish with 
the disappearance of its traditional carrier. A new, seemingly chaotic 
regime of violence has been forming since the 1990s, characterized by 
autonomous operators running amok, killer sects, warlords of every 
description, and transnational NGOs of another — terrorist — stripe. 
If states and states in spe proved their status as sovereigns and decided 
between war and peace, new competition now entered the stage. A 
colorful cast of post-statist agents of violence begins to take possession 
of the ur-ground of sovereignty, the law. 
This frightening development incorporates two basic moments. 
First, it is to be understood as a process of unleashing. Violence, up 
to this point essentially a means of politics, detaches itself from its 
connection to political ends and palpably takes on the character of an 
end in itself; parallel to this the market is taking the place of the state 
in the universe of violence as well. Amidst the process of separation 
from the state, violence enters a new liaison. Violence markets emerge 
as a substitute and competitor for state power. With this a familiar 
phenomenon of early modern times returns. 
No development without precursors and predecessors. This is no 
less true for the rise of violence as an end in itself. Already in the 
nineteenth century the glorification of nothingness and the worship 
of destruction were in vogue in parts of bohemia. The basic axiom 
of the necrophiliac character of philosophical vitalism goes back to 
261Violence as the Order of Things
Friedrich Nietzsche: “rather will nothingness than not will” was his 
groundbreaking expression. His successors only took the decisive 
step by elevating the will to nothingness to an actual will, and war 
and destruction to the highest acts of creation. Filippo Tommaso 
Marinetti did not only speak for himself when he wrote in 1909 in 
“The Futurist Manifesto”: “We want to glorify war — the only cure 
for the world — militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of 
anarchists, the beautiful ideas which kill, and contempt for woman.”36 
Legions of painters and authors around the end of the nineteenth and 
beginning of the twentieth century indulged in bloodthirsty fantasies 
and revealed themselves to be absorbed by Abel Bonnard’s visions of 
unleashed violence: “We have to encompass war in all its wild poetry. 
If a man throws himself into war he does not only rediscover all his 
instincts, but also regains his virtues. […] In war everything is created 
anew.”37 War occupies a place of honor not for the sake of political ends 
that can be achieved by military means, but is rather celebrated for its 
own sake — that is, as the epitome of male self-presentation and the 
glory of the modern subject.
This break with Clausewitz’s framework and its instrumental 
understanding of violence, of course, only pertained to the level of 
individual motives. The hope for redemption from capitalist boredom 
was the hope for redemption by the statist war messiah. It was his task 
to make such an event of salvation possible, as happened to Hermann 
Hesse in August 1914: “To be torn out of a dull capitalistic peace was 
good for many Germans and it seems to me that a genuine artist would 
find greater value in a nation of men who have faced death and who 
know the immediacy and freshness of camp life.”38 
Some high priests of violence went one step further. In the “Second 
Surrealist Manifesto,” published in 1930, André Breton praises the 
murder without motive or reason as an acte gratuite (André Gide), as 
an existential deed as such: “The ultimate surrealist deed is to walk 
into the street with a revolver in one’s hand and, without aiming, fire 
shots into the masses of people for as long as one can.”39 
That Breton glorifies murder and violence as such does not 
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distinguish his perspective from the aestheticization of horror. In this 
regard it is only the malignant spirit of the world war epoch speaking 
through him. His position, insofar as he is asking the individuals to 
take it into their own hands, is vanguard. In Karl Kraus’s Last Days of 
Mankind it was still: “War is war, and in war one has to do some things 
that one previously merely wanted to do.”40 Breton dreamed of a world 
in which one need not wait for the right circumstances but can brace 
oneself every time to be master over life and death. 
In the age of what Peter Klein calls “mass-affirmation,” this form 
of murderous subjective self-determination was far from the general 
consciousness and way of life. But this changed fundamentally with 
the process of consolidation through separation and depletion of the 
intermediary powers like state and class, which was misunderstood as 
a process of individualization. Seventy years ago, artists provoked by 
turning random destruction and self-extermination into the epitome 
of self-positing. Today we witness the leap to a corresponding practice 
of massacre. 
Of course, the vanguards of violence subjectivity are exceptional 
figures. Probably there can be found medical terms for people like 
the Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh or the Beltway snipers. 
This does not change the fact that their pathological acts shed, as 
an exaggeration, a bright light on the social normality: “Just as a 
mentally ill person brings to light the truth of his family, a gypsy the 
truth of the settled citizen, the bondsman the truth of his master, an 
individual running amok ex negativo brings to light the suppressed 
truth of our present society.”41 However, the application of medical 
categories to the leading figure of our epoch, the suicide bomber, 
brings with it considerable difficulties.42 The Israeli psychologist 
Ariel Merari in his study of the environment and biography of fifty 
suicide bombers came to a frightening and unequivocal conclusion: 
“He could […] ascertain neither similarities in their character-
structures nor pathological personality patterns. He found no insane 
persons or broken individuals, no failed existences, and no monstrous 
souls. The most conspicuous aspect of all the perpetrators was their 
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inconspicuousness.”43 The highest level of madness can no longer 
be determined as such because it is not a deviant insanity but the 
constitutive lunacy of the commodity subject driven to its most bitter 
consequence.
Old and New Terrorism
Terror is not a new phenomenon. Ever since the nineteenth century, 
groups tried to achieve political goals by spectacular attacks. In the age 
of politics and state formation, terrorism always remained a marginal 
factor, and that goes for its effectiveness as for the number of victims. 
The victims of left- and right-wing terrorism in the last 150 years might 
amount to those killed in one day of World War II. The restricted 
success of terrorist acts in political confrontations is hardly surprising 
insofar as it has always been an emergency strategy originating from 
a position of extreme weakness. The recourse to terrorism has only 
been taken by elitist groups that saw no possibility of gaining influence 
on a broader political organization, but hoped to make up for that by 
spectacular attacks. The “propaganda of the deed” aimed at pulling 
the layers of society that the terrorist claimed to represent from their 
lethargy so that they would stand up for the interests ascribed to them 
by the terrorists. With their method the terrorists dreamed of paving 
the way for a formation of “classes” or “nations” resting on a broader 
social foundation. 
This concept of indirect mobilization hardly ever worked, but the 
underlying concept of terror as a political means had the side effect 
of keeping the terrorist trail of blood thin. As long as terror aimed 
at the mobilization of interested third parties, it had to be selective 
in choosing the victims of attacks. Whoever targeted high-ranking 
and hated functionaries could hope to gain the sympathies of those 
circles of the population in whose name he acted. Accidental victims 
were to be avoided — they undermined the basis of the terrorists’ 
legitimation — and indiscriminate mass destruction was ruled out 
from the beginning. 
If  the new terrorism rested on the same basis as the political 
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terrorism of the past, it would be no major threat and would be 
relatively easy to account for. Unfortunately it has emancipated itself 
fundamentally from the instrumental understanding of violence. 
Terrorism thus gains a new quality — namely the capacity for 
murderous efficiency. A marginal phenomenon threatens to turn into 
the dominant form of violence of the twenty-first century. Whether 
apocalyptic sects and fundamentalist fanatics use weapons of mass 
destruction is merely a question of technological feasibility; one 
can hardly hope that a structural limit will result from the terrorist 
motif as such. Far from remaining a deterrent, the ability to realize 
Armageddon constitutes the very attraction of the new terrorism for 
today’s competition subject who strives for omnipotence. There is no 
culture that does not create its own reservoir of angry young men 
who, equally attracted to and repelled by their existence as commodity 
subjects, escape into some kind of eschatological fundamentalism. 
Everywhere a population ripe for recruitment: commodity subjects 
who see no individual and collective possibility for future development 
other than taking revenge for a long chain of real or imagined national 
or individual indignities. 
The Identical Subject-Object of Destruction
War in commodity society has turned violence into an act of abstraction. 
The place of hand-to-hand combat has been taken first by mechanical 
and then by automatic destruction labor. This metamorphosis is bound 
up with the development of the long-range weapon. The decisive 
historical turning point in this regard is marked by the Battle of 
Agincourt in 1415, in which English longbows crushingly defeated 
a larger French army. The distance weapon, disregarded by feudal 
warriors as being dishonorable and inappropriate to their social class, 
triumphed over the medieval warrior. The spatial distance over which 
the warriors raked each other grew only slightly with the development 
of firearms and then more rapidly after World War I. At the end of 
that development are those long-range bombers that flew from U.S. 
territory to their mission over Baghdad, and for whom the battlefield 
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only existed on the display of their airborne computers. 
To this spatial separation corresponds a process of  internal 
distancing. The enemy is degraded to a passive object. The challenge 
in the duel in which the opponents confront each other as equals 
is substituted in  commodity society war by the separation of the 
destruction worker on one hand and the biomass to be killed on the 
other. Already the Fordist (but more than ever the scientized) war 
resembles pest control in its methods and no longer has anything to 
do with classical battle. Not only does the killing move more and more 
out of the visual field of the killer; killing and being killed also dissolve 
into independent acts, with one or the other side being exposed to the 
man-driven apparatus of destruction.
The new archetypal actor of violence of our time, the suicide 
bomber, represents the implosion of  this structure. The polar 
oppositions into which this murderous practice split suddenly unify. 
The suicide bomber no longer carries a weapon; he is himself one. His 
body is turned into an explosive body and even the separation of killing 
subject and subject of killing has been rendered obsolete in a perverted 
way. In that identical subject-object it finds its suspension. After 600 
years, the long-range weapon has been substituted by a historically 
new weapon, the weapon of absolute lack of distance.
Weapon and Market
Neoliberal ideology categorically dreads monopolies and the state. The 
exception to this generally valid rule is of course presupposed even by 
free-market fanatics. Few of them dare to attack the state monopoly 
on violence. The main asset of the state is to be left untouched by the 
celebrated process of destatification. 
The total free market economy as it prevailed after the epochal 
break of 1989 proves to be more consistent in this regard than its 
ideologues. The catastrophic final victory of the world market over 
the statist developing regimes is accompanied by the dissolution and 
gradual disintegration of the statist monopoly on violence in the South 
and the East. With the loss of the ability to create the basic conditions 
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of the valorization of value in much of its territory, state power loses 
both the ability to eliminate and the interest in eliminating all other 
actors of violence from its own entire territory. Increasingly large 
geographical spaces de facto elude state control. Especially where the 
withdrawal of regular statehood provides ideal working conditions 
for actors operating in illegal sectors of the world markets (drugs, 
smuggling, weapons, and human trafficking), those apparatuses take 
the place of the police. Before the historical process of transferring 
organized violence into the sole instrument of abstract generality 
in the peripheral states of the world market is completed, the entire 
direction of development is reversed. The structures of violence are 
increasingly influenced by mafia factions, which are dedicated to 
protecting and violently carrying out their business interests. 
This shift towards markets of  violence is not only brought 
about by the displacement of state power. The statist apparatus of 
violence is itself undergoing a metamorphosis during the collapse 
of modernization. The concept of “state business” takes on a literal 
meaning through the loss of a perspective of valorization, and the 
distinction between mafia and state becomes blurred. During the 
period of state ascendency, corruption meant a disturbance of the 
normal function and reproduction of statehood. In large swathes of 
the world the concept of corruption has become useless insofar as 
the practices that it describes must be considered the rule and have 
long since become the actual material basis of the reproduction of 
the state apparatus. 
In the center of that development stand the security apparatuses. 
For their members it is perfectly natural to use their traditional 
position as guarantor of law and order, and their skills in the use 
of violence, as private human capital. Having the social means of 
violence at their disposal puts them in the position to secure access for 
themselves to the few goods of the breakdown regions that still have a 
place in the global valorization process. Some African countries have 
already undergone this process: the national economies of Congo or 
Liberia turned into pure looting economies, while the world of politics 
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has shrunk to the dimensions of an armed fight for control of raw 
materials. The remnants of state power turn into the main players 
on the thriving markets of violence. 
The Post-Statist War
The old international wars dissociated the ends of war from its means. 
Wars used to be waged to gain a changed position of power for peace. 
War appeared as a kind of investment in advance for a possible postwar 
world. In the military competition between sovereigns organized in 
nation states, the side that won knew how to mobilize most effectively 
all the human and material resources in its territory into a machine 
of  destruction for the sake of  defeating the enemy. Considered 
economically, the war economy was the alignment of social production 
to maximized unproductive state consumption. The material substrate 
of the war economy was turning as much abstract wealth as possible, 
siphoned off through nonmilitary means such as taxes or bond issues, 
into as many, and as effective, means of destruction as possible. 
Our post-statist wars conform to a different pattern. The separation 
of the ends and means of war is invalid: the ends have turned into 
the means. The new masters of the state of exception themselves 
use violence as a means to the appropriation of wealth. The war 
economy no longer represents the extreme version of overall social 
overconsumption; rather, the war economy functions as a looting 
economy, as the special form of reproduction of military players who 
have ceased to function as abstract generality. As in the early modern 
conflicts, it is the task of war to nourish war. In the past, the battle of 
nationalisms was about which of the competitors could start the task 
of homogenization and modernization, and where. Questions such 
as whether Alsace and its inhabitants would be part of the German or 
French modernization machines, or if Poland is allowed to experience 
an autonomous process of national development, were decided by 
the force of arms. In the wars of disintegration in the South and the 
East, nationalism, having degenerated into ethnicism, again plays a 
central, albeit differently situated role. Ethnic differences essentially 
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determine recruitment for competing war gangs and the preferred 
victims of the corporations of the looting economy. 
The transition from a war economy of state consumption to a 
looting economy dramatically changes the face of war. In the new 
wars the conflict between combatants begins to retreat; military 
actions instead find their main targets in the goods and chattels and 
the lives of noncombatants. Statified wars are characterized by the 
effort to focus the impact of destruction on the enemy troops. If the 
civilian population was caught in the crosshairs, it was in the course 
of attacks that were indirectly aimed at the armed enemy as a result of 
the destruction of infrastructure and supply. Massacres of the civilian 
population or mass migrations of refugees were the ugly side effects 
of military conflicts.44 In the contemporary wars of disintegration, 
massacres, looting, and “ethnic cleansing” are elevated into the actual 
content of military operations. The direct confrontation of competing 
armed powers is retreating and in many wars of disintegration it is 
carefully avoided by all parties involved. 
The epoch of statist wars, in which the elimination of enemy troops 
was central, was characterized by a perpetual arms race. Its monetary 
effect was a permanent explosion of costs. The wars of disintegration 
of our times are characterized instead by being permanently low-
budget wars. First, many of  the new warlords can, directly or 
indirectly, help themselves to the leftover arsenals from the epoch 
of statist modernization. During the Yugoslav wars, for example, the 
Serbian troops basically operated with the war material of the former 
army, left over from the time of Tito’s Yugoslavia. Second, with the 
change of target, cheap weapons such as machine guns, mines, and 
machetes take the place of tanks and planes as dominant weapons. 
The consequences of the actions of contemporary warlords include 
devastation that rivals that of the wars of state creation of the past, 
albeit associated with a comparably minimal financial effort. Rarely 
in the history of modernity has the sum of investment per casualty 
and displaced person been as low as in the wars of disintegration of 
the late-twentieth and twenty-first centuries in the South and East. 
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This new economy of war is also in effect where the ugliest kind of 
economical rationality disappears behind the pure goal of destruction. 
Compared to states, even al-Qaeda, run and financed by a successful 
businessman, gets by with remarkably modest financial means. 
The history of the statist regime of violence can be described as 
a double movement of the potentialization of violence. The power 
of destruction grew dramatically whereas at the same time great 
manifest wars became less frequent. This development is due not 
least to an immense increase in the price of arms. This leads gradually 
to the reduction of the number of actors of violence who are able to 
compete on the relevant level of destruction. In the course of the 
microelectronic revolution this number of competitors shrank to one: 
the United States.45 On the other hand, however, thousands of groups 
worldwide are now able to raise the means to instigate a “new” war. 
The transition from state wars to wars of disintegration is therefore 
also accompanied by the process of depotentialization, which in turn 
is to be understood as twofold. The nightmare of a nuclear showdown 
of the superpowers vanished with the end of the East-West conflict, 
but only to make room for the low-intensity conflicts that have been 
emerging and growing in numbers since the 1990s. It is frightening 
that even in Europe military conflicts could be waged again. Even more 
frightening are developments in the Third World. Not only did wars 
continue on the periphery of the world market even after the end 
of the East-West confrontation; with the transposition to a purely 
looting-economy basis they also took on an epidemic character.
With the transition to the age of wars of disintegration, it was 
not only the case that the number of  armed conflicts increased; 
individual conflicts also often drag on. In the same arenas new players 
of violence emerge to fight each other in changing constellations of 
alliances. This new feature can also easily be placed in the context of 
the basic changes in the war economy. As periods of massive statist 
overconsumption, international wars affected or even interrupted 
the overall social movement of accumulation. Imperialist wars then 
drew their legitimation essentially from their expected results. A 
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nation state fulfilled its task as abstract universality only when it 
managed to end wars successfully as soon as possible. Even for the 
anticolonial movements, which began their battles from a position of 
military weakness and therefore had to rely on strategies of attrition, 
the mobilization for the wars of liberation was only an unfortunate, 
inevitable, bloody opening for their actual “peaceful” project of 
modernization. Despite the invaluable significance of the anticolonial 
struggles as rites of passage on the way to becoming a nation, it would 
have occurred to no one to prolong the overture voluntarily. Where 
war turns into a mode of reproduction for its agents and disconnects 
itself  from the overriding social horizon, the players of war have 
little reason to seek a military perspective. Left to themselves, these 
conflicts burn out only to the extent that the potential for economic 
looting and appropriation of  monetary wealth is exhausted. An 
early end usually occurs only when the “international community” 
brings itself to intervene. But in such cases the precarious peace is 
principally predicated on the international troops’ allowing local 
players of violence to put their looting business on a different basis, 
and to squeeze money out of the international institutions and aid 
organizations instead of the local population. 
In the process of statification the regime of violence obtained a 
binary structure. In the first place a clear boundary emerged between 
domestic and international violence, a difference reflected in the 
institutional separation of army and police. The wars of disintegration 
eliminate this line of demarcation: not only to the extent that these 
functional distinctions lose their significance, but that respect for state 
borders is also alien to the new players of violence. That the warlords 
of Rwanda and Burundi are also playing a central role in Congo is not 
an isolated case. Routinely operations that target members of their 
own state and attacks on other aspects or institutions of communal 
life coincide. 
To the bipolar structure of the statified orders of violence there 
also belonged a strict separation of war and peace. Whether one or 
the other state of affairs was currently in effect was legally just as 
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clearly defined as it could be experienced unequivocally in everyday 
life. Abeyances that could not be comprehended as either peace or 
war were unknown to the universe of Clausewitz. In the world of 
wars of disintegration, precisely these in-between states become the 
rule. During the war in Bosnia the international mediators pressured 
the conflict parties into more than a dozen truces before the Dayton 
agreement. As soon as the ink with which the official representatives 
of Serbians, Croatians, and Muslims had signed was dry, they were 
broken. This was no oddity peculiar to that part of the world, but 
an index of the blurring of war and peace in the age of the wars of 
disintegration. 
The dominance of commodity subjectivity is ultimately predicated 
on the reduction of humans to biomass approved for killing. In the 
statified regime of violence, this basis appeared as a special, spatially 
and temporally limited sphere that contradicted the domain of law and 
contract: a counterworld that would only become reality in the state of 
exception. Only in this constellation could free competition as normal 
social relation emerge from immediate physical force. The post-statist 
regime of violence destroys this limitation. The regular competition 
of commodity owners and the irregular competition of direct killing 
are visibly merging. In the breakdown regions of the fully globalized 
world market this merging process is already in full effect. 
The Ugly Inverse of Individualization
In the centers of the world market, the domination of the territorial 
state can look back on a much longer history than on the periphery, and 
it is therefore considerably more rooted. At the same time the credit-
worthiness of the Western states provides a much more solid monetary 
foundation for the role of the state as ideal universal capitalist. In 
the course of globalization, the symbiosis of the territorial state and 
“its” capitals becomes fragile, but still state power in the West can 
continue to play that part for quite some time. The very heart of state 
sovereignty, the state monopoly on violence, remains untouched in its 
core substance. Although there also exist slums and banlieues ruled by 
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gangs in the West, and although a growing privatization of “security” 
can be observed — symptoms for the emerging of zones of differing 
“security density” — the basic supremacy of state power is not put 
in doubt by these phenomena. Also the elsewhere barely noticeable 
line between state and mafia remains, in the West, fairly clear, for the 
moment at least. 
Long before the territorial state regimes of violence lose their 
monetary basis even in the West, their dissolution has already begun. 
One of the starting points is provided immediately by the neoliberal 
offensive and the advance of the total market in the capitalist centers. 
In a world that does not want to know society — only individuals 
and success at all costs — inadmissible fears are growing: the total 
rationalization and full economization of social relations creates a 
greenhouse in which their immanent opposite, irrationality, always 
already charged with violence, thrives. The process of individualization 
also touches the violent core of competition subjectivity. The lunacy 
from which none are spared — having to exist as a self-sufficient 
subject — translates itself  into the crazy impulse to defend this 
unlivable way of existence by any means necessary, preferably with 
a weapon in hand, against real and above all imaginary dangers. The 
feeling of omnipotence and impotence that determines the commodity 
subject finds its most extreme expression in the age of complete 
subjugation to the total market. It is increasingly impossible to live 
out nation-statist claims of omnipotence. These find an adequate 
form of appearance and dissolution in pseudo-religious sects and 
individual Rambo-fantasies in which the released component of 
violence threatens the core of society. 
The horrific construct with which the state theorist Hobbes once 
legitimized the existence of the Leviathan returns as a pattern of 
perception, and paranoia becomes a leading psychic disturbance in an 
epoch in which asocial sociality is driven to the extreme. The paranoiac 
“finds himself in a kind of natural state, similar to the one described 
by Hobbes in the Leviathan: he is surrounded by enemies, isolated, 
without connection to a society….From this perspective paranoia is 
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simply the situation of a person [who] feels forced to live outside 
of society. Political paranoia is the unfortunate attempt to step into 
relation with others again, to form a community again.”46
This is probably furthest developed in the United States, above all 
with regards to ideologically motivated violence. There, racist and 
Christian fundamentalist groups not only turn against the existing 
state but increasingly against any overarching statehood at all. The 
most devastating terror attack in the history of the United States up to 
9/11, that of Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City in April 1995, targeted 
a building of the federal government. This choice of target is not to be 
comprehended as the confusion of a single person, nor does the anti-
statist motif limit itself to the extreme Right and millenarian religious 
sects.47 Especially in established political organizations like the NRA 
(National Rifle Association), this basic orientation is obvious.48
The World Police in the Decade of Human-Rights Paternalism
The established regime of violence in the centers of the world market 
is dissolved not only by the emergence of new agents of violence. In 
confrontation with them, the established state power also begins to 
bid farewell to the familiar framework of reference, finally mutating 
into the driving force of its own dissolution. 
This process occurs in two phases. The first begins immediately 
after the breakdown of  actually existing socialism. With the 
disappearance of  Eastern competition, the United States and its 
junior partners accrued a kind of world monopoly on violence. The 
West was now able to intervene militarily practically everywhere in 
the world without having to expect serious counterstrikes from the 
targeted ruins of modernization. This not only led to the participation 
of the West, no longer used to war, in the process of depotentialization 
while increasingly sending its own troops to military operations in 
the periphery of the world market; above all, for the first time the 
strict separation between inner-statist and international violence was 
questioned, as it had developed since the Westphalian Peace of 1648. On 
the basis of its own superiority, the West believed it would be possible 
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to apply the model of domestic pacification — police power assigned 
as the monopoly on violence — to the international stage. 
The conflicts emerging in the breakdown regions since the 
beginning of the 1990s, mostly ethnically motivated, touched the West 
only indirectly. To the extent that the wars of disintegration did not 
involve secessionist movements that impinged on capitalist centers 
(Yugoslavia), they merely raised legitimation problems. The TV images 
of ugly bloodshed were in blatant contradiction with the Western-
universalistic credo that the triumph of market and democracy would 
open up a wonderful and peaceful future for the planet. The Western 
interventions had a corresponding character, namely that of human-
rights paternalism. Also where glorious competition-subjectivity 
could no longer maintain its “peaceful” counterpart in labor society 
due to a lack of developmental horizon, it was not supposed to run 
riot in its horrific alternative form as murder-subjectivity. Even in the 
de facto written-off regions of the world, security imperialism tried 
militarily to enforce the “right” form of respect for universal Western 
principles against the reality of crisis.
With human-rights paternalism the West turned “mission 
impossible” into a program. The well-intended drivel of a new world 
order has from the beginning been nothing but a label for exemplary 
operations. This alone already denies the claim to be the world police. 
Where and when the Western-dominated international community 
intervened (Somalia, East Timor, Kosovo, and Bosnia) it was always 
influenced greatly by the patterns of perception of a media-transmitted 
world publicity rather than by a far-reaching, sustainable plan. This 
limited range was, however, by no means only a question of a lack of 
political will or of inadequate implementation. Even the attempt to 
manage acute conflicts would considerably overextend the military-
logistic capabilities as well as the financial potentials of the West. 
What faces the West is all the more Sisyphean because although the 
military risk of the miscellaneous “peacemaking” or “peacekeeping” 
actions was and is in most regions limited, the peace-sheriff was 
doomed to permanent patrol. This necessity springs immediately 
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from the phantasmagorical goal. The West can here and there suspend 
the wars of disintegration by means of troops and the application of 
corresponding financial means, detaining some warlords and bribing 
others. Real pacification would, however, mean a break with the long-
anachronistic concept of recuperative nation-building and capitalist 
development. Durable pacification in the age of crisis is only possible 
by means of exoduses and emancipatory destatification from below, 
as a break with the Western subject form and with the imperatives of 
unleashed competition. But that would be precisely the opposite of 
even the most well-intentioned human-rights paternalism. 
Western policy towards the breakdown regions and ailing ruins 
of modernization incorporates the clandestine acknowledgement as 
well as the denial of the dissolution of the territorial-statist order. 
While in the construction of what amounts to a new domestic foreign 
policy the West defies the separation, constitutive of the territorial 
state, of inner-statist and international violence it simultaneously 
hallucinates a form of nation-building, attempting to reeducate one 
or another warlord faction into a state power. At the high point of the 
national liberation movements of the Third World, the leaders of the 
“free world” pregnantly denounced the emergent state power in spe as 
bandits and robbers. Today the politically tainted mafia-clan leaders 
are welcomed as statesmen.  
This continuation of the collapsed order of the territorial state, 
however, is made visible only by the assemblage of  friends and 
contacts these would-be human rights keepers choose on location. 
It comes into effect especially in the determination of the enemy. The 
crazy construct of the “rogue state” speaks volumes in this regard. 
Hallucinating that some ruin of modernization such as Iraq, Libya, 
and Cuba poses a danger to the new world order, the leading Western 
powers, impervious to the simplest facts, define precisely the kind of 
enemy that does not stand a chance. 
The level of asymmetry that characterized the world-order wars 
of the 1990s has probably not been seen since the conquest of the 
Inca Empire by Pizarro. Every time the United States mobilizes its 
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high-tech military apparatus, it is confronted with an opponent with 
weapons from another league. If war is understood in the strictest 
sense by Clausewitz, then the U.S. campaigns of the last decade no 
longer fit the category. If, according to Clausewitz, war does not begin 
with an attack but a defense, then war as a phenomenon is bound to 
a minimal degree of ability to defend; that is, the will and the ability 
of the attacked side to turn blood and thunder into a mutual event. 
These conditions were met neither in the Iraq campaign nor in the 
Kosovo intervention of 1999. In both cases the “battle,” from the 
Western point of view, is reduced to target practice from the air on 
run-down Fordist armies on the ground. The Kosovo conflict can be 
most accurately described as the merging of two hijackings. On one 
side, Serbian militias and paramilitaries terrorized and displaced the 
Kosovo-Albanian civil population. On the other side, NATO alternately 
punished the population of Serbia and destroyed the infrastructure 
of the rest of Yugoslavia without a single NATO soldier needing to set 
foot in the country.
The Limits of Omnipotence
The biggest “military power of all times” will never meet an enemy 
that could muster even a fraction of the military resources available 
to the United States. Of course this asymmetry does not guarantee 
triumph. Everywhere the fruits of military successes are withering for 
the West, not only ex post facto with respect to the inner contradiction 
of exercising control without the ability to seize territories and begin 
the valorization process; the military ability to triumph at any time 
is also limited. The first limitation lies in the extreme costs of the 
high-tech military apparatus of the United States. The last remaining 
superpower is not merely excluded from the tendency, inherent to the 
“new wars,” of minimizing the initial  monetary costs of death and 
destruction; it experiences the complete opposite. In the wars of world 
order of the West, for the first time in military history the missiles are 
more expensive than the targets. 
In this context it is worth taking a close look at the concept of 
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“surgical attacks,” ranking high in the U.S. military apparatus. Of 
course this is in the first instance errant propaganda. At the same time, 
as a euphemism this expression describes a special battle economy, 
an original exaggeration of the American way of fighting in the 
aftermath of human-rights paternalism. Already in the Fordist wars, 
the U.S. destruction apparatus was characterized by an extremely high 
organic composition. Whether in World War II, Korea, or Vietnam, U.S. 
warfare was determined to minimize its own casualties by means of 
material expenses. In the war on Kosovo and Iraq the enemy could for 
the first time participate in that relative protection. It was all about 
beautiful pictures and an impressive demonstration of power — the 
effectiveness of destruction was secondary. Never before have there 
been such a ratio of fireworks to the number of casualties. Considering 
the single applied use value (explosive force in TNT units) as well as 
the monetary value of each explosion, the direct victims were by far 
the most laboriously produced deaths in military history. The U.S. 
cannot afford many campaigns like the one against the Hussein regime.
Second, the force of the superpower is calibrated to a very specific 
type of opponent. It can with ostentation crush into the dust those 
enemies that depend essentially on territorial control — be it only 
for the purposes of economic looting — and that organize themselves 
as states or pseudo-states. The high-tech military machine is useless 
as soon as the Western centers no longer confront conflicts between 
states but are attacked from within the global world market society. 
9/11 marks a historical cut. The attacks on the World Trade Center 
abruptly revealed the vulnerability of the capitalist centers, but that 
type of violator is appropriate to challenge Western superiority. About 
the fate of al-Qaeda one can only speculate; but little speculation 
is required about the fact that this organization will become the 
prototype of a new epoch of violence. With 9/11, security imperialism 
also entered a new phase. Facing its own vulnerability, the world police 
got rid of paternalism in favor of brutal repression. As in every war, 
also in the war on terror the opponents are beginning to resemble 
each other. 
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The State of Exception as Rule; or, 
Guantánamo Is Everywhere
The war on terror and especially its second phase, the conquest of down 
the Ba’ath regime, have a transitory function. The choice of enemy 
already documents that the Western leading power is hallucinating 
itself back to a bygone epoch of wars between states; with the Hussein 
regime, the United States chose a surrogate enemy organized in a 
territorial state. That is, a target that can be easily overrun with a high-
tech military machine rather than the actual enemy, the transnational 
and deterritorial network al-Qaeda. At the same time, the egomaniacal 
world police have kicked open a door to a new epoch that would have 
better remained closed. 
First, with the triumph over Saddam Hussein’s “rogue state” and 
the occupation of Iraq, the United States has landed in exactly the 
kind of succession conflict they hallucinated away with the concept 
of “rogue state.” After its fast victory the superpower finds itself 
endlessly engaged in a low-intensity war against an ungraspable, 
deterritorialized enemy.49 The U.S. troops probably will not be better 
off in their Iraqi protectorate than Israel, equally superior in military 
power, facing the never-ending al-Aqsa Intifada. 
At the same time, with the war on Iraq, Western hegemony 
abandoned the ground of human-rights paternalism. The United States 
itself began acting as a transnational actor of violence that no longer 
knows any limits. While human-rights paternalism still reacted to 
anomic conditions, the leadership of the last superpower claims the 
primal right of all sovereignty, the declaration of the state of exception, 
for the global theater. The war on terror represents the self-enabling 
of  an unleashed leviathan, equally absolved from international 
agreements and martial and domestic law. 
The war on Iraq in 2003 illustrates this new quality. It goes 
beyond the referential framework of the international conflicts in a 
threefold fashion: structurally; with regard to the arrangements of 
military actions; and concerning the war’s ends. Whether enforced 
demilitarization or regime change, the explanation for the attack on 
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Iraq would have been unthinkable as casus belli in the traditional 
universe. Not that foreign powers were never involved in the 
overthrow of governments: as is well known, the United States in 
particular has some experience in the discipline. But this time regime 
change enforced from the outside functioned as a highly official and 
emphatically proclaimed war aim. All international wars since 1648 
fit the most general of Clausewitz’s definitions of war: “War is thus an 
act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”50 The attack on Iraq in 
2003 does not fit this framework. It does not aim at the retreat of the 
enemy sovereign. Before the U.S. troops moved towards Baghdad they 
had deprived the Iraqi state of the status as subject of international 
law, an absolutely unprecedented process in history.51 As sovereign 
the Iraqi leadership could not capitulate, since doing so would have 
meant to acknowledge its own non-existence as sovereign, not only 
regarding the future but also regarding the present and the past.52 
The military operations of the war on Iraq reflect this in their own 
way. They mix elements of statist warfare with manhunts against 
the ruling regime that were being executed according to the slogan 
“wanted dead or alive.” The military actions were opened for instance 
by a (failed) attack on the alleged location of Saddam Hussein. 
The battle against the Iraqi dictator was, as in the logic of the 
international wars, no longer about depriving the enemy government 
of its military instruments and rendering it defenseless. The military 
event seemed more like a mafia-style retribution. More precisely, there 
was something to it of the procedure of the avengers in Hollywood 
movies. The former bearer of enemy sovereignty had turned into 
biomass approved for killing. The special treatment that Saddam’s 
sons faced instead of arrest speaks volumes in this context, as does 
the subsequent exhibition of the bodies. When dead GIs were dragged 
through the streets of Mogadishu for the cameras in the early 1990s, 
the Western public still reacted with outrage. One decade later, the U.S. 
administration reveals that it is not very far removed from General 
Aidid’s gangs. It relies on the American TV audience’s having arrived 
at the level of the jubilating mob of the Somali capital when it stages 
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itself as master over life and death. 
Because of its democracy-missionary and security-imperialist 
intentions, the war on terror implies a tendency to come untethered. 
A war aim such as “security” is neither achievable nor objectifiable and 
it can be only left to the free judgment of the leviathan to define it as 
appropriately achieved or not. But also in its temporal and geographical 
structure the war on terror is not simply long and wide-ranging, but 
limitless. The justification of the necessity of preemptive battle against 
terrorism renders almost every state a possible target. What could 
contribute more to the unleashing of fundamentalist desperados more 
than the war that is to subdue them?
It is more likely that the circle will be squared than that the war 
on terror should end with a victorious peace for democracy. On 
the historical horizon there lies rather the threat that the war will 
discharge into an exceptional state maintained both by the leviathan 
and by the terrorist behemoths. The result of the war on Iraq already 
gives some idea of  how it could continue. Rather than a state of 
exception limited geographically and temporally (camp and front), 
familiar from the epoch of the rise of commodity society, a permanent 
and spatially omnipresent state of exception under Western auspices 
begins to appear. 
Initially, the parallel running-amok of  the superpower and 
Islamic fundamentalism is sure to ravage the Middle East. But it is not 
necessarily in the logic of things that this will remain the full extent 
of the matter. The security-imperialist leviathan can ultimately only 
fail in its efforts to externalize violent irrationality and to wage it as 
an external war, and to try to contain it with police force. Whether 
Islamic fundamentalists carry the will to destruction, the ultima ratio 
of commodity subjectivity, into its Western primal home, or whether 
other terrorist behemoths take on the job, the security-imperialist 
leviathan will always find an occasion and an opportunity to do his part 
for the abolition of the normality of commodity society even at home. 
The U.S. Patriot Act, the invalidation of basic rights, the police function 
of the military discussed in Germany — these are all indications of the 
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direction into which the statist regime of violence might move if its 
foundation is crumbling: towards the permanent state of exception. 
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The Nightmare of Freedom: The Foundations 
of “Western Values” and the Helplessness of 
Critique
Robert Kurz (2005)
It is well known that the concepts of freedom and equality form the 
central keywords of the Enlightenment. Liberalism has certainly not 
been the sole trafficker of these ideals. Paradoxically, they play just 
as big a part in Marxism and anarchism. They also play an important 
ideological role in contemporary social movements. The Left stares at 
the idols of freedom and equality like the rabbit stares at the snake. 
To avoid being blinded by the splendor of these idols, it is advisable 
to look for their social foundations. Marx already uncovered these 
foundations more than 100 years ago: the sphere of  the market, 
capitalist circulation, commodity exchange, and universal buying 
and selling.
In this sphere, a fully determined sort of freedom and equality 
prevails, which refers solely to selling what one wants to sell  —  as 
long as a buyer is found — and buying what one wants to buy — as 
long as one can pay. And only in this sense does equality also prevail 
— the equality of money and commodity owners. Their equality has 
nothing to do with quantity, but only with the social form common to 
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both. The same cannot be bought for a cent as for a dollar; but no matter 
whether it’s a penny or a dollar, in qualitative terms the equality of 
the money form prevails. In buying and selling there are no masters 
or slaves, and nobody commands or obeys; there are only free and 
equal people in law. Whether man, woman, child, white, black, or 
brown: the customer is welcome under any circumstances. The sphere 
of commodity exchange is the sphere of mutual respect. Where an 
exchange of a commodity and money takes place, there is no violence. 
The bourgeois smile is always that of a salesman.
Marx’s sarcasm is related to the fact that this market sphere makes 
up only a small fraction of modern social life. Commodity exchange or 
circulation has as its precondition an entirely different sphere: namely, 
capitalist production, the functional space of business administration 
and what Marx calls “abstract labor.” Here, laws entirely different 
from those of commodity circulation apply. Here, the salesman’s smile 
freezes into the cynical grimace of the slave driver or prison guard. 
When working, wrote the young Marx, the worker “isn’t himself, but 
outside himself.” The freedom in commodity production is so small 
that the content, sense, and purpose of what is produced there cannot 
be determined. Neither do the owners of capital or managers have 
this freedom, because they are under the pressure of competition. 
Production, therefore, entirely follows the principles of command and 
obedience. Where the business administration regime is especially 
efficient, workers are sometimes not even allowed the right to defecate 
in private. Neoliberalism, in particular, loves this wholly extraordinary 
productive strictness.
The freedom and equality of circulation and the dictatorship of 
business-administered production only appear to contradict each 
other. Purely formally, workers are unfree in production precisely 
because they exercised their freedom beforehand as commodity 
owners on the market. That is, they sold their labor power. Naturally, 
this freedom to sell one’s own labor power is itself owed to compulsion 
and unfreedom: modernization created historical circumstances 
under which there is no other possibility of sustaining one’s life. 
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One must either buy labor power and employ it for the end-in-itself 
of capitalist valorization, or sell one’s own labor power and let it be 
employed for this end-in-itself. As long as there were independent 
producers (farmers and artisans) there was no universal market. 
Rather, the greater part of social relations played themselves out in 
other forms. The rise of the universal market proceeded alongside the 
fall of independent producers. All other goods come to be traded as 
commodities only because there is a labor market, and because human 
labor power has also assumed the commodity form. The sphere of 
freedom and equality in circulation exists only because the sphere of 
unfreedom has developed out of production. Universal freedom thus 
also takes place in the form of universal competition.
This problem persists in the area of personal reproduction or 
private life, where commodities are consumed and intimate social 
relations have their place. Here there are many activities and 
moments of  life that are not fulfilled in commodity production 
(such as housekeeping, raising children, or love). In the process of 
modernization, women were made materially, socio-psychically, and 
cultural-symbolically responsible for these aspects, and they were 
devalued for that very reason: no “money value” is transacted in these 
moments of social life; thus, in the sense of capitalist valorization, 
they are inferior. This dissociation (in the sense of Roswitha Scholz’s 
concept of value dissociation) is not confined to a definable secondary 
sphere, but seeps through the entire ensemble of social life processes. 
Thus, within commodity production, women are as a rule worse-paid 
and reach leadership positions relatively infrequently. In personal 
relationships there is a determinate gender code that implies for 
women a structurally subordinate relation, even when it is sometimes 
broken or modified in postmodernity. Likewise, the non-white 
and non-Western part of humanity was already abandoned by the 
philosophy of the Enlightenment to a structural subordination.
The abolition of relations of “dominion of man over man” appears 
solely in the sphere of circulation and the market. That hypocritical 
sphere of freedom and equality is not, however, based merely on 
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structures of dependence; in an immediate sense, it is constituted as 
a naked function of the end-in-itself of capitalist valorization. In crass 
opposition to the exchange of independent products, the universal 
market does not serve the reciprocal satisfaction of needs. Rather, it is 
only a regime of accumulation or transitional stage belonging to capital 
itself. When sold, abstract value “realizes” itself as money, and the 
function of apparently free trade consists precisely in that. Original 
monetary capital, transformed via production into commodities, 
turns back into its money form multiplied by profit. The nature of 
capital is expressed precisely therein as an end in itself, that is, to turn 
money into more money with the consequent accumulation of what 
Marx calls “abstract wealth” in an endless process. Thus, by exercising 
their liberty and equality in the sphere of circulation, people achieve 
nothing but capital’s self-mediation. That is, they transform the surplus 
value or profit created from the commodity form back to the money 
form. Therefore, the freedom and equality of circulation are nothing 
but a mechanism for capital’s goal of realization. Each act of freedom 
requires the performance of an act of pump-priming that transforms 
capital from its commodity state into its money state. 
Modern bourgeois freedom possesses a peculiar character: it is 
identical to a higher, abstract, and anonymous form of servitude. 
Social emancipation would be liberation from this kind of freedom 
rather than its realization. Things look no better for the concept of 
equality, which openly implies the threat of forcing individuals into a 
single form. Modernization, in a manner of speaking, sewed humanity 
into the uniform of monetary subjects. But relations of structural 
dependency are hidden beneath it. In reality, the needs, the tastes, 
the cultural interests, and the personal objectives of individuals are 
never equal; they are only subjected to the equality of the commodity 
form. Therefore, as Adorno said, it would be emancipatory to be able 
to be “unequal in peace.”
Since the Enlightenment, equality has retained its false aura via the 
argumentative sleight of hand of bourgeois ideologues. The meaning 
of the concept of inequality was shifted from the simple variety of 
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individuals to the subordination of one individual to another. That 
which in itself is the mere expression of individual characteristics, 
namely inequality, suddenly appears as the expression of domination. 
And vice versa: that which in itself  is the expression of uniform 
compulsion, namely equality, suddenly appears as the expression of 
freedom from domination. Here, in modern ideology, we must deal 
with a case of Orwellian language. In reality, inequality has nothing 
to do with domination, and equality has nothing to do with self-
determination. Rather the opposite: in modernity equality itself is a 
relation of domination.
The result is a permanent contradiction in modern ideology. On 
one side, the sphere of circulation becomes separated from the entire 
context of capitalist reproduction and elevated as an ideal. On the 
other side, the de facto dictatorship of production and of the structural 
devaluation of the feminine are declared unbreakable objective laws 
of nature. Each side must be played constantly against the other; for 
this reason these social relations after a certain period of time enter 
the realm of common sense. Freedom and equality represent exactly 
what Adorno called the “context of blindness.” And the Left inherited 
this blindness along with the Enlightenment’s conceptual apparatus. In 
particular, utopian, democratic, and libertarian socialists, anarchists, 
and dissidents in state socialist countries all appealed to the ideals of 
freedom and liberty, without recognizing that they are restricted to 
the sphere of circulation and without seeing through to the inner link 
of freedom and unfreedom in modernity.
Today, social critics fall back more than ever into the ideals of 
circulation. This has structural causes. The global crisis caused by the 
third industrial revolution drives an increasing number of people out 
of real production and forcibly converts them into agents of circulation. 
As cheap labor in the service industry, as salespeople, street dealers, 
or even beggars, they themselves now experience, paradoxically, the 
sphere of freedom and equality as the yoke of a secondary job; the 
dictatorship of production is extended to more and more activities of 
circulation, finally reaching the entrepreneurs of poverty. Freedom 
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and unfreedom immediately coincide here; but, ideologically, that 
paradox is once again assimilated in terms of the ideals of circulation. 
Inasmuch as individuals experience themselves increasingly via 
their own petty-bourgeois self-conception as widely circulating 
“human capital,” a neo-petty-bourgeois version of the utopianism of 
commodity exchange comes back around after the demise of labor 
socialism. In a society in which everyone constantly attempts to sell 
something to someone, and in which social relations dissolve into a 
universal bazaar, the growing signs of crisis are perceived through the 
grid of circulation. In a veritably compulsory manner, an intelligentsia 
of self-salespeople interprets the problems of the third industrial 
revolution along the lines of relations of circulation: one commodity 
owner meets another. Even the overcoming of commodity production 
is imagined according to the categories of eternal exchange.
Individuals, who do not as a rule reflect critically on their social 
constitution and who only seem to be independent of each other in the 
sphere of circulation, are asked periodically to appreciate the other’s 
good fortune and extend goodwill instead of competing with each 
other; all of this is to treat the problem as if it were to be found not 
in social production and ways of living, but rather in an individually 
representable pathology that could be cured by pedagogical and 
therapeutic measures. The salesman’s smile is interpreted as the 
idealism of amiable social relations that are no longer minted in 
competition, as if social transformation were possible via the utopian 
construct of  personal conduct, outside the substantial mode of 
production and life. These utopian beliefs are rooted in the idealized 
sphere of circulation — where the neo-petty-bourgeois utopians 
appoint themselves the bedside doctors of the subject.
The ideology of circles of exchange that is propagated in many 
countries fails, in practice, to represent anything but a hobby economy; 
where it has been attempted on a large scale, as in the recent Argentine 
crisis, it has failed massively. The attempt (supported by the research 
of French ethnographer Marcel Mauss, especially in his major work, 
The Gift) to redeem “eternal exchange” from competition by using 
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the model of  so-called archaic societies and transforming it into 
a reciprocal exchange of gifts — that is, into a kind of permanent 
Christmas — seems even more insufficient. The idea of an “economy 
of the gift” cannot, by its essence, extend beyond immediate personal 
relationships; hence it ignores the scale of social productive forces and 
highly organized social contexts. It would be absurd for one individual 
to say to another: “give me a kidney transplant and, if you’re very good, 
I’ll give you a combine harvester.” The problem is not how individuals 
might mutually “grant” each other something, but to apply our social 
forces (infrastructures, systems of education and science, systems 
of industrial and immaterial production) sensibly, not destructively.
On the contrary, utopias of circulation always look for a solution 
primarily on the plane of individual modes of behavior. Yet that’s 
putting the cart before the horse. Instead of making commodity 
circulation and its accompanying market competition superfluous 
through a social revolution of production and of our way of life, such 
a backwards approach asks the isolated subject of circulation to realize 
the ontological pretension of exchange in a reformed, whitewashed 
form. The aim is an ethical canceling-out of  competition. Social 
emancipation then appears as the mere consequence of a utopia 
consisting of the freedom and equality of the subject of circulation, 
supposedly realized in small groups. The matter of practical solidarity 
in social contexts is ideologized and made into a mendacious, 
pedagogical, and often psychotherapeutic idealism which can simply 
turn into the terror of kindness and reciprocal social control (for 
example, along the lines of religious sects). This neo-petty-bourgeois 
utopianism of human capital in circulation is, just like all earlier 
utopias, condemned to failure.

Curtains for Universalism: Islamism as 
Fundamentalism in Modern Social Form
Karl-Heinz Lewed (2008)
“Western values are Western values. Islamic values are universal values.”
– Mohamad Mahatir, Former Prime Minister of Malaysia
The West has responded to the threat of Islamist terror, particularly 
since the attacks on the World Trade Center, in two ways: first, in 
practical, political terms through select campaigns of destruction in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and, second, in ideological terms through the 
myth of what Samuel P. Huntington called a “clash of civilizations” 
and the fundamentalism of “Western Values.” 9/11 had the effect 
of an ideological accelerant, which managed to inflame further an 
already growing culturalist firestorm. The ever increasing economic 
crisis in the centers of  capitalism,  together with the social and 
material insecurity of individual people, had laid the groundwork 
for culturalism in the 1990s. Its paradigmatic claim, that is, of a major 
line of confrontation between the West and “Islam,” was met with an 
even greater deal of approval as a result of the terror attacks of Islamist 
groups. Since then, a stream of culturalist elaborations has continued 
to pour forth, and the pervasive stereotypes arising out of Western 
culturalism are being rearticulated with growing and pervasive 
vehemence.1 “Islam” is said to have nothing to do with the history 
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of Western civilization, its way of life, and its basic values; rather it 
represents a totally different culture. It is said to be premodern because 
its views of the world stem from religiously motivated, medieval 
thinking, and is therefore diametrically opposed to personal freedom, 
the core of the Western way of life. What “Islam” strives for, then, is 
continually to expand its horizons, representing a threat to “Western 
culture.” In fact, in the confrontation between Islamism and Western 
cultural warriors, we find not two essentially foreign cultures standing 
opposite each other, but two complementary variations of dealing with 
a globalization marked by crisis capitalism, whose common foundation 
takes the modern social form of interaction through the production of 
commodities, abstract labor and law, as well as the attendant forms of 
subjectivity. If the implementation of capitalist forms of socialization 
in “Islamic” countries has taken on a very specific and contradictory 
character, a fundamental transformation of social relations already 
took place long ago under the guidance of the nationalist modernizing 
dictatorships, and continues through to modern, bourgeois social 
relations.2 
With the excommunication of  the “Islamic” world from the 
social fabric of  bourgeois modernity, however, the fundamental 
social forms that dominate in both the capitalist core regions and 
the global South are totally effaced. The growing social decay in 
countries on the periphery, in the end the product of a recuperative 
modernization, is painted over, seen through a culturalist lens as 
something purely the result of a culture foreign to the West. Thus, 
the asynchronous nature of the current crisis, further polarizing the 
periphery and the center, appears as an existential conflict between 
Occident and Orient. Simultaneously, the critique of the political 
and ideological background in its historical context is rendered 
impossible, since culturalism displaces critical distance in favor of 
classification and identity. For culturalism, one thing is fundamentally 
obsolete: comprehending social contradictions and their disavowals 
in a historical context. Identity-based logic simplifies the historical 
process to a cultural fashioning of a preconceived being residing inside 
295Curtains for Universalism
totally self-contained and static cultural structures. Culturalism is 
constituted by the construction and classification of  collective 
identities, including the formulation of a clash between them. Thus, 
the real historical dimensions are effaced, as are the developments 
looming on the horizon. Contrary to culturalist constructions, the 
current situation in these regions does not result from an ostensible 
continuation of centuries of cultural traditions; rather it has much 
more to do with a crisis-laden process involving the dissolution of social 
formations on the basis of modern bourgeois social relations. Indeed, 
a fundamental transformation of social structures took place under 
the modernizing dictatorships. The process of this transformation had 
as its prerequisite both colonial domination and the disentanglement 
and “emancipation” from this domination. The content of the newly 
created frame of abstract social relations was, however, the equally 
abstract valorization of labor. The central contradiction that Islamism’s 
ideology of decline attests to could and can only be found in the fact 
that although the framework of social networks is based on modern 
forms, the universalization of the production of abstract wealth 
failed in these forms. Islamism is the direct product of this failure. It 
represents a specific ideological and (post)political form of decline of 
recuperative modernization, participating as such in the continuity 
of that process. Both the genesis and the decline of the nation-state 
form are constitutive of the emergence of Islamism. Its orientation 
reflects central elements of the modern bourgeois form, which cloaked 
themselves in religious garb, in particular the claim to sovereignty 
and a single legal system for all relative to the religion-based form 
of law.3 For a serious critique, the ideology of Islamism is not to be 
understood without reference to the level of nation-statehood and 
form of law — in other words, the standpoint of political generality. 
For this reason, I will concentrate on those forms which, in the process 
of the decline in the economic content, have gone through a specific 
reformulation, taking on a religious semblance. Thus Islamism proves 
to be the fundamentalism of the modern social form.
The statist movement towards a national collective occurred not 
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simply through the rationalized cobbling together of individual units, 
torn from their traditional modes of living and made into a functional 
whole; in fact, irrational elements played a central role. These elements 
are part and parcel of the patriarchal form of male subjectivity and 
its inherent impulse to classify things into an all-encompassing 
sociality. The requirement for the appearance of concreteness and 
identification with an imagined, pure totality — like a “people” or 
a certain culture — finds its deep subjective foundations here. Only 
with the universalization of isolated individuality and its concomitant 
powerlessness in the face of the social does it become necessary to 
submit and subordinate oneself to a national or ethnic community, 
thereby merging into it. In a future article, I will attempt to determine 
the implications of this relationship at the level of subjects, and show 
how patriarchal structures, antisemitism, and, finally, the rendering 
of collective subjects are re-elaborated in Islamism as specific elements 
of modernity, becoming virulent as means of coming to terms with 
socioeconomic upheaval and its contradictions.4 
The Generality of Self-Seeking Interest
The implementation of modern bourgeois forms of social intercourse 
mediated through the commodity form took place fundamentally 
at the level of nation state formation. The statist sovereign played a 
double role in this process. On one hand, he spurred the dismantling 
of traditional forms of social hierarchy with their “ancient hierarchical 
and organic forms of association.”5 On the other, state-organized 
violence pursued a general rationalization of  the social order, 
replacing the established social structures with new objectified power 
relations. The process of implementing commodity society turned 
out to be an “enterprise of general uprooting” of individuals and, 
simultaneously, a new social cohesion taking the form of abstract 
mediation, a social “reconstruction according to the principles of 
reason.”6 The constitution of state power and the creation of new 
and abstract relationships between individuals went hand in hand. 
Exemplary of this consonance is the development of absolutist power 
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in France, which, as Tocqueville shows, anticipated the fundamental 
forms of bourgeois dominance.7 Seen in this way, political systems 
— from the absolutist state to bourgeois democracy and on to the 
modernizing dictatorships — represent different manifestations of 
a shared identity at the most fundamental level, an identity that lies 
beyond the concrete formation of the statist power apparatus that 
administers public business. Rousseau calls this level, which lies 
outside the individual organs of sovereignty, the general will.8 The 
general foundation of statist praxis is expressed in the fact that state 
operations are legitimated not from within, but through a public 
interest, which simultaneously underwrites and overlaps with the 
state.9 Marx aptly describes the character of this universalization 
in the Grundrisse: “The general interest is precisely the generality of 
self-seeking interests.” “The other [the partner in the generalized 
exchange of commodities] is also recognized and acknowledged as 
one who likewise realizes his self-seeking interest, so that both know 
that the common interest is only...the exchanges between self-seeking 
interests.”10 Of course, what Marx calls “self-seeking interest” is not the 
abject personal character of the individual but the result of generalized 
social interaction between commodity owners. Social connections 
in commodity society are thereby fundamentally marked by the 
fact that labor or the commodity function as social mediators. Every 
individual in this kind of social relationship of mediation is included 
only as the owner of his commodity — and that means, generally 
speaking, the commodity of his own labor power. Thus, he does not 
work in order to manufacture a specific object, but to secure money 
and hence a portion of the abstract wealth of commodities. The social 
connection of mediation through labor thus breaks down into two 
elements of concrete activity for others, that is, for the anonymous 
social context represented in commodities and in the sphere of private, 
“self-seeking” interest for money. “Each [both parties in the exchange 
process] looks only to his own advantage. The only force bringing 
them together, and putting them into relation with the other, is the 
selfishness, the gain, and the private interest of each.”11 In a society 
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in which labor stands at the center of social mediation, every activity 
becomes external to individuals and therefore merely a means. At the 
level of social relationships, this form of mediation expresses itself in 
the division into separate relationships of the will of each individual 
commodity owner to his product or the value represented in it; that 
is, in property relations.12 This is precisely what Marx means when 
he uses the phrase “self-seeking interests.” It is no accident, then, that 
in the final article of the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen,” the founding political document of modern bourgeois 
society, we read that “property” is an “inviolable and sacred right,” of 
which “no one can be deprived.” Property as “sacred right” obviously 
does not mean a “natural” relation to an object; rather, it articulates 
the abstract sociality of the individual commodity monads and the 
standpoint of their private interests. Social generality is therefore an 
abstract generality, a common framework of separate, individualized 
monads endowed with free will. 
Through the notion of law, the other side of abstract generality, 
separate private interests are placed in an equally abstract relationship 
to one another and are as such mediated. The commodity-formed 
individual is therefore not only constituted (in relation to his private 
property) as free, but simultaneously as an equal among equals related 
to a polity (law), which forms the abstract framework of abstract 
individuals. In addition to freedom belonging to commodity owners, 
the general will emerges — in other words, the spheres of right and 
law, in which all are viewed as equal. The concept of universalism 
expresses the universalization of the abstract private standpoint as 
well as the equality of abstract individuals as equal subjects before the 
law. There are always two souls that reside in the modern universal 
subject: that of free will and that of “universal law.” The most advanced 
representative of bourgeois reason, Immanuel Kant, outlines in his 
Critiques precisely these two aspects of bourgeois subjectivity — free 
will and the universal form of law — and simultaneously formulates 
a program of complete submission to them.  Kant is theoretically 
consistent insofar as his concept of the “form of law in general” is 
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clearly not aimed at actual written laws — unlike the contemporary 
positivist simplified notions of “jurisprudence”— rather at the level of 
“law itself ” underlying the statist legal system.13 This underlying form 
is nothing other than one pole of the individual’s abstract mediation 
relationship vis-à-vis the commodity. The mediation implies, on one 
hand, the discretionary power of commodity owners over their private 
property (including their own labor power) to the exclusion of all 
others; on the other hand, the constitution of a “generality of self-
seeking interests” as right and law emerge. Abstract individuals are 
deeply affected by two sides of the same coin of subjectivity. Obviously, 
the combination of freedom and legality can be found in “Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.” Article I states that “Men are 
born and remain free and equal in rights,” while Article VI specifically 
clarifies the content of social relations in the form of the generality of 
right: “The law is the expression of the general will.” This formulation 
makes absolutely clear how the societal cohesion of  individuals 
reduced to commodities can only be expressed in the form of law. 
The basic form of the relation of commodity owners we have 
been describing must take a concrete form in the daily circulation of 
individuals, a form which has a dual character: the abstract relation 
expresses itself on one hand in the sphere of the market, in which 
the individual commodity owners realize their private portion of the 
social mass of value; on the other hand, the mediation of abstract 
relationships through the form of law manifests itself in a highly 
differentiated system of public institutions: the sphere of politics and 
the state. The 1791 “Declaration” explicitly highlights the requirement 
of external force: “The guarantee of the rights of man and of the citizen 
necessitates a public force.” 
According to an uncritical understanding of  human rights, 
they express only the interests of  individuals with respect to 
statist force. Contrary to this limited perspective, however, the 
1791 “Declaration” formulates clearly the dual character of private 
relationships: individuals are free to handle their hallowed property 
as they please and at the same time are necessarily tied to law and 
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the state as community. Given their basic elements, the state and 
the free individual stand not in opposition to each other, but form 
a logical and complementary unity: “the Sovereign presupposes 
citizens to be individuals, he as an individual needs them...and 
he guarantees their existence as isolated citizens. Herein lies the 
‘common interest’: that the two spheres require each other as much 
as much as they differ.”14 The general form of interest is private and 
the statist institutionalization represents this general and abstract 
form. The state is therefore only the external shape of the abstract 
form of relations between individuals. We can in no way find the 
underlying conditions of right and law in the empirical “forms of 
expressions” of state force, or likewise in the personal decisions of 
individuals. The profound depth of the Kantian critique quoted above 
therefore resides in the formulation of free will and the form of law 
as “transcendentality,”  rather than deriving it from an empirical 
determination of will, in the way, say, Hobbes attempts to. The latter 
viewpoint leads back to the constitution of the Sovereign through a 
contractual relation between the isolated individuals and presupposes 
from the outset their monadic existence as natural “people.” Opposed 
to that, the Kantian “form of a Law in general” is a superindividual 
sphere, that is, a framework of  “transcendental” legality and 
freedom in which individuals already operate. The Marxian critique 
of commodity production can identify this “transcendentality” as a 
historically specific form of relation and, to a certain extent, bring it 
down from the otherworldly sphere of reason to the earthly ground 
of commodity relations. 
Independence and National Unity Within the 
Horizon of the General Interest
Not only has the ideology of bourgeois society underlined the categories 
of abstract generality and general will; the collective actors of later 
nation-state formations legitimate themselves explicitly by using 
these categories. And even its form of decline, political Islam, refers to 
them when legitimating itself. All of modernity’s political systems, no 
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matter how differently they style themselves, stand fundamentally in 
a long and unified tradition of statist sovereignty as the standpoint of 
generality that stretches all the way back to the beginnings of bourgeois 
society, a standpoint which obliges the statist institutions of power 
to maintain the status of neutrality in the face of private interests. 
What follows from the form of law as the mediation of respective 
private property relationships is that the representative organs must 
constitute themselves as neutral and independent. Figuratively, this 
claim is embodied well in the figure of “Lady Justice”: blind to the 
items on her scales — that is, the respective private interests — it 
is only a question of legal equilibrium, the formal balance between 
abstract private interests.15 This claim to independence or rather the 
indifference to the specific matter at hand implies that the personnel 
representing the institutionalized general will, in other words the 
officers of the court and public administrators, are likewise forced 
to uphold a strict neutrality because, as functionaries of general 
operations, they operate in a sphere which is ideally located outside 
the particular interests, including their own as private persons. 
The infringement of this basic rule — that is, the mixing of general 
interests and the particular interests of public personnel — is however 
already implied. Officials, who are meant to take the general interest 
seriously, find themselves all too easily mixed up with their private 
interest.  Broadly speaking,  history shows that there is no clear 
correlation between the regular functioning of the sphere of private 
relationships (mediated by the market) and the near “disturbance-free” 
administration of general operations. The historical implementation 
of the modern forms, in which the sphere of private relationships 
was first created, was signaled by a mixing of the two spheres. The 
tendency towards the diffusion of particular interests is intensified 
in the crisis of commodity production such that a separation of the 
general operations from the outside private interest proves to be more 
and more difficult. In these cases it is common to speak of corrupt 
states, which are then ranked on a new scale created especially for 
them. Ultimately, this contradiction leads to the collapse of the crucial 
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neutrality of the public sphere.16 The gravitational pull of corruption 
also affects the countries where Islamism has entered into the 
corridors of political power: “Empowered Islam offers neither new 
kinds of social or economic justice. Hypocrisy is dominant: under the 
veil of moral conservatism, corruption is pervasive. [...] Empowerment 
leads to corruption, compromise, and the loss of utopia.”17
The ideal of the formal and functional independence and neutrality 
of the sovereign as public authority is merely one facet of this relation. 
In addition, political sovereignty externally represents the national 
unity of private, individual relationships. In the nation, the mass of 
isolated individuals is coalesced into a broader constituency. So, too, 
does the individual, the presupposed sovereign, as the general will of 
private property relations, find its concrete form in an all-powerful 
nation. The mystical transfiguration of this submission as “devotion 
to the nation” (Marx) points out that the real-metaphysical quality 
of the abstract form is in fact a civil relationship, unconsciously 
produced through the mediation of money and law. The mythologically 
charged concept of the nation has resulted, since its first formulation, 
from this externalization of social relationships and the subsequent 
metaphysical Categorical Imperative. The sovereign is thus the 
extended community of the nationally defined individual, one who 
stands in a negative relationship with any other nation. The national 
whole stands only on one particular territory, one fenced in by its 
sovereign, ever-enclosed, and secured from the outside. And so, too, 
privileges (such as social benefits) only come to the members of the 
national community.
For both the self-image and self-legitimation of the nation as a 
whole, as for individuals, bourgeois social dynamics play an important 
role: first, the need for continuous circulation of the productive basis of 
wealth production; second, the dissolution of traditional relationships 
and forms of production; and third, permanent expansion. Material 
production, as the social structure that underpins the requirement of 
constant modernization, is turned into an ideology of universal social 
progress, and it finds general acceptance. The nation, now identified 
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with this comprehensive, all-encompassing dynamic, must, as the 
subject of “progress,” grant meaning and achieve concrete goals. This 
identification with the national unity, however, is mediated through 
an individual perspective, whereby the respective private interests 
are included in the promise of progress of the whole. The legitimacy 
of executive state power is based on two rules: first, neutrality of legal 
institutions regulating private property relations; second, perceiving 
national interests in the sense of the dynamic of its own community 
and in contrast to all non-national interests.
These two moments are now playing an important role in the 
enforcement of modern social forms — not just as a real process, 
but also as an ideological reference point for the mobilization of the 
population. This is particularly true for recuperative modernization, 
in which the state’s sovereignty came to prominence with both the 
dissolution of traditional social structures and the implementation of 
the modern social form. In the “Islamic” countries, this development 
came along with the historical marks of colonialism, the subsequent 
national modernization regime, and finally — this regime’s rejection 
— as political Islamism. The respective contradictions, both of the 
recuperative modernization regimes as well as Islamism whose 
appearance on the historical stage they provoked, can be illustrated 
alongside the previously outlined two moments of national legitimacy.
Anticolonial Liberation in the World of Abstract Domination
In the European colonies and quasi-colonies, colonial policy and 
colonial institutions were subjected to the economic and political 
interests of the centers, a practice legitimated by the racist devaluation 
of the colonized population. Against the system of colonial domination 
now stand anticolonial liberation movements in the name of the 
nation or the people, which attack this domination on two related 
levels of  public interest. On one hand, this was done with the 
demand for independence of the newly created public authority 
from the colonial interests. The national liberation movements stood 
against the particular interests of the colonial powers for political 
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independence and for their own sovereign, who would follow the 
dictates of neutrality. On the other hand, linked to this was the call 
for the redistribution of the abstract wealth over which state authority 
presided and to distribute it among nationally defined members — 
that is, to realize national interests for the sake of their community.
Compared with colonial and imperialist oppression and 
exploitation, this step is undoubtedly progressive, as is the liberation 
of individuals from the mechanisms of racially legitimated coercive 
conditions, from social exclusion, and from violence by the colonial 
apparatus. Last but not least, the hope that the wretched living 
conditions of the majority of the population would improve rallied 
the anticolonial struggles. Still, the legitimacy and thus the practice 
of the national liberation movements remained essentially within 
the framework of abstract political universality. The independence 
strived for was not only independence from colonial rule, but rather a 
determinate content of a specific manner —  namely, the constitution 
of a form of law independent of private interests. Thus modern forms 
of domination — that is, abstract domination — replaced the repressive 
structures of colonialism. The right to social participation and a secure 
livelihood for all, rights formulated during the fight for liberation, 
resulted in a social structure that precisely excludes this end. And 
so the upheaval of social relations proceeded for the most part not 
towards the differentiation and expansion of a national bourgeoisie, 
but towards “socialist” mobilization of  labor under the direct 
supervision of the state. In these circumstances, its function was not 
limited to “general development,” like building public infrastructure, 
but also included the immediate content of this private relationship, 
the production of abstract social wealth. Insofar as the state appeared 
as the general contractor of labor-form mobilization, it manifested 
the “will of the people” in the triumvirate of production, expended 
labor, and income. The state control of recuperative modernization 
was based essentially on the latecomers to modernization, in the cities 
where the redevelopment of the national space was also driven by the 
industrialization program of a nation state. Exemplary here was the 
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Germany of the nineteenth century. Industrialization should lead to 
a general revolution in the productive base. Within this process, the 
categories of labor and money are provided, as well as the political 
sovereign, who was to bring about this development. Nasser did so 
in Egypt in the 1950s. He pointedly expressed the clear difficulties 
of implementing a commodity-producing system when he said in a 
speech to striking workers: “In any case it is impossible today to raise 
the standard of living of workers. In order to do that we need to give 
them money, and to do that it is our duty to increase production by 
creating industries. To offer you any other prospect would be to deceive 
you. The only way which permits us to raise the standard of living of 
the workers is construction and labor.”18 With the universalization 
of the production of abstract wealth, private, individual interests 
simultaneously and necessarily took on a universal, social form. 
Money and labor increasingly became the center of social mediation 
such that the individual was ever more relegated to the context of 
personal relationships.
Beneath the surface of state intervention, which increasingly 
placed social reproduction on the basis of labor power and income, 
a fundamental change took place in the social fabric that effected 
every aspect of life. This change was both visible and tangible in 
phenomena such as the rural exodus and soaring urbanization, the 
disintegration of traditional family relationships, and integration into 
objectified social functions. The colonial rulers had already partially 
transformed social relationships into commodified exchanges and 
the play of  private interests. Now, modernizing dictatorships 
fundamentally revolutionized the social mediations. Strikingly, 
even the greatest thinkers of  the national liberation movements 
refer without bias to the basic contradiction between the general 
interest and “selfish” interest, by presupposing both as given. This 
is evident from Frantz Fanon’s indictment of colonial rule: namely, 
that it had failed to produce a bourgeoisie, which is precisely the 
class representative of private interests essential for further national 
development. The national dictatorships of modernization attempted 
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to make up this gap as quickly as possible through a comprehensive 
political and economic development program: “The task is either 
to develop the national bourgeoisie, or, if that was too weak or too 
dependent on Western interests and influences, for the state to take 
it over. In light of this theory, the Communist parties in many former 
colonies — and especially in the Arab world — allied themselves 
with nationalist parties, representing an indigenous bourgeoisie, or 
even a military-bureaucratic state.”19 Everyone from nationalists to 
the state bureaucracy, from the socialists to the communist parties, 
shares a common position regarding the radical reformulation of social 
interaction under the guiding star of abstract universalism, namely, 
of the bourgeois categories of reason and labor. Freedom and equality 
before the law fall under the same framework as the mediation of 
labor and money. The anticolonial liberation movements made the 
enforcement of modern bourgeois forms their explicit program. Where 
attempts at continued social organization and the appropriation of 
social wealth developed (such as councils or cooperatives), they were 
relatively quickly suppressed or incorporated into state institutions. 
The history of recuperative modernization shows how difficult it 
was to gain access to the economic standards of the West, especially the 
world market. Given the one-sided, metropole-aligned economy with 
minimal vertical integration and an orientation towards agriculture 
and raw materials, the starting conditions for producing value for the 
world system were very bad. The state needed not only to create the 
basis for a wide range of economic production (provision of necessary 
infrastructure from roads to communications, the expansion of public 
administration, creating an education system, and so on), but also, as 
a key economic agent, to begin the production of abstract wealth. But 
the concept of “import substitution,” which was followed in almost 
all developing countries and designed to reduce dependence on 
foreign capital goods imports by developing their own self-supporting 
industry, was ultimately unsuccessful. Most industrial production 
was limited to simple assembly, minimally vertically integrated and 
lagging behind the international standard, so the dependence upon 
307Curtains for Universalism
high-quality and expensive capital goods remained. At the same time, 
exports became more expensive due to overvalued exchange rates, 
such that the increasing need for foreign exchange led to a growing 
national debt. Even more serious was, however, that the aim of general, 
self-sustaining industrial production failed on its own terms. Not only 
did the unassailable lead in productivity of the industrial centers play 
a central role, but most important of all was the basic contradiction 
of trying to build a differentiated and complex system of production 
under the rule of a central planning bureaucracy. The cumbersome 
command economy was structurally incapable of organizing flexible 
manufacturing processes, such as are created almost automatically 
under conditions of capitalist competition, which is the dictate of 
the market. Overall, therefore, the modernization regime became 
entangled in structural contradictions that finally plummeted the 
nation state’s politics of industrialization into crisis.
The Ruins of Modernization and the Emergence of Islamism
The dynamics of  abstract wealth production in the “developing 
countries” increasingly lost its momentum in the 1970s and 1980s 
due to the lacking generalization of its industrial basis. Even the 
increasing oil revenues in some central “Islamic” countries could 
not compensate for this industrial stagnation, contributing instead 
to a one-sided orientation of the economy towards these sources of 
revenues, substantially benefiting only a minority. And so the system 
of abstract relationships was generalized, but not their content: not 
the abstract production of wealth. Islam expert Gilles Kepel dates the 
beginning of the “Islamic period” to the early 1970s, and more precisely 
to the first “oil crisis.”20 Saudi Arabia, as an ideal core country and 
source of material support for Islamism, rose at that time due to rising 
oil prices, becoming the leading power in the region. This refers in part 
to the last, failed attempt to develop an independent national economy. 
On the other hand, there is a certain irony: in spite of Islamists’ anti-
Western and anti-American polemics and demarcation they materially 
remain attached to the IV-drip of the local valorization of value due to 
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their reliance on the shift to a petrodollar economy.
For the populace, the implementation of  modern forms 
of  socialization meant, especially in regions that were once 
predominantly rural, that social relations were transformed by the 
process of modernization: a sprawling urban migration to the cities 
took place; and urban ways of life prevailed. Initially, this change 
represents a real improvement of material conditions, because within 
the newly established framework of abstract forms of relationship, 
opportunities for advancement and participation emerged. The 
ideology of national progress depended explicitly on the program 
of universal participation in abstract wealth. This first transition, 
perceived as a largely positive social change, was over no later than 
the mid-1970s, mainly due to a sharp population increase, and a young 
generation who did not see material conditions improving and lost 
the perspective of the social whole.21 Bernard Schmid describes the 
situation in the period of national progress for Algeria: 
A majority lived with the expectation that progress in the 
development of the country would in the long run benefit 
the “lower” echelons of society. This hope was in line with 
reality insofar as schools and transport links were all built 
in the seventies, and the Algerian population benefited from 
relatively developed social systems, such as a free health care 
(in 1974). Picture this: sitting in the last car, the occupants 
could bear hardship as long as they had the impression that 
the entire train — the whole of Algerian society — was going 
forward and so was also transporting them towards the target. 
But the situation becomes unbearable if the passengers in the 
rear wagon have the impression that they have been suspended 
from the rest of the train and the front of the car is going on 
alone. This perception intensified in the course of the eighties: 
social inequalities grew, corruption became ever more obvious 
and determined access to artificially discounted consumer 
goods — which are imported by state structures, but are often 
sold in parallel channels on a shadow sector and distributed 
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there.22 
The situation in the regions with failed modernization is now felt 
more generally, causing economic frictions to be experienced as 
comprehensive social misery and the utter loss of prospects. This train 
of events puts the prospect of individuals participating in the blessings 
of the national whole ever more into question. On one hand, the system 
of private interests prevailed. On the other hand, the content of said 
system, the production of abstract wealth, remained very fragile, 
so that a growing proportion of the population had no access to this 
wealth. Islam scholar Olivier Roy in his study The Islamic Way West has 
convincingly shown the extent to which the social transformation 
process was generalized and the individual standpoint is now the 
foundation of social relations. He shows the close relationship between 
the “Islamic” countries and the West in key social developments. The 
disintegration of traditional social relations has led to a matrix of 
individualization, which Roy has also identified as a central feature of 
Islamic fundamentalism. As in the West, the situation is dominated by 
strategies based on professional success and individual performance.23 
He describes the current situation as a “crisis of indigenous cultures,” 
the moment of a “process of deculturation” in that the “social authority 
of religion is gone,” and there is a general loss of “social authority.”24 
The current re-Islamization, Roy argues, has the secularized concept 
of the individual as its foundation. It appears from the will of the 
individual” and leads to the “individual reformulation of personal 
religiosity.”25 “Central is the self, and consequently the individual. 
[…] Currently taking place among Muslims is an individualization 
of belief and behavior, especially among those living in the West. 
The ego is highlighted, each strives for self-actualization and looks 
for an individual reconstruction of  his attitude to religion. […] 
Individualization is a prerequisite for the Westernization of Islam, 
and that’s what happened.”26 In the process, Roy distinguishes 
between the form and the content of praxis: Westernization means 
something more than just the West. The content may be different, 
but the “form of individuality is the same.”27 The modernization of 
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social relations within the formation of the nation state took place 
therefore as the transformation of relations towards the position of 
the abstract individual. The process of “acculturation” and the change 
of the “common grammar of social relations” evolved in the horizon 
of modern bourgeois relations on the basis of private interest and 
“free will.”28
Therefore, it is anything but surprising that in these regions 
the generalized private subject position, in one of his main fields 
of  activity, is the consumer. With the generalization of  private 
interest and the individualization of living conditions, the Western 
consumerist attitude arrives. From the get-go, little remains of the 
imagined collective future or the belief in the progress of the nation 
as a whole. Rather, now the abstract universality of “the spirit of the 
people” faces the abstract privacy of the individual. This is clearly 
noticeable, for instance, in Algeria: “after industrial policy has been 
abandoned in favor of free trade and the importation of Western 
commodities, the predominant fascination with the colorful world of 
commodities is, for the time being, displayed on the shleves of specially 
established state supermarkets.”29 This “free will” given to the abstract 
individual is subject to the temptations of the increasingly colorful 
commodity aesthetic that makes up an essential moment in the world 
of modern subjectivity. But an increasingly large part of the population 
cannot participate in the consumer world because the experiments 
spawned by recuperative modernization produced not a system of 
mass production, mass employment, and mass consumption, but 
rather one of mass poverty and exclusion, where living and working 
conditions are increasingly precarious, and where a rapid increase in 
the informal sector followed.
Large parts of the population did not perceive the mechanisms 
of  social exclusion as an expression of  economic contradictions 
and the structural crisis of the overall system but interpreted them 
through their individual, biased subject positions. Thus general 
misery appeared to be due to corruption, that is, in the illegal mixing 
of “general operations” with the private interests of executives. The 
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national nomenklatura procured gross benefits through their privileged 
access to the material resources of  the public. This widespread 
perception was not entirely wrong, as corruption, obvious to all, 
grew along with the economy. However, this confuses cause and effect. 
For the ever-increasing diffusion of private interests in the public 
sector can be considered a consequence of the fact that the state was 
interested in erecting itself as abstract universality against particular 
interests, along with the failure of recuperative modernization. From 
the individuals’ perspective, the social regression appears to be caused 
by the nomenklatura, who are responsible for the crisis. The latter have 
driven the sovereign into the abyss, in that they wrongly used him in 
terms of their selfish, individual interests, rather than as a general 
framework for the mediation of diverse, social, private interests, 
thus creating appropriate private development opportunities. The 
structural failure to generalize the production of abstract wealth 
appeared, from the perspective of their own social frame of reference, 
to be due to the individual misconduct of  the “privileged elite” 
governing the country.30
With the national state bureaucracy the concept of the nation 
largely came into disrepute. The charge that the national elite 
oppressed and exploited the individual was, retrospectively for the 
entire period of nationalism (i.e., of recuperative nation building), 
interpretively integrated into the anticolonial period. Thus, the 
national phase appeared to be an extension of colonial domination 
and exploitation, except the bearer of  this rule was now not the 
colonial powers, but cliques of the state bureaucracy, which were 
characterized as spittle-licking lackeys of foreign powers, especially 
the United States. And just as the colonial powers kept their colonies in 
a relation of economic dependency and allowed them no independent 
political sovereignty, the postcolonial regime undermined the social 
order further, thereby causing general social malaise. Because they 
pursued only their particular interests rather than serving the 
public good, the sphere of  the independent sovereign itself  had 
been discredited. The result of this is the view that nationalism is 
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identical with the particularist position and responsible for the 
increasing exclusion of the population from social participation. 
The independent sovereign, according to this logic, broke with the 
principle of equality that is attached to sovereignty, which, after all, 
enshrines the idea of equal rights for all. The anti-imperialism and 
anticolonialism of the past era were now actualized against the failure 
of modernization and became largely identical with nationalism. In 
this way, Islamism was a reservoir for a new anti-imperialism, one 
able to give political expression to the growing social upheaval and 
the resulting social tensions — though not without also installing 
certain religious motives in this protest. This results in a general 
shift of the voice of social protest in a direction that had heretofore 
been politically marginal. A common reference point for the different 
Islamic movements was the criticism of the oppression of national 
regimes as particularistic, accomplices of the West, particularly of 
the United States and of  Israel. The Western Hemisphere and its 
democratic system becomes a symbol of particularism against which 
Islam’s universality is asserted: “Western values are Western values, 
Islamic values, however, are universal values.”31 As a counterpoint to 
the particularistic point of view of foreign rule, Islamists argue for the 
organization of a “just society” in which the same law (understood, 
however, within the meaning of  “Islamic law”) for all would be 
guaranteed through the transcendence of sovereignty, the sovereignty 
of God. Both the movements of political Islam in the early 1980s as 
well as today, especially terrorist networks, share this belief. The 
law as the embodiment of divine order and as the central goal to be 
achieved was the reference point both for the “Islamic revolution” in 
Iran and al-Qaeda. Before analyzing this ideological shift and showing 
that the reformulation of the general religious standpoint reflects the 
contradictions of the global crisis, I would first like to clarify some 
statements by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Sayyid Qutb.
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The “Spirit of the People” According to bin Laden, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, and Sayyid Qutb 
We begin with three quotes from George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden: 
“These people despise freedom. It is a fight for freedom. It is 
a struggle, so that we can say to all lovers of freedom: We will 
not let them terrorize us...”32
“They have declared war on us. And the United States, they 
are hunting. As long as I am president, we are determined to be 
firm and strong in our pursuit of these people who kill innocent 
people because they hate freedom.”33 
“Bush said…that we hate freedom….On the contrary, we 
want our country to return to freedom; pursuing your freedom 
destroys our freedom.”34
The last quotation is from a video release by bin Laden entitled 
“Message to the American People.” The entire text is instructive insofar 
as the theoretical framework — if you want to call it that — is quite 
familiar: first, freedom for the people and security, but also values 
such as justice, humanity, work, business, and common sense. So all 
terms that reference the modern form of socialization. The train of 
thought he develops in his message to the American people reflects 
the tradition of anti-imperialist liberation struggles as well as the 
dimension of sovereignty strived for, the “spirit of the people.” The 
dominance of the West, that is, the United States and Israel, means that 
Muslim countries are doomed, according to bin Laden, to suffering, 
injustice, and misery. Since the dominant nations are only pretending 
to defend freedom, the war of the oppressed peoples, the war of the 
Jihadist, is not offensive, but rather defensive. The United States is a 
repressive regime, similar to the military and neo-feudal regimes in 
Islamic countries who are dominated by “pride and arrogance, greed 
and corruption.”35 Bush, too, prevailed due to his family clan, partly 
by choice and partly by open fraud and lies, similar to the regimes in 
the “Islamic” countries. Bin Laden characterizes Bush and Bush Senior 
in the following: “He transferred to his son, who passed a ‘Patriotic 
Act’ under the pretext of fighting terrorism, both despotism and a 
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contempt for freedom.”36 
Bin Laden and al-Qaeda’s position is therefore not one of 
implacable opposition between “Islam” and the “West,” or between 
the “Orient” and the “Occident,” in the sense the Western culturalists 
(like Huntington) discuss the “clash of civilizations.” In contrast to 
this, al-Qaeda’s position is much closer to the abstract universality 
of the public interest. After all, their criticism is not directed against 
the “American people” as a whole, as a cultural community, but 
rather claims to represent their “true interests.” The Patriot Act, bin 
Laden claims, shows the despotic rule of the Bush clan, which will be 
consolidated with the help of this law, and will restrict the freedom 
of individuals and control them. This rhetoric reproduces exactly 
the perspective of Islamic anti-imperialists regarding the national 
development regimes, which they held responsible for suppressing 
the “true interests” of the people. Insofar as it is a global network, al-
Qaeda transcends this perspective, since it is not limited to “Islamic” 
countries and seeks to combat state bureaucratic cliques as well. They 
universalize the standpoint of a global framework, and claim to be 
the true representatives of all individual interests in the context of 
the abstract universality of the global scale. It follows therefore that 
they attempted to mobilize the American people against the assumed 
particularism of the U.S. government and the U.S. oligarchy: “The real 
losers are you, the American people and its economy.”37 Bin Laden 
refers not only to the position of abstract universality in the form 
of the “American people” but also that of its immanent contrary, 
individual freedom in the economic sphere of  the market. Both 
moments warn against the “greed” of the private interests of the 
Bush clique, asserting that their policies only respond to the particular 
interests of private companies. The American people in turn have been 
manipulated by these economic cliques and have made a mistake. The 
end of the message reads: “Know that it is better to return to the good 
than to remain in error and that reasonable people sacrifice neither 
their safety, nor their money, nor their children for a liar in the White 
House.”38 Bin Laden here appeals to the private interests of isolated 
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individuals, along with their essential attributes of money and family, 
which under the given situation could not be realized. Reason should 
assist in the effort to establish a rule where both the individual and the 
totality of the people would have a place — and bin Laden claims this 
as the rule of al-Qaeda and the global Islamist movement. They are the 
true representative of the universal law, he claims, being based upon 
Islamic law, while, on the other hand, democracy represents the rule 
of special interests and of private interests by certain power groups 
at the expense of the public. This means not only that the national 
modernization regimes, with their nationalism, but also that the 
Western democracies are representatives of vested interests.
Al-Qaeda’s chief theorist, Ayman al-Zawahiri engages the dialectic 
of general and private interests, even more thoroughly. Just like bin 
Laden, he identifies democracy with the rule of special interests over the 
standpoint of universality. According to al-Zawahiri, in a democracy, 
the parliament, or, more precisely, individual parliamentarians sit in 
the place of the people. “In democracy, the legislature is the people, 
represented by a majority of seats in parliament. These delegates are 
men and women, Christians, communists, and secularists. What they 
say becomes law, that must be imposed on all, by which taxes are levied 
and people are executed.”39 In the parliamentary systems, deputies 
rule according to their own private interests, which they impose on 
“the people” through the law, instead of the sovereign, who represents 
the “real interest” of the people. In this respect, democracy is not the 
right form to achieve the universality of the law, but instead subjugates 
the people under the arbitrary will of certain private interests. The 
claim of universal interest thus corresponds to a basic level of common 
anti-imperialist argument. Al-Zawahiri thus shares the latter’s total 
blindness regarding the general standpoint as the dominance of the 
abstract form of sociality. One could claim that it finally becomes crazy 
when this perspective, instead of criticizing a universal standpoint as 
such, formulates the latter in neo-religious terms: “These people, who 
are making laws for all in a democracy, revere idols. There are those 
rulers whom God […] has mentioned, ‘and do not take others as lord 
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next to Allah.’”40 The parliamentary system, fundamentally corrupted 
by individual interests, culminates in the arrogance of being the 
supreme sovereign. It puts the private interests of a few in the place 
of the public interest, a handful of idols in the place of the one God. 
This conception of divine universal law was already formulated 
by Sayyid Qutb, the most important theorist of political Islamism. 
He interprets the condition, “if people worship people, and human 
beings claim that they, as such, have the right to be entitled obedience, 
and the right, as creatures of law, to set values and set rules,” as the 
presumption of divine sovereignty. “This happens both in democracies 
and in dictatorships: the first divine characteristic is law […] to be 
able to establish rules and doctrines, to adopt laws and regulations, 
to establish values, and to judge as referee. […] To elevate terrestrial 
systems to this Right, in one way or another, in all cases, the case is 
decided by a group of people, and this group, which imposes on others 
their laws, values, and ideas, consists of mere terrestrial men, some of 
whom obey men instead of God, and allow men to claim to be divine. 
They worship men instead of God, even if they do not bow down before 
them or fall on their knees.”41 And Qutb added, “This is the difference 
between Muslims and those who are committed to each other instead 
of God. This clearly shows who the Muslims are. They are the ones who 
worship God alone.”42 
Transcendental Legitimacy and Divine Sovereignty
The position Islamists oppose to particular interests is the public 
interest understood in terms of legality and justice, but related not 
to the secular context of a nation, rather to a higher divine authority 
and metaphysical sovereignty. The enlightened, Western cultural 
warriors understand this orientation of the Islamists as proof of their 
premodern or, alternatively, regressive and totalitarian backwardness, 
and also use it to promote their progressive civilization on the basis 
of modern reason. The enlightened Westerners’ preferred critique 
of Islam is the lack of separation between religion and politics. In 
return the Islamists argue for the achievement of universal law in 
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relation to the highest divine authority. The question is whether this 
alleged identity between the monotheistic God and the unity of the 
Act is actually a premodern and archaic worldview, the expression of a 
premodern social structure, or whether, on the contrary, it corresponds 
to the forms of civic association specific to bourgeois society. Looking 
more closely at the position of Islamists with respect to traditional 
religiosity, one must first clearly state that they have vehemently 
fought the religious traditions and cultural heritage of Islam. “The 
main targets of  Neofundamentalists are the so-called Muslim 
Cultures.” They “speak against local forms of Islam, such as exist in 
Egypt and Morocco, and lead a relentless fight against old traditions...
for example, against all the ‘saints cults,’ such as the ‘Ziarat’ in Central 
Asia or the ‘Moussem’ in North Africa, a religious pilgrimage to draw in 
people to pray at the graves of the local patron saint.”43 The premodern 
communities were — both socially and in their religious practices — 
the opposite of a strict standardization of social relations in general 
laws. Traditional Islam integrated a variety of pre-Islamic moments, 
such as the ancient Egyptian cult of the dead. These adaptations of pre-
Islamic religiosity and diverse religious practices have been a thorn 
in the side to the Islamists because their perspective of the reign of 
eternal law requires the production of a uniform basis for all Muslims 
and therefore includes the task of breaking up the diversified pattern 
of religious and cultural life. Under premodern conditions, focusing 
social reality on a standard principle of statutory form and politics was 
unthinkable. The modern character of Islam aspires to just that. Insofar 
as the secular regimes of modernization have not ousted traditional 
social relations in favor of the system of abstract social mediation, the 
Islamists continue that work under the banner of “eternal law.” Their 
struggle is thus directed not only against the national regime and its 
“Western backers” but also against traditional cultural and religious 
social structures. Both of these together, according to the Islamists, 
are complicit in the miserable state in which the “Islamic” countries 
as a whole find themselves. The resistance against neocolonialism, 
understood as domination by the national regime, is linked to the 
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struggle against traditional Islamic cultural remnants, insofar as both 
hold responsibility for the social decline of the “Islamic” order. This 
idea mainly comes from the already-cited Egyptian thinker of Islam, 
Sayyid Qutb, who traces impoverishment and social disintegration 
back to the fact that the “Islamic” society is falling away from the only 
true social and religious practice: the focus on a single principle, one 
given by divine law. The heterogeneous and diverse religious heritages 
that exist in the “Islamic” countries appear to him as equivalent to the 
apostasy of the individualist form of legality, that marks the depraved 
and dissolute life of Western decadence.
In this, the Islamists proclaim the identity of religion and politics, 
discredited in the West, not through arresting the development of 
Islamism in the premodern and religious Middle Ages, but rather 
in the context of the specific standardization of the practice of life 
within commodified modernity. The desire to orient the social whole 
according to the criteria of reasonable religious legalism corresponds 
to the enforcement of abstract forms of relationship. The ambiguity of 
Enlightenment thought is that it thought itself to be antireligious and 
secular, but that the abstract rationality of modernity is in fact based 
on the transcendental nature of social mediation. The Enlightenment 
philosophy of Kant at least was consistent inasmuch as it formulated 
forms of  reasons as otherworldly, as a matter of  metaphysics, 
independent of concrete human experience and sensible practice. 
The actions of individuals, in accordance to the Kantian foundation of 
bourgeois reason, must correspond to a “transcendental” framework a 
priori, and only this metaphysical framework established the specific 
conduct of subjects. As we saw earlier, this is connected by the forms 
of modern rationality to a system where freedom and legal status are 
understood as expressions of abstract private relationships.
It is more coherent to understand the law of Islamism that is 
oriented at the beyond in the context of this transcendentality, rather 
than as an extension of “backward” social relations. The concept of 
sovereignty came first with modernity and its system of abstract 
social relations, as did the categories of the “will of the people” and 
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the uniform statutory form. The metaphysics of the divine law of the 
Islamists should, therefore, be seen within the horizon of modern 
bourgeois relations, as formulated by Kant in The Metaphysics of Morals.
This connection is also plausible insofar as, in the process of crisis 
in its entirety, the sovereign state as the realization of the universal 
standpoint is eroded. The sovereign is thus no longer the authority 
that mediates diverse private interests and provides for the operation 
of the abstract whole. So, where do those who seek legitimacy, who 
demand, in the face of growing social polarization, “social equality,” 
“justice,” and “equal rights for all”? No longer upon the earth, a real-
metaphysical sphere of the unconsciously created mesh of private 
relations, the nation or the state, but rather only in the imagination 
of a supernatural, otherworldly realm. Therefore the metaphysics 
of the legal form ascends to the heavens and the universality of 
private interest finds, as its destination, divine sovereignty. That 
this transcendence is assumed to be identical with the “spirit of the 
people” has become clear in the texts of bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and 
Qutb. The transcendental foundation of the general will in Islamism 
seems anything but arbitrary. The positivist and flattened Enlightened 
perspective of today cheats these dimensions, in that it assumes its 
constructed counterpart to be theocracy and cultural retrogression; it 
thus hides the problem of its own foundations. 
In the early days of the enforcement of civil commerce systems, to 
interpret Kant’s Critiques explicitly, the forms of “free will” and legality 
were far from obvious. The transformation of social relations was so 
fundamental that a non-negligible interest in the self-legitimation of 
these forms existed. An important aspect was to resolve the apparent 
contradiction: how one can present the comprehensive and non-
empirical general spirit in the legal form of an appropriate state 
representation. The problem therefore consists in the attempt to realize 
the “spirit of the people” in the institutions of the public sphere, or 
rather the resolution of the fundamental tension between the real-
metaphysical universality of the form of relating, on one hand, and the 
concreteness of a governing, legislative body, on the other hand. In the 
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wake of the French Revolution, this tension was expressed in the form 
of an opposition between the sacred and the all-encompassing nation 
and the respective representatives of the national whole. The distrust of 
the representatives of state power from the perspective of the general 
position of the people was, in the course of revolutionary events, ever-
increasingly virulent and partly caused the radicalism that sought 
to end the separation of the people from state power. Robespierre’s 
criticism of the French Constitution of 1791 zeroes in on this logic, 
describing a “strange, fully representative system of government, 
without any counter weight to the sovereignty of the people” — “such 
a government is the most intolerable of all despotisms.”44 
The events surrounding the year 1789 in France are now long 
past, but the fundamental tension between the real-metaphysical 
universality of the form of sociability and its concrete realization in 
the state legislative authority remains. And this contradiction is most 
apparent in the Islamic reformulation of sovereignty. It is precisely in 
the diffusion of private interests into the sphere of the government 
system in the failed national modernization regimes that the state 
bureaucracy is “the most intolerable of all despotisms.” By contrast, 
Islamism was consistent and moved the standpoint of universality 
away from the paradigm of the nation, and gave it a new religious 
upholstering. In view of the canonization of the nation or people, as 
is characteristic of all nation-state formation processes, the reference 
to a religious foundation presented itself. Islamism and the “Islamic 
revolution” thus occur as the historical legacy of national liberation. 
Responding to the discrediting of the national fabric in the crisis 
regions, Islamism, however, reclothes the general spirit in religious 
terms. Central to this revival of the general spirit is the right of the 
excluded to participate in modern forms of socialization. This claim 
is asserted against the corrupt regimes of modernizing dictatorships 
through a religious reformulation of the ideals of equality and justice, 
asserted against the dictators who have been accused of increasing the 
social exclusion of broad sectors of the population and of particular 
advantages to others, thus violating constitutionally promised equality.
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From the Machine of Progress to the Legislative Form
The guiding star of  the national independence movements was 
the nation as the subject of  real social progress, repressing and 
destroying traditional structures in favor of a new national unity of 
the whole. Related to this was the right to bring about the production 
of abstract wealth. This coincided with an emphasis on the progress 
and development of productive forces, which aimed to revolutionize, 
both technically and organizationally, the production of  wealth, 
and to focus it on the utilization of labor power. By cranking up the 
state-sponsored progress machine, the idea of progress was linked 
to creating increasingly rich forms of sensual gratification for the 
individual. In Islamism, this moment of  material modernization 
takes place only in the background. Its program for liberation from 
domination, identified as neocolonialism, systematically masks the 
plane of the conditions of wealth production. Instead, the Islamists’ 
program is reduced to the dimension of compliance with the law 
given by God as shaped by Muhammad. Islamism as a political 
force obliges itself to enforce Islamic values and principles against 
“depraved” society. This is the background for the integrated politics 
of moralization of the Islamist movement in terms of abiding by sharia 
law. The real social content of the legal form, the abstract production of 
wealth, is, for the Islamists, only a minor problem that will be corrected 
by the restoration of the correct law without any further action. “If 
the company once again respects its religious commandments and its 
cultural identity,” so the idea goes, “then everyone would find a place 
in it.”45 “The reform of the soul should precede […] the reform of the 
state. Policy does not help in the purification of the soul.”46 Hence the 
non-concrete, porous, and cloudy provisions on specific social goals. 
Ultimately, the control of the individual in relation to compliance with 
legal statutes remains the central content of government action. In 
Afghanistan, when in power, the Taliban realized this program with 
a sort of postnational, Jacobin dictatorship of virtue. With the actual 
social contradictions and tensions due to the continuing deterioration 
of the material situation, the Islamists were distant and ultimately 
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helpless, or rather helpless and ultimately distanced: “In power (Iran) 
or in the opposition (Egypt), Islamists have so far always been unable to 
cope with the social and economic changes in which they participate. 
The revolutionary social message […] of the Islamists has faded in 
favor of a conservative program: the insistence on a ‘sharia-ization’ of 
constitutional law.”47 This legal orientation as the sole content of state 
action only reflects the ongoing crisis process. The thrust of Islamism 
is the defense and delimitation of the outside, so that the inside can 
be brought under legal order. “For the radical Islamists, the priority 
is more to ‘re-establish their own morals’ in their own society so that 
they can be ‘healthy’ and can withstand the ‘cultural aggression of the 
West.’”48 This reduction of the task of government to upholding the 
law once again documents the core state function. Especially in the 
ongoing crisis process, the legal form excludes direct social relations 
and entrenches the individual in the system of abstract socialization.
Conspiracy Theory 
It would therefore be too simple to characterize the religious 
reformulation of the legal form as a mere revival of Islamic anti-
imperialism in the tradition of  anticolonial movements. This 
emphasis on the legal form makes clear that this is a matter of the 
restoration of a social order that threatens to fall apart at the seams. 
The subjugation of the individual to divine law has to be judged as 
a psychosocial way to work through a crisis that involves, and to 
process a general hopelessness regarding the possibility of effective 
change. Its powerlessness regarding the structural crisis and the 
decomposition of abstract social connection forces out the interpretive 
paradigms that exceed the horizon of  “classical” anticolonial 
resistance in the phase of  national liberation. The real threat of 
the dissolution of social relationships is made noticeable — among 
other things in the ideological matrix — when one tries to explain 
Islamism’s powerlessness in the face of social collapse. Ultimately 
these explanations are a projective defense mechanism that explains 
general misery as a result of a conspiracy, of external interventions 
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and interests, so that it can continue to believe in the fiction of a just 
society. The cry of “equal rights for all” is at the same time the projection 
of an identity wholeness in a religious-legal collective. The subjectivity 
threatened by this process of social breakdown attributes that threat 
to the external domination of certain social groups, and creates, at 
the same time, an identity, a collective “grandiose self ” (Heinz Kohut) 
in an imagined community of the faithful. Conspiracy theory thus 
supplements the anti-imperialist critique of the failed modernization 
regime as an alleged neocolonial system. This perspective informs 
the entirety of Islamism. Behind the disintegration of the imagined 
harmonious whole was not only a corrupt elite who had pushed their 
private interests to the fore while neglecting the overall interest of the 
public, or who had passed on that, but rather an authority that secretly 
and systematically worked on behalf of a plan. The national elites did 
not simply act according to their private advantage — which they were 
doing more effectively in the wake of the crisis — rather, they were 
primarily puppets of the true masterminds of the decomposition, who 
are identified, depending on the perspective, with the West as a whole, 
or at least with the United States and Israel.
In Algeria, this pattern of projecting conspiracy theories was 
already present in the founding manifesto of the FIS whose name — 
“Islamic Salvation Front” — references the sense of threat it produced. 
It says: “The State providing service to the colonizer, in his undertaking 
of war on our religion and our dignity and by questioning the unity 
of our country, is a clear aggression against our sovereignty and our 
personnalité (i.e., identity).”49 It denounces “the existence of elements 
inside the state apparatus that are hostile to our religion and are the 
only agents of the executive from colonialist plans. […] It is vital to 
thwart this plot by a purge of government institutions from all telltale 
elements on one hand, and resolute action to end the sabotage of the 
entire country, on the other hand.”50 Here the alleged close links 
between the strong unity of a country and its related institutional 
framework  fade into the perspective of current Islamism, which, 
however, increasingly favors a vague territorial identity of spiritual 
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community of all Muslims, known as the Ummah. At heart it is always 
the same: to attribute to threatening external influences or claim as 
already foregone the loss of the unity and order of the state, which will 
be recovered through the consistent application of the law. The process 
of disintegration of the system of the abstract form of socialization is 
thus explained away as due to external forces, who conspired to bring 
it about. These conspiracy theories, which are an antisemitic form of 
understanding the crisis, prove once again that Islamism is a child 
of modernization or a crumbling form of modernization and not a 
premodern phenomenon.
Conclusion
Islamism reveals a specific current that counteracts, through a 
religiously inverted prosecution of the sovereignty of the law, the 
symptoms of social decay and of the global process of exclusion from 
the universe of abstract wealth production through a religiously 
inverted prosecution of the sovereignty of the law. The contradiction 
between the form of social relations and the crisis of its content is 
resolved in the affirmation of religious reformulation of the form of 
the universal standpoint. 
Developments in the “Islamic” countries are, however, to be valued 
as a kind of negative preview to the processes that began long ago in the 
capitalist centers, and that continue to accelerate, albeit in different 
concrete forms, of course. Putin as a paragovernmental “godfather” 
represents one pole: the resolution of the universal into the realm of 
individual interest. Islamism represents the other: as the revival of the 
standpoint of universality in the form of a dictatorship of moral values 
and principles. Just as the implementation and universalization of 
commodity production was characterized by a qualitatively new form 
of violent domination, so too does the universalization of exclusion 
represent a release and potentiation of these moments of domination 
and violence. To look at this more closely in all its forms and levels 
requires that the irrational aspect of free will, law, and the system 
of binding together of free agents to support a “rational” whole, be 
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discussed more extensively than in the case here. Then one could also 
clarify the previous section’s question — the manner in which the 
community becomes charged with an identity, whether the “great self ” 
(Kohut) or the “grandiose We” which is bound up with the universal 
standpoint of Islamism more precisely. This “we” is the collective 
equivalent of the masculine subjectivity of modernity, whose obsessive 
goal is to reassure itself perpetually of its own perfection, and which 
is ultimately willing to sacrifice the world for this desired perfection. 
In this respect the collective subjects, as they are brought into being by 
Islamism, are not just its passive products, but themselves contribute 
to its active, propulsive moments.  
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how unquestioned it remains in the collective imagination given the 
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statements, people speak of “the Islamic world,” of a “Muslim culture,” 
and also, in a milder form, of the “Islamically-influenced countries” 
and “regions with an Islamic religious tradition,” and so on. All these 
formulations are marked by a certain degree of culturalism and the idea 
of a unified culture characteristic “of Islam.” To avoid this linguistic error, 
I will place “Islamic” in quotations marks.  My goal is to take the relevance 
of the religious tradition in the process of modernization seriously 
without hypostasizing it as an independent being.
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Islamic fundamentalism.
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unthematized. This constructedness is valid at a general level, that is, 
nations and political systems are quite obviously historical products, 
which, as we know, did not take shape until the modern era, namely, in 
the last two centuries. However, they are at the same time the result of a 
process of mediation organized around the commodity form, a process 
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thus not just manipulative forms of sociality deployed symbolically 
through cultural structures, but result from the unconsciously executed 
praxis inside the system of commodity-based social relations. Nationalist 
state formation can therefore in no way be adequately formulated 
as the product or result of a simple “concept,” as Benedict Anderson’s 
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On the Current Global Economic Crisis:  
Questions and Answers
Robert Kurz (2010)
Over the course of the last three years, the economic crisis has 
generated three distinct phases of transformation: from the crisis 
of the real estate market to the crisis of the financial markets, from 
the crisis of the financial markets to the economic crisis, and from 
the economic crisis to the currency crisis. To what extent can these 
three phases of crisis be explained by means of your concept of a 
general economic crisis of capitalism?
These three phases of transformation merely constitute the surface 
of events. The crisis of the real estate market was the trigger for a 
crisis of the finance and debt systems, which had been smoldering 
for a long time. The latter crisis did not result from the so-called 
excesses of speculation that stood opposed to a presumably healthy 
“normal economy.” Rather, the opposite was the case: the finance 
and debt bubbles were a consequence of a lack of actual valorization 
of capital. The credit superstructure has never been an external 
factor, but it has always been an integral component of capitalist 
commodity production. Over the course of the past two decades, this 
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internal relation has been amplified into a structural dependence of 
the so-called real economy on the finance markets. Consequently, the 
financial crisis could only result in a historical collapse of short-term 
economic prospects.
All three phases were already contained in the close succession of 
crises following the first case of insolvency in Mexico in 1982. What 
initially only seemed to be a debt crisis on the periphery quickly 
reached the global capitalist centers. In the early 1990s, the Japanese 
real estate bubble burst and the Nikkei shrank down to a quarter of its 
peak level, and to this day Japan has not recovered from the resulting 
banking crisis and the stagnation of its national economy. In the mid-
1990s the accumulated foreign currency (largely U.S.) debt of the tiger 
economies led to a financial collapse and resulted in currency crisis 
and sharp recession. Similar events occurred in the context of the 
Russian financial crisis at the end of the Yeltsin era and in Argentina 
toward the end of the twentieth century. The bursting of the dot-com 
bubble in 2001 resulted in the disappearance of the new markets, along 
with their astronomical market capitalization of small Internet and 
software enterprises, which led to a brief global economic recession. 
All of these crises had one thing in common: they were limited both 
to particular regions and to specific sectors and consequently seemed 
manageable, in particular by means of the stagnation or lowering of 
federal interest rates for which Japan had provided an example. This 
financial strategy on the part of the central banks (in particular the 
U.S. Federal Reserve), however, not only brought about the largest real 
estate bubble of all time but also further sustained a deficit economy 
of unexpected proportions that manifested itself primarily in the 
circulation of deficits between the United States and China, which was 
able to help support the global economy for a few years. Up until the 
early summer of 2008, economic institutes calculated that the boom 
would last for decades, despite the fact that they were well aware of 
the “imbalances” underlying the one-way street of Pacific exports. But 
the problem was strategically understated in the face of the apparent 
success of “finance-driven economic growth.”
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The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008 revealed 
that the global finance bubble economy had in reality exhausted itself. 
The resultant global chain reaction simultaneously affected not only 
the large finance centers but also virtually every corner of the globe, 
from Iceland to Kazakhstan. The global deficit economy had run out 
of steam, and the collapse could no longer be prevented by additional 
monetary contributions from the central banks. Everywhere, the 
responsibility fell on state credit systems to a degree that surpassed 
even the war economies of the past. The bailout packages for the 
banking system did not fix the system but only temporarily kept it 
alive. Additional national economic stimulus programs were able 
to avert complete collapse, but ultimately the problem was merely 
displaced from finance bubbles onto state finances.
These consequences initially manifested themselves in the threat of 
Greek bankruptcy and the associated crisis of the European monetary 
union. Greece constitutes the weakest link in the eurozone, which in 
turn constituted the weakest link in the global economy, since the euro 
had (as an artificial currency) been based on wholly disparate national 
production levels and differing strengths of capital and as a result was 
only useful for the one-way flow of exports of a deficit economy. This 
currency crisis, however, is qualitatively different from those that 
preceded it: it is the avatar of a general crisis of state finance, which 
will not only affect the central E.U. states such as Germany, France, 
and Great Britain but also the United States and China.
Currently, we come across consolatory narratives everywhere, 
arguing that the bailout packages are restoring trust in a finance 
system in crisis and transforming the mountains of bad credit back 
into tradable credit, while the immense stimulus packages are 
providing the thrust for the development toward a new, self-sustaining 
global economy. This “all clear” discourse that is merely attached to 
the surface of things and whose life span is largely limited to the 
beginning of the next quarter does not, however, take into account 
the fundamental laws of a capitalist system. The crisis process that 
has been underway since 2008 not only constitutes the culmination 
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of previous, partial signs of crisis — it is also distinct from previous 
economic and structural crises.
What has come to fruition here is a secular, immanent contradiction 
of the valorization of capital, which can be represented in two distinct 
stages. Initially, the development of productive forces that was a result 
of the necessity of competition led to a disproportionally rapid growth 
of fixed capital relative to labor force as a result of the increasingly 
scientific character of production. In order to employ even one single 
worker for the production of capital, it is necessary to mobilize a 
constantly increasing aggregate of real capital (increasing capital 
intensity). As a result, the “dead” advance costs of the valorization of 
capital increased to a degree that increasingly made it impossible to 
finance these costs out of the generated profit itself (machines only 
transfer previously generated value; they do not generate new value). 
The result of this was a historical expansion of the credit system that 
quickly encompassed all areas (corporations, the state, and private 
households). More and more frequently, it became necessary to draw 
on future surplus value (in the form of credit) in order to be able 
to generate actual surplus value. This contradiction was tenable as 
long as those credits could be paid back by means of ongoing surplus 
production. This compensatory mechanism, however, effectively 
disappeared with the onset of  the third industrial revolution 
(microelectronics) at the end of the 1970s — labor power that generated 
actual surplus value was in this new historical dimension gradually 
rationalized out of existence. As a result, the chains of credits, which 
had to reach further and further into the future, threatened to break, 
and in fact did so in a number of areas. It is no accident, therefore, 
that the onset of the third industrial revolution coincides with the 
beginning of a series of financial, economic, and currency crises, the 
culmination of which we are experiencing today.
The so-called neoliberal revolution was not a subjective, political 
project. It was rather an escape strategy from the objective problems 
of  a shortage of  actual surplus production, based on the rapid 
acceleration of current processes without any change in direction. 
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What is now frequently naively presented as a historical error — that 
is, the large-scale deregulation of finance markets — was in reality 
the only strategy that allowed for a further deferral of the collapse of 
the global system. The valorization of capital was virtualized in the 
form of fictional capital that could no longer be matched by the actual 
substance of value. The debt economy mutated into a finance bubble 
economy (stocks and real estate) with increasingly adventurous 
derivatives. Over the course of two decades this relation developed 
into an unprecedented actual economy determined wholly by deficits. 
Indeed, it is necessary to refer to this kind of economic system as a 
deficit economy, since fictional valorization did not remain confined 
to the discrete sphere of finance as in previous moments in history 
but, in the form of the insubstantial consumer purchasing power of 
the middle class (alongside real-terms declines in wages), entered 
the real economy and thus fuelled the global boom. The millions of 
apparently real jobs in the one-sidedly oriented export industries are 
an optical illusion, since the sale of their products is based not upon 
real profit and wages but instead on the injections of a rotten credit 
superstructure and finance bubbles.
The release of large sums of money by the central banks, which 
completed the break with the monetaristic doctrine of neoliberalism 
(a limitation of the total sum of money), was itself already a desperate 
measure. The recent displacement of the problem onto the sphere 
of state credit does not solve the problem but instead only further 
delays it until the next expected collapse. There is no real potential for 
valorization for which state-sponsored bailout and stimulus programs 
could provide the thrust. Hence, the internal relation between 
financial, economic, and currency crisis reveals itself as an internal 
historical limit of capital on the level of the development of productive 
forces and the increasingly scientific character of production that it 
generates. The degree of negative socialization (socialization based on 
value and competition) that has currently been reached can no longer 
be contained by capitalist categories.
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According to your own estimates, how high is the risk of inflation 
or deflation?
Inflation and deflation are merely two different forms of devaluing 
the aggregate relations of capital. Structural mass unemployment, 
increasing precarity, and dumping wages — the new global standard 
resulting from the third industrial revolution — already brought about 
a deflationary devaluing of the commodity of labor, of what Marx 
would call the “variable” component of capital (the only component 
that generates new value). The underside of this was the finance 
bubble economy, the development of titles and properties without 
substance (thus entirely fictional) as asset inflation. Because the global 
connections of this asset inflation touched a number of currency areas, 
it was able to persist for quite a while without immediately triggering 
a large-scale devaluation of the monetary medium in general. Such a 
devaluation, however, was already to be expected in the final stages 
of the last deficit economy when the rates of inflation in many newly 
industrialized countries (including China) approached twenty percent, 
and the United States expected a rate of six to ten percent by the end 
of 2008. In principle, therefore, the inflationary endgame of such a 
creation of purchasing power without substance via finance bubbles, 
despite its complex global mediation, would have been no different 
from the classic idea of solving the problem by printing more and 
more money.
The path toward this scenario, however, was disrupted by the 
crash of the finance markets, which in an instant eliminated trillions 
of dollars of fictional assets, leaving behind mountains of basically 
worthless certificates in the vaults of  banks. The asset inflation, 
therefore, did not turn into a monetary inflation but gave rise to 
an asset deflation. After the mechanism of the deficit economy had 
abruptly come to a standstill, a similarly rapid reduction of global 
excess capacities (especially in the auto industry) should have 
followed, since these capacities were based upon the influx of fictional 
purchasing power from the debt and finance bubbles. What should 
have followed is thus a large-scale devaluation of real capital (the 
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means of production) and commodity capital on markets (commodities 
rendered unsellable), together with an increased push toward the 
devaluation of labor power (massive job losses). To this day, we are 
witnessing a global wave of bankruptcies, yet the deflation of real and 
commodity capital has for the time being been slowed by means of the 
gigantic state programs financed through credits. Both in the finance 
sector and in the production sector the beloved “market clearing” was 
prevented, contrary to the laws of the market, since, due to the lack 
of potential for new valorization, such a market clearing would have 
left  behind nothing but an economic wasteland.
However, the dismantling of  excess capacities has only been 
delayed, and in the not-too-distant future it will be executed via the 
crisis of state finance. All economic stimulus and bailout packages are 
ultimately nonproductive state consumption, even if their effect on the 
surface is artificially to keep alive a variety of businesses. States would 
have to finance the credits for such consumption by taxing the profits 
and salaries resulting from the real production of surplus value. But 
this, of course, is circular logic, since the former effort has only become 
necessary in the first place because the latter process no longer occurs 
to a sufficient extent. The ultima ratio in such an inescapable situation 
is, therefore, the increased printing of money as we have come to know 
from war economies — now, however, this is done in order to prolong 
the life of capitalism and its mode of production itself.
The central banks themselves have dismantled a variety of security 
structures by accepting, against their own rules, toxic certificates 
from banks as “securities” or by acquiring potentially worthless state 
loans from candidates for state bankruptcy (see the practices of the 
European Central Bank). On one hand, the mechanisms are put in 
place for the development of an enormous inflation potential (meaning 
the devaluation of money, of the capitalist end in itself) from which 
all aggregate relations of capital depart and into which they must 
be transformed back. Since the flood of money resulting from state-
sponsored bailout and stimulus packages (as opposed to the flood of 
money generated by the central banks for the transnational finance 
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markets) is directly injected into the respective currency areas, the 
incubation period for the realization of inflationary potential is much 
shorter than in the case of the transnational finance bubble economy. 
On the other hand, we do not see any form of apprehension with 
respect to further increasing the amount of new money being printed. 
The actual, relative stabilization on a lower level than in times of a 
booming deficit economy would have to be permanently subsidized by 
the state, and this, of course, is only possibly via the creation of new 
money. As a result, the saving programs in fact counteract the rescue, 
stimulus, and bailout measures.
This dilemma is bound to continue to run its course, in particular 
because the back-and-forth of  mutually contradictory measures 
cannot lead to the vanishing of deflation and inflation into thin air. 
Since inflation (with regard to money proper) and deflation (with 
regard to labor power, monetary assets, real capital, and commodity 
capital) are merely different forms of devaluing elements of capitalist 
reproduction, they could in principle occur simultaneously. This 
will increasingly be the case since the emergency-driven monetary 
and economic policies continue to oscillate between fundamentally 
contradictory options. Already at the end of the 1970s and at the 
beginning of the 1980s, we witnessed the simultaneity of deflationary 
stagnation and increasing inflation (what came to be known as 
“stagflation”) resulting from a lack of real valorization. Indeed, it 
was precisely this stagflation that was the grounds for the neoliberal 
revolution, which, however, simply produced an historical deferral by 
means of the deregulation of the finance bubble economy. Now, the 
old problem returns on a much higher level of internal contradictions. 
As a consequence, what has become possible is a simultaneously 
inflationary and deflationary shock at the moment at which one of 
the contradictory measures is taken to its structural extreme and 
exhausts itself, as well as a period of stagflation with decidedly more 
dire consequences than thirty years ago, should both options exhaust 
themselves in quick succession.
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With regard to the crisis of  the Greek economy, critics of 
neoliberalism accuse German economists of misrepresenting 
relations and determinations, of strangling the welfare state with 
the IMF’s saving measures, and of generally pursuing contradictory 
solutions. Do you agree with these critics or does their evaluation 
of the matter miss the core of the problem at hand?
A pure critique of neoliberalism (as advanced by ATTAC and a large 
portion of the Left) is abbreviated, since it does not reach the internal 
relations of the crisis and instead simply addresses what are seen 
as erroneous economic policies. Often related to this is the hope 
for a return to Keynesianism and the resulting return to a “good” 
form of capitalism characterized by investments in certain labor 
sectors and the gratifications of a welfare state. Yet, this is illusory 
and misses the core of the problem, since both the neoliberal and 
the Keynesian doctrine presuppose, similarly blindly, the capitalist 
mode of production, its categories, and its criteria. In the context of 
the current crisis, however, the predominant mode of production 
itself is the problem. Keynesianism can only return in the form of 
crisis and emergency management — that is, as a continuation of 
neoliberalism with different means — and this can only lead to a 
further intensification of the contradictions.
It is, however, correct to assert that German politicians 
misrepresent the determinations and relations of the problem at hand 
and merely pursue contradictory solutions — but the hope for a re-
regulated Keynesian welfare state itself is a contradictory solution. 
After all, what is the nature of these contradictions? Alongside the 
large Pacific circulation of deficits there existed a smaller European 
system of deficit circulation for which the euro was initially designed 
— and in a manner directly shaped by German interests. More than 
forty percent of the immense German export surpluses ended up (and 
still do) in the European Union and in particular in the eurozone. These 
surpluses confront the deficits in trade balance of other (in particular 
southern) E.U. nations. These nations were outcompeted with the help 
of the euro, since the potential for equalization via the devaluation 
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of national currencies no longer existed. Since now everywhere the 
relatively weak reanimation of the deficit economy is based on the 
displacement of the problem from the finance bubble economy onto 
state credit, the state deficits of the neighboring countries constitute 
the flip side of the German export economy. 
German elites do not want to recognize this relationship and refuse 
to surrender their supposed export advantages. Connected to the 
currency union in this respect is the fact that Germany (not only since 
Hartz IV)supports the largest low-wage sector in Europe and that the 
real wages in Germany, with the help of silent unions, have dropped 
faster and to a greater degree than elsewhere.1 The constantly growing 
export surplus on this basis has resulted in a relative capital strength 
of Germany. Now, however, the business foundations of this model 
are being questioned. Within the European Union we are witnessing 
a growing conflict between Germany and the deficit countries. Also on 
the larger scale of transnational relations the positions of economic 
policy have been reversed. The United States, as the biggest deficit 
nation, demands just like the southern European nations that Germany 
abandon all saving policies and instead stimulate national consumption 
in order to erase imbalances. We are confronted with a world that 
has seemingly been turned upside down: the former champions of 
neoliberalism now demand diametrically opposed economic policies 
and take on the role German unions feared to play. This may initially 
seems like a development in line with hopes for Keynesianism, yet 
it is nonsensical insofar as this would force the inflationary option. 
Like the IMF, the United States and members of the European Union 
flirt with a supposedly “controllable inflation” in order to address the 
dilemma — yet, given the current economic situation, such control 
would be lost very quickly. 
There is thus no escape from this dilemma. Secretly, the elites 
of course know this. The spuriously explained resignations of high-
ranking political functionaries, most recently German President 
Horst Köhler, are an indication that a severe conflict is carried out 
behind the veil of professional optimism. This is likely to be repeated 
341On the Current Global Economic Crisis
in other nations. A classic wait-and-see strategy when confronted 
with problems (as per Helmut Kohl) is no longer possible. As a result, 
one repair program follows the next in rapid succession while still 
having to keep in mind the demoscopic will of the voter (if we are not 
to descend into a dictatorship of a state of emergency), thus resulting 
in general conflict and aggression. The capitalist mode of production 
must not be called into question, and, as a result, similar to the first 
stage of the financial crisis, discussions are determined by the hunt 
for those who are at fault. In fact, the conflict in the CDU/FDP-led 
government in Germany is not party-specific but instead will, given 
the current problem, likely occur with any given form of coalition. It 
is no wonder that some combatants have thrown in the towel.
In your estimation, what will happen in the foreseeable future?
Since the monetary measures and fiscal strategies of economic policy 
are immanently contradictory, we can expect a second wave of the 
global economic crisis within the next few years. This second wave 
could be triggered by the crisis (and potential breakdown) of the 
European currency union. Formally, the situation in which Greece 
currently finds itself is similar to that with which Argentina was faced 
a decade ago. But that crisis was limited to a single nation and thus 
largely left the global economic system unaffected. The threatening 
national bankruptcies in the eurozone are quite different in this 
respect, since they have the potential to undo the entire currency 
union. The collapse of European deficit circulation would shatter the 
German export economy, and the strength of German capital would 
be lost. This would not only mean that the hitherto-deferred major 
bankruptcies and massive job loss would also take place in Germany, 
but also that German state finances (which are also based on large 
amounts of debt) would be in a situation similar to that of Greece, in 
which, after the collapse of one-sided export relations, the strength 
of finance markets would disappear. Such a development would not 
only be disastrous for the European region but also, given Europe’s 
economic importance for the world system, for the global economy. 
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The situation is equally dire for the large Pacific system of debt 
circulation between China and the United States. In this context, each 
side hopes that the other side creates the preconditions for further 
stabilization. The state-sponsored bailout and stimulus packages on 
the part of the United States did manage partially to halt the collapse 
of consumption, yet without reaching pre-crisis levels and at the cost 
of calling into question the United States’ status as world power, since 
the externally financed state credit system and its role in financing 
the war machine and war efforts had reached their limits. The United 
States demands of China a long-overdue appreciation of its national 
currency and, as in the case of its demands directed at Germany, 
credit-financed strengthening of  national consumption in order 
to reduce the imbalance of commodity flows and to strengthen the 
United States’ own exports, which in turn is hoped to compensate 
for the United States’ weakened national consumption. In most 
industrial sectors, however, the United States simply does not have 
the necessary export capacities, and their development would require 
vast investments. Conversely, China’s corresponding capacities would 
have to be dismantled, since U.S. corporations, just as European and 
Japanese corporations, have invested heavily in these capacities (due 
to cost advantages) in order to supply their own and foreign markets.
But China shows just as little interest in surrendering its export 
advantages based on low wages and an artificially depreciated 
currency as Germany, since in both cases the entirety of the economy 
is oriented toward one-sided export. A change which would have to 
take place over the course of a year or maybe even decades, however, 
would quickly reach its limits, since imbalances were the very life 
elixir of the global economy. China has developed the largest state-
sponsored economic program of all nations and all times by basing it 
on its gigantic fund of monetary reserves and forcing its banks to give 
out massive credits. But precisely for this reason it cannot allow any 
serious currency correction, since this would substantially devalue 
its accumulated monetary reserves. The Chinese economic programs 
strengthen national consumption only indirectly and not to the extent 
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necessary, and China is therefore not able to lead the world economy in 
the same way the United States’ foreign-financed consumerism did up 
to this point. The largest part of China’s programs flows directly into 
additional infrastructures and the development of production capacity, 
which are all directed at the same goal: restarting the one-sided export 
machinery. If  this does not succeed, China will be left sitting on a 
mountain of investment ruins with corresponding consequences for 
the financial system. Moreover, China will not be able to survive such 
a program and simultaneously continue to purchase U.S. government 
bonds to the same degree that it did in the past. 
In the Pacific region, therefore, the European dilemma is repeated 
on a larger scale. Deficit circulation is continuing more slowly after 
the crash, and is flanked by arduously reanimated national economies 
based on state programs. If  the latter run out, the entire system 
threatens to collapse. The second wave of the global crisis can begin 
in either geographic region (or possibly even in both simultaneously). 
All current success stories are only momentary impressions that are 
falsely taken as a basis for extrapolating years into the future — just 
as during the peak of the global deficit economy between 2007 and the 
summer of 2008. Yet, in this current context, the projected success 
and numbers are even less credible than in the past, since they assume 
a much lower basic level after the crash of the global economy. This 
seemingly unshakably positive form of thinking is heading for its next 
Waterloo. The only question that remains is which incubation period 
and which new configuration of contradictions will be necessary this 
time in order to undo the system. The only consolation that remains 
for such positive thinkers will likely be their own characteristic short-
term memory, whose horizon does not extend beyond their own noses.
What forms of mediation can be established between the immanent 
struggles for basic conditions of survival and the critique of the 
basic categories of the capitalist system (commodity, value, money, 
abstract labor, state, politics)?
Without a doubt, extraparliamentary, organized social struggles for 
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the material and cultural necessities of life as resistance against the 
brutal lowering of the level of civilization is the only alternative to 
the Left’s political, parliamentary complicity in state-sponsored crisis 
administration. A newly constituted social countermovement will be 
equally indispensable, initially in the form of the immanent attempt 
to work through contradictions, which will not delegate its needs and 
demands to the state but instead advance autonomous demands, even 
if those are made of the state. Central topics here include adequate 
minimum wages, resistance against increasing cuts to social transfers 
and against the repressive chicanery and compulsory programs 
of labor administration, resistance against privatization and the 
demolition of vitally important public infrastructures (including, 
for example, health care). Additionally, this would involve serious 
engagements with the important question of funding education and 
the process of questioning the accepted practice of chaining education 
and research to capital’s needs for valorization, which have become 
obsolete. 
An important moment in the mediation of “categorical critique” 
consists in the ability to learn how to distinguish between progressive 
and affirmative forms of working out contradictions. This includes 
in particular the realization that a defense of  the fundamental 
necessities of  life by party-political means has become entirely 
illusory. The content of the alternatives has to be developed out of 
direct social demands on one hand and the vain hopes for new state 
economic programs and new capital investments on the other. The 
latter instantly ties social needs to the “successful” valorization of 
capital on the rapidly eroding basis of abstract labor and to the ability 
to be financed according to capitalist criteria. The former, in contrast, 
can lead to a negation of the terror of “financeability” and to the 
possibility of surpassing the value and money forms. This alternative 
can, if it is put into practice, also be raised within the “Left” wing of 
the political class, where it would lead to polarization. Elements of 
these alternatives already existed in the workers’ movements of the 
past, but against the ideological backdrop of abstract labor. It was 
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precisely for this reason that social countermovements were always 
transformed into state-oriented movements (in accordance with their 
own labor-ontological consciousness) and qua party-Marxism limited 
to a state-capitalist politics of intervention — after all, the state is the 
subsuming social entity based on abstract labor. The limits of abstract 
labor and real valorization of capital today force the question of the 
alternative of social countermovement and statism in an entirely new 
direction, which thus demands to be formulated with greater rigor 
(at a moment at which the hope for state credit does not contain any 
social potential and can only lead to the embarrassment of unleashing 
inflation).
A second moment of mediation is the critique of all forms of social 
segregation, whether these are articulated openly or indirectly. As 
long as social movements operate upon the plane of an immanent 
working-out of contradictions there will always be such tendencies. 
Already in the traditional labor movements there were at work 
a series of affects articulated in opposition to the unskilled lowest 
classes. Today, we encounter similar attitudes in an (albeit shrinking) 
globalized labor-aristocracy that stands opposed to those dropped by 
the system or to those employed in low-wage sectors, as well as in the 
attitude of any given “dominant culture” to its pool of migrant workers. 
Most important here, however, are the academic and subacademic 
middle classes in the capitalist centers, who, faced with the threat 
of their social and economic decline, attempt to save their own skin 
and formulate their own specific interests as “human capital” in 
stylized fashion in relation to the general ideal of emancipation, in 
truth ultimately caring little about the existence of “others.” To the 
extent to which a social countermovement constitutes itself, one of its 
duties must be a categorical critique of and the attempt to analyze and 
oppose the various potentials for social segregation, which intersect 
in complex fashion. 
This will only be possible if such a critique communicates that it 
is in fact easily possible to provide the basic necessities of life for all if 
we are not bound by capitalist categories. In this respect, it is the duty 
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of social countermovements to illustrate the immense discrepancy 
between the potentialities for material wealth and the impossibility 
of continuing to limit such potentialities to capitalist forms. Even if 
the theoretical reflection of the actual capitalist categories — value 
form, commodity, surplus value, and abstract labor — and their 
state-political modulation are not present in mass consciousness, 
practical experience of the existence of capacities for the satisfaction 
of material, social, and cultural needs that exist practically, technically, 
and materially but are rendered inaccessible by capitalism can still 
be mobilized — in particular at the moment at which the absurd end 
in itself of the transformation of labor into more labor and money 
into more money no longer functions. As more and more people 
are becoming homeless while simultaneously scores of homes and 
apartments are left vacant, as more and more people in need of 
medical support and care are inadequately attended to while doctors, 
caretakers, and nurses become unemployed, such experiences can 
form the basis for a fundamental, radical critique of the commodity 
and value forms, which would add a theoretical dimension to already 
existing reflections. 
Such a strategy is appropriate, too, when considering the so-called 
ecological problem (climate change, exploitation of nature, and the 
erosion of the natural basis for life). The mediation of a categorical 
critique consists in this case in the attempt to foreground the internal 
connections (and resultant limitations) of the destructive potential 
of the capitalist production of material wealth on one hand and the 
capitalist forms of social relations on the other. It is not the production 
of sufficient amounts of food and cultural goods itself that led to the 
destruction of the biosphere, but rather the rationalization of the 
logic of valorization via business administration that simultaneously 
generates poverty, robs itself  of its own foundation, and destroys 
nature. The destructive potential of specific capitalist forms of material 
wealth (traffic and transportation, armaments industry, agricultural 
industry, and so on) must not be privileged over the socialization of 
necessities of life. The alternative to making everyone “auto-mobile” 
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is not the liquidation of mobility per se but instead the development 
of  public transportation under social control in opposition to 
privatization. It is particularly perfidious in this context to present 
people who are impoverished by capitalism and subsist merely by 
means of insulting emergency rations with calculations that accuse 
them of overconsumption and resultant damage to the environment. 
While only recently the “climate catastrophe” occupied a central role 
in public discourse and the news media, the current crisis has led to 
the widespread repealing of recently established ecological programs, 
since the capitalist form must be preserved at any cost. Yet it is, of 
course, entirely possible that the crisis managers will seek further 
social reductions and legitimate their necessity by appealing to the 
ecological argument. This contradiction also determines a part of the 
ecological ideology that corresponds to sections of the middle classes, 
which speaks of the limits of capitalism only in the sense of an external 
limit of natural resources while the internal limit of abstract labor 
and the valorization of value is only recognized in a foreshortened 
manner (the limits of economic growth), since those sections of the 
middle class desire to participate “ecologically” in the administration 
of the current crisis. From the standpoint of a developed critique of 
political economy this ecological reductionism must be critiqued just 
like the economically affirmative temptation of crisis Keynesianism.
An additional step toward the mediation of categorical critique 
would be the return to a discussion about social planning that refuses 
to be limited to abstract labor, the commodity form, and the state. As 
an inheritance of the previous epoch, socialism is currently more than 
ever equated with statification, which leads to paradoxical expressions 
such as “finance market socialism,” which denote nothing more 
directly than the real paradoxes of the new relations of crisis. For a 
true transformation beyond capitalism, however, the main activity 
consists in the new organization of the global flow of material and 
social resources as such and in the refusal to represent it by means of 
the categories such as value and labor substance, which have become 
historically obsolete. Included in this is the problem of the moments 
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of social reproduction that could never be contained and subsumed by 
the categories of abstract labor and that were historically delegated to 
women (child care, health and social care, domestic and affective labor, 
and so on). This “social mortar,” too, begins to crumble as we reach 
the limits of the valorization of capital. Any social transformation 
must also reorganize these aspects anew, reject their gendered logic, 
and instead organize them by means of a social time fund, which 
has long been possible. Moreover, a broad social discussion must be 
started that includes a wide variety of experiences and competencies 
without restricting it to a single, narrow theoretical focus. Theoretical 
critique can only attempt to stimulate such a discussion by means 
of highlighting the development of crisis and to foreground the key 
problems in regards to social planning.
Particularly since a categorical critique of capitalist formal relations 
cannot, despite the historical crisis, be mediated without experiencing 
moments of breakage as it reaches the limits of what Marx calls the 
objective forms of thought corresponding to social consciousness, 
it must not limit itself  in a bourgeois sense to a politically and 
economically narrowed, “objective” line of argumentation. A crucial 
moment of such mediation is also a radical critique of ideology. All 
affirmative forms of processing the crisis on the level of consciousness 
produce ideology (not only in statist orientations or ecological 
reductionism). All modern base-ideologies such as nationalism, 
antisemitism, antiziganism (most notably the resentment directed 
against the Sinti and Roma as the pariahs of modernity), and sexism are 
amplified and newly configured in the context of the current crisis. The 
backdrop of this is the aggressive defense of the respective capitalist 
existence of social strata engaged in violent competition. Central in 
this regard is the current ideology of the “new middle classes,” which 
in the context of the crisis are engaged in a struggle for hegemony. 
The different elements of ideology production here often experience a 
process of (at times indirect) amalgamation. It is the job of categorical 
critique, therefore, to analyze the modulated dispositifs of ideology 
production and to explore the concept of ideology beyond traditional 
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Marxism in order to connect the program of social transformation to 
a program of ideology-critical intervention. The current “movement 
Left” and its theoretically disarmed focus on largely symbolic struggles 
is far removed from all this. It is in part for this reason that we can 
increasingly observe sinister conversions of left to right positions in 
the context of an abbreviated critique of capitalism.
What role can class struggle in the Lukácsian sense play in the 
process of spreading class consciousness?
A traditional understanding of class struggles can, in this new situation 
of  a confrontation with the absolute inner limit of  valorization, 
no longer be mobilized. Historically, the representation of  the 
proletariat by unions and political entities was no different from the 
representation of self-affirmative “variable capital” and therefore the 
representation of abstract labor. This depended on the construction 
of a merely relative opposition of the putatively transhistorical, 
anthropological principle of labor and the juridically construed form 
of capitalist private property, while abstract labor and juridical private 
property of the means of production in reality only constitute different 
formal determinations within the common, overarching system of 
relations of the valorization of value. Marx described this overarching 
relation as the “automatic subject” of modern fetish society, which 
contains all social situations as functions of the logic of valorization. 
There is no ontological principle upon which social emancipation could 
base itself. Instead, capitalism must be surpassed solely by means of a 
concrete, historical critique of its basic forms. Class struggle was first 
and foremost a struggle for recognition based on capitalist categories. 
For this reason, the workers’ movement adopted from Protestantism 
and the bourgeois ideology of the Enlightenment not only the ontology 
of abstract labor but also the ontology of capitalist gender relations, 
that is, the historically assigned categories of  masculinity and 
femininity. That which surpassed the struggle for recognition (right 
to strike, freedom of coalition, freedom of assembly, right to vote, 
and so on) still only led to a further statification of the unsurpassed 
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categories of capitalism. In this, the understanding of socialism within 
the context of class struggle exhausted itself.
In the new historical situation, the demand for the recognition 
of those who depend upon wages has long been granted and in fact 
becomes a bond and trap for the citizen-subjects of a fetish society. For 
better or worse, humanity is tied to valorization-compulsion. This is 
not only a matter of consciousness, since the social basis of the class 
struggle of old is also eroded objectively. Part of the conditions of the 
third industrial revolution is capital’s inability to assemble armies of 
abstract labor. Since the process of individualization as a phenomenon 
of crisis destroys the social filters, the socially atomized subject 
relates directly to the global value-relation, which is simultaneously 
virtualized in the form of bad debts and therefore becomes obsolete. It 
may appear as though a variety of diffuse social situations have been 
created that can no longer be integrated into capitalist categories. 
Temporary workers, the underemployed, the transfer-dependent 
unemployed as objects of  crisis administration, the pseudo-self-
employed, and owners of  impoverished small businesses do not 
constitute the homogeneous mass of  a surplus-value-producing 
proletariat. The movement ideology of the 1990s adopted the notion of 
such “diversity” affirmatively and assembled it purely notionally under 
the category of the multitude. The new organization of social struggle, 
however, cannot consist of the desire to be recognized as surplus-
producing entity, but must instead concern itself with the critique 
and transformation of value as category and its associated gender 
relations. The basis for this cannot be a predetermined capitalist 
organization of labor which will be dissolved and demoralized, but 
the self-conscious organization of a concrete, historical critique of 
predominant categories that emerges out of the immanent working-
through of contradictions. This is, therefore, not a question of objective 
class constitution as the representation of variable capital but instead 
a question of consciousness — yet not idealistic consciousness along 
the lines of a moral-philosophical ethics, but a consciousness that 
confronts the historical limits of valorization and the deterioration 
351On the Current Global Economic Crisis
of the level of civilization.
At this point it is important to return once more to the problem 
of the crisis of the “new middle classes.” The unorganized state of 
the industrial armies of labor and the deterioration of the traditional 
labor movement coincided with the ascension of skilled middle strata 
during the phase of Fordist prosperity. The economic basis for this 
was not the immediate, actual production of surplus value but the 
expansion of state credit. The associated social self-consciousness 
consisted less in the ontology of labor as in the status of the “human 
capital” of higher education. The New Left that emerged since 1968 was 
already largely a middle-class movement, even if it sought in vain (in 
abstract-ideological fashion and out of a commitment to the traditional 
Marxist fund) a connection with the disappearing class struggle of the 
proletariat. In the era of finance bubble economics, the new middle 
classes became increasingly dependent upon the expansion of private 
credit and thus experienced steadily growing precarity. In particular 
in this process the worldview of middle-class consciousness assumed 
a dominant position (also on the Left). Revivals of traditional class-
struggle rhetoric and in particular their derivatives in the form of 
the post-workerist multitude are all implicitly (and at times even 
explicitly) formulated from the perspective of  the categorically 
affirmative consciousness of the middle class. Today, it is not mainly 
the long-eroded ontology of labor that blocks the transformation 
from the Marxism of labor movements to categorical critique, but 
the ideology of the middle class that continues to insist upon its human 
capital as the basis of a variety of theoretical models and movements. 
Since a large-scale, social countermovement must also include the 
middle classes, transcending this ideology is of the utmost importance. 
The problem of  an organization of  social struggle that must 
integrate the desperate “diversity” of social strata beyond the class-
struggle paradigm in altered fashion theoretically does not depart from 
ground zero. The transition to categorical critique can be found in the 
work of theoreticians at the boundaries of traditional Marxism such 
as Georg Lukács (and in a different way in Adorno). Lukács may have 
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provided the earliest indication of this in the essay on reification. As 
is to be expected, given the historical situation out of which the essay 
emerges, he connects for the first time the implicit ontology of labor 
and the class standpoint that emerges out of it to the thematization 
of the constitution of the modern fetish that spans social strata. Of 
course, Lukács let himself be convinced by party Marxists that his 
groundbreaking insights were idealistic and returned to an explicit 
and rather boring ontology of abstract labor in his later work. Yet, his 
1923 work has also been recognized by new approaches to a categorical 
critique since the 1980s, in particular with regard to the consideration 
of an “imputed class consciousness” and of the proletariat as “subject-
object of history.” A new reading of this part of Lukács’ work in the 
context of the current situation generates surprising insights. What 
he collects under the category of reification constitutes a critique, 
unparallelled for its time, of capitalism’s basic forms — indeed, some 
passages read like an anticipation of postmodern thought. Important 
here is the postulate of a critical “coming into consciousness” of the 
commodity form as capitalism’s universal form of being, including the 
integration of the commodity labor. The result of this is that Lukács is 
able once again to approach the Marxian determination of capitalist 
categories as simultaneously both actual conditions of existence and 
objective forms of thought that had been overshadowed by labor-
movement Marxism.
If  one dissociates this approach from its attribution to the 
standpoint of labor, much can be adopted for a new categorical critique 
under the conditions of individualization and the deterioration of 
the relations of value. Of primary importance in this context is the 
attempt to integrate modern gender relations (which Lukács’s work 
does not address) into the categorical plane. Furthermore, the critical 
relativization of proletarian class-consciousness as it is laid out in the 
essay on reification must today be primarily examined in relation to 
the middle class. Our project, in other words, is the reformulation of 
Lukács’ insights in the context of a fundamentally different historical 
situation in order to energize the critical “coming into consciousness” 
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of the commodity form for a reintegration of social struggle beyond 
capitalist false objectivity.
How would you define a concept of revolution suited for the current 
historical situation that is able to break with fetishism and with an 
everyday life that is completely subordinated to the reproduction 
of capital?
The term “revolution” is historically determined via the paradigm of 
the great French Revolution, the subsequent bourgeois revolutions 
of  the nineteenth century and the revolutions of  recuperative 
modernization at the periphery of the global market in the twentieth 
century (Russia, China, and the Third World). In this context, the 
revolution was limited to the political form of a seizure of power and 
in the twentieth century to the statification of capitalist categories. 
Consequently, the term belongs to the history of the development of 
abstract labor, the logic of valorization, and modern gender relations 
— and for this reason, the term’s career appears to be over. In the 
context of “remainder Marxism” and movement ideology the concept 
no longer plays a role in the act of political transformation — but this 
throws out the baby with the bathwater. By retiring the concept of 
revolution without reworking it in relation to the current historical 
context, the Left has ratified the terms of its surrender to the social 
basis of the middle classes.
Already in his early writings, Marx criticized politically limited 
variants of the term “revolution.” For him, a “social revolution” was 
qualitatively different, since it was aimed at the abolition of the 
political form of the state along with capitalist value relations and the 
commodity form. As later in Lukács, such a transformation naturally 
still took the shape of a proletarian revolution. Yet, precisely this 
paradigm has remained stuck at the stage of a politically abbreviated 
conception of revolution. Beyond the ontology of abstract labor, the 
internal limits of valorization and the question of social revolution 
take on a new and different quality, and the latter must be defined as 
the transcendence of the currently dominant social synthesis in the 
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forms of value and capitalist gender relations. “Social synthesis” here 
means nothing other than the specific form of socialization in the 
sense of a negative totality, which can only be surpassed by means of 
a total social transformation.
Especially for this reason a new social movement on a transnational 
scale is necessary in order to begin the process of transforming the 
social synthesis. Occupations of factories by workers are, therefore, 
in no way sufficient, since these workers merely reify their status 
as a collective subject of capital, thereby remaining at the mercy 
of the synthesis via the market and competition. All past attempts 
at transformation (as, for example, in the case of the great crisis in 
Argentina) failed for this reason. Transformation is not possible on the 
plane of singular units of capital or particular units of reproduction. 
Instead, the question of synthesis and the associated forms of social 
planning beyond the commodity form must form the beginning (and 
not the endpoint) of any practical break with capitalism. Consequently, 
the concept “revolution” is not simply without substance, even if it no 
longer bears any relation to the old political definitions of the term. 
Critical theory as categorical critique must insist upon the point of 
social synthesis, also in opposition to purely symbolic movement 
consciousness, which refuses to address this key problem.
The post-workerist movement-Left today (including, for example, 
John Holloway) enjoys talking about the desire to change the world 
without seizing power. In this context, the critique of social synthesis is 
replaced with the diffuse notion of the “quotidian,” which was already 
popular in the movement of 1968. What is frequently designated as 
a revolutionization of the quotidian in one way or another always 
accompanies social change, but, reduced to this facet, such change 
can also include any given cultural adaptation to capitalist dynamics. 
Corresponding concepts of the movement of ’68 and the postmodern 
Left have long been absorbed into capitalist crisis management, as 
exemplified by the neoliberal propaganda that foregrounds individual 
self-responsibility. The thematization of the quotidian can neither 
replace real interventions on the plane of social synthesis nor is it 
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able to render superfluous the forms of power necessary for such 
an intervention (such as strikes, blockades, and the disruption of 
capitalist nerve centers). The question of power is in no way limited 
to the paradigm of state power, but it must emerge with particular 
significance and urgency in the context of resistance against crisis 
management and administration. In reality, the quotidian is not 
itself a pool of resistance — in fact, such assertions render the latter 
term hollow and useless. Resistance, on the contrary, begins where 
individuals raise themselves out of the pool of the quotidian that is 
everywhere determined by capitalism and by doing so become able to 
organize in the first place.
The Left metaphysics of the quotidian in essence constitutes a 
continuation of the failed alternative movements of the 1980s as well 
as a continuation of attempts pragmatically or in neo-utopian fashion 
to legitimate “other” forms of producing and living on a small scale 
within particular communities. Such attempts, as in the form of so-
called “local economies” or the digital open-source movement, are also 
unable to reach the level of social synthesis, just like occupations of 
factories. As pseudo-alternatives to a social resistance movement that 
emerges out of capitalist immanence they threaten to transform into 
the self-administration of poverty. As soon as even the thought of a 
critique of the commodity form appears, however, it is deconstructed 
to a form that no longer allows for such a critique without losing its 
decisive content and without resulting in hopeless contradictions. The 
supposed alternatives not only remain stuck in bourgeois contract 
relations, but they also solely address tiny segments of reproduction, 
which, as a whole, remain determined by capitalism. It is no surprise, 
then, that the particular “praxis projects” tend to aim for external 
financing through the state, be that in the form of basic income or 
communal sponsoring. Keynesian statism and alternative ideology 
are two sides of the same coin, and the common denominator is the 
direct or indirect orientation in the direction of state credit. This way, 
the disavowed dominance of middle-class consciousness shows itself 
once again. The Keynesian and alternative-movement lefts are forced 
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to the same degree to deny and repress the new quality of the present 
crisis, since their illusions cannot survive the end of the global credit 
system and finance-bubble economy. They will have to confront the 
real limits of the predominant social synthesis at the very latest at the 
point at which the massive collapse of the global economy also reaches 
the quotidian in the capitalist centers. 
Note
1. The Hartz reforms were the proposals put forward at the recommendation 
of the Hartz Commission, founded by the (Social-Democratic) Schröder 
administration in 2002 for the reform of the German labor market, and 
implemented between 2003 and 2005. The last of these reforms, Hartz 
IV, combined unemployment and social security benefits, at the (much 
lower) level of the latter, on a means-tested basis. [Eds.] 
The Ontological Break: Before the Beginning 
of a Different World History
Robert Kurz (2005)
The debate over globalization seems to have come to a point of 
exhaustion. This is not, however, because the underlying social process 
has exhausted itself — the process itself is still in its incipient stage. 
Rather, the forms of interpretation have prematurely run out of 
steam. The guild of economists and political scientists has filled entire 
libraries with discussions of the boundaries of national economies 
blown open by the globalization of capital and with discussions of the 
resulting dissolution of the nation state and political regulation as a 
frame of reference. Yet this widespread set of realizations has largely 
remained without consequence. The more clearly analysis shows that 
nation and politics have become obsolete, the more stubbornly political 
and theoretical discourse tries to hold on to the concepts of nation and 
politics. The concepts that were developed to cope with the problem 
correspondingly appear weak and unpersuasive.
The problem is that there are no immanent alternatives to these 
concepts because, just like concepts such as labor, money, and market, 
they represent the petrified determinations of modern capitalist 
358 Marxism and the Critique of Value
ontology — and thus also represent its categories. If we understand 
ontology not anthropologically or transhistorically, but rather as 
historically contingent, then ontological concepts or categories of 
sociality indicate distinct historical fields; in Marxian terms: a form 
of society or a mode of production and a mode of living. The modern 
system of commodity production constitutes a historical ontology of 
this kind.
Within such a field there exist at any given point in time a multitude 
of alternatives and arguments. These, however, remain confined to and 
move within the same historical-ontological categories. The critique 
and suspension of the categories themselves appears to be unthinkable. 
Thus, it is possible to critique a certain politics in order to replace it 
with another; but within modern ontology it is impossible to critique 
politics in itself and replace it with another mode of social regulation. 
For this we lack the appropriate form of thought, and therefore all the 
concepts as well. Only the determinate content of politics is malleable, 
but not the categorical form or mode of all content. The same goes for 
the categories of nation, state, rights, labor, money, and market, as well 
as of the individual, subject, and gender relations (social masculinity 
and femininity). At any given point, any of these categorical forms can 
be modified, only in a quasi-adjectival sense. Yet the category itself 
and its corresponding social mode are never put up for substantial 
negotiation.
The analytical insight that the process of globalization renders 
nation and politics obsolete can therefore not be worked through with 
the means and methods the modern social sciences have to offer. It is 
today no longer the case that it is a matter of substituting a specific 
content with a different, new content within the same social form 
— say, the substitution of the dominant political constellation with 
another. Such strategies would, for example, propose that the world 
power United States could be replaced by a new Euro-Asian power 
bloc, or that the neoliberal political economy could be surpassed by 
the return to Keynesian paradigms. Rather, globalization questions 
the political mode and national form as such.
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What this means is that contemporary analysis asserts more than 
it knows. With its insight into the loss of the regulatory capacity of 
the nation state and of politics, it involuntarily comes up against the 
limits of modern ontology itself. But when one category falls, all others 
must fall like dominoes. For the historical formation of the modern 
system of commodity production can only exist as a totality, in which 
one basic condition presupposes another and the different categories 
determine each other.
It is, therefore, not the case that the loss of political authority would 
not affect the economy or even allow it to run free. On the contrary, the 
political constitutes the mode of regulation of the modern system of 
commodity production, which cannot function economically without 
such regulation. Globalization itself, which blows up the frame of 
the national and thus destroys the political as mode of regulation, 
is conditioned, in turn, by the fact that abstract labor, as the form of 
productive value and surplus-value generating human activity within 
the development of productive forces, is increasingly replaced by 
fixed capital (Sachkapital). The resulting depreciation of value pushes 
management toward the transnational rationalization of the business 
economy. In the same way that scientified objective capital substitutes 
for labor, capital is de-substantialized and the valorization of value 
reaches its historical limits; the “depreciation” of nation and politics is 
nothing more than a product of this process. Yet, once the categorical 
structure of forms of production, reproduction, and regulation has 
been diluted, forms of individuality, of the subject, and its androcentric 
determination of gender, also become obsolete.
What seems at first to be a particular crisis of the political and 
its national limits is in reality a crisis of modern ontology. Such a 
categorical crisis demands in response a categorical critique. Yet, 
such a project currently lacks both appropriate forms of imagination 
and adequate concepts. Until now, critique has been immanent to 
dominant categories, relating only to determinate content, and not to 
the ontological forms and modes of the modern system of commodity 
production — hence the current paralysis of thought and praxis. The 
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planetary administration of this ontological crisis cannot hold back 
the dissolution into barbarism of a global society defined in capitalist 
terms. On the contrary, it becomes instead an integral part of the 
descent into barbarism.
What is required here is an ontological break — from which 
global discourse, however, still shies away, even the radical Left. 
What predominates in its place are regressive ideas that seek to 
reverse the movement of the wheel of history in order to avoid this 
utterly unthinkable ontological break. While the hardliners of crisis 
administration want to separate the majority of humanity from their 
own conditions of existence, most self-styled critics of globalization 
seek ideally to escape to the past from the very object of their critique; 
they fall back on hopelessly reactionary paradigms of nation, politics, 
and Keynesian regulation, or journey even further back in time to 
the ideals of romanticized agrarian societies. An integral part of this 
regressive tendency is the religious madness that rages in all cultural 
spheres and exceeds all comparable manifestations in the breaks in the 
history of modernization. 
In order to be able to think clearly and question modern ontology as 
such it would be necessary to understand this ontology as historically 
determined. For only in this way does the thought of its overcoming 
become possible. The ontological crisis of the twenty-first century can 
only be resolved if the history of the constitution of those apparently 
natural, a priori categories of modern commodity production from the 
sixteenth to the eighteenth century are not only newly illuminated but 
also fundamentally re-evaluated.
This task, however, is blocked by an ideological apparatus, which 
is as constitutive of modernity as the categorical totality of its social 
reproduction. The foundation of this ideational, and, in its ontologically 
affirmative character, always already ideological apparatus is 
constituted by Enlightenment philosophy. All modern theories are 
equally derived from this root, liberalism just as Marxism, as well 
as the bourgeois-reactionary movements of counter-Enlightenment 
and antimodernity. For this reason, all of these theories are equally 
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incapable of formulating the required categorical critique and realizing 
the necessary ontological break. 
The once world-shattering conflicts between liberalism, Marxism, 
and conservatism always addressed specific social, political, juridical, 
or ideological matters. However, they never addressed the categorical 
forms and ontological modes of  sociality. In this sense, liberals, 
Marxists, conservatives, and the radical Right could equally be patriots, 
politicians, subjects, androcentric universalists, and statesmen, labor-, 
rights-, or finance-enthusiasts, and were distinguished only by nuances 
of content. Because of their common grounding in Enlightenment 
thinking, the seemingly conflicting ideologies of modernization reveal 
themselves in the context of the crisis of modern ontology to be one and 
the same ideological apparatus in the sense of a common persistence 
with this same ontology at any price.
The insight that can occasionally be gleaned in postmodern 
discourse since the 1980s — that Left, Right, and liberal ideologies 
have become interchangeable — points to the hidden foundation that 
is common to them in the same way that neoliberalism as an ideology of 
crisis currently determines, with only minimal variations, the entirety 
of the political spectrum across party lines. Postmodern thought, 
however, has noticed this interchangeability solely phenomenologically 
and superficially, and hence without questioning the underlying 
ontology of modernity. Instead, postmodernism seeks to sneak past 
the ontological problem by means of simply rejecting all theories of 
modernity’s ontology as dogmatic and totalitarian claims — as if the 
problem were inherently theoretical and not in fact a problem emerging 
from the reality of the social mode of reproduction. In this way, the 
basic categories of the modern system of commodity production 
are certainly not criticized, but are instead only removed from the 
focus of the critical gaze without, however, being escapable in social 
practice. Postmodernism, too, thus proves to be an integral part of the 
total ideological apparatus and, despite assertions to the contrary, a 
derivative of Enlightenment philosophy.
Enlightenment thought explicitly grounded, expanded, 
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consolidated, and ideologically legitimated the categories of modern 
ontology that prior to the eighteenth century were still unstable. For 
this reason, the required ontological break must be accompanied by 
the radical critique of the Enlightenment and of all those forms of 
philosophy, theory, and ideology that emerged from it. In rejecting 
its foundations, all the rest is rejected as well. The ontological break 
consists precisely in this. 
However, the Enlightenment did not only develop the categories 
of  labor, value, commodity, market, law and policy, legal status, 
androcentric universalism, subject, and notions of  abstract 
individuality as conceptual reflections of a social ontology of modernity 
that was born out of a blind historical process; the Enlightenment 
simultaneously placed them within a logical and historical context so 
as to make them sacrosanct.
Earlier agrarian social forms also possessed their own respective 
historical ontologies: ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, no differently 
from Greco-Roman antiquity, imperial China, Islamic culture, and the 
Christian Middle Ages. But all of these ontologies were in a certain 
sense self-sufficient. They were defined in themselves, did not need to 
be assessed against any other ontology, and were under no pressure 
to justify themselves. While there existed in each case relationships 
with foreign cultures of the same period, these “others” were usually 
negatively defined as “barbarians,” “unbelievers,” or “pagans.” Such 
definitions, however, were not based on historical-philosophical 
systems and only represented incidental limitations. 
The modern system of commodity production, in contrast, needed 
to ground its ontology in a reflexive manner — reflexively, however, 
not in the sense of a critical project but rather in the sense of a project 
of legitimating itself as a system. Indeed, it was the compulsion to 
justify the new, foundational claim to the subjugation and battering 
of individuals that produced the Enlightenment’s philosophy of history. 
The monstrous demands of capitalism, which directly aims to transform 
the process of life in its entirety into an immediate function of its 
logic of valorization, could no longer be based on a loose assemblage 
363The Ontological Break
of traditions.
On one hand, it was necessary to bestow upon the specifically 
modern ontology the dignity of an objective natural relation. That is, 
it was necessary explicitly to transform an historical ontology into a 
transhistorical and anthropological ontology — being-human as such. 
On the other, this resulted in the need to establish a logical relation 
between this modern, now transhistorically reasoned ontology and all 
previous historical formations and all concurrent noncapitalist (still 
predominantly agrarian) cultures. 
The result could not have been any other than a stamping of the 
mark of inferiority on the past. This not only represented a new 
worldview, but also a revaluation afresh of all values. In agrarian 
societies, people understood themselves as the children of their parents 
not simply in the ontogenetic sense, but in the phylogenic and socio-
historical sense as well. The oldest people were celebrated in the same 
way as ancestors and mythic heroes of the past were. The golden age 
was located in the beginnings and not in the future; the unsurpassable 
ideal was the mythical “first time” and not the “end result” of a process 
of exerting effort. 
Enlightenment philosophy of  history did not reflect on this 
worldview in a critical way. Rather, it turned it on its head. Ancestors 
and “primitive men” were regarded as unemancipated children in an 
historico-phylogenic sense, who only reached adulthood in modern 
ontology. All previous historical periods appeared first as errors of 
humanity, later becoming imperfect and immature prior stages of 
modernity, which, in turn, went on to represent the culmination and 
end point of a process of maturation — the “end of history” in the 
ontological sense. History was then for the first time systemically 
defined as development — from simpler or ontological forms to 
higher and better ones. That is, as the progress from the primitive to 
the actual state of being human in the context of commodity-producing 
modernity.
On one hand, the specifically historical ontological categories of 
modernity were established transhistorically, as if they had always been 
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there. Even the concept of ontology itself appeared to be synonymous 
with anthropological, transhistorical, or ahistorical circumstances. For 
this reason, it became impossible to seek other historical ontologies 
and to determine their own specificities. Instead, the Enlightenment 
projected its modern categories, which it constituted and legitimated, 
onto all of the past and the future. The only remaining questions all 
followed the same principle: what were “labor,” the “nation,” the 
“political,” “value,” the “market,” “money,” the “subject,” and so on, like 
in ancient Egypt, among the Celts, or in the Christian Middle Ages; or, 
conversely, how will the same categories look in the future and how will 
they be modified? In adopting this ontologization of modern categories, 
Marxism, too, was merely able to formulate its “socialist alternative” 
in an adjectival sense, as simply another thematic accentuation or 
regulation within the same social and historical form. 
On the other hand, from the perspective of such a projection, past 
societies inevitably appeared as categorically imperfect. What were, 
in fact, other historical ontologies were defined (and consequently 
disfigured) as categorically “immature,” not yet sufficiently developed 
modern ontology. Similarly, all contemporary societies that had not yet 
been completely determined by modern ontology were fitted into the 
same schema; these were equally seen as underdeveloped, immature, 
and inferior. Constituted in this way, Enlightenment philosophy of 
history essentially served as the legitimating ideology of internal and 
external colonization. In the name of that philosophy of history and 
its schemata, the submission of society to a system of the valorization 
of value — as well as its associated abstract labor with intolerable and 
disciplinary demands — can be propagated as historically necessary 
and as part of a change for the better. 
The concept of barbarism, borrowed from agrarian civilizations, 
emerged as a pejorative definition of previous or contemporary 
noncapitalist humanity: “barbarism” became synonymous with a lack 
of civility in the sense of capitalist circulation (market subjectivity and 
legal form) and, as such, with a lack of submission to modern ontology. 
We still have no other concept at our disposition to characterize 
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destructive, violent, and destabilizing tendencies that threaten the 
social context. Already Marx used the concept of “barbarism” critically 
by relating it to the history of the formation of the system of commodity 
production in reference to both “primitive accumulation” and the 
history of the disintegration of modernity in crises of capitalism. 
The break with modern ontology as it is required today requires us to 
move beyond Marx and to reveal as barbaric (and thus to destroy the 
foundations of) the core of the capitalist social machine, to destroy 
abstract labor and its inner structure of discipline and reified human 
administration that is generally misunderstood as civilization.
This task of the ontological break is nonetheless complex and 
difficult to grasp, since the philosophy of history produced by the 
Enlightenment is legitimated paradoxically not simply as affirmative, 
but also as critical. The ideological apparatus established by the 
Enlightenment blocks the necessary ontological break precisely 
because it has been able to move within this paradox for a long 
time. Liberal bourgeois criticism always focused solely on the social 
conditions that prevented the imposition of modern ontology. Both 
in the sense of internal and external colonization, this was a question 
of the remnants left behind by agrarian formations. Among these 
remnants were not only previous relations of domination in the form of 
personal dependencies, but also certain conditions of life that detracted 
from the modern demands of abstract labor. In this way, the majority 
of religious holidays of agrarian societies were abolished to provide 
a clear path for the transformation of the temporality of life into the 
functional temporality of the valorization of capital. 
The Enlightenment criticized older forms of personal dependency 
solely to legitimate the new forms of reified dependency of abstract 
labor, market, and the state. This criticism contained repressive 
aspects because it was linked to the propaganda of abstract diligence, 
discipline, and submission to the new demands of capitalism, along 
with destroying, together with old forms of domination, universal 
human achievements of agrarian relations. In fact, an older ailment 
was only replaced by a new, and in many ways even worse ailment. It 
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was nevertheless possible for the liberal ideology of the Enlightenment 
to champion still-emergent modern relations as liberation from the 
feudal burden and to represent itself as shedding light on the dark 
superstitions of the Middle Ages. Feudal violence was condemned, 
while the abstract labor of modernity was “tortured into” people 
with an unprecedented violence, as expressed by Marx. The concept 
of criticism, in general, was identified by Enlightenment liberalism 
with the criticism of agrarian society, as capitalist modernity, with 
its atrocities, appeared as progress, even while in the real world it 
represented something very different for great masses of people. 
During the late nineteenth century and even more in the twentieth, 
the concept of criticism shifted more and more to internal capitalist 
relations, after agrarian society had practically already disappeared 
along with its structures of personal dependency. Obviously, this was 
not a question of modern ontology and its categories, but only of the 
overcoming of old contents and structures through new structures, 
still founded on the same ontological ground. The system of commodity 
production, that is, capitalism, is inherently not a static situation, but 
rather a dynamic process of constant change and evolution: but it is a 
process that always develops in the same manner and under the same 
formal categories. It is a constant struggle between the new and the 
old, but it is at all times only the struggle between the capitalist new 
and the capitalist old. For the liberal understanding of criticism, the 
capitalist old has taken the place of the ontologically old, that is, of the 
now no-longer-existing feudal agrarian social relations. The ontological 
break between the proto-modern and the modern has been replaced by 
the permanent structural break internal to modernity and its ontology. 
This internal dynamic operates under the label “modernization.” 
Henceforth, liberal criticism has been formulated in the sense of a 
modernization of modernity.
This process of  permanent modernization in the ontological 
categories of modernity itself undergoes an additional legitimation 
by means of an opposite, complementary, and immanent critique, 
which is in turn legitimated in a romantic or reactionary manner. The 
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supposedly good “old” is cast against the nefarious “new,” without, 
however, subjecting the modern ontology to the slightest criticism. 
This is not even a defense of the actual premodern ontology present in 
agrarian society. Rather, the reactionary or conservative movement 
of antimodernity, too, is an invention of modernity and a derivative 
of the Enlightenment itself. 
This is a bourgeois critique of bourgeois existence, which, since 
the end of the eighteenth century, has been loaded with images of 
an idealized agrarian society and with a system of pseudo-feudal 
values — similar to an opposing liberalism, which is loaded with the 
ideals and values of capitalist circulation (freedom of the autonomous 
subject integrated into the market, and so on). Yet pseudo-agrarian 
ideals were from the beginning formulated from within the categories 
of modern ontology, and not against it. Just as romanticism helped 
in the birth of modern abstract individuality, conservatism and its 
more radical versions of reactionary thought became propagators of 
modern nationalism and its ethno-ideological, racist, and antisemitic 
legitimation. In the Protestant work ethic and in social Darwinism, there 
was always a commonality between conservatives and reactionaries 
with liberalism that suggests their common roots in Enlightenment 
thinking. 
The more the ideological attachment of  conservative and 
reactionary thought to the idealized agrarian society faded, the clearer 
its position within the modern ontology and its dynamic needed to 
be. In this context, the romantic and reactionary current followed 
in the same path as liberalism — only with reversed polarity. Just as 
liberal critique stood opposed to the capitalist old in the context of a 
permanent, modernization of modernity interior to capitalism, thus 
acting as the advocate of the capitalist new, so too did conservative and 
reactionary countercritique operate in the name and as advocate of the 
respective capitalistic old in opposition to the capitalist new, which was 
perceived as a force of demoralization and disintegration. 
Since this immanent polarity marked the same ontological field, 
however, their immanent opposition at the same time shielded this 
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field from any possible metacriticism. Apart from the intolerable 
demands on human beings, the discomfort and destructive potential 
of the modern system of production created an increasing tension that 
could constantly be shifted to or canalized in the internal movement 
between progress and reaction, between liberalism and conservatism. 
The destructiveness of modernity should be redeemed by the ultimate 
impulse of modernization (progress), or, on the contrary, tamed by 
activism on behalf of the present situation of modernity directed 
against its own dynamic (conservatism or reaction). It is precisely 
for this reason that the critique of the social and historical ontology 
underlying this position was blocked. 
However, the bourgeois-immanent contradiction inherent in 
liberalism on one hand, and conservative or romantic reaction on 
the other, formed far from the only obstacle for a critique of modern 
ontology. Instead, a second wave of criticism developed within this 
ontology that superimposed itself on the first. The second wave was 
sustained on one hand by the Western labor movement and on the other 
by so-called liberation movements on the periphery of the world market, 
including the Russian Revolution and the anticolonial movements and 
regimes. In all of these historical movements, a fundamental critique 
of capitalism, which was articulated, in many ways, by recourse to 
Marxist theory, was officially established. Nevertheless, this second 
wave was also fundamentally limited primarily to the modern ontology 
of the system of commodity production and, thus, to its categories. The 
return to Marx was limited to the components of this ontology retained 
by Marx himself, while all of the other moments of his theory that went 
beyond this remained muted or ignored. 
The reason for the historical phenomenon of this second wave of 
affirmative criticism, which superimposes itself onto the opposition 
within the bourgeoisie, must be sought in the problem the social 
sciences call “historical noncontemporaneity.” Modern ontology 
did not structurally or geographically develop in uniformity, but in 
discontinuous spurts. 
In the countries of the West that gave rise to the system of commodity 
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production, only a few categories were formed, while others remained 
underdeveloped. This was particularly true for the formation of the 
modern subject, of abstract individuality, and associated forms of law 
and politics. Neither the Enlightenment nor liberalism could establish 
these categories as abstract and general, equally legitimate for all 
members of society. Universalism, formulated theoretically, fell apart 
as a consequence of its confrontation with social limits. Enlightenment 
thinkers and liberals persisted in the understanding of the “man” of 
modern ontology solely as the male, propertied citizen, while the mass 
of wage laborers, male and female, were on one hand subjugated to 
the discipline of abstract labor, yet remained on the other both on the 
juridical and on the political level ontologically exterritorialized. In 
order to complete its process not of a subjective but of a reified form 
of dependence, modern ontology needed to generalize the former 
relation. Only by means of political and juridical integration could the 
categorical subjugation of man be completed.
From that constellation, the labor movement in the West assumed 
the specific function of a modernization of modernity that consisted 
in the struggle of wage laborers for recognition as integrated subjects 
of law, politics, and participation in the state (universal suffrage, 
freedom of coalition and assembly). But here categorical critique was 
also blocked, and instead of the ontological break, the labor movement 
undertook the completion of modern ontology. It assumed in part the 
role of liberalism in the actual, practical universalization of certain 
modern categories. Liberalism, in turn, proved to be incapable of such 
universalization, instead revealing itself as a conservative force in 
this respect. Consequently, the labor movement accused liberalism of 
betraying its own ideals and itself adopted the principal ideologemes 
of the Enlightenment, including the Protestant work ethic. 
The modern ontology of the system of commodity production, 
however, also included specific gender relations insofar as all 
moments of life and reproduction, whether material, psychosocial, 
or cultural-symbolic, that were not subsumed by capitalist categories 
were designated as feminine and in practice delegated to women — 
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throughout all historical developments internal to this ontology. The 
recognition of female wage laborers — and, in general, of women — in 
bourgeois society as subjects of law and of civil society and political 
life, a recognition that was denied by the majority of Enlightenment 
philosophers, possessed only limited validity even after the second 
wave of value-immanent criticism: on one hand, they moved within the 
official spheres of society, but at the same time kept one foot “outside” 
because they continued to represent those dissociated moments that 
could not be systemically integrated. In this way, modern ontology is 
not a closed totality, but rather broken and self-contradictory, mediated 
by what Roswitha Scholz calls specifically gendered “relations of 
dissociation.” As a result of the relation of dissociation corresponding 
with modern ontology, the bourgeois recognition of women had to 
remain correspondingly fragmented and incomplete. The abstract 
individual is, in reality and in its complete form, masculinized, in 
much the same way that abstract universalism for this reason always 
remains androcentric. 
The positive dialectic of bourgeois recognition was repeated on a 
larger scale on the periphery by movements for national independence 
and free participation in the global market. In this case, the critique 
of capitalism referred to the structure of colonial and postcolonial 
domination in relation to the more advanced Western nations, 
but not to its basic social categories. Here too it was a question of a 
recognition perfectly situated in modern ontology rather than in its 
critique or overcoming. Thus, both the Russian and Chinese Revolution 
and subsequent liberation movements in the southern hemisphere 
assumed a function within the modernization of modernity, namely, 
the recuperative modernization of national economies and states 
on the periphery. Consequently, this historical movement also had 
to be grounded in the idealized categories of modernity and in their 
legitimation carried out by the Enlightenment, thus remaining confined 
within androcentric universalism. 
The asynchrony at the heart of modern ontology produced a gap 
in development — geographically and within society itself — which 
371The Ontological Break
gave rise to both the seemingly radical critique and the liberal critique 
of Enlightenment. The Western labor movement, the revolutions of 
the East, and the national liberation movements in the southern 
hemisphere were merely different versions of  a recuperative 
modernization in the context of that asymmetry. These attempted to 
get into the system of commodity production, and not to get out of that 
historical ontology. That option could be taken positively as progress 
and development, as long as the world system as a whole still afforded 
a space for a subsequent modernization of modernity.
Such a space for development, however, no longer exists. In the third 
industrial revolution, modern ontology as such reaches its historical 
limit. The very same categories within which the entire process of 
modernization took place are becoming obsolete, as is clearly illustrated 
on the level of labor as well as in concepts such as nation and politics. 
With that, the ashynchrony internal to the system of commodity 
production also disappears. But this, of course, does not mean that 
all societies have reached the highest level of modern development 
or that we have surpassed situations of uneven development and 
reached a new situation of  positive planetary contemporaneity. 
Rather, asynchrony ceases to exist because the system of commodity 
production is experiencing a large-scale ontological crisis. Whatever 
the level of development achieved by particular societies, they are all 
hit by this ontological or categorical crisis. 
The different world societies still very much experience decidedly 
different material, social, and political structural situations. Many 
countries are only in the beginnings of modern “development”; others 
remain stuck in the intermediate stages of this development. Yet the gap 
between such societies no longer mobilizes a dynamic of recuperative 
modernization — it only mobilizes the dynamic of barbarism. The 
ontological crisis produces a negative contemporaneity, a doomsday 
of modern categories, which gradually travels across still-unequal 
conditions. There is no going back to the old agrarian society, but the 
development of modern ontological forms, inasmuch as it has taken 
place, has broken down. Entire industries disappear; entire continents 
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are decoupled; and in the Western core countries, too, the growing crisis 
is simply managed without any prospects for change.
Everywhere and on all levels of the exhausted capitalist ontology 
the crisis hits not only capitalist categories, but also the gendered 
relations of dissociation. Gender relations are “out of control”; the 
increasingly fragile masculine identity corresponding to the total and 
one-dimensional subjectivity of abstract labor, law, politics, and so 
on, begins to break apart. It decomposes into a “feral” state (Roswitha 
Scholz), which becomes an integral component of the tendency toward 
barbarism and sets loose a new potential for gratuitous violence against 
women. Barbarism can no longer be held at bay by a simple and already-
failed inherent recognition of women. Rather, it requires an ontological 
break with the totality of the historical field of capitalist modernity, 
a field in which the relations of dissociation are inherently gendered. 
The same ontological crisis, however, paralyzes critique more than 
ever. The paradigms of socialist critique of capitalism (immanent 
to its categories and ontologically positive) are so deeply rooted in 
asynchrony that they seem unable to surpass a general paralysis of 
thought. The ghostly reiteration of such forms of thought remains 
unsuccessful, since they are unable to reach the necessary complexity 
of categorical critique to respond to the context of the ontological 
break. In a way, liberalism, conservatism, and classical Marxism have 
all together become reactionary. The ideologies of modernization 
decompose and mingle. Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment 
have become identical. Today there are antisemitic communists and 
racist liberals, conservative Enlightenment thinkers, radical pro-
market socialists, and sexist and misogynist utopians. Recent social 
movements have up until now proven to be impotent in the face of the 
problems of ontological critique and negative contemporaneity. Despite 
the enormous diversity of inherited conditions, these problems can 
be formulated and resolved only in common, as those of a planetary 
society. 
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Marxism and the Critique of Value aims to complete 
the critique of the value-form that was initiated by 
Marx. While Marx’s “esoteric” critique of value has 
been rediscovered from time to time by post-Marxists 
who know they’ve found something interesting but 
don’t quite know which end is the handle, Anglophone 
Marxism has tended to bury this esoteric critique 
beneath a more redistributionist understanding of 
Marx. The essays in this volume attempt to think the 
critique of value through to the end, and to draw out 
its implications for the current economic crisis; for 
violence, Islamism, gender relations, masculinity, and 
the concept of class; for revolutionary practice and 
agency; for the role of the state and the future of the 
commons; for the concepts that come down to us 
from Enlightenment thought: indeed, for the manifold 
phenomena that characterize contemporary society 
under a capitalism in crisis.
